



Photo: Royal Yugoslav Government

Before the War

COLONEL MIHAILOVICH
MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN PRAGUE

GENERAL MIHAILOVICH
///
THE WORLD'S VERDICT

A SELECTION OF ARTICLES
ON THE FIRST RESISTANCE LEADER IN EUROPE
PUBLISHED IN THE WORLD PRESS

With an Introduction by
the General's Friends

and a Foreword by F. A. VOIGT

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DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH

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"Twas on Kossovo's plain ?
 Ah, no ! In Belgrade city,
 Malice unleashed,
 Afraid of truth, devoid of pity,
 Hounded the patriot to be slain.

O, Peoples, listen to his parting word :
 " The gale of the world has carried me."
 In silence let that forest voice be heard,
 And sense the storm that broke that noble tree.

M. C. THOMSON.

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FOREWORD

THE disloyal will always hate the loyal. Drazha Mihailovich was arrested, tried, found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed for the crime of loyalty, as were so many of his faithful companions and followers :

Damnatos fidei crimine, gravissimo inter desciscentis.

He was the victim of an international conspiracy. Some of the conspirators, it is true, were not men of ill-will. But either they were ill-informed by unworthy counsellors (as events have shown), or they were of narrow or confused understanding—men such as are easily misled by those of stronger and evil purpose.

At the heart of the conspiracy there was a malignant hatred—hatred of all the Western Powers fought for in the First and Second World Wars, hatred of honour, truth, freedom, and, therefore, of loyalty.

When disloyalty prevailed and immediately seized its most illustrious enemy, Drazha Mihailovich, he may well have said :

“ For peace I had great bitterness.”

But he could also have said—and perhaps he did say :

“ There is no peace unto the wicked.”

And, indeed, for the disloyalists who are, to-day, masters in his country, there is not peace : in their own home they are afraid, and they go begging for bread at strangers' doors.

For years they laboured to destroy Drazha Mihailovich by false rumour, false report, false insinuation, and, finally, by a mountain of falsehood unadulterated by one word of truth.

The mountain fell and he was killed by the fall. But even as it fell, it was exposed to the world as nothing but a vast heap of filth, dust, decay, and rubbish that stank, and blinded, and appalled.

The integrity of Mihailovich became the more evident by contrast with the perfidy of his enemies.

What men of good will and of reasonable knowledge and understanding, do not know, to-day, that General Mihailovich was right and that the most formidable of his enemies, Marshal

Tito, was wrong, that Mihailovich tried to save his people and Tito to destroy them.

And the time is approaching when Mihailovich will from his grave cry out to the enemy and destroyer :

“ Behold, thou art taken in thy mischief,
because thou art a bloody man.”

The following pages are made up of tributes to General Mihailovich that were written at a time when he was hardest beset by his enemies,—tributes that make up as it were, a frail monument to his loyalty and his greatness, a monument that has a provisional character as it were, during the time that must pass until a national monument is erected to General Mihailovich in Belgrade, a monument erected by the Serbian nation. The words :

Sans peur et sans reproche

would be a fitting tribute to his memory.

F. A. VOIGT.

INTRODUCTION

DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH was born in 1893 in the small town of Ivanyitza near Chachak, where his father was a schoolmaster. In 1910 Mihailovich entered the Military Academy, but his studies were interrupted in 1912 when he took part in the Serbo-Turkish War as a Cadet-Corporal. Twice decorated for acts of bravery, he was promoted to Cadet-Sergeant and later to Second-Lieutenant in the Serbo-Bulgarian War, and participated in all operations.

When the First World War broke out in 1914, Mihailovich served with his regiment and was decorated several times. He particularly distinguished himself in an action in September, 1918 near Shtip and was promoted to First-Lieutenant and decorated with the White Eagle.

After the armistice, Mihailovich resumed his military studies. In 1929 he took a six months' course in the French Army. Promoted to Staff Officer, then professor of tactics at the Higher College of the Military Academy, he was appointed Military Attaché first in Sofia and subsequently in Prague.

On the eve of the present war, Mihailovich submitted a report to the Yugoslav General Staff in which he forecast almost everything that took place in April, 1941. He was of the opinion that the idea of defending practically indefensible Northern frontiers should be abandoned and proposed concentrating all forces in mountainous regions where the overwhelming superiority of the German tanks would be ineffectual. He wrote a book on guerilla warfare which secured him a considerable following.

At the time that war broke out Colonel Mihailovich was Chief of Staff of a motorised division in Doboy, a small town in Bosnia. When capitulation was ordered by General Simovich without the knowledge of the Yugoslav Government, he refused to accept it and resolved to try to break through with chosen troops in the direction of Eastern Bosnia and Serbia, where he hoped to find an established front, and to join up with the regular army. On the way there he and his men were attacked by strong German formations, which, after fierce fighting,

routed the troops; the commander of the small tank formation was taken prisoner, while Mihailovich was forced to withdraw into the hills.

Asked whether he had heard anything about the capitulation, Mihailovich answered:

“Capitulation? I do not know what capitulation is. I have served in the army for many years, but I have never heard this word.”*

Colonel Mihailovich arrived at Ravna Gora on May 8th, 1941, and there the first guerilla force was organised, not only the first in Yugoslavia, but the first in Europe; and for the first time on record in the countries of enslaved Europe a new way of opposing the conqueror was brought into effect.

Mihailovich was appointed Major-General on December 9th, 1941; Minister of War on January 11th, 1942; and Lieutenant-General on January 19th, 1942. Finally on June 17th, 1942 he was appointed General and Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

Germany became alarmed. General Dankelmann, Military Governor of Serbia, asked for reinforcements; but the German Army was too deeply involved in Russia, and it was impossible to deplete the Russian front. The German General attempted to arrange an armistice with Mihailovich, but the latter laid down certain conditions. He agreed to receive the German envoys, nevertheless his terms proved unacceptable to the Germans.

“I demand,” he said, “that the German troops evacuate my country and then peace will be restored. As long as a single enemy soldier remains on our soil we shall continue to fight.”†

Throughout Yugoslavia Mihailovich and his men were concealed everywhere: in the hollow recesses of the plains of the Srem and Bachka regions, in the mountains of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, amid the granite boulders of Montenegro; some were found scattered in villages which had been razed to the ground; others lurked behind the rocks of the

**We were There to Escape*, by George Mikes. Nicholson & Watson. London, 1945.

†*The Struggle of the Serbs*, by K. St. Pavlowitch. The Standard Art Book Co. Ltd., London, 1943.

Southern Adriatic coast; while sometimes they lived underground, hidden in secret munition dumps and caves. They lay in ambush in the ruins of bombed houses from which they would suddenly dart out and wreak vengeance on the enemy, whether German, Bulgar, Hungarian, Italian or Albanian who all collaborated in the occupation of Yugoslavia. Mihailovich's men hovered like vultures over enemy camps ever ready to pounce upon their prey.

Whereas the Germans succeeded in recruiting legionaries and volunteers for service with the *Wehrmacht* amongst almost every conquered and satellite people in the world, yet the Serbs and the Poles never contributed a single military unit in support of the enemy.

The Germans would no longer tolerate this kind of resistance. They sent their well-known *Strafexpeditionen*, and the fight began again. The reprisals were appalling. They will remain for all time a symbol of German barbarism, for the Germans killed for the sake of killing.

On January 19th, 1943, a new proclamation from General Bader the Commander of the German Forces, was issued against General Mihailovich.

“A group of rebels, under the leadership of the former Colonel Drazha Mihailovich, is continuing to fight,” said General Bader. “These rebels give themselves out to be the regular Yugoslav Army and they are endeavouring to prolong the war, which was brought to a conclusion by the armistice that has been duly signed. . . .”

Warfare went on unabated and General Mihailovich sent the following message to General Bader:

“A year and half has elapsed since I undertook this life-and-death struggle to exterminate the invaders on Yugoslav soil. . . . Our fighting spirit is based on our traditional love of liberty and on our unflinching faith in the victory of our Allies. . . . For every German soldier killed or missing, you ordered the shooting of 50 to 100 innocent and defenceless Serbian people. I wish to draw attention to the fact that the day of judgment is not far off. I warn you that if you continue to use savage reprisals I will use the same measures against German soldiers. . . .”

On July 20th, 1943, the Axis-controlled Press published a

proclamation offering a reward of 100,000 gold marks for the capture of Mihailovich, dead or alive. His men were being killed, seized or arrested. His followers were being questioned, tortured and imprisoned; they were also being sent to work in the mines. In spite of the extremely precarious situation, in spite of German reprisals, in spite of lack of arms and ammunition, General Mihailovich continued to exert his organized military resistance.

For military intervention supporting the Allied cause, especially at the most critical moment when Rommel's *Afrika-korps* stood before El-Alamein, General Mihailovich received congratulations and thanks from the Allied Commanders. General Eisenhower, General Auchinleck, Air-Marshal Tedder, Admiral Harwood and General de Gaulle emphasized the importance of his help.

Once again the Yugoslav David defied a Goliath; and this time successfully. We owe that military success to the Yugoslav people and their leader, Mihailovich.

After the Teheran Conference, General Mihailovich was sacrificed for reasons of high political expediency. In the Autumn of 1944, he was abandoned by the Great Allies and as his attempts at co-operation with the advancing Red Army had been rejected, General Mihailovich demobilized the greater part of his forces.

In September, 1944, when his position was becoming precarious, the Americans offered to get him out of the country. General Mihailovich replied:

"I must stay with my people. My strength is in the people."

And he stayed with his people.

The Red Army entered Belgrade on October 20th, 1944, to enthrone Tito, a Russian emissary, against the will of the great majority of the Yugoslav people. General Mihailovich remained with his people who guarded him and provided for his needs.

After five long years spent in the mountains the state of General Mihailovich's health caused anxiety to those around him. He was begged to leave the country for a while. He categorically refused to consider taking such a step, and, in a letter—the last one written by him—he says:

"Under no conceivable circumstances will I leave my country and my people. . . . The Communists are devoting all their efforts to capture me. . . . On several occasions I have been in desperate straits. . . . You know my strategic purpose—to maintain myself at all costs for the great task which lies ahead. It may be that I shall fall in our sacred cause. But you all know well that this would not mean that the righteous cause for which our nation is fighting would fall with me. . . ."*

General Mihailovich fell seventeen months after the so-called "liberation" of Yugoslavia. Reports from Belgrade on March 24th, 1946, announced his capture under puzzling circumstances on March 13th, 1946. His trial before a Communist military court began on June 10th, 1946. He was "sentenced" to death on July 15th, 1946, and murdered on July 17th, 1946.

General Mihailovich is no more. He has departed this world convinced that he was abandoned by the Allies. The voices that were raised abroad in his defence were not allowed to reach him and he died without the satisfaction of knowing that in the opinion of many he died an innocent man and a great soldier.

General Mihailovich is no more, but the legends of his heroic deeds are becoming more and more popular and they live in the hearts of the people.

General Mihailovich is no more. He has departed this world. Those who murdered him have not only perpetrated a crime, they have also committed a grave mistake, for democratic public opinion is well aware of General Mihailovich's merits.

General Mihailovich is no more. The last words of this great patriot were concise and poignant. He said:

"I strove for much, I undertook much, but the gales of the world have carried away both me and my work."

* * *

**Ally Betrayed*, by David Martin. Prentice Hall, Inc. New York, 1946.

On June 3rd, 1946, the following letter was published in *The Times* :

Sir,

We desire to express no opinion as to General Mihailovich's guilt or innocence of collaboration or other crimes mentioned, but believing, as we do, that a system of justice that refuses to consider a man guilty until he be proved so is one of the most precious of human rights, we venture to press most earnestly that he be given a fair trial and that the depositions, made by British officers who served with him, and which we understand have been forwarded by His Majesty's Government, will be given full consideration at the trial.

We are yours truly,

Bernard, Cardinal Griffin.

George Cicestr.

M. E. Aubrey, Secretary Baptist Union.

Birdwood, F. M.

Caldecote.

Lindsay.

Arthur Longmore, Air Chief Marshal.

John McKenzie, Moderator, Church of Scotland.

Milne, F. M.

Gilbert Murray.

Rebecca West.

In a letter published in *Reynolds News* on May 19th, 1946, Mr Churchill said amongst other things that he has

"no sympathy with the Communists and crypto-Communists in this country who are endeavouring to deny General Mihailovich a fair trial. He it was who took the lead in making the revolution in Yugoslavia which played a part delaying the German attack on Russia by several weeks."

Many others in this country and abroad have raised their voices asking for a fair trial. In the United States a *Committee for a Fair Trial for Drazha Mihailovich* was formed. But all this was in vain. General Mihailovich was condemned even before the opening of the trial, even before he was captured.

On May 10th, 1945, ten months before the capture of General Mihailovich, Tito's Foreign Secretary said at San Francisco that "he will be tried for collaboration and shot as a traitor."

On April 5th, 1946, two months before the opening of the trial, Tito's present Foreign Secretary, informed the United States Ambassador in Belgrade that

"the crimes of the traitor Drazha Mihailovich against the people of Yugoslavia are far too great and horrible that discussion could or should be allowed as to whether he is guilty or not."

Whilst the case was still *sub judice*, the Yugoslav Government, through their embassies, circulated an *ex parte* indictment, entitled "*The Treason of Mihailovich*."*

On July 8th, 1946, seven days before the passing of the sentence, Tito himself, considering that Mihailovich was guilty and that he would be condemned, in a speech made before the people at Uzhitzé said :

"You, in this historical country, have seen the first signs of treason committed by certain military formations under the command of Drazha Mihailovich. This treason did not start at Ravna Gora or somewhere else in Yugoslavia. It started in London, where the Royal Government took refuge."

On July 14th, 1946, on the eve of the passing of the sentence, Tito, in a speech made before the people at Tzetyiné said that

"Drazha became intimate with Pavelich, the executioner of the Serbs, and with Stepinatz, the head of the Catholic Church of Croatia. He was a spy even before the war,"

and he continued attacking Mihailovich's Counsel for

"defending Mihailovich . . . The Counsel had defended Mihailovich in taking an attitude contrary to the interest of the people, as an enemy of them. . . . This is the ideology not only of Counsel Yoksimovich alone, but also of others like him who hide under the mask of Democracy. . . ."

Many people believe that the Court which tried General Mihailovich was an independent judicial body, and as such had passed sentence impartially. But Georgevich, President of the Belgrade Military Court and his two associates, all three young officers in the Partisan Army, took part personally in the open warfare waged against Mihailovich and are members of the Communist Party.

**The Treason of Mihailovich*. The Yugoslav Embassy Information Office, London, 1946.

They judged without the law on legal procedure and on the strength of retroactive laws.

The indictment was based exclusively on the documentary material compiled by a State Commission over which Dr Nedelykovich, President of Tito's War Crimes Commission, presided. In this indictment special stress seems to have been laid on the execution of certain individuals carried out on suggestions from General Mihailovich, the same being confirmed by the Royal Government through the B.B.C. At a conference with foreign Press representatives held in Belgrade on October 1st, 1945, Dr Nedelykovich stated that

"according to data collected in places where crimes were committed the number of those slaughtered in this way exceeds 10,000. . . . No Germans or collaborationists had ever been executed."

Dr Nedelykovich also asserted that all those who were killed in this way were members of Tito's guerilla bands. The truth, however, is quite different. The persons whose names were given through the B.B.C. were not meant to be killed. It was only meant as a warning and that their misdeeds were well-known. The announcements were made over the B.B.C. in accordance with suggestions received from General Mihailovich and transmitted through the British authorities to the Royal Yugoslav Government. Altogether 76 names were read over the B.B.C. They were only the names of those Quisling elements who were notorious for their services to the enemy. The list did not contain a single member of Tito's guerilla bands. If the President of Tito's War Crimes Commission can make such false statements, one can be justified in assuming that many documents compiled by him in which the "guilt" of General Mihailovich is "proved" were also false.

The barristers who were appointed to defend General Mihailovich were given the indictment only a week before the opening of the trial and were unable to study it in detail. All their demands to hear numerous witnesses from abroad and inside the country were refused. The evidence given by British and American officers and sent to Tito's Government was refused to be heard by the Court.

Only two witnesses for the defence were called and they were two, until then, insignificant women, but whose names will live

in the history of the Serbian people. Maria Ognyanov and Vukosava Tukulyatz, when asked what their employment was, both stated that under the present régime they had no right to work. When the judge corrected their references to "General" Mihailovich with: "You mean the accused Mihailovich," they replied with dignity: "Accused by the Communist Party, not by us!" After being cautioned that they might be charged with contempt of Court, they bowed before General Mihailovich and marched out defiantly with their heads high.

All the other witnesses who were called were witnesses for the prosecution, among them individuals whom General Mihailovich had wanted to arrest for collaboration with the *Gestapo*, as for instance Radosav Jurich who had managed to escape being arrested by joining Tito, or such as Yovan Shkava, who had previously been condemned by Tito's Courts to hard labour and, although now a convict, was called as a witness before the Court.

Another witness, Milenko Yovanovich, stated that Mihailovich's men killed four American airmen who had been forced to land, giving their names. Three days later, the four mentioned airmen sent a telegram to Mihailovich's Counsel in which they stated that

"contrary to the assertions of the witness they are not missing but alive in the United States and anxious to go to Belgrade to give evidence in favour of Mihailovich to whom they owe their lives."

Such a procedure on the part of Tito's Courts of Justice induced Cardinal Griffin, when he spoke in London at the Annual Meeting of the *Society of Our Lady of Good Council* on July 23rd, 1946, to say:

"The recent trial of General Mihailovich comes as a rude shock to the people of this country. The General was considered a guilty man. The judge became the prosecutor, and the defendant was denied his just defence. The behaviour of the people in the Courts was reminiscent of the crowd of Roman pagans in the Colosseum cheering the murder of an early Christian."

* * *

When General Mihailovich first organised his resistance against the invader in the Summer of 1941, he carried out extensive operations. His task was complicated from the first by the necessity of defending the Serbs against the Ustashis who were attempting to massacre them out of all existence.

The appalling reprisals carried out by the Germans together with the small likelihood of receiving much help from abroad, obliged the General to alter his tactics. He adopted guerilla tactics. His troops were active everywhere carrying out sabotage and well-thought out operations. At the same time he set out a widespread and powerful military organization in the greater part of the country to prepare for large scale operations when the Allies should land.

General Mihailovich undertook major operations at four periods :—

1.—At the time when the Germans broke off their friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. towards the end of June 1941, and as Russia was therefore obliged to enter the war on the side of the Allies, he organized uprisings in Serbia and Montenegro.

2.—When the British were in a very precarious position in North Africa in August-December, 1942, units of the Yugoslav Army under the command of General Mihailovich attacked various sections of the all-important Belgrade-Salonika railway line. The damage they inflicted on enemy transports at this most crucial moment was explicitly recognised by Mr Eden and, as already mentioned, by General Eisenhower, General Auchinleck, Air-Marshal Tedder and Admiral Harwood, in the messages of thanks which they sent to General Mihailovich, congratulating him and his army on the services they had rendered to the Allied troops in Africa and to the Russians in the East.

3.—After the collapse of Italy, in September 1943, General Mihailovich once more undertook a series of extensive operations against the enemy.

4.—When, at the "request" of Tito, the Red Army crossed the Yugoslav frontier in September, 1944, General Mihailovich ordered general mobilization of all his forces, which thereupon liberated a large part of Serbia and whenever possible he co-operated with the Red Army.

During the whole of this period, from 1941 to the end of

1944, General Mihailovich's forces were continually carrying out sabotage activities, wrecking enemy trains, attacking important enemy positions and lines of communication, and rescuing Allied airmen who had been forced down over Yugoslavia.

Apart from guerilla warfare against the enemy, General Mihailovich's troops protected the civilian population from German reprisals and requisitions and also from the terroristic methods of the Partisans.

The *Central National Committee*, on which Croats and Slovenes were represented as well as Serbs, has repeatedly made it clear in messages endorsed by General Mihailovich that its movement was purely democratic and aimed only at the liberation of Yugoslavia by such methods which did not involve the physical annihilation of its population nor their enslavement by a dictatorship, whatever its colour or foreign sympathies. The *National Assembly* held in the mountains in January, 1944 once again gave clear and unequivocal expression to these aims, though their resolutions were given little publicity in the outside world.

In view of the fact that General Mihailovich was "captured" "tried," "sentenced" and executed for his "collaboration with the enemy" we feel it necessary to place on record a few typical examples of the manner in which, both personally and in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, he made significant and repeated contributions to the Allied cause.

All the following actions were carried out by General Mihailovich's forces of which many were described in a deposition of five British officers :—

May 21st, 1941.—On the road between Gornji Milanovatz and Kraguyevatz, in the village of Lyulyatzi, fighting against a German motorised force.

July 13th, 1941.—Revolt flared up in Montenegro. The rebels assaulted Italian garrisons taking town after town. A few days later the Italians held only Tzetinyé, Podgoritza and Nikshich.

July 29th, 1941.—Revolt flared up in Lika and Bosanska Krayina. The rebels attacked Ustashi garrisons taking Srb, Drvar, Mrkonyich Grad and Grahovo.

September, 1941.—Valyevo besieged, while the Gornji Milanovatz-Kraguyevatz road was closed.

September 19th, 1941.—The Germans fled from Uzhitzé in a panic. First Pozhega near Uzhitzé fell, then Chachak.

September 21st, 1941.—The town of Kraguyevatz stormed and the Germans forced into one sector of the town, but the Germans received reinforcements and Mihailovich was obliged to retire.

September 30th, 1941.—Gornyi Milanovatz captured and first German prisoners taken in the Drina valley. Loznitza attacked and captured, then Kovilyacha; several hundred German prisoners captured and the town of Shabatatz approached. In Eastern Serbia, apart from the railway lines which the Germans held, Mihailovich had control of the whole area.

October, 1941.—Concentrated attack on the town of Shabatatz and half of the town taken, but owing to the arrival of German reinforcements, Mihailovich was forced to withdraw again.

January, 1942.—The Germans concentrated all their efforts on the destruction of Mihailovich's Headquarters. With two armoured divisions they completely covered the district of Ravna Gora.

March, 1942.—The German Military Governor of Serbia issued a summons to Mihailovich and his men to surrender within five days, threatening that their families would otherwise be taken as hostages.

May, 1942.—On the Goliya Mountains, the Germans tried to get an infernal machine into Mihailovich's Headquarters made up in the form of a packet "sent by British transport."

August, 1942.—Fighting on the Mali Yastrebats ridge against the Bulgars who were brought in to reinforce the German occupying forces.

September 9th, 1942.—Mihailovich ordered civil disobedience and, at the request of the British Military Command, gave instructions for sabotage throughout the country.

October, 1942.—During the decisive battles of El-Alamein and Stalingrad, saboteurs and diversionary units were at work destroying bridges, blowing up railways and immobilising locomotives. The Germans carried out mass arrests of citizens in Belgrade, Western and Eastern Serbia, as well as the capturing of peasants and the burning of villages.

The Germans and the Bulgars undertook a punitive expedition which culminated in the burning of the village of Kriva Reka. Seventy houses were burned and over 600 people massacred.

November 21st, 1942.—Five bridges on the line between Kraljevo and Krushevatz destroyed.

November 23rd, 1942.—On the Kraljevo-Rashka line one bridge completely destroyed and two damaged in two places.

November 27th, 1942.—The line Kraljevo-Rashka and Kraljevo-Stalach again broken at a number of points.

December, 1942.—At the village of Mrshatz a German train of war equipment and munitions destroyed. Near Pochekovina and Stopanya two railway bridges destroyed. Of the 362 locomotives on the Belgrade-Salonika line, 112 defective owing to sabotage.

December 25th, 1942.—The Germans executed 2,500 adherents of Mihailovich at Yayintzé near Belgrade.

January, 1943.—Fighting against the Germans at Zayechar.

January 19th, 1943.—The German Military Governor of Serbia issued a new summons to Mihailovich. The Serbs exposed to the severest oppression by the Germans.

January 31st, 1943.—The railway track Ugrinovtzi-Kriva Reka blown up and the telephone lines cut.

February, 1943.—Fighting against the Bulgars at Osnich. The Bulgarian punitive expedition arrested all priests, teachers and more prominent peasants in the district of Bolyevatz.

February 15th, 1943.—Major General Fischer, *Feldkommandant* at Vrnyachka Banya announced that 25 followers of Mihailovich were shot at Kraguyevatz.

March, 1943.—Fighting against the Germans at Sikol. Reprisals against the civilian population.

May, 1943.—Fighting against the Germans on the Deli Yovan range. In the end the Germans executed all Yugoslav prisoners and burnt the village of Glogovitza. Fighting against the Bulgars at the village of Mali Izvor. The Bulgars took reprisals by making wholesale arrests and killing all the shepherds they came across.

June 8th, 1943.—A mixed German-Bulgarian force was engaged near Zhagubitza, fatal casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken.

July 13th, 1943.—Axis troops were successfully engaged in order to protect the supply-dropping area at Pranyané, near Chachak, and thus enabling urgently needed means of communication and equipment for the British Military Mission to be dropped.

July 30th, 1943.—A strong Bulgarian force engaged at Muchanyé and severe casualties inflicted.

August, 1943.—Axis forces attacked on several occasions in the Uzhitzé-Chachak-Ivanyitza area.

August 4th, 1943.—Strong German and Bulgarian forces conducted mopping up operations in the district of Takovo in pursuit of Mihailovich's units. The Klyuch brigade attacked Germans near the village of Moracha.

August 6th, 1943.—In the district of Pozhega, Germans and Bulgars pursued Mihailovich's units.

August 9th, 1943.—Fighting against the Germans following attack on Chayniché.

August 10th, 1943.—The town of Focha captured.

August 14th, 1943.—Attacks in the districts of Krushevatz, Ariljyé, Pozhega, Chachak, Homolyé, Toplitza, Kapaonik and Dragachevo. Sabotage on Chachak-Pozhega line. Chayniché taken from the Germans.

August 19th, 1943.—Focha-Gorazhdé road and railway line wrecked.

August 20th, 1943.—Action against Germans in the district of Dragachevo.

August 27th, 1943.—Action against German, Italian and Bulgarian forces in the *défilé* near the town of Syenitza.

September 1st, 1943.—Action at Zhirovski Vrh between the Goretz detachment and the Germans, and near the river Idriyitza between the Primorski detachment and the Italians. A detachment accompanying a British delegate on his way to Krayina fought off attack by Germans near Zayechar. Fighting against Germans on Chemerno mountains and against Bulgars in the district of Trstenik.

September 3rd, 1943.—Near the village of Trnovitzé, on the left bank of the river Drina, German forces routed. Much enemy war material captured.

September 6th, 1943.—Axis troops engaged at Chemernitza, casualties inflicted and prisoners taken.

September 8th, 1943.—In the village of Stragari fighting against Germans.

September 10th, 1943.—In Montenegro, Herzegovina, Sandzhak and Eastern Bosnia, general mobilization ordered by Mihailovich following Italy's capitulation. At Novi Pazar fighting against Germans, and Albanians wearing German uniforms.

September 11th, 1943.—A German column advancing from Chaplyina towards Metkovich attacked. All communications between Trebinyé and Bilyeché destroyed. Fighting against Germans at Vilyusha near Trebinyé. A detachment of Mihailovich's forces, detailed to assist British officers in securing implementation of the Italian armistice inasmuch as it affected local Italian forces in the Lim valley, attacked and captured the town of Priyepolyé after its seizure by a strong German force. Heavy casualties inflicted on the Germans and a considerable quantity of booty, including motor transport, captured. Without the successful conclusion of this action the British officers could not have carried out their orders.

September 13th, 1943.—Near Priboy communications cut and railway line destroyed. The towns of Gatzko and Bilyeché captured.

September 14th, 1943.—Fighting against Germans on Kom mountains North-west of Knin.

September 15th, 1943.—The town of Biyelo Polyé captured. Fighting against the Germans on front from Dubrovnik to Kotor.

September 16th, 1943.—The towns of Nova Varosh, Trebinyé, Grahovo and Kalinovnik taken. The Medyedya-Rudo line wrecked and one train destroyed. German garrisons in that area attacked.

September 17th, 1943.—400 Germans taken prisoner during fighting in the vicinity of Boka Kotorska. A train carrying German troops wrecked.

September 29th, 1943.—On General Mihailovich's personal orders and with the assistance of his Headquarter troops, four important railway bridges destroyed and track torn up between Mokra Gora and Vishegrad on the Sarayevo-Uzhitzé line. Bulgar troops who attempted to intervene repulsed with casualties.

October 8th, 1943.—The town of Vishegrad was attacked and captured from a strong garrison of German and Ustashi troops on whom heavy casualties were inflicted.

October 11th, 1943.—A German tug and barges on the Danube at Bolyetin attacked and damaged.

November 11th, 1943.—In Slovenia one of Mihailovich's units, about 1,500 strong, fought a successful action in a mountainous district. In the village of Klochevtzi a short action against strong patrol of General Vlasov's soldiers.

November 12th, 1943.—In the district of Ram a formation of 2,000 Bulgars were attacked simultaneously at three points. Sustaining considerable losses they were forced to withdraw. They burnt peasant houses and killed innocent people on their way. In the village of Lyubich 30 German soldiers were attacked. South of Leskovatz an enemy train carrying war material to Skoplyé destroyed. Fighting against the Germans in Eastern Sandzhak. War booty captured and 21 Germans killed.

November 16th, 1943.—A group of 150 Bulgars were attacked near the villages of Balta, Barilovatz and Ilova. The Bulgarian garrison in Pozhega was surprised, disarmed and captured. This operation occurred when strong German-Bulgar forces were preparing to break into the Sandzhak.

November 17th, 1943.—A German truck was attacked near the village of Bratulyevtzi, not far from Zayechar. A passenger train was stopped near the Bor mines, 16 Germans and 5 Bulgars were disarmed and captured. The entire district of Bolyevatz cleared of the invader. A bridge near the village of Plavno on the Knin-Grachatz line destroyed. Rails on the line from the village of Pajen to Knin (20 miles in length) torn up, taken away and buried in the forest.

November 18th, 1943.—Fighting against the Germans in the area of Kossovo, Vrlyik, Kiyev and Ston.

December 3rd, 1943.—A strong German force was surprised in the village of Dubatz and completely broken up. 27 Germans killed. The Germans burned 39 houses in the villages of Dubatz, Brezovitzza and Vlastelitzza. They took away all captured males over 15 years of age. A German detachment of 35 S.S. men was attacked on the Bolyevatz-Zayechar road. The Germans surrendered. Military booty

captured. A specially trained unit of the first Shumadiya corps successfully crossed the Danube between Grotzka and Smederevo, helped by local organisation; they attacked a German column of 38 loaded trucks, destroying all vehicles and killing all attendants. The railroad station at Kisatz on the Novi Sad-Subotitzza line burned down, hemp mills in Kula, Odzhatzi, Palanka, Stari Vrbas and Vepkovatz destroyed.

December 6th, 1943.—Fighting against superior German-Bulgar forces at Svinjarevo and Miriyevo cost the enemy 23 dead and 18 wounded. In a sudden attack on the Belgrade-Chachak express near Brdyani, 47 German and Bulgarian officers and men were disarmed and much war material captured.

January 5th, 1944.—British and American military personnel were escorted from Valjevo to a point South of Dubrovnik and their embarkation for Italy successfully covered. Two actions were fought against Axis troops.

August, 1944.—Although Mihailovich was abandoned by all the Allies, he made every effort to rescue, protect and return 500 Allied airmen to Allied territory, including American, British, French and Russian, who were forced to bale out of their burning or damaged planes after bombing expeditions over Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania.

September 1st, 1944.—General Mihailovich issued a proclamation for general mobilization.

September 2nd, 1944.—The line from Belgrade to Uzhitzé destroyed, a German armoured train blown up, the German garrison at Kadina Luka was attacked and disarmed, several hundred Germans taken prisoner. All the towns in Krayina, except Negotin, liberated. German garrisons at Petrovatz, Zhagubitzza, Kuchevo and Kostolatz were defeated and the towns liberated while about 120 lorries captured and about 1,000 Germans taken prisoner.

October 3rd, 1944.—The town of Lazarevatz captured after three hours' sharp fighting.

October, 1944.—A unit of 5,000 Mihailovich's soldiers attacked the Germans at Krushevatz, destroyed three German military transport trains near the village of Stopanya, freed Krushevatz, took a large number of Germans and one General

prisoner. The commander of the unit then marched to meet the Russian advancing troops, and with them entered the liberated town of Krushevatz. While the most enthusiastic demonstrations were going on, the Russians ordered the Chetniks to lay down their arms. The railway line between Kraljevo and Chachak was destroyed, control of all that district gained, the German forces in Chachak were attacked. While the fighting, which lasted for several days against heavy German armoured forces was still in progress, the first Russian spearhead arrived, and in a combined attack the town was freed and the Germans taken prisoner. Not long afterwards the Russians also disarmed the Chetniks here.

This is the picture and the true story of Mihailovich's "collaboration" with the Germans and their satellites. From May, 1941 to October, 1944, he was, as stated courageously by his Counsel, "the master and Mountain King of Serbia." During all the war, he, his soldiers and his followers fought the Germans, the Italians, the Bulgars, the Magyars, the Albanians, the Ustashis and collaborated with them but only "through the medium of our guns," as stated ultimately by a youth sentenced in Belgrade for having fought under the command of this great patriot.

* * *

Realizing his difficult position, General Mihailovich made the following statement in August, 1944 :

"More than three years ago I took up arms to fight for Democracy against Dictatorship in the form of Nazism and Fascism. In fighting for this cause there were ten occasions on which I almost lost my life. If I must die in fighting against a new form of Dictatorship, I shall die bitter because I have been deserted by those who profess to believe in Democracy, but satisfied that I myself have fought bravely and honestly and have refused to compromise my cause."*

The aim of this book is to give our readers a picture of the case of General Mihailovich as seen in the light of the international Press ; a true picture of the case of a brave man who fought for Democracy against Dictatorship and who, after Democracy had won, was murdered by the Dictatorship which

**Ally Betrayed*, by David Martin. Prentice Hall, Inc. New York, 1946.

had been set up in his country by the very Democracies, whose Ally he was.

Let us hope that his sacrifice will not be in vain.

* * *

Before closing we would like to convey our very warm thanks to all those who have so willingly given us their unselfish aid in the publishing of this book.

Our gratitude is due :—

To the numerous friends residing in all parts of the world for their assistance in collecting these articles.

To the Authors, to the Editors of newspapers and periodicals and to the owners of photograph copyrights, who have allowed us to make use of the articles and illustrations included in this book.

To the many friends who so readily came to our assistance with the necessary translations, and

To Messrs John Bellows Limited, Printers and Publishers, for their personal interest, unflinching courtesy and very excellent work.

We would like very specially to thank Mr F. A. Voigt for having so kindly consented to write the Foreword to this book. He has thereby once again clearly manifested his great sympathy for Yugoslavia and in particular for General Mihailovich, whom he has defended from first to last with undaunted courage.

A GROUP OF FRIENDS OF GENERAL MIHAILOVICH

London, January, 1947.

PART I

The American Press

*Great news! Early this morning the Yugoslav nation
found its soul!*
March 27th, 1941

WINSTON CHURCHILL

*Reprinted from an article by Constantine Brown in "The Evening Star"
(Washington) of March 26th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.*

THIS CHANGING WORLD

DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH, who once was described in America and Britain as the "Balkan Eagle," the "Robin Hood of Serbia" and the "White Hope" of the Allies in the Balkans, is now officially reported to be in a jail somewhere in Yugoslavia awaiting a perfunctory trial before being executed by the Government of his erstwhile rival, Marshal Tito.

Those who know the people in that section of the Balkans say that the lore-loving Serbs unquestionably will make him into a legendary hero—just as the American and British Governments described him before political expediency compelled them to drop him after the Teheran Conference.

Mihailovich was an obscure officer in the Royal Yugoslav Army until the forces of King Peter were crushed by the Nazi's armour and air force. He was known to a few professionals as an expert in guerilla warfare which had formed the major part of his study while on the Yugoslav General Staff.

He emerged from obscurity and became an international hero after King Peter, his Government and all the "rank" of Yugoslavia departed for Cairo in the summer of 1941 and let him resist the Germans with a handful of poorly equipped but fanatical Chetniks. Between the summer of 1941 and the beginning of 1944 he gained wide publicity and honours were heaped on him by his own and the Allied Governments. The United States had promised his Government at least one flight of bombers, if it decided to resist the Germans. The bombers were never sent to Mihailovich's hide-out, for reasons which are still kept among the war's top secrets.

The British were liberal in their praise of the Yugoslav leader, but less in so far as the sending of war materials or medical supplies were concerned. King Peter promoted him from the rank of Colonel to full General and appointed Mihailovich Minister of Army, Navy and Air Force which existed only on paper.

In the fall of 1942, General Eisenhower, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in the Mediterranean, sent the Yugoslav "hero" a telegram of congratulations on his valiant resistance, and a few months later General de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French, awarded the *Croix de Guerre* to this "legendary hero who has never ceased to fight against the common enemy."

At the time Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel was within 30 miles of Alexandria. Britain's General Auchinleck, Air Marshal Tedder and Admiral Cunningham sent their warmest thanks and congratulations to Mihailovich for having slowed down the flow of Nazi supplies to North Africa with his guerilla tactics. As an indication of deep appreciation for his activities, King George presented Mihailovich with a "purse" of \$10,000 in gold.

But after the Teheran Conference of the Big Three, Mihailovich's star began to wane. Few persons knew at the time that the new man of the Balkans and Eastern Europe had been blue-printed at Teheran. Greece was marked as being in the British zone of influence and so was Yugoslavia. On Premier Stalin's advice, Winston Churchill decided to change the leadership of Yugoslavia and accepted the services of the little known Partisan commander Tito. The British Prime Minister knew Tito was a Communist, but he was not concerned over his political allegiance. He trusted his Russian colleague, who promptly undertook to order his henchman to place himself under the British wing.

From that time, Mihailovich and his 70,000 or 80,000 Chetniks were described as collaborationists and "traitors." The trickle of supplies ended. His purchase of war materials from the corrupt Italian generals was described as proof of his collaboration, although it was the British High Command which provided the Chetnik leader with the necessary dollar and pound sterling currency which Mussolini's favourites demanded.

Mihailovich's refusal to undertake an offensive against the Germans when the Allied forces were still far away from Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy was taken as a final demonstration that King Peter's "Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces" had sold out. As a matter of fact, he informed the British that an offensive against the Germans would be hopeless.

The man who went through the whole range of adjectives from "Balkan Eagle" to the "Nazi collaborationist and traitor" is now in the hands of his arch-enemy, the new leader of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito. None of the Governments which only a few years ago heaped praise and honours on him can do anything to save him. The life of a leader, even if he is known to the Governments of the Great Powers to be an honest and upstanding man, is of little value in the face of political expediency.

Reprinted from an article in "The Journal American" (New York) of March 30th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

A SHAMEFUL BETRAYAL

IF the United States Government does less than its utmost to prevent the planned murder of General Drazha Mihailovich by Tito's Communists, it will have committed an act of betrayal that the American people will remember with shame for ever.

General Mihailovich, as War Minister of Yugoslavia, valiantly resisted the advance of the German armies across his country.

When the hopeless fight was lost, he refused to give up but organized the brilliant and tremendously effective Yugoslav Underground Army, which harried the Germans so boldly and effectively that many divisions of Nazi troops were kept from other fronts.

Among the feats for which Americans are and should be most grateful to him was his rescue of some 500 American airmen forced down in Yugoslavia in raids on the Rumanian and Bulgarian oil fields.

So highly did the American Government value the bravery and military effectiveness of Mihailovich's patriot army that American Military Missions were secretly sent into Yugoslavia to co-operate with it.

General Mihailovich was our friend and Ally.

But when Soviet Russia set about infiltrating and undermining Yugoslavia, the United States Government withdrew its support from Mihailovich and gave it to the Communist puppet Tito.

Now Tito's relentless agents have hunted Mihailovich down and Tito's spokesmen have announced before any trial has been held, that he "certainly will be shot."

Mihailovich's only offence is that he resisted Communist Russia in defence of his own country's freedom.

In abandoning him to support the despoilers of his country's freedom, the American Government committed a sufficiently shameful act of betrayal.

If it now permits him to be murdered by his Communist enemies, the shame will be eternal.

Reprinted from the leading article in the "Washington Post" (Washington) of March 30th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

MIHAILOVICH

EARLY this week the Belgrade radio dramatically announced that the Serbian guerilla leader, General Drazha Mihailovich, had been captured after a man-hunt that had been in progress for more than two years. The capture is supposed to have occurred near a place called Vishegrad in the Bosnian mountains, but just how

it was effected is a matter of some mystery. The official story by the Yugoslav Government is that Mihailovich was tracked down to a mountain cave, guarded by less than a dozen followers—all that were left of his famous Chetniks, once said to be more than 100,000.

Nothing further had been heard about Mihailovich or his fate at the hands of his captors. The capture is said to have occurred nearly ten days ago, and it is not at all impossible that Mihailovich may now be dead. Everywhere in the Russian sphere of influence he had been denounced as one of the great war criminals and proscribed. A spokesman of the Tito Government promised that Mihailovich would have a fair trial at the end of which he would certainly be shot, because there was more than enough evidence of his crimes to convict him.

None of the great figures of the war has been the subject of more intense propaganda, adulatory and vindictive, than General Mihailovich. On the one side he has been portrayed as the very incarnation of selfless patriotism, on the other as the archetype of Fascist traitor. Nevertheless, almost nothing is known by Americans about his real activities and motives. It has never been made quite clear why the British Government, whose diplomatic agents certainly had something to do with the decision of the Serbian army leaders to resist the German invasion and with the *coup d'Etat* of 1941, which deposed the Regent Paul, later in the war transferred all its support and assistance from Mihailovich and his Serbian and Bosnian Chetniks to Tito and his Croatian and Slovene Partisans. In New York recently Winston Churchill is reported to have said that it was a matter of favouring the side that was hurting the Germans most. Moreover, he has unmistakable evidence that Mihailovich had collaborated with the Germans. But the nature of this supposed collaboration is not clear, nor is it explained whether the collaboration, occurred before or after the rivalry of Tito and Mihailovich in Yugoslavia, had reached the stage of open civil war.

Thus on the question of whether Mihailovich betrayed the Allies or whether (as his friends insist) the Allies betrayed Mihailovich, it is quite impossible, at this point, to form an unprejudiced judgment. One thing is certain, that the bitterness engendered by this controversy, which has religious as well as political aspects, will not soon subside. And here we have another example of the evil consequences of secret diplomacy and of the use of propaganda as a diplomatic weapon. In the case of Yugoslavia and other places the British and American peoples found themselves committed by their leaders to a policy the implications of which could not be understood and about which, for lack of real information, any intelligent discussion was impossible.

Reprinted from an article by David Martin* in "The New Leader" (Washington) of April 13th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

THE CASE OF DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH

THE Yugoslav Government has captured General Mihailovich, leader of the first guerilla army to take the field against the Nazis. Belgrade reports that he will be "examined" for a period of three months before being brought to trial. In view of evidence already on hand his execution is a foregone conclusion, unless the United States and Britain intervene.

Drazha Mihailovich is a symbol of the tragedy of our times. In the whole of human history no man has been so abused and so calumniated by those whose ally he was. If the calumnies had come only from the Communist press, it would have been a matter neither of great concern nor great importance. The fact is, however, that the Communists were able to enlist the aid of the better part of the democratic press, Tory as well as Liberal, in their campaign against Mihailovich. That they were able to do so is sobering evidence of the power and subtlety of the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

Now that the issue seems to have been decided, it may be revealed that not a single British or American officer attached to Mihailovich believed that he was in cahoots with the Germans. Despite several serious criticisms, all of them reported that the movement had the support of the overwhelming majority of the Serb people and that it warranted continued Allied support. The corollary of this is that a number of British and American officers who had taken their attachment to the Partisan movement with high enthusiasm, found the reality of Partisan democracy so utterly unlike the newspaper myth that they submitted completely condemnatory reports. Several, out of respect for their own consciences, asked to be transferred elsewhere.

How, then, did it come about that the Allies abandoned Mihailovich and threw their weight behind Tito in what was, in effect, a war of extermination against the Chetnik movement?

Churchill is one of the few great men of our time who, having committed a blunder, can admit that he has blundered. Concerning his handling of the Yugoslav situation, Churchill has already informed the Press that he considers it his greatest mistake. Churchill is reported to have said, "I was deceived and badly informed."

Ex-Premier Shubashich and ex-Finance Minister Shutey, without whose assistance it would have been impossible to establish a pro-Tito Government in London, were compelled to resign from Tito's Government and are today living under house arrest in Belgrade. Brigadier Fitzroy MacClean and Major Randolph Churchill, whose glowing

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accounts of Tito played some role in swinging British support behind him, today make no attempt to conceal their hostility to the régime. Vilder, chief broadcaster of the Yugoslav section of the BBC during the pro-Tito period, is living in exile in London and doing his utmost to make amends. Bogdan Raditza, one of the chief pro-Tito publicists in America, is now happy to be living in Italy.

And so on through a very lengthy list. None of these people was Communist. Indeed, on the basis of their pre-war record, few of them would have qualified as fellow-travellers. With a few exceptions, they acted in what they honestly considered to be the best interest of Yugoslavia. They believed that the Partisan movement represented a genuine coalition of national forces; they believed that Mihailovich was a reactionary who was collaborating with the enemy.

That these things were not so, everyone now will admit. The question that remains is: how could people in high places permit themselves to be so deceived?

In the case of the British Foreign Office, there was a marked bias against Mihailovich from the beginning, and it was on the basis of this antipathy that the pro-Tito propaganda took root. For some time after the Ustashi massacres, in which over 500,000 Serbs perished, Serb sentiment was violently anti-Croat and generally in favour of an independent Serbian State. Though Mihailovich, even at his bitterest, never abandoned belief in a united Yugoslavia, several of his most prominent advisers were outspoken pan-Serbs. Having brought the Serbs and the Croats together at the end of the last war, the British Government was not disposed to see this unity disrupted. Considering the Chetnik movement a menace to this unity, they began to cast about for an alternative. They found this alternative in Tito. Tito stood for a federal Yugoslavia. Moreover, he gave assurances that he did not intend to communize the country. The final consideration was that in supporting Tito against Mihailovich the British were removing an important source of friction with the Soviet Union.

Basing themselves on the existing antipathy to Mihailovich, and by employing the services of party members and fellow-travellers in key positions, the sponsors of Tito were able to compel the suppression of news, to obtain official currency for Partisan propaganda, and even to contrive the falsification of British and American military intelligence.

The people who make policy could not have been completely unaware of what was going on. But they were psychologically disposed to receive military intelligence which was in harmony with their policy, by tolerating the suppression of news, and by tolerating the colouring of military intelligence, however, they made it increasingly difficult for themselves to know what was really happening in Yugoslavia.

The exigencies of war made an alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies essential. To maintain this alliance, certain concessions were necessary. It was necessary, among other things, to attempt to enforce some sort of compromise between the Communist and the non-Communist resistance elements in Europe.

But in retrospect one must ask whether, out of deference to the totalitarian sensitiveness of our Communist Allies, it was necessary to accept a virtual *gleichschaltung* of the democratic press so far as the sphere of Soviet activities was concerned.

When Lt.-Colonel William Deakin and Brigadier Fitzroy MacClean came back from Tito's headquarters, bringing with them high eulogies of the Partisan commander, they were permitted to make public statements to the British Press. But when Colonel Bailey, Colonel Hudson, Brigadier Armstrong and the other members of the British Mission to Mihailovich returned to England, they were placed under quarantine. In the United States, Lt.-Colonel Louis Huot and several other officers who were sympathetic to Tito were also given complete freedom of speech. But when Lt.-Colonel Albert Seitz, and Captain Walter Mansfield, who had gone into Yugoslavia to report on Mihailovich, returned to Washington in early 1944, not even members of the House Military Affairs Committee were permitted to see them.

Having committed ourselves to the support of a totalitarian movement, it would almost seem as if we simultaneously accepted the totalitarian thesis that there must be no news but the news emanating from the totalitarian fount.

The one advantage of the present trial is that it will probably bring out far more than the Belgrade prosecutors are counting on. The American officers who have until now remained silent, are beginning to speak. Among the many stories they will have to tell, is the story of what actually happened in Serbia when the Red Army entered.

On September 1st, 1944, Mihailovich issued orders for a general uprising. Before this his troops had already been deployed for attacks on German positions in Central and North-East Serbia. American officers saw with their own eyes how the Partisan army invading Serbia from the West skirted around the German garrisons at Uzhitze and Chachak and made straight for the flank of the Chetnik deployment. They saw how Chetnik villages mobilized to the last man and went into action against the Germans. They saw how the Chetniks collaborated with the Russians at Krushevatz and other points—and then were disarmed by them and handed over to the Partisans.

Former Marine Captain Walter R. Mansfield of New York is another American soldier who should be allowed to testify in defence of Mihailovich. He was parachuted into Yugoslavia in 1943 to report on guerilla warfare. Writing to William Philip Simms, he commented that we are giving Axis war criminals open trials lasting months. We can hardly permit the Communists to railroad an Ally to his death. "I can testify that he never collaborated with the Nazis."

Another story that will come out is about the rescue of the American airmen. Between the night of August 10th and the night of December 27th, 1944, the American Air Rescue Mission attached to Mihailovich's headquarters evacuated to Italy 432 American airmen and some 80 other Allied personnel, including a number of Russians who had been rescued by the Chetniks in various parts of Yugoslavia. These 500

soldiers would make good witnesses for Mihailovich. But will their testimony be admitted in a totalitarian court?

Members of the Air Rescue Mission travelling with Mihailovich in Bosnia during October, November and December, were impressed above all by the reverence which he inspired among the common people. Bosnia had been a battleground in the civil war. But wherever Mihailovich went in Bosnia, the peasants came thronging from miles around to see "*Chicha*" (Uncle). Elderly women knelt and kissed his hands; children brought him eggs and apples; the peasants came with hams and chickens. Two months after the fall of Belgrade, Mihailovich was still mingling freely with the people, attending baptisms and village *kolas*—always completely unguarded. To this day there is not a village in the whole of Serbia in which Marshal Tito would dare to appear without a corps of bodyguards.

The Allied world has a moral obligation in the case of Drazha Mihailovich. If the trial takes place in a Belgrade court, then it can be predicted that, in the manner of all those who come up before Soviet courts, Mihailovich will play his own prosecutor, confess to all the charges against him, abuse himself as a traitor to the fatherland—and be executed.

In view of the services which Mihailovich has rendered to the Allied cause, the American Government could safely request that the Yugoslav Government turn Mihailovich, together with whatever evidence it may have against him, over to an international tribunal. But in whatever court the trial takes place, it is the moral duty of both the British and American Governments to make public the extensive information they have bearing on the case, and to insist that American and British officers who were attached to Mihailovich, as well as Allied airmen who were rescued by him, be subpoenaed to testify at his trial.

The U.S. State Department has requested that the Yugoslav Government permit American officers and airmen to testify at the trial of Mihailovich. If this request should be refused then the world will know how much confidence to have in the findings of the court.

Reprinted from an article in "The Sun" (New York) of June 11th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

AMERICAN OFFICER DENIES HE HEARD MIHAILOVICH TALK COLLABORATION

COLONEL ROBERT McDOWELL, former head of the American Military Mission to General Mihailovich, revealed today that his only meetings with Germans in Yugoslavia were concerned with Nazi offers of surrender and not with collaboration, as was charged by the Government of Marshal Tito at the opening session yesterday of the Mihailovich treason trial near Belgrade.

In a statement, issued, through the Committee for a Fair Trial for Drazha Mihailovich, 901 Lexington Avenue, which was approved by both the War and State Departments, McDowell categorically denied charges of collaboration and denied that the Chetnik leader had even attended the surrender conferences in August, 1944.

McDowell, an expert in Near Eastern affairs and a former professor of modern Balkans history at the University of Michigan, said that he had attended the conferences with Nazi agents on instructions from the United States High Command. He resides in Washington, D.C., and is at present on terminal leave from the Army.

McDowell, who describes himself as a "life-long Liberal," said that at the conclusion of his mission to the Chetniks he volunteered to return to Yugoslavia for further investigation in the company of Partisans and Allied officers who supported the Partisans. "This offer," he said, "was refused."

Describing Mihailovich as a "bitter anti-Nazi," McDowell said that the "evidence on which General Mihailovich is accused in part is false, in part is a distortion of truth."

"His accusers, whatever the mouthpiece they find," the American officer said, "are the few Yugoslav Communists who, by deception, have prostituted and destroyed the popular resistance movement which they led and who, during the war, were repeatedly proved guilty of gross falsehood and misrepresentation."

"The real crime for which General Mihailovich is accused is that in the minds of 80 per cent of the Yugoslav population he became, and remains, the symbol of the simple, sturdy Yugoslav peasant resistance to tyranny, whether foreign or domestic."

Prosecutors of the trial of the bearded guerilla leader, alleged that McDowell had taken part in a meeting between Mihailovich and German officials for purposes of collaboration.

In his carefully documented statement, McDowell also denied other Communist charges against the General, saying that he had "seen and heard of absolutely no evidence serving to connect General Mihailovich personally, or officers under his direct command, with any form of collaboration with the Germans. The evidence includes not only personal observation, but the totality of the documents seen and conversations held with United States, Allied and enemy personnel."

The Colonel's statement also described the Chetnik national uprising against the Germans and makes the charge that Tito's Partisans in their invasion of Serbia avoided all contacts with the Germans and instead attacked the Chetniks on the flanks.

Concerning the charges of his meeting with German officials, McDowell, who was chief of the military mission from August to November, 1944: states:

"Much has been made of reports of visits to the headquarters of General Mihailovich on the part of a certain Herr Starker, a German Foreign Office employee, in the fall of 1944. The

following is the true account of this incident. German officials made a contact with the undersigned for the purpose of discussing the surrender of German Forces. As is now well known there were many such German contacts during the last months of German resistance and they had little significance due to the Nazi unwillingness to realize that the Allies were serious in their demands for unconditional surrender. The undersigned was instructed to listen to and transmit any German offer.

"General Mihailovich was most unwilling to have any contact with Germans but agreed to Starker's coming, on the insistence of the undersigned. The undersigned had two interviews with Starker. As the General was with the undersigned both prior to and after these interviews, there could have been no opportunity for the General to have had private meetings with Starker. During the period covered by these meetings the Yugoslav Communist efforts to capture Mihailovich were so constant and severe that it must have been evident to the Germans that the General was in no position to aid them or to accept aid from them.

"The undersigned is convinced that this incident is simply an example of the effort made today to destroy the reputation of General Mihailovich by the distortion of facts."

In McDowell's opinion there is no doubt that the Chetnik forces made the most substantial contributions to the Allied war effort in their guerilla war against the Nazis. During 1941 and 1942, McDowell points out, they made confirmed contribution to the Anglo-American campaigns in Africa by hampering German supply lines.

In 1943 and early 1944 severe Nazi reprisals against the Yugoslav civilian population made Mihailovich adopt a more cautious policy, but in September, 1944, a major effort against the Germans was planned and executed thoroughly. Axis movements were disrupted, according to McDowell, and quantities of munitions and prisoners were taken.

"At this moment," states McDowell, "the Communist-led forces of Marshal Tito attacked the Mihailovich forces on a broad front. This attack was personally witnessed by the undersigned and his staff. In attacking the Mihailovich forces, the forces of Tito passed through the German line of garrisons on the Western Morava River and ignored the Germans in favour of this attack against men already engaged against the Germans."

McDowell states that the Partisan communiqués were often falsified and that they were put out as propaganda. He said that in Serbia and part of Bosnia the civilian population was almost to a man loyal to Mihailovich and that there was scant evidence that Communist control had ever been established in that area.

He sums up in the following paragraph:

"The undersigned is convinced by all the evidence that the rank and file of the movement led by Tito and the other Communist leaders sought to resist the Axis just as did the Nationalists.

However, the actual resistance offered to the Axis was strictly limited by the priority imposed by the Communist leaders to the civil war and the effort to destroy the influence of Mihailovich. Under the circumstances no group of Yugoslav resistance was able to make a substantial contribution during 1944 and 1945."

Reprinted from an article by Walter R. Mansfield in "The Washington Post" (Washington) of June 24th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor, Overseas News Agency, Inc., and Author.*

MY LIFE WITH MIHAILOVICH

IT was now the middle of September, 1943. Upon our return to General Mihailovich's secret mountain headquarters after capture of the Italian garrison of Priboy, I found him visibly upset. Seated with his tall, bearded staff officers around a rough-hewn table under the trees, he pointed out that BBC London in its daily radio broadcasts to Yugoslavia, was now glorifying Tito and his Communist guerillas and casting reflections on the Chetniks—all this despite the fact that Mihailovich, as I could see with my own eyes, was attacking the Nazis on all fronts and capturing Italian prisoners.

Tito (Joseph Broz), former Russian-trained Communist underground agent in Yugoslavia, had organized a guerilla band in 1941, after the Nazi had attacked Russia, and had started a campaign to control the loosely organized guerillas throughout Serbia. In the fall of 1941 an attempt by the two forces to work together, near Uzhitzé, had failed. Thereafter clashes between Tito's Partisans and Mihailovich's Chetniks were rapidly ripening into a full-scale civil war.

Mihailovich appealed to me to ask Cairo for more American officers who might parachute to his forces and verify the situation for themselves. In the midst of this confusion, Cairo radioed me that an American colonel and a British brigadier would parachute in to us during the September moon period.

In late September, after several nights of waiting on the cold moonlit mountainside, we heard the heavy drone of bombers approaching our signal fires. As I desperately kept flashing my light up in the direction of the planes, I realized that these were moments of both excitement and homesickness. There, up in the sky, were men who would be back home on an Allied airfield within five hours! How I wished I could be with them!

* As a Captain in the United States Marine Corps assigned to the Office of Strategic Services for special duty behind the enemy lines, Walter Mansfield, former Assistant United States Attorney, was parachuted into Yugoslavia in August, 1943, as the first United States liaison officer with General Draza Mihailovich's Chetnik forces.

Finally, our incoming delegation was safely dropped to us—British Brigadier Armstrong, six British officers and enlisted men and my new American commanding officer, Colonel Albert B. Seitz. At the same time, several tons of badly needed military supplies were dropped.

Colonel Seitz proved to be a tall, pleasant Virginian, who rapidly won over the guerillas by his easy affability. After I gave him a complete report of the current situation, more conferences were held with General Mihailovich. It was decided that we would launch a large scale attack on the city of Vishegrad where over 800 Germans were garrisoned. Our objective was to try to wipe out the garrison and destroy the large railroad bridge which spanned the Drina River between Serbia and Bosnia. Mihailovich immediately sent out orders to all Chetnik guerilla leaders in the area to assemble secretly in the woods about 10 miles south of Vishegrad. During the week that followed over 2,500 guerillas gradually massed.

At dawn on October 4th, 1943, the attack was launched with heavy mortar bombardment. Creeping up to the ridge overlooking the town I had an excellent opportunity to see the mortar crews in action. I shall never forget the skill and intrepidity of these men, many of whom were formerly artillery officers in the regular Yugoslav Army. Dressed in rags, handicapped by lack of mortar sights and heavy base plates (which American crews would consider essential) they were lobbing shells on to chosen targets with remarkable accuracy.

The fighting continued all morning with our patrols gradually infiltrating until contact was made. By afternoon we had taken the town and had killed or wounded over 200 Germans.

A terrific explosion rocked the countryside, as we lay hidden behind a concrete wall. The bridge was completely cut off at the south end and twisted down into the deep river ravine below.

Meanwhile, our guerillas were proceeding toward Rogatitza, chasing the Germans. We stayed for a while in the town and then retired to the hills since it was expected that the Germans would shortly bring up very large reinforcements which would make it impossible for us to hold the city.

On the way back to our headquarters in the woods, we stopped to listen to BBC London on the radio. Everyone was completely amazed to hear the announcer broadcast a Tito daily communiqué announcing that in a glorious battle against the Germans Tito's Communist guerillas had taken the town of Rogatitza. Several of us had gone as far as this town with our own guerillas and saw no Partisans or Germans in the vicinity. It was a great blow to Mihailovich.

Now we moved our entire staff headquarters up into the mountain of Ravenyé, overlooking the valley leading into Rudo. One afternoon, as Colonel Seitz and I were leisurely encoding intelligence messages to O.S.S. headquarters at Cairo, we heard the hum of an approaching plane.

Pretty soon it came into view—a German *Stuka*, flying extremely low and obviously searching for our headquarters. Just then some of

the guerillas on a hill opposite us made the mistake of trying to machine-gun the passing plane. Quickly it wheeled around and started diving down at us, letting go with all machine guns at once.

Hardly had this attack finished, when one of General Mihailovich's emissaries came rushing up and said: "We must get out of here at once. The General has ordered immediate departure. A large German force is coming up the valley from Rudo and we may expect attack at any minute!"

Within a half-hour sporadic rifle and machine-gun fire started. Gradually it grew in intensity. Now the first mortar shells were beginning to explode with crunches which echoed throughout the surrounding mountains. Once more the planes came back and sprayed us.

How was the fight going? No one up with us seemed to know. I stopped two returning soldiers who were bearing a wounded Chetnik on a home made litter and asked them.

"Do not be afraid," one of them replied. "Our '*Chicha*' (nickname for Mihailovich) has gone down to the woods himself, and, with him near, we will certainly hold them off until dark."

We thanked God as dusk descended. Now the Jerries were having difficulty distinguishing friend from foe and were using signal flares and tracer bullets to locate themselves. The order came back from Mihailovich, "Start pulling back over the mountains." As we slowly trudged up the steep trails, the firing began to die down. Darkness had saved us.

The superior German force was not ready to give up so easily. During the night and the following day, we were chased steadily northward. Finally, dirty and exhausted, we limped into the little town of Doboy where I bedded down in the battered old railroad station along with 40 or 50 others. As I slid into my makeshift bag I looked up on the wall to see a Nazi poster printed in the German language on one side and Serbo-Croatian on the other. It read:

"Because of the nefarious acts of that brigand Drazha Mihailovich we have been forced to take the lives of (there followed a list of names) as well as 122 others."

(Signed) "Ulm,"
"Oberkommandant, Belgrad."

Reprinted from an article by Walter Dushnyck in "America" (New York) of July 6th, 1946, by kind permission of the America Press.

THE DRAMA OF GENERAL MIHAILOVICH

GENERAL DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH, once the hero leader of the Yugoslav Chetniks, is a symbol of the times. Had history run a different course we might have found General MacArthur, or de Gaulle, or Montgomery in his stead, or even a mass trial of all. Ironically enough, General Bor-Komorowski had the good fortune

It was indeed, typical of Mihailovich to refuse to leave with the last American Mission, preferring to remain with his people and face Tito's grotesque "Court of Justice."

Many persons who know the efficiency of courts of justice under the Soviet system, and who recall that Yugoslavia is under the tight supervisory hand of the NKVD, or rather OZNA, its counterpart in Yugoslavia, predicted that the trial against General Mihailovich would be a "political show-trial" against the U.S. and Great Britain. The general pattern of the hearings seems to confirm this hypothesis.

Tito's prosecution tried to prove that the U.S. and Great Britain, ostensibly supporting the Partisans, were in reality undertaking a campaign to liquidate them with the help of the Chetniks. Actually, the Allies stopped sending military supplies to General Mihailovich after the Teheran conference. Colonel McDowell's deposition stated categorically that no American plane that came back after picking up American fliers carried cargo when it set out.

On another point, General Mihailovich maintained that he was "but a pawn in power politics and that the U.S. and Britain had impelled him into the course his Chetniks pursued." Furthermore, he was reported as saying that he wished to come to terms with the Partisans but that the British Mission under Colonel Duane Hudson refused to assist him; and again, that his positive orientation toward Russia was opposed by the Yugoslav Government-in-exile. Both American and British Missions since the Teheran conference supported Tito's Partisans only.

In a document entitled, "Trial of Mihailovich: an Analysis," signed by David Martin, secretary of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Drazha Mihailovich, it was stated that the court proceedings were wholly political. The accused were given only a very short time to prepare their defence. From the sketchy reports of the trial, it is evident that the presiding judges, all army men, were prejudiced and openly hostile toward Mihailovich and his associates. The defendants, for instance, remained on the stand for seven hours a day. The president of the court made occasional speeches to the audience, recounting Mihailovich's "guilt."

There are strong suppositions, moreover, that the defendants were subjected to physical and psychological pressure. Mihailovich's testimony was, according to the Committee's statement, "a complex of truths, half-truths, and complete fabrication forced upon him by the prosecution." Mihailovich was quoted as complaining, "I am very tired. Sometimes I am so tired that I say Yes when I mean No." The behaviour of the rest of the defendants, while not following the same pattern exactly, disturbingly indicated that the men did not act normally. As in previous trials of outstanding Chetnik leaders like Keserovich, Lukachevich, Slepchevich, and others, the conduct of the defendants led qualified experts to charge they had been drugged.

General Mihailovich pleaded not guilty. Yet he admitted responsibility for so many "crimes" charged against him that finally his plea

of not guilty no longer had meaning. While it seems that he was given a chance to defend his own person, the prosecution extracted from him most important concessions which condemned all his subordinates, his entire Chetnik movement, the Yugoslav Government-in-exile, and at the same time the Governments of the U.S. and Great Britain. He supposedly declared that he disapproved in principle of having American fliers testify in his behalf, but he added, "They could add much to my defence." It is hard to believe that a man on trial for his life would refuse assistance of witnesses who could come to his rescue. He was reported, furthermore, as complaining of losing his memory. For instance, he could not recall his first attack upon German troops, but did remember that the Partisans started a resistance movement several days ahead of the Chetniks! Also, he implicated many of his commanders as collaborators with the Germans, but when asked the names of those who did not collaborate, Mihailovich replied, "I do not remember."

Mihailovich is no more. The resourceful, inspiring Chetnik leader, implacable enemy of Nazi *Übermenschen*, as well as of power-mad little commissars of the Red Star, has become a broken symbol of a small, betrayed people.

The Soviet Union, by destroying Mihailovich-the-ideal and Mihailovich-the-man, makes an important advance in its programme. His so-called trial was only one of many conducted by People's Courts in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Finland, and the Baltics. Next on the agenda is Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, who will face a Military Court in Kiev.

Mr Gromyko's undiplomatic utterances against the visiting Polish General Bor-Komorowski are, in this wise, significant. Moscow's obvious intention is to remove or destroy anyone who was, is, or could be a potential enemy of the Soviet system. With an iron hand and by terror, all such persons, of whom perhaps the best known was General Mihailovich, are being removed in the countries behind the iron curtain, so that there may be favourable circumstances for the implantation of the Soviet way of life.

Reprinted from the leading article in "The New York Times" (New York) of July 16th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

MIHAILOVICH

LIKE a Greek tragedy, the trial of General Drazha Mihailovich has proceeded to its inevitable conclusion. His conviction and sentence were certain from the start. The Tito Government repeatedly had said as much, even before he was captured in his mountain hideout almost a year after the end of the war. He was to be given a "fair trial," found guilty and shot. That now is the verdict.

The Belgrade trial had the outward aspect of jurisprudence. It was a public trial, of which the outside world was allowed an uncensored account. Mihailovich was confronted with the evidence against him and allowed to answer the charges. There ends, however, the resemblance to judicial procedures in democratic countries, or even to the trial at Nuremberg, where a new principle of international law is being established. Mihailovich was held incommunicado for weeks after his capture and, as is known on good authority, he was subjected to torture during those weeks. Defence counsel was allowed only a few days in which to prepare his case. Proffered testimony of United States and British fliers, who had been rescued by the Chetniks, and of other Allied officers who had done liaison work with Mihailovich, was barred. Wholly extraneous issues of United States and British political attitudes were introduced. The mere privilege of admitting or denying charges that was granted General Mihailovich does not answer the democratic world's idea of a defence or a fair trial.

Mihailovich's principal crime, obviously, was that he lost the war within a war that was fought in Yugoslavia. He did not deny from the stand that there were clashes between his Chetniks and Tito's Partisans. That, however, was not the charge. The public charge was that he collaborated with the Germans and Italians. He denied any collaboration with the Germans and admitted the authenticity only of some collaboration with the Italians. There is considerable evidence that the Partisans were not above such dealings themselves when it suited their purposes.

More was at stake in Belgrade than the life of the one-time Serbian hero, who was the first man in Yugoslavia to lead a well-organized resistance to the Nazis. Tito's Government also was on trial. By the verdict it too has been found guilty.

Reprinted from the leading article in "The Evening Star" (Washington) of July 16th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

MIHAILOVICH CONDEMNED

IF the case had been tried before an international tribunal, or if the Tito Government had granted the United States request to let several Americans testify in his defence, the sentencing of General Draža Mihailovich would not now seem so much like an act of political venom outraging justice. The trial was conducted by a controlled Military Court and it is difficult to escape the conviction that this man has been condemned to death not because he committed treason but because he lost out in his own country against a bitter rival intent upon liquidating him.

Last March a member of Tito's Government frankly declared that the captured Chetnik leader would be given a "fair" trial and then be

taken out and shot. In other words, as far as the Yugoslav régime was concerned, the guilty verdict was handed down even before the case was heard, or so it appeared at the time, and the appearance was not dissipated later by the actual court proceedings, especially in view of the unbending refusal to hear the defending testimony of American fliers rescued from the Nazis by Mihailovich.

The man's background, moreover, argues eloquently against the idea of his having been a traitor or Axis collaborator, no matter what his other failings may have been. Early in 1943 Russia flatly accused him, and the Moscow-trained Marshal Tito—who suddenly emerged as head of a rival Yugoslav resistance force long after Mihailovich had taken up arms against the Nazis—elaborated on the accusation. Such charges, however, had all the earmarks of a deliberate smear campaign even after Prime Minister Churchill, in May of 1944, declared that no more Allied supplies would be sent to Mihailovich because "he has not been fighting" and because "some of his subordinates have made accommodations with the enemy." In saying this Mr Churchill was careful to absolve the Chetnik leader of any personal blame. After all, he was a soldier of extraordinary courage and patriotism who had won Serbia's highest military honours in the First World War and who had thrilled and inspired free peoples everywhere when he took to the mountains to battle the Nazis and become one of the greatest Allied heroes of the hour—a man in whom treason seemed inconceivable.

Accordingly, considered against his personal record, the condemnation of Mihailovich has the mark of ruthless factional politics upon it. Unquestionably it satisfies the Belgrade dictatorship, but not so the free world. For a long time to come the character of the justice involved will be questioned and history's final judgment may well be against the condemners rather than the tragic man condemned.

Reprinted from the leading article in "The New York Times" (New York) of July 18th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

HE HELPED SAVE MOSCOW

THE fingers of history, rustling through the pages of the Second World War, may provide an ironic postscript to the scene that took place at dawn yesterday somewhere in the vicinity of Belgrade when General Draža Mihailovich crumpled before the bullets of a Yugoslav firing squad. The record is fairly obvious now. A more complete search and study of the files of the German General Staff, and a historical assessment of the various factors that entered into the successful defence of Moscow by the Red Army during the fall and winter of 1941, may show that the one most important factor was the time that was bought for the Russians in the spring of 1941

by Yugoslavia and Mihailovich. On the record written thus far, the Russian-controlled Tito Government has taken the life of a man to whom Russia owes a great debt.

The recorded facts of the German attack on Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia in 1941 are these, as testified to by von Paulus, the German commander at Stalingrad, and by Jodl, the former German Chief of Staff, before the Allied Tribunal at Nuremberg.

Hitler drew his plan for the attack on Russia in December, 1940. At that time he hoped to absorb the Balkans without a fight. This would have secured his right flank for the attack on Russia. Mihailovich, then a Colonel, was among an influential group in Yugoslavia that resisted an alliance with Germany, overthrew the pro-Nazi Government and installed one favourable to the Allies. When it became evident that Yugoslavia would not yield without a fight, von Paulus tells us, Hitler set the date of the drive on Yugoslavia for March and that against Russia for five weeks later. The attack on Yugoslavia actually was launched on April 6th, 1941.

While Hitler was preparing his move against Yugoslavia, the new Yugoslav Government at once sent emissaries to Moscow seeking a mutual assistance pact. The best that it could get was, first, a promise to remain neutral, and then a treaty of friendship. The Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact still was in force then.

The initial German attack on Yugoslavia made swift progress. The Government was driven from Belgrade. In the hills, however, a new Yugoslav hero emerged. Mihailovich, fighting a gallant delaying action, rallied the remnants of the Yugoslav Army and began an open and effective guerilla resistance to the German Army. Because of this unexpected resistance, the German Army's time-table of five weeks between the attack on Yugoslavia and the drive on the Soviet stretched to ten weeks. When it began, June 22nd, it was weakened by the necessity of maintaining several divisions in Yugoslavia to hold that flank.

Everyone knows the rest of the story. Delayed three months beyond the time originally set for the attack, the German Army failed to reach Moscow before the dreaded Russian winter had set in. With the help of winter, the Red Army held the line in front of Moscow. Hundreds of thousands of Germans who had expected to garrison in the shelter of the Russian capital died instead in the icy trenches a few miles away. There is good reason to believe that this—even more than the defence of Stalingrad—was the turning point of the German-Russian conflict.

History may decide that it is not Tito—who was in safety while Mihailovich was fighting in the hills in those early days—but the executed Chetnik leader whose statue should stand in Red Square in Moscow. But Mihailovich fell yesterday in Belgrade.

Reprinted from an article by Eleanor Roosevelt in "The Chicago Times" (Chicago) of July 19th, 1946, by kind permission of the United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

MIHAILOVICH

I WAS somewhat saddened this morning when I saw in the paper that General Mihailovich of Yugoslavia had been executed. The man next to me in the subway pointed it out to a friend and said:

"That's the Russian way of handling things. He wasn't a traitor to his country. He fought the Germans at the start, but he didn't agree to the kind of government the Yugoslavs now have, and that's what happened to the Opposition."

I think he pretty much voiced a feeling which troubles many people. We who live in countries where we are free to oppose the existing form of government, so long as we do not advocate violence, fear this means of handling political opposition. In the United States, in Great Britain, in France, and in many other countries, you can speak your mind about the public men in power. You can advocate changes in your government without fear that the party in power will hale you into court and then shoot you at dawn.

We will have great difficulty bringing about a meeting of minds between peoples who have such different ideas of what political freedom means. I can represent my Government and, if I disagree with any stand they wish me to take, I can resign, but no one will put me in prison or punish me in any way. That is the only way, it seems to me, that one can have political freedom.

Here in our country, there have been times when efforts were made to influence public opinion in an election, and in some elections, even recently, some efforts have been made to threaten people.

There have been other times when people have been promised certain benefits, and their sense of greed may have over-ridden their sense of obligation to a free citizenship—temporarily! By and large, however, our people have grown to know that neither threats nor promises carry much weight. If people should receive some temporary benefit by voting a certain way, they may find other reasons to regret their action.

Reprinted from a leading article by F. A. Voigt in the "American Srbobran" (Pittsburgh) of August 9th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH

IT is astonishing how many people have been moved by the news that Drazha Mihailovich is dead; people who knew very little of the truth, but feel, instinctively, what is true and are convinced, instinctively, that a great wrong has been done.

The wrong done in the world today is immense—not only individuals innumerable, but whole nations are being annihilated. It would not

be surprising, therefore, if injustice to one man—a man so little known in this country—passed without comment. But there is much comment—and not only in the Press.

The comment in the Press is not of a kind that does honour to this country (Britain.—Ed.). One great newspaper has expressed the opinion that Drazha Mihailovich must be a traitor because he was not on the winning side. Samuel Butler wrote :

“ For loyalty is just the same,
Whether it win or lose the game.”

Another great newspaper expresses certain apprehensions. It tries to be fair : Drazha Mihailovich, so it informs us, did not really know what he was doing, did not understand what was happening in the world. “ Forces beyond his control ” were at work—he “ did not see the perplexities of his position.” A very cool, objective judgment by a great newspaper !

But there are some lines by William Blake on a man whose judgment was “ so very cool ” and

“ Not prejudic'd by feelings great or small.
Amiable state ! He cannot feel at all.”

This, perhaps, is all that can be said in defence of the author of the article in the great newspaper, that he cannot feel what is right or wrong, because “ he cannot feel at all.”

The public, however, is not “ so very cool,” not so objective. It has some strong prejudices, especially against falsehood and injustice. When it gathered from the newspapers and the wireless—who never show such prejudices—that Drazha Mihailovich had been shot as a traitor, it was disturbed—and deeply so. Its prejudices have been aroused, it does not show the “ amiable state ” of the Press and wireless. It does not believe that Drazha Mihailovich was a traitor.

The “ amiable state ” of the great newspaper is ruffled by only one small perturbation—perturbation because there is “ a legend ” about the name of Mihailovich, and because some people may “ continue to use it after his death.” There is indeed “ a legend,” and, whether it is used or not, it will continue after his death—for generations to come.

Legend may err in detail and it may be fanciful, but it often embodies the essential truth—which is so often missed by great newspapers. According to legend—which has grown up despite the Press and the wireless—Drazha Mihailovich is a hero-patriot. The legend is believed by the public in this country and the United States, and indeed it is the truth. That is why people have been so much moved by the news that he is dead.

Many hero-patriots have died in recent years, and many more will die in the years to come. Why, then, are people so much moved ?

The reason is, that they have not yet grown accustomed to the notion that to lose a fight is in itself dishonourable. They feel instinctively that Mihailovich was a true Ally of this country which had so many false Allies. They feel that this country gave him too little support, and

that there has been a deal of misrepresentations, not to say lying, about him : that he was unjustly abandoned to his fate. They fail to understand how he could be a traitor when the Germans were losing the war—that a man should go over to the winning side is dishonourable and understandable, but that he should go over to the losing side is altogether incomprehensible.

It may be that people do not know the whole truth—the Press and wireless have been careful to keep it away from them—that Drazha Mihailovich fought for his country's independence, that he fought loyally on the side of the Allies (of Russia as well as of Great Britain and the United States), that they gave him almost nothing to fight with, that he spared the lives of his own people not because he was a bad soldier, but because he was a good one, not because he lacked ardour, but because he was full of ardour for his country's good, and because he would not engage in enterprise of no military value which would result in murderous reprisal. He fought the Partisans because he regarded them as the enemies—no less than the Germans—of his country's independence, and events have proved him right. He fought that Yugoslavia might be free. Tito fought so that she might lose her freedom.

Tito was successful. But the people of this country and of the United States do not like Tito, despite his success, despite all the efforts of the press and wireless to make him appear great, heroic, and virtuous. The Bible says : . . . “ The bloodthirsty hate the upright.” That is why Tito hated Mihailovich—and the people of this country and of the United States feel, with sure instinct, that Tito is bloodthirsty and Mihailovich was upright.

They also feel that the responsibility for the death of Mihailovich is very wide—that their own countries, somehow or other, share it, that something should have been done to prevent what is so clearly the judicial murder of a man who fought for this country as well as for his own.

They believe in the words of the Bible—it has so many words that are relevant to our present condition—that “ righteousness exalteth a nation.” It is their resolve that, some day, this righteousness shall prevail. It was in the defence of this righteousness that Mihailovich died—when he could easily have saved himself, long ago, by conformity or flight. That is the reason why people are so moved by his death, that is why he has become a legend—and why the legend will live from generation to generation.

PART II

The Argentine Press

But the German nation will now settle its account with that Serbian clique of criminals in Belgrade which believes that it can once again place the Balkans at the disposal of a British attempt on European peace.

April 6th, 1941.

ADOLF HITLER.

Reprinted from an article in "The Standard" (Buenos Aires) of June 15th, 1946.

THE TRIAL IN YUGOSLAVIA

THE trial of General Mihailovich is being stage-managed in Belgrade with many tricks that must have been taught the Government and the prosecution in Moscow. The proceedings are being conducted on lines made familiar to all in Russian People's Courts. We have no compunction at all in commenting at this stage, for the customary *sub judice* inhibitions do not apply in a case that has probably been decided in advance. This does not mean we anticipate the conviction and capital punishment of the prisoner, for, as one newspaper correspondent has suggested, it is likely an arrangement already has been reached with the prisoner that he be either acquitted or sentenced and pardoned. Those who have been following the trial proceedings closely will not be surprised whatever verdict is returned for they are convinced that one of the primary objects of Marshal Tito and his Government is to disparage and discredit British and American war-time co-operation with Yugoslav patriots and to stimulate the political campaign against the Western Powers. The cross-examination has been directed palpably to this end.

Marshal Tito, we think, is making a serious mistake in permitting himself to be used politically by the Russians. While it is true that the final drive of liberation for Yugoslavia came from the Red Army he should remember that he himself and his brave Partisans were kept going for the greater part of the war by British and American assistance conveyed to them at great expense and risk. Neither country was particularly interested in the internal politics of the Yugoslavs until these directly affected operations against the enemy. When the time for decision arrived it was reached on purely military grounds. The issue was whether Tito or Mihailovich was of greater value in fighting or harassing the enemy. The world knows what the choice was and the world also knows how Britain and America have been compensated. It is high time Tito realised that he is not going to make much success

of his régime in Yugoslavia until he ceases being a Moscow puppet and exhibits a little more respect and consideration for those who succoured and supported him when he was most in need. We were always under the impression that Tito was a leader of character and would prove as long-headed in politics as he was in war.

Reprinted from an article in "El Pueblo" (Buenos Aires) of July 18th, 1946.

ASESINATO LEGALIZADO

EL fusilamiento de Draja Mihailovich pone fin a una disputa local de Yugoslavia, que no nos interesa. Probablemente, si el resultado de la contienda hubiese sido inverso, Tito sería el ejecutado de hoy.

Pero la avalancha histórica que ha envuelto a estos personajes, encumbrándolos hasta hacerlos protagonistas de acontecimientos que los superaban, ha dado también a estos cuatro tiros disparados en una prisión de Belgrado, cierto tono u cierto sentido que trascienden de la atmósfera local y han hecho pronunciarse a hombres de estado muy distantes sobre la suerte de dos jefes de bandas guerrilleras. Es así como el veredicto pronunciado contra Mihailovich has conmovido la palabra de su propio rey Pedro, exilado en Londres: del ex canciller Anthony Eden, interpelante de su sucesor Bevin; y del senador americano Vandenberg, que calificó la ejecución de "asesinato legalizado." De nada han valido, como era de suponer, tales intentos de clemencia. La sentencia se ha cumplido, con el visito bueno de Moscú, que maneja a la vista del mundo al gobierno títere del llamado mariscal Tito.

Por cierto que la injusticia de este fusilamiento asoma por todas partes. Mihailovich, en su papel de patriota, cumplió con su deber. Hizo primero la guerra al nazismo invasor de su patria; y luego la hizo al comunismo, encarnado allí por Tito. Pero para Rusia no cuentan estos matices. Ya creará que es mucho haberle permutado el tiro en la nuca por los disparos de un pelotón.

PART III

The Belgian Press

Your courage will shine out in the pages of history and will, too, reap a more immediate reward. Whatever you may lose in the present, you have saved the future.

April 6th, 1941.

WINSTON CHURCHILL.

Reprinted from an article by G. Masson de Fernig in "La Nation Belge" (Brussels) of July 14th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

LA DESTINÉE TRAGIQUE DE DRAJA MIHAILOVITCH

DEPUIS l'arrestation et le renvoi devant la justice militaire du général Draja Mihailovich, une nouvelle campagne de graffiti a fait son apparition sur les murs de Trieste, cité considérée par beaucoup comme la seule région encore plus ou moins yougoslave où il soit possible de manifester librement ses opinions. Cette polémique murale éclipse même parfois celle portant sur l'avenir de Trieste et de la Vénétie Julienne, et on en arrive alors à ce singulier paradoxe, qu'après les Yougoslaves royalistes, les plus ardents partisans du général tchetnik sont les Italiens qu'il a combattu avec tant d'âpreté pendant la guerre!

Des Yougoslaves récemment évadés de Belgrade, parmi lesquels j'ai pu rencontrer un ancien officier des forces tchetniks de Mihailovich, m'ont rapporté certains détails de la lutte qui les a opposés, pendant la guerre déjà, aux "partisans" de Tito, et qui trouve aujourd'hui son affreux épilogue devant la justice militaire yougoslave.

Voici d'abord en quelques mots les rétroactes de cette rivalité sans grandeur, ni générosité.

Le 25 mars 1941, le gouvernement yougoslave de M. Tzvetkovitch, et avec lui le prince Paul, crut devoir adhérer au pacte tripartite et consentir à l'Axe des avantages et des privilèges incompatibles avec l'honneur d'une nation souveraine. Le résultat ne se fit pas attendre, car, deux jours plus tard, le 27, un coup d'Etat militaire balayait M. Tzvetkovitch, et avec lui le prince Paul lui-même, pour placer sur le trône le jeune roi Pierre II, qui n'avait pas encore atteint sa majorité, et pour confier les affaires de l'Etat à un gouvernement de large concentration nationale.

Mais les événements se précipitaient. Le 6 avril, Hitler attaquait la Yougoslavie sans déclaration de guerre, de tous les côtés à la fois, et, le 12, l'armée capitulait. A ce moment, Mihailovich était colonel. Il refusa, lui, de capituler et préféra se réfugier dans les montagnes

inaccessibles avec un groupe d'officiers et de soldats décidés à continuer la guerre sur le sol même de la patrie, et coûte que coûte. C'est alors qu'il fut nommé général et ministre de la guerre par le gouvernement royal en exil à Londres.

A ce moment, nous a-t-on rapporté, Joseph Broz, dit Tito, qui s'était réfugié en Russie, et ses partisans, obéissant aux ordres de Moscou, alors allié de l'Allemagne, firent tout ce qu'ils purent pour saboter la résistance du général Mihailovitch et des hostilités ouvertes commencèrent dès l'automne 1941. Elles ne devaient plus cesser, malgré l'entrée en guerre de l'U.R.S.S. contre l'Axe.

Il ressort de tous les témoignages que j'ai pu recueillir que la Yougoslavie fut, pendant la guerre, le théâtre de trois guerres : d'abord une guerre à mort entre "tchetniks" et "partisans," ensuite la guerre menée par la Yougoslavie contre les envahisseurs allemands et italiens et, enfin, une surnoise guerre d'influence que les Russes livrèrent aux Anglais et aux Américains. Les Allemands avaient d'ailleurs fort bien compris la situation, puisqu'ils offraient la même somme, soit 100,000 marks or, pour la capture mort ou vif de Tito ou de Mihailovitch ; le premier traité d' "agent du bolchévisme russe" et le second d' "agent de la ploutocratie anglo-américaine."

Après le mois de septembre 1943, quand se termina la conférence de Téhéran, la politique alliée vis-à-vis du général Mihailovitch se modifia radicalement. Les gouvernements de Londres et de Washington abandonnèrent les tchetniks à leur sort et les sacrifièrent à la consolidation de l'alliance entre la Russie et les puissances occidentales. Les envois d'armes au général Mihailovitch, qui n'avaient jamais été bien importants, cessèrent tout à fait et la propagande alliée se mit à épauler Tito, au point que des coups de main exécutés par des tchetniks furent attribués par la B.B.C. au groupe de "partisans." Ces faits sont corroborés par de nombreux officiers américains qui se sont trouvés au quartier général de Mihailovitch.

A Londres pourtant, on n'avait pas la conscience tout à fait tranquille. Aussi continua-t-on à faire des efforts en vue d'amener un compromis susceptible de permettre à la Yougoslavie de se prononcer en toute liberté après la fin des hostilités sur la forme de régime qu'elle désirait se donner. C'est pourquoi au mois d'août 1944, le Dr Choubachitch se rendit de Londres au quartier général du maréchal Tito pour négocier un "modus vivendi." Il en résulta l'accord Tito-Choubachitch qui prévoyait la création d'une régence provisoire qui aurait à exercer le pouvoir en attendant que puisse avoir lieu une consultation populaire. Le 12 février 1945, la conférence de Yalta confirma et amplifia l'accord Tito-Choubachitch en stipulant que toutes les décisions prises sous la régence devraient ensuite être ratifiées par l'assemblée constituante à élire.

Or, disent les fidèles du général, le maréchal Tito a délibérément violé toutes les clauses de ces accords et M. Choubachitch lui-même a été obligé de démissionner "pour cause de maladie" un peu avant les élections. Les élections pour l'assemblée nationale eurent lieu

le 11 novembre 1945 dans des conditions telles qu'elles donnèrent à Tito, comme n'importe qui pouvait le prévoir, une majorité qui allait de 90 à 100 p.c. ! Elles consacreront la révolution communiste imposée au pays, à en croire les mêmes témoins, par une minorité d'agitateurs servis par une armée de mouchards.

A partir de ce moment, Mihailovitch était perdu ; abandonné par les uns et haï par les autres. Au mois de septembre 1945, le dernier officier américain en quittant son état-major en avion, lui offrit de l'emmener avec lui. Mais le général, après l'avoir courtoisement remercié, lui répondit avec un peu d'amertume dans la voix : "Je sens qu'il est de mon devoir de rester avec mes hommes, dans mon pays, jusqu'au bout."

L'échéance qu'il prévoyait arriva le 13 mars 1946, et le 26 du même mois, le gouvernement du maréchal Tito annonça que le général Mihailovitch avait été capturé par des partisans et qu'il a à répondre devant un conseil de guerre des crimes de haute trahison, de collaboration avec l'ennemi et du fait d'avoir livré aux Allemands des militaires alliés. Sur ce dernier point, plus de 500 aviateurs alliés, en majorité américains et anglais, infligeaient au maréchal Tito un démenti catégorique et extrêmement impressionnant. Ils peuvent le faire avec d'autant plus de conviction qu'ils ont tous été sauvés, soignés et évacués par les soins des forces de Mihailovitch avant "et après" le moment où il fut désavoué par le haut commandement anglo-américain.

Une demande officielle du département d'Etat de Washington, en date du 30 mars 1946, qui tendait à ce que ces aviateurs puissent être entendus au procès comme témoins à décharge, fut purement et simplement rejetée par le gouvernement de Belgrade.

Le général Mihailovitch, qui fut le seul homme sur le continent européen à tenir tête aux Allemands après la défaite yougoslave et grecque, est ainsi condamné d'avance et son procès n'est qu'un prétexte à propagande. Le gouvernement yougoslave l'a d'ailleurs avoué explicitement lorsqu'il a déclaré fin mars dans sa réponse à la note américaine : "Les crimes du traître Mihailovitch contre le peuple yougoslave sont trop vastes et trop horribles pour qu'il soit possible ou tolérable de discuter sur le point de savoir s'il est coupable ou non."

Un exemple, qui m'a été donné, suffit à montrer à quel point la situation politique était compliquée en Yougoslavie vers la fin de la guerre. Il émane d'un sous-officier du service de santé faisant partie d'un groupe de tchetniks qui avaient pour mission, en septembre 1944 de protéger un aérodrome utilisé par l'aviation américaine.

Ce détachement auprès duquel se trouvait encore un officier américain se prépara à attaquer une petite localité défendue par une garnison allemande. L'officier américain tenta d'abord de négocier la reddition des Allemands. Après avoir essuyé un refus, il essaya d'obtenir des partisans qui se trouvaient dans les environs qu'ils fassent cause commune avec les tchetniks pour donner l'assaut. Mais ici il se heurta à un autre refus. Le commandant des tchetniks ordonna

dirigées contre leur chef et son Q.G. de Ravna Gora. En mars, un ultimatum fut rejeté malgré des menaces de représailles contre les familles des tchetniks. A la fin de l'été, Mihailovitch, que le gouvernement de Londres avait successivement nommé ministre de la guerre et commandant en chef de l'armée de l'intérieur, organise la désobéissance civile totale, puis ordonne le sabotage général. L'action qui en découle a pour résultat de gêner considérablement les opérations de l'axe à El Alamein (les lignes ferroviaires vers la Grèce et le Moyen-Orient étant devenues presque inutilisables) et de Stalingrad (30 divisions allemandes étant retenues en Serbie). Les lignes vitales furent l'objet d'attaques continuelles, ainsi que les ponts. Environ un tiers des locomotives furent mises hors d'usage. En guise de représailles, les Allemands envoyèrent la division S.S. *Prinz Eugen* qui pilla les fermes, arrêta les suspects, brûla, massacra, commit les pires atrocités : dans la seule commune de Kriva Reka, on compta, en octobre, 70 maisons brûlées et 600 habitants torturés puis massacrés ; les 25 et 26 décembre, 2.500 sympathisants de Mihailovitch furent fusillés au champ de tir de Yayintzi, près de Belgrade.

Pendant l'année 1943 : nouvelle vague d'attaques et de représailles allemandes et bulgares. Six des principaux chefs tchetniks y périrent. Le 19 janvier, le général Bader, commandant militaire en Serbie, placardait un avertissement à la population pour l'inviter à lutter contre Mihailovitch et les "rebelles criminels." La tête du général était mise à prix pour une somme de 100.000 R.M.-or, comme celle de Tito. Cette manœuvre d'intimidation échoua. Vers octobre, la terreur battait son plein. Elle découlait en droite ligne des instructions d'Hitler, mentionnées par celui-ci dans sa lettre à Mussolini en date du 16 février 1943. Cette lettre démontre la haine existant entre l'axe et Mihailovitch.

En Serbie, au terme de combats acharnés, les tchetniks libérèrent encore quelques localités, menèrent à bien des sabotages et firent de nombreux prisonniers et tués malgré une attaque massive de l'ennemi dans les quatre arrondissements. En Bosnie, dans le Sandzak, le Monténégro et l'Herzégovine, la capitulation italienne amena une recrudescence de l'activité tchetnik. Une douzaine de villes furent libérées, dont le centre très fortifié de Vichégrad. De nombreuses garnisons allemandes et deux divisions italiennes furent désarmées. Tous les ponts de la Drina furent détruits pour couper la retraite de l'ennemi. Au cours de ces opérations, les partisans installés dans les villes libérées par les tchetniks, attaquaient ceux-ci dans le dos.

C'est en décembre à Téhéran, que les alliés décident que la Yougoslavie sera dans la sphère d'influence russe et que Tito, seul, sera aidé dorénavant par la propagande et l'envoi d'armes. Cependant, alors que les Britanniques abandonnent définitivement le général et font pression sur le gouvernement yougoslave de Londres, les Américains ne coupent pas entièrement les ponts grâce à l'action de l'ambassadeur yougoslave Constantin Fotitch.

Pendant l'année 1944 : lors de l'entrée de l'armée rouge en Yougoslavie, les tchetniks, contrôlant complètement les principales régions de Serbie, prenaient en chasse les troupes allemandes refoulées vers l'ouest, et libéraient leurs villes. Le 1er septembre, Mihailovitch décréta la mobilisation générale. Aux confins de la Serbie occidentale, les tchetniks furent pris à partie par les troupes de Tito. Dans Krouchevatz libérée, le lieutenant-colonel Kesserovitch et 2.000 tchetniks furent désarmés par les Russes qui permirent alors aux partisans d'entrer en "libérateurs." Ce drame se produisit un peu partout.

Dès lors, Mihailovitch n'avait plus qu'à se retirer avec une partie de ses troupes dans les montagnes de Bosnie. Il revenait ainsi à son point de départ de mai 1941, pendant que Tito "vainqueur" s'installait à Belgrade en octobre.

Mais la lutte continua contre le gouvernement illégal. En février 1946, c'est-à-dire un an et demi plus tard, les troupes de Mihailovitch se chiffraient à 100.000 hommes environ. Dans des conditions matérielles extrêmement pénibles, ils repoussèrent en décembre 1945 une armée de 100.000 hommes, bien équipés, leur tuant Drapchine, chef de la 1ère armée blindée, dans la bourgade de Vinkovtzi. Sur la ligne ferroviaire de Belgrade à Nich, les tchetniks arrêtaient en décembre 1945, également un train transportant les douze juges du colonel Kesserovitch, l'héroïque bras droit de Mihailovitch qui avait été exécuté peu auparavant. Ils les forcèrent à embrasser un étendard rouge et les exécutèrent séance tenante. Hélas ! Si les armées de Tito étaient impuissantes devant ces redoutables combattants, l'O.Z.N.A., dirigée par des techniciens russes parvint à capturer le général et quelques hommes. On sait la suite.

Les conclusions seront brèves. Lorsqu'on a étudié les documents, on peut affirmer que Mihailovitch fut un soldat droit et sincère, appelé à juste titre, le premier résistant d'Europe ; il fut aussi la première grande victime de ceux qui ont partout étouffé, déshonoré toutes les résistances.

Il est clair que le procès de Belgrade ne présentait aucune garantie d'équité ni de légalité. En fait, il s'agissait, au terme de manœuvres politiques ébauchées déjà en pleine guerre, d'un coup de massue dont le général devait faire définitivement les frais. Derrière et par-delà son rival, Tito visait le gouvernement légal et démocratique du roi Pierre II, dont il condamna plusieurs membres par contumace en même temps que le général ; derrière et par-delà eux, l'U.R.S.S., dont Tito n'était que l'homme de paille, visait les deux grandes nations démocratiques qui l'avaient secouru aux heures noires, et qu'elle associait aux accusations contre le chef tchetnik, disant que sa "collaboration" était inspirée par les "cliques réactionnaires" de Londres et Washington.

PART IV

The British Press

A des milliers de kilomètres de Londres, du gouvernement dont il est membre et du souverain dont il est le délégué, Mihailovitch, seul ministre légitime d'un pays occupé par Hitler demeure sur le sol national de ce pays, Mihailovitch, général, fait et commande le feu, Mihailovitch, ministre de la guerre, fait la guerre.

THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

December 1st, 1941.

Reprinted from an article by Captain Michael Lees in the "Sunday Express" (London) of May 26th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

WAS MIHAILOVICH RIGHT OR WRONG?

EARLY in June General Mihailovich, leader of the Yugoslav Chetniks, who was supplanted late in the war by Tito as "the man Britain backs," is to be tried by Tito's Government as a traitor.

The news stirs my memory. It was the evening of May 24th, 1944. The place, a small mountain village near Chachak, about 100 miles south of Belgrade.

We sat on low stools in the kitchen of a peasant's cottage listening to the B.B.C. foreign news broadcast. The announcer's voice came through, precise and clear.

"In Yugoslavia, the British Mission with General Mihailovich, leader of the Chetniks, is to be withdrawn. Mr Churchill explained today that His Majesty's Government regrets that it has been forced to take this decision because of the conclusive evidence indicating that units under Mihailovich's command have been co-operating with the enemy in the fight against Marshal Tito's Partisans. In Italy the Allied armies. . . ."

The Minister—for that was the title by which Mihailovich liked to be known—rose from his seat and turned off the radio. We sat embarrassed, looking away as his sad eyes rested on each of us in turn. He spoke calmly:

" . . . I realize, Gentlemen, that this decision is no fault of yours. If I may do so, I still regard you as my friends and the friends of Yugoslavia. I shall do everything in my power to help you to escape safely.

"Perhaps we shall meet again in happier circumstances after the war. You will always be welcome here."

No one answered. There was nothing worth while to be said, but I felt the tears rising to my eyes. It was the gesture of a very gallant gentleman who had lost all but his pride.

Mihailovich was a man of early middle age. Slightly built and of less than average height, he was nevertheless wiry and possessed great stamina.

Beneath a thick black beard, his features were studious, but when things went well his eyes twinkled merrily through steel-rimmed spectacles.

He looked the scholar rather than the soldier, and he was, indeed, well read and interested in subjects of academic nature.

But his greatest passion, and perhaps failing, was that of all his Serbian compatriots . . . the study of politics.

That was easy to understand, for the whole of his adult life had been spent in the turbulent atmosphere of Balkan intrigue. He could just remember the Balkan War of 1912 and the Great War which decimated the Serbs.

As a young officer he had seen the fusion of six southern Slav States into the new Yugoslavia, with all the attendant vicissitudes.

He was a captain when King Alexander was murdered at Marseilles by a Croat agent in 1934, and he was a major on the General Staff when the glorious but typically Balkan *coup d'état* of March 1941, displaced Prince Paul's Government and precipitated the German attack on Yugoslavia.

Mihailovich was unusual in his absolute confidence of ultimate British victory.

Between the wars, most of the Balkan people looked to France as the leading Western democracy, and after Dunkirk many regarded a German victory as inevitable.

The Yugoslav decision to fight was made by a group of impetuous army officers after they had displaced the reluctant politicians.

But it was little more than a gesture to uphold the honour of the country, and when the army surrendered the majority returned to their homes, resigning themselves to defeat.

Mihailovich, on the other hand, was convinced that the democracies would triumph in the end, and recruiting a few other stalwarts he went into hiding in the mountains to organise a guerilla army.

Within quite a short time he had a large force under his command. His men were mainly ex-regular soldiers and Serbian peasants, and his movement flourished strongest in Serbia and Montenegro.

After a time they came to be known as Chetniks, though Mihailovich himself always discouraged the use of that term. Traditionally, the Chetniks were the Serbian Home Guard, and soon after the occupation the Germans had mobilised them to keep down unruly elements in the mountains in particular the Communists.

It was an extremely ill-advised move on the part of the enemy because within a few months, they deserted *en masse* to Mihailovich.

In 1942, King Peter's Government, in exile, appointed Mihailovich Minister of War and General-Commanding all Yugoslav Forces in the country.

His movement was by then 30,000 strong and he encouraged them to call themselves the Royal Yugoslav Army, but the name Chetniks stuck.

They were organised into brigades, each of which was allotted its own area to live in and operate from.

Mihailovich himself had a personal staff and bodyguard of about 50 men, and he was always on the move.

Hiding in the woods by day and marching at night, he covered quite fantastic distances through the mountains as he toured his various commands.

His extraordinary mobility and excellent security was the secret of his success in evading capture for so long.

Even the Chetniks themselves never knew where he was from day to day, and on one unforgettable occasion I had thought him to be in Montenegro, only to discover later that he had been less than 10 miles away from my base in Serbia. The secrecy in which he shrouded his movements was one of the most fascinating aspects of the Minister's personality, and it was made possible only by the unswerving loyalty and devotion of the peasant population to whom he was a great national hero. Mihailovich kept in touch with his units by means of an agency in Belgrade. Regular despatches sent to this address were forwarded on to his headquarters.

The couriers, some of them women, travelled by rail disguised as innocuous citizens.

Whereas the Minister dictated the general policy to be followed by the Chetniks, it was left to the various commanders to recruit and organise their bands and to plan their activities. The brigades varied in strength from 100 to 500 men, and as they were generally subdivided into battalions of about 50.

This policy considerably limited their scope and as the majority of the recruits were drawn from the immediate localities in which they were operating, they were loath to be too active lest they incited the wrath of the Germans against their own kinsmen.

In the early days of the occupation, when the Serbs were still smarting from their defeat by the German *Blitzkrieg*, the Chetniks massed together and carried out some very courageous attacks on enemy garrisons and lines of communication.

But deterred by the barbaric reprisals and realising that liberation could not come for some considerable time, they began to avoid battle whenever possible.

Instead they turned their attentions to building up a large force in the mountains ready to spring into action as soon as the approach of an Allied army would give an uprising a chance of success.

But it was politics which brought about Mihailovich's downfall.

The Chetnik movement formed originally for the sole purpose




Photo: American Srboiran

During the War

GENERAL MIHAILOVICH

MINISTER OF WAR AND DEPUTY C.-IN-C.

of conducting guerilla warfare against the Germans, gradually assumed a pronounced Right-wing, pan-Serbian character.

Confident in his position as Minister of War, Mihailovich could not understand that the Allies had sunk all their political differences in the war effort against the Nazis and that they really meant it when they said that they would support only those who fought the common enemy to the best of their ability, irrespective of colours or creed.

He was worried by the ever-increasing strength of Tito's revolutionary Freedom Front Forces, against whom the Chetniks were already waging a civil war.

And despite the advice and warnings of the British Mission, he directed his forces to postpone all action against the enemy and to divert their whole effort into bringing the civil war to a successful conclusion.

That mistake was fatal to Mihailovich and to his cause. In explanation it can be said that he regarded Tito's movement as a greater threat to his country than the Germans.

Convinced, as he was, that the German defeat was inevitable, whether he assisted in it or not, he succumbed to the temptation of settling his own political differences with the Partisans first.

In many ways Mihailovich was stubborn, and no amount of persuasion could move him once he had made up his mind.

Whether his ideas were right or wrong only posterity will tell.

He had great courage, both moral and physical, and at least he was loyal to his convictions and to his King.

Reprinted from the leading article in "The Western Morning News and Daily Gazette" (Plymouth) of June 12th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

A BLUNDER

THE opening stages of the trial of General Mihailovich have confirmed the impression already formed that not only the General but the Western democracies would be put on trial. Tito has returned to Belgrade from Moscow, after discussions which have resulted in the promise of substantial military aid. We shall no doubt hear later—and perhaps disconcertingly—what else he and his mission had secured.

Nothing has happened since Mr Churchill in Brussels described his support of Tito as one of the greatest errors of the war to suggest any modification of that verdict, and it is more likely to be strengthened than weakened by future events. Few will now question that a political blunder was made. Those who were associated with it are now describing the military circumstances of the time in the endeavour to show that however unfortunate its consequences the decision was inevitable. On this point the evidence is not entirely conclusive.

The picture presented in some quarters of General Mihailovich ceasing to be interested in fighting the Germans and devoting all his attention to the Partisans, who for their part were anxious only to expel the invader, can not be reconciled with a good deal of first hand and apparently reliable evidence from British and American quarters. There is no doubt that General Mihailovich was very much concerned at the possibilities opened up by the evident Communist desire to seize possession of the country, and all that has happened since indicates that his fears were not groundless. It must be remembered, however, that he and his Chetniks were the first to take arms against the invader and that the Partisans showed no inclination to do so until Germany was the enemy not only of Yugoslavia but of Russia.

To say that General Mihailovich was more interested in his own country than in any other is to pay him tribute which patriots anywhere would wish to earn. It cannot be payed to Tito or to any other non-Russian Commissar in the Soviet service. Our primary concern, however, is not the personal virtue of either of the leading parties in this quarrel. It is with the effect of their activities on our interest. Even if we could accept entirely the military picture presented by those who seek to justify the change of policy when Mihailovich was abandoned, the historian would probably still have to record that a blunder was made in subordinating political consideration entirely to military. It is not the only occasion on which it was made, but it is the most flagrant.

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GENERAL MIHAILOVICH

IT has come as a surprise to many observers that the lengthy indictment of General Drazha Mihailovich, Minister of War in the refugee London Government of King Peter of Yugoslavia, should also include charges against Britain and the U.S.A.

In fact, there is already evidence that the world-wide interest which the trial has aroused, and the widespread anxiety in Britain and the United States that it should be fair, have prompted earnest consideration in Belgrade of the proper ways and means of discrediting evidence brought forth on the General's behalf from outside.

For both British and United States officers who were seconded to missions of liaison with the Chetnik forces have made depositions that on certain stated occasions he did in fact carry out operations planned against the Germans and approved by the British General H.Q. in Cairo.

It is impossible to see entirely black or white in the issue, which is itself criss-crossed with a series of others, some political, some military,

some ideological. But in so far as the trial is likely to be regarded the world over as a test of Yugoslav judicial processes under Marshal Tito's régime, some estimate of the implications is clearly necessary.

The first point to be established is that whereas Marshal Tito's active fighting began only after the Soviet Union was at war with Germany, Mihailovich was in the field from the Feast of St. George—Georgevdan—in May, 1941. On that day his supporters, who were still loosely organised, rose more or less spontaneously in various parts of the country. They achieved little, but they made their stand. At the same moment Tito was in Belgrade and, on his own account, carefully preparing his campaign. This is very likely true to the extent that once the Germans had overrun the country the Communist Party needed to overhaul its organisation.

At the same time the official Communist attitude remained one of opposition to an "imperialist" war. Russia had been supplying grains and oil via the Danube to the German war machine and was certainly doing so till late in 1940. And it is worth remembering that on the day Germany invaded Yugoslavia, April 6th, 1941, the Soviet Government concluded with the Royal Yugoslav Government a Pact of Alliance. Ten days later, when the country was overrun, Russia abruptly cancelled the Treaty and expelled the Yugoslav Minister to Moscow. This is a historical fact which needs to be remembered.

Tito's Partisan forces developed early in 1942 and made their first stand in the summer of the year. By that time Russia was fully at war with Germany and, indeed, heavily on the defensive. The last obstacle to Communist participation in an "imperialist" war had thus been removed. There was a phase recorded only in the propaganda sallies of both contestants, during which Tito and Mihailovich attempted to come to terms. Tito says the Chetniks attacked the Partisans in Bosnia. The Chetniks say the reverse was the case. Whichever came first, and whoever fired the first shot, the two sides were at war with each other almost from the start.

They had opposing attitudes to guerilla war in any case. For the German reprisals, called down by the Chetniks' efforts in 1941, had persuaded Mihailovich that he should lie low till help came from abroad. The Partisans considered that reprisals helped their case. In any event they would further disrupt a social system they were concerned to end. And, being many of them Croats, they were not averse from seeing devastation of Serb villages. But that is not the whole story. There were many Serbs from Bosnia fighting alongside Tito, and as time went on there was more than a trickle of Serbs leaving Mihailovich to join the other side.

The difference of tactics grew more marked as time went on. Mihailovich was largely—but by no means altogether—passive. Tito was active. Any activity against the enemy was welcome to the Allies. So that when word reached Cairo late in 1942, that if Tito did not receive support he might himself do a deal with the Germans, aid was promptly sent. Early in 1943 a small British Mission had been

sent, and later in the year it was reinforced by the arrival of Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean. One of the first recommendations which came back from his mission was that the B.B.C. should change its tone in handling news of the Yugoslav resistance. Tito's men were infuriated that the Chetniks should get broadcast credit for every act of sabotage. The British line changed accordingly. From then on, about the early months of 1944, it was increasingly believed in London that the chief fighting and sabotage were carried on by Tito, while Mihailovich was increasingly thought to be passive.

The conclusion was unjust, but it was supported by the curious fact that the mission to Mihailovich, composed of men knowing Yugoslavia intimately, were critical of the claims put forward to them and reported only those they believed true. This was not so of the mission to Tito, which reported home virtually all that Tito claimed to have achieved, without being allowed to verify these reports on the spot. Tito never allowed them to see very much. And when individual officers grew to know the country too well, or learned to speak the language too fluently, their recall was asked for.

The combination of results was a false appraisal in London of all but one thing. It was falsely thought Mihailovich was doing nothing. It was rightly recognised that the Chetniks were at least as afraid of Communism as of Nazism. Mihailovich was certainly holding his fire while the Germans launched their heavy campaigns against his rivals, hoping that when the Allies finally landed they would have strength enough to lend worthwhile support, and that by that time Communism would present no great menace.

Such calculations, however, natural in Serbia, cut right across the Allies' plans at Teheran and before. Britain was then the warm and enthusiastic ally of the Soviet Union against Germany. The alliance was very different from today. It was therefore natural that, with this appraisal of the situation in London, help should more and more be given to those who, it was believed, were fighting the Hun.

It is worth mentioning that Tito's claims were broadcast by the radio station, Free Yugoslavia, which was established in Soviet territory. Those claims were watched and analysed in London and Washington with care. And on many occasions they were found to be false. An example comes to mind. The "town of Perast" was one day said to have been "encircled" by Tito's forces. A glance at the map showed first that Perast was a small village, next, that one side of it was sea, and then that the other side was a lofty mountain. "Encirclement" was obvious nonsense. But the conclusion to be drawn from a mounting list of such claims was, in fact, only drawn later on when the damage had been done.

The crucial point came late in 1944, when Mihailovich was naturally growing sour and when the Partisans had produced dossiers purporting to prove that he had "collaborated." The fact is that many of his subordinates, who were apt to be unruly, did collaborate. But the Partisans were never very far from doing the same. If they had had as

little support as Mihailovich, it is more than likely that they, instead of the Chetniks, would at least have lain low.

However, when this critical phase was reached, Mihailovich was put to the test. A series of operations were named by the Supreme Command which, in fact, he did not carry out. Why he did not is a mystery. The fact is he did not, and that clinched the matter then.

But to say that he took little active part in the war against the Germans is not to say that he should not have deserved our support if there had been support to spare. He had then a great part of Serbia with him against Communism, and today, whether he is a prisoner or free, he is the idol of the Serbs and their symbol. His death, which is already called for by the Yugoslav Press in advance of the "trial," would make him one more of Serbia's historic martyrs.

And a close scrutiny of the trial reports should show to what extent correspondent's reports are free. At least one correspondent of a responsible newspaper, on seeking a visa to report the trial, was told he could have it on condition his reports were "more objective than in the past."

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THE RECORD OF GENERAL MIHAILOVICH

THE trial of General Mihailovich at present confronts us with a mystery. It was, of course, bound to be obscure. Like all Balkan affairs the subject-matter is complicated, and the proceedings are being reported by people who are for the most part uninformed or biased, and are sub-edited by bewildered Londoners, who have not a notion of what the whole thing is about. Hence, to give one example of the prevailing confusion, there are represented as "confessions of collaboration," allusions to the collaboration of guerilla commanders whom Mihailovich had frequently reported to the Allies as rebels against his authority or as independent and mischievous rivals. But why does Mihailovich conduct his own defence as if he knew his own activities only from the files of *Time and Tide* or *The Nineteenth Century and After*? Why does he leave out, now and in these pressing circumstances, exactly what those of us who were defending his cause during the war had to leave out because of the censorship? Why is he, apparently, telling unpalatable lies about his own relations with various members of the British Military Mission, instead of telling the not discreditable truth as he reported it at the time to the Yugoslav Government and as it was confirmed by the reports of those members? Why, a hale man of fifty-odd, does he ramble like a centenarian? There hangs a veil between this man's ordeal and the world. The safest thing we can do at the moment is to go back and look at the past.

Drazha Mihailovich, a middle-aged professional soldier of Serb birth, a sometime lecturer on Tactics in the Yugoslav Staff College, had before the war been considering what his country could do if it should be invaded by the Nazis. He knew that his poverty-stricken country could not afford tanks or planes to beat back the *Panzer Divisions* and the *Luftwaffe*; but he also knew that his country was rich in courageous men and women and in wooded and mountainous tracts where tanks could not travel and bombing had to be blind. Therefore he decided the proper plan for the Yugoslav Army would be to withdraw before the invading Germans into the forests of the Bosnian and Serbian and Montenegrin uplands, to carry on guerilla warfare from those bases, and to descend when a British or Turkish force arrived in the Balkans to drive out the Germans, and help them by a general rising.

Mihailovich was well aware that there was no use bringing this plan before the Regent, Prince Paul. Nor was it any use laying it before M. Stoyadinovich, Yugoslav Prime Minister of that day. Mihailovich therefore visited by night a number of Yugoslav Left-wing politicians and acquainted them with his plan, mentioning, with terrible prophetic power, that he hoped he would not be the one who had to carry it out; he was a professional soldier, a technician, he said, and did not want to be a leader, for he had no gifts for conferences and the like. But when the time came, in 1941, there was none but he to carry out the plan.

To him, in 1943, sitting uncomfortably in a mountain fastness, in the midst of his ravaged land, the British Government addressed a singular request. It urged him to lead his forces in an attack on the Germans all over the country, and to destroy all lines of communications. Mihailovich answered, and repeated his answer again and again, with the most careful and painstaking exposition of his reasons, that he would not do this until he received an undertaking that an Allied Army was about to invade the Balkan Peninsula. He explained that the Germans were holding Yugoslavia not by numbers but by a policy of reprisals. Their troops were thinly dispersed over the country; but if the Yugoslav guerillas attacked them or committed any acts of sabotage the German authorities did not trouble to follow up the particular party of guerillas responsible but simply chose at random a number of Yugoslavs and put them to death. This policy meant, as Mihailovich pointed out with some impatience, that any widespread action against the Germans on the lines suggested by the British would unless the Allies were immediately at hand to follow up the attack on a grand scale, mean that an immense number of Yugoslavs would be massacred; and as about a third of the national population was killed or died of disease in the last war this would be a German victory of biological warfare. This would inevitably weaken the popularity of Mihailovich's troops and lower their own morale, as it would seem as if their General had led them to inflict a major disaster on their mother-country which had brought them no benefit whatsoever. In this event,

the Allies, when they did come to drive the Nazis out of the Balkans, would find no forces to help them, and a population which was either apathetic or hostile.

The War Office took no notice of these arguments, but told Mihailovich that he must attack the Germans, and destroy the lines of communications through Yugoslavia. When Mihailovich repeated his reasons for refusing, the War Office told him that the Partisans were doing far better than he was. This was in a sense true. The Partisans frequently defied the Germans' policy of reprisals by committing acts of sabotage; this was obviously due to the circumstances that their leaders took their orders from Moscow, and Russians were not likely to feel as tender as Yugoslavs about the shedding of Yugoslav blood. They were also doing far better in the way of propaganda.

In Tito, the Partisans had a leader who could hit any mug for six, and enjoy it. Fate had given him as a lovely present Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, who had been sent out as head of the British Military Mission. This gentleman sent back the most glowing reports on Tito's military might up till the day the Germans captured his headquarters, and then and afterwards represented Tito as pro-British and an ideal head of the Yugoslav State for co-operation with Great Britain. The course of history saw him fall from the favour of those who had acted on his advice. He is now staging a very singular come-back in the Press.

The War Office not only rebuked Mihailovich for not doing as well as Tito, it rebuked him because, while he said he could not fight the Germans, his troops frequently fought the Partisans. To this Mihailovich replied that when his troops fought the Partisans it was because the Partisans had attacked them; but that he had occasionally to initiate hostilities against the Partisans because they were seizing tracts of country in which they committed acts of sabotage contrary to his plan, destroying railway lines which he could use for his own purposes, taking levies of food which he had relied on for his commissariat, and setting up small soviets which impressed the peasants so unfavourably that they implored him to come and expel the invaders.

There was obviously something in what Mihailovich said. Had England been invaded, and Montgomery had been holding together the English army until the American expeditionary force arrived, he would probably have been displeased if a force under the leadership of Mr Harry Pollitt and Professor J. B. S. Haldane had overrun the country, carrying out raids and sabotage without consulting him, and enraging the population of the districts near, say Newbury and Thirsk and Thetford, by putting them under Communist rule. But the War Office was unmoved; satisfied by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean's breathless tales of what a staunch friend to Great Britain he had found in Tito, it went on nagging Mihailovich and pestering the Royal Yugoslav Government to dismiss him from his post as Minister of War.

It is no wonder that Mihailovich, who must have thought that he or the world was going mad, was often provoked to a pungency of expression which was unacceptable to London.

Very soon after the entry of Yugoslavia into the war it was rumoured that Mihailovich was a disguised Fascist who was collaborating with the Germans and the Italians. That rumour plainly came out of the Communist box. It was designed to divert English sympathy from Mihailovich and concentrate it on Tito; it was, in fact, the first application of the formula we have since seen used in every European country to discredit all non-Communist Resistance Movements.

It was a pity, and even worse than a pity, that the British Government allowed its case against Mihailovich, which rested on his inaction, to be confused with this rumour. The proofs of his innocence lay open to the eye here in London. Day by day, throughout the relevant period, Mihailovich had sent to his Government here in London a consistent and credible account of his activities, which set out in detail his disagreement with the Allies and his distrust of them. This account tallied so well with the reports sent home by the British Military Missions, established at Mihailovich's headquarters and elsewhere in the areas commanded by his troops, that various English officials from both the War Office and the Foreign Office constantly met officials of the Royal Yugoslav Government and conferred with them concerning the situation, without either side seriously questioning each other's common assumptions. That situation had all sorts of ingredients, including nobility, intransigence, ignorance, imbecility, but it was devoid of treachery.

So it seemed to those of us in London who tried to keep ourselves clean from war-fever; and now there comes a book* *Missfire* by Jasper Rootham which makes its quite clear that that is how the situation looked in Yugoslavia when it was regarded by honest and intelligent eyes. Colonel Rootham is, though he omits to tell us so, a distinguished young Civil Servant who insisted on finding his way into a fighting job. In May, 1943, after he had had two years in the Middle East, he and two other Englishmen were dropped by parachute in the picturesque district in the north-east corner of Serbia, just south and east of the point where Yugoslavia and Bulgaria meet.

The three men formed one of the British Missions accredited to General Mihailovich. His instructions were "to collect intelligence about Axis military dispositions and to encourage and promote resistance among the guerillas, particularly in the way of sabotage of lines of communication and industrial facilities working for the enemy." The aircraft which dropped them dropped at the same time supplies of explosives and arms, of which further instalments were to be delivered periodically. Those supplies were absolutely necessary if the sabotage were to be carried out. Only one-tenth of the troops at the command to which Colonel Rootham was posted were armed, and those inadequately. There was no difficulty in picking up the loaded parachutes or in distributing them, tasks which Colonel Rootham found the Mihailovich troops performed very competently. But these

**Missfire*—Jasper Rootham—Chatto & Windus—12s. 6d.

supplies came infrequently, were far fewer in number than was required, and were often quite unsuitable. The irregular arrivals of the aircraft imposed a severe strain on the Serbs, for the preparation of a reception party involved considerable organization. The irregularity of the supplies cannot have been due to weather conditions. Colonel Rootham records that in twelve months he received twenty-seven sorties. There can be no connection between these figures and flying weather.

To Mihailovich's troops the presence of English officers urging them to commit acts of sabotage and promising them arms for the purpose which however did not arrive, was naturally a constant exasperation. "It is not surprising that Velya and Lyubisha and their officers were somewhat bewildered," writes Colonel Rootham, "by the stream of instructions, apparently self-contradictory, and of promises apparently unfulfilled, with which we were bombarded over the wireless by the Middle East authorities." It is the one flaw in Colonel Rootham's book that he seems not yet to see that he and his companions must have been exceedingly exasperating to the Serbs for other reasons.

Quite obviously the first care of the authorities who sent out these missions should have been to see that all members of them were properly briefed regarding the permanent and temporary factors in the Yugoslav situation. They were apparently not briefed at all. It was apparently not until he and his friend Erik had been eight months in the country that they realized the elementary fact that the political differences between the various sections of the population were largely due to religious differences. He also regarded as a legend and still seems to do so to some extent, the story of the part played by Croatia in the collapse of Yugoslavia, yet the mutiny of the Croat regiments, which had its sequel in the emergence of the Croat Division in the German Forces, is a verified historical fact; and one individual case of Croat treachery, to which he alludes with scepticism, could have been proved even then by the testimony of many persons who had left Yugoslavia subsequent to the German invasion.

What is still more astonishing is that although the difference between the British Government and Mihailovich notoriously related to reprisals, no effort had been made to instruct the members of the mission what the Yugoslavs had already suffered. "First and foremost, and coming to us as a complete surprise," he says of his discussions with the Yugoslavs, "was the belief in the massacres of Serbs living in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia by their Croatian and Moslem fellow Yugoslavs." He apparently still looks on this as a folk-tale with a basis of truth. Yet the report of these massacres was framed by responsible people and smuggled out of Yugoslavia by a highly respectable professional man; its authenticity was questioned here by Roman Catholics who had, in the end, to admit regretfully that, although the figures were exaggerated, it was in substance true. Colonel Rootham must, when he tried to pin down what was fact and what was fancy in what appeared to him to be popular fantasies, have been about ten times as unattractive to the Serbs as an American would have been who came

here in 1942 and tried to discover how much we had dreamed up about the Battle of Britain. The department who briefed him must have been either very stupid or much too clever.

When Colonel Rootham, in response to repeated injunctions of the Headquarters, Middle East, persuaded his local commander into taking part in an operation against lines of communication, the results were not satisfactory. The party went to a point overlooking the Danube and shot at a German tug with a 20 mm. gun. This had been dropped without any telescopic sights, and in spite of requests none had been sent. One of the Englishmen had devised a substitute with two horse hairs. With the ammunition they had been able to fire nine shots, of which five scored hits. The Serbs rather thought that the result would have been different if the gun had had its telescopic sights. True that the captain of the tug was killed, Danube traffic suffered some interruption for some days, and the tug had to be towed downstream for repairs. But on the bridge of the steamer there had been an agent working for another British Military Mission. Such an accident might happen at any time, as the means of communication were obviously poor and the Missions never knew what each other was doing. Four days later the Germans issued a leaflet describing the incident and announcing that as a reprisal one hundred and fifty sympathisers of the movement of Drazha Mihailovich had been shot in Belgrade. When Headquarters, Middle East were informed of this incident they made no reply.

This was, of course, only a matter of a local command. Mihailovich's own experience had hardly been happier. In October under severe pressure from Brigadier Armstrong, who had been sent out a month before, Mihailovich had abandoned his determination to play a waiting game and had made a raid on the important junction of Vishegrad. He drove out the Germans, sabotaged the railway line to Uzhitsé, and withdrew according to plan. The Germans did not return to Vishegrad, but Tito occupied the empty town. Not long afterwards the B.B.C. announced in its European Service that Marshal Tito's National Liberation Army had freed Vishegrad and destroyed the communications between it and Uzhitsé.

Later a double operation was planned, by which Colonel Rootham's unit and another local command supervised by Brigadier Armstrong should simultaneously have destroyed two bridges, one each on the two railway lines that run from north to south joining Belgrade to Greece. This was never carried out because Mihailovich never gave the order to attack, and the local commander of the forces which should have acted under Brigadier Armstrong's orders was away with almost all his men, repelling an eastward drive into Serbia of Tito's men. Colonel Rootham speculates on Mihailovich's motives. "Was it not made clear to him that it was his last chance with the British? Or was he genuinely prevented from giving the order to act by the need—more pressing in his eyes—of keeping the Partisans from breaking into Serbia? I do not know."

The statement which Mihailovich sent to his friends in London shortly after this incident made it plain that he knew well that this was the last chance with the British but it appeared to him impossible to take it. He had received a call for help from peasants who had reason to think their lives and their property in danger, since there was a civil war and they were being attacked by their opponents; and he considered it more important to obey that call from people of his own blood, than to perform an act, certainly dangerous to those same people, and probably useless in pursuance of a policy imposed on him by aliens whom he suspected of complete carelessness towards Yugoslav interests.

What grounds he had for that suspicion are proved by two sentences, perhaps the most significant sentences in the whole of *Missfire* in which Colonel Rootham defines that policy. (It must be noted that this book has passed the War Office). "On my return I found a number of telegrams from Headquarters, Middle East, which said that our strategic needs were immediate action against lines of communication in Yugoslavia. This, I suppose, was part of the 'cover plan' designed to confuse the enemy about the coming invasion of the mainland."

Proofs are not lacking that this supposition was correct. At this same time an officer in the British Army, one William M. Jones, a Toronto insurance agent, was travelling about Croatia and Slovenia issuing proclamations which were posted on walls and trees, calling on the Croats and Slovenes to rise against Fascism because the time of liberation was at hand. The purpose of this action, whether he knew it or not, was to persuade the Germans to believe that the British were about to invade Yugoslavia instead of Sicily. A number of the Croats and Slovenes who obeyed this call and gathered together in the woods were massacred. About the same time, too, reports reached unoccupied France through Marseilles that similar incidents had taken place in Greece.

It is extremely difficult to believe that this step can have been justifiable from a military point of view, in an area then so subject to enemy reconnaissance as the Mediterranean, and it is difficult to imagine a more abominable step from a humanitarian point of view. There are sacrifices which we have no right to demand from our Allies, if we are not to put ourselves on the same level as the Nazis. The case of Mihailovich can only be judged if we imagine again that England was invaded by the Germans; and that Montgomery at the head of the remnants of an English Army, had been asked to engage in a course of action which would have brought virtual extermination of the English people, in order to cover the landing of an American expeditionary force in France. If he had shrunk from the responsibility, that would have given no man the right to call him a traitor.

Colonel Rootham makes it quite clear that he did not suspect Mihailovich of collaboration with the Axis. He describes it as "a tremendous shock" when, on November 29th, 1943, he received a signal from the Middle East which asked "first, whether he could estimate the reactions of the local commanders if Mihailovich were to be replaced,

and secondly, whether any of them had to our knowledge received orders from Mihailovich." He makes the definite statement that "no suggestion of collaboration with the Axis or thought of his removal had ever occurred to us," and answered that Mihailovich's organisation would probably fall to pieces without him, and that "we had no evidence, nor did we believe that the commanders we knew had orders to collaborate with the Axis," and could think of only one who was in the least likely to obey them if they were given. Nor, later, at Mihailovich's headquarters could he find any evidence of treachery. He tells a painful story of how one of Mihailovich's commanders, who had made an indiscreet but very rational attempt to save a village from reprisals, was shot for treating with the enemy.

There, indeed, is a sense in which he found evidence of German "collaboration" with the Mihailovich troops, but only a special sense, and in that sense the British and Americans were as guilty. It was the German game not to interfere with Mihailovich's troops in order that the war between them and the Partisans should continue and countless Yugoslavs should be killed; and it is probable that Mihailovich's commanders were aware of that policy. "This may be described as collaboration," writes Colonel Rootham grimly, "I think that it was." But he goes on to point out that many of the Partisans who were engaged in this fratricidal warfare were using arms supplied by the British and Americans, who were lavishing supplies on Tito on a scale that made him and his companions gasp when they heard of it. On one occasion sixty sorties were dropped on the Partisans in one night. In view of Mihailovich's pitiful lack of arms described by Colonel Rootham there can be no doubt who must have been the aggressor in this civil war.

"We could see no cause in that situation for anything but tears," writes Colonel Rootham; and he might have added shame, for that he certainly felt. A peculiarly unpleasant incident occurred a fortnight or so after the first suggestion that Mihailovich was collaborating with the Axis, ten days after Teheran. Middle East suddenly sent a telegram to Colonel Rootham giving him discretion to lead his party to the nearest detachments of Partisans, giving him the position of three such detachments. This naturally appeared to Colonel Rootham as an invitation to offer a gratuitous insult to the Serbs. "Whatever their faults, I regarded the men amongst whom we had been living for the past six months as our friends, and it seemed to me that to try to escape from them on the quiet would be a scurvy trick. Quite apart from its moral aspect, if anything was calculated to turn them wholly against us, and tempt them to use violence, that would be it. Never before had I felt so acutely the conflict between duty and what seemed to be personal honour, nor received orders so distasteful. For to be blunt, I did not want to leave the Serbs, and the organization of Mihailovich which represented them."

Colonel Rootham was to feel more acute shame three months later, on the eve of his departure from the country. One day he saw Serbian

peasants laughing and shouting as a great fleet of Fortresses and Liberators flew overhead, to bombard, as they thought Axis territory. It was peculiarly unfortunate that they should have in fact bombed Belgrade so intensively that many civilian inhabitants were buried in a common grave, and that they chose for that day Easter Sunday, the supreme day of religious and secular rejoicing in the Balkan year. "It is no doubt unreasonable to expect that the Allied Air Force in the Mediterranean," writes Colonel Rootham in chilly irony, "should have had on its staff an adviser about ecclesiastical festivals in the Orthodox Church. . . . As for the Germans and the Quislings, it was, of course, the biggest propaganda windfall they had ever had."

This is a senseless story. Or is it, on the contrary, a story disconcerting in the glimpses of a sense cold as steel? For it would have been most convenient for some people if one of Mihailovich's commanders, seeing the representative of a long-distrusted Ally stealing away to the camp of his enemy, had shot him; it must have been most convenient for some people when the inhabitants of Belgrade learned to hate the British and the Americans. What is the story behind the story? Granted that the British policy in Yugoslavia was a great man's moment of imbecility, who furnished that imbecility with its pabulum, who exploited that moment? What constructive mind was behind the messages sent by Headquarters, Middle East, which, individually inept, imposed a pattern of action that quietly and irresistibly extinguished Mihailovich, exalted Tito, and drove England for ever out of the Balkans?

The results of these messages may be considered accidental, but only if one accepts the hypothesis, at which the mind revolts, that a monkey banging at random at the keys of a typewriter throughout eternity is bound in the course of time to recompose all the works of Shakespeare. Did chance so give Blimp that kind of insensate genius? Or is there a Mr Zilliacus in the British Army as well as in the House of Commons? Surely we would be safer if we knew; and safety is a pleasant thing. It cannot be agreeable to sit among enemies who speak's one's own tongue and wait for an ungentle end, as Mihailovich waits today. But better that, than to make excuses, and wipe one's mouth and say one did not eat, and go on lying; and put other honest men like Colonel Rootham under the necessity of writing books icy with disgust.

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DIRTY WORK AT THE CROSS-ROADS

THE cross-roads mentioned above are situated in the Balkans in general, and in Yugoslavia in particular, and the dirty work was done during the war. In the 1914-18 war the Allies went down some very dirty side-streets when they concluded the secret

treaties with Italy, and in the 1939-45 war some queer things were done in the Balkans. Some gleams of light are thrown along dark passages by the Mihailovich trial. A great deal of the evidence which is coming out is—in our belief—completely unreliable. We have our own sources of information about the Mihailovich-Tito business, and we have never been more sure that history will justify us when we assert that the information which caused the British Government to abandon Mihailovich and transfer its support, moral and material, to Tito was and will be proved to have been false. Mihailovich made his mistakes, but his policy was based on two beliefs. These were, one, that Tito was a Russian puppet and the Croats were prepared to do anything to get on top of the Serbs (religious disputation between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Vatican comes into this); two, that the pressure which the British brought to bear upon him to take certain military action against the Germans in Yugoslavia showed a complete ignorance of what was practical.

If you turn back to *News-Letter* 441 (21.12.44) you will see that we supported the view that the best thing to do was to back Tito.

Why did we do this? Because our information was the same as that upon which H.M. Government based their change of policy. Later we began to get some further information. We could hardly believe that the Cabinet was being led up the garden path, but our new information was so categorical and disinterested that we began to change our mind and said so (see *News-Letters* 445, 448, 450, 463, 464 and 468). Last week we received news which convinces us beyond doubt that the members of the Government in 1944 were misled and they now know they were misled. A man's life is at stake; let those who should speak open their mouths.

Reprinted from an article by Kenneth Greenlees in "The Tablet" (London) of July 16th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

THE RECORD OF MIHAILOVICH

GENERAL MIHAILOVICH, former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, former Minister of War in the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile, is on trial for his life, and the moment is opportune to try to understand how a patriot, an ally and friend, finds himself being charged with treason and collaboration with the enemy.

The writer's interest in the story of Mihailovich and its implications started in September, 1941, when the first British officer left the Middle East to contact Mihailovich. After a year as staff officer on the planning and operational sections, the writer joined Mihailovich early in 1943, and served with him until the mission was officially withdrawn in the middle of 1944. He continued to keep in indirect contact and

followed the story from Italy, Austria, Germany and England. He came to know Mihailovich and his staff intimately; his knowledge has not blinded him to their mistakes and errors, but it has bred respect and understanding. It is not treachery to decline to accept a revolution.

In the spring of 1941, Colonel Mihailovich, a regular officer in the Yugoslav Army, found himself in the hills with a small group of officers and men. His country had been overrun by the Germans and was being partitioned between them, the Italians and the Bulgarians. Reports reached him of other groups of the beaten army hiding in the hills, all over the country. Mihailovich, who had always been a friend of the British and hated the Axis and its Nazi doctrines, who had written several papers on the conduct of guerilla warfare in the Yugoslav mountains, little knowing that he would soon be the first to put his theories into practice, resolved to unite his people into one Army of Resistance and to continue the fight for freedom side by side with Britain, at that time the sole surviving opponent in the field against Nazism.

It seems extraordinary that a man who threw in his lot with the British when they were at their lowest ebb and his own country had been overrun by the enemy should now be accused of collaborating with the same enemy at a time when, beaten, they were preparing to withdraw from his country and the Allies were heading for certain victory.

But let us return to Mihailovich in the hills. His plan was to organise his army for the day when the Allied armies would land on the coast of the country, to assist them by seizing and holding for them vulnerable points and harassing the enemy lines of communication, and generally to co-ordinate his plan with that of the Allies. He was not to know that no such Allied landing was ever to take place.

In point of fact, having established contact by wireless with the British in 1941, having then received liaison officers and missions from the British and later from the Americans (his request for a Russian Mission was inexplicably refused), he was asked to take the offensive immediately. At that stage there was no chance of an Allied landing, and lack of aircraft precluded a supporting air offensive and gravely limited the quantity of supplies which could be dropped to his forces. Furthermore, it was difficult for him to understand such a request, since resistance movements in other parts of Europe were being urged to lie low and await the day when the Allies would be in a stronger position to help them.

His promotion to be Deputy-Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War brought two further major problems. Firstly, being responsible to his King and Government, exiled in London, but being in communication with them only indirectly through the British, and never being placed under the command of the Allied Chiefs of Staff, orders from the latter came as requests rather than commands, without it being made clear whether they bore the approval of his Government.

Secondly, Mihailovich found that for any small act of sabotage on his part the Germans killed first several, then hundreds, finally thousands, of innocent Yugoslavs. He thus had to weigh up the value of his efforts for the Allies against the harm to be suffered by his own people, on whom he and his forces were entirely dependent for shelter, food, recruits, but above all, for information. His responsibility towards his people increased a thousandfold with his promotion. On this point he appears to have received very little understanding or sympathy from the Allies.

But dominating the situation were his relations with and attitude towards Tito and his Communist-led Partisans. The German attack on Russia was the signal for Tito and his followers to take to the hills. Tito's object, like that of Mihailovich, was to liberate Yugoslavia from Axis occupation. But their ideals for the future of the country were very different. Tito, the Communist, wished to establish a republic; Mihailovich, the loyalist, sought the return of the monarchy. The Germans were quick to seize this opportunity of sowing the seeds of civil war, and soon succeeded. At first Mihailovich and Tito tried to work together, but the combination of army officer and politician, of monarchist and republican, proved impossible. Tito and his forces withdrew from Serbia, where Mihailovich remained in control until late in 1944, while Tito and his forces gradually became the stronger in the rest of the country.

In the spring of 1943 the Allies established contact with Tito, and followed this with supplies. Giving material support to both sides aggravated the situation for Mihailovich, who came to consider Tito an even greater menace than the Germans to his King and Government, to whom he was directly responsible.

Finally, in 1944, it was decided that the short-term military view must take precedence over the long-term political one. The Allied Missions were withdrawn from Mihailovich, who faithfully carried out the instructions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief to take all necessary steps to ensure the success of the evacuation. Mihailovich was thus left without Allied support or supplies to continue the struggle to free the country from Nazi occupation and the threatened rule of the Communists, who were being strengthened by increasingly large Allied supplies sent for use against the Germans, but which Mihailovich could prove were being used to a great extent against his own forces. Whilst attempting this herculean task, he found time to rescue, succour and evacuate to safety many hundreds of Allied arimen who had been shot down over Yugoslavia. Reports continued to come out of the country of his Allied sympathies, even though abandoned by them.

When Germany was finally defeated, Mihailovich continued the struggle against the new régime of Tito, which appeared to him as oppressive on the people as that of the Nazis. He was finally captured by the forces of Tito in March, 1946, when stricken by typhus, having spent weeks on a stretcher, carried from one hide-out to another. Ten days after his capture, when he had been interrogated and statements

obtained, the news was released to the world, and it was announced that he would be tried.

The man who in the dark days of 1941, when his country was overrun by the all-powerful Nazis, chose to follow his friends the British in their fight for a free democratic world; who put his trust in the Atlantic Charter and had the courage of his convictions to carry on the fight even when it appeared that he had been abandoned by his Allies and friends; who for five years was to a large part of the Yugoslav nation their leader in resistance, their champion of the four freedoms—this man is now made to appear in court as a mumbling, broken old man who refuses the assistance of his former Allies at his defence; who seems to take no interest in his own trial, his own fate or that of his country for which he fought so valiantly and courageously. Such is the effect of the present-day method of interrogation; such is the strength of those who wish to kill “the Mihailovich legend.”

Meanwhile, the four Great Powers continue to do their utmost to ensure that justice is done at Nuremberg, but fail to see that in the eyes of posterity such efforts will be wasted if at the same time they fail to ensure similar justice for Mihailovich. The British Government should have requested that British officers who had served with Mihailovich be allowed to give evidence at the trial. The refusal of the American request for similar facilities should not absolve us from asking. Furthermore, a verbatim report of the trial should have been demanded. The correspondents who are reporting the trial cannot do more than summarise. A summary, however good, is not enough to allow for a fair and comprehensive judgment of the case to be made. Will we be sure, after this trial, that the smaller nations will be convinced that we are the true champions of their rights and liberties? Will we be free of the accusation that we sacrificed the smaller country to appease the greater?

These are not idle hypothetical questions, but questions which the writer has often been asked by members of these small nations. When he was in Yugoslavia with Mihailovich in 1943 and 1944, he found the answer easy at first. He was convinced that we were the champions of justice for all, small or large. But as, from the field, he observed the change of Allied policy as he was trying to justify Mihailovich to the Allies and the Allies to Mihailovich, the answer became more and more difficult. Now, observing our attitude to the Mihailovich trial, and to the difficulties of the other small nations, his original answer seems more and more wrong. To one who watched the building up of Mihailovich from the beginning, who served with Mihailovich for eighteen months, who continued to follow his gallant struggle from afar till the bitter end, the apparent attitude of indifference in the moral issues involved is painful and shocking. Surely this is not the way for a Great Power to give a moral lead to the rest of the world.

Reprinted from the leading article in "The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post" (London) of July 16th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

PENALTY OF ERROR

GENERAL MIHAILOVICH, Minister of War in the Yugoslav Government in exile, has been sentenced to die before a firing squad for collaboration with the Axis. In the eyes of his avowed opponents, who were also his judges, there was apparently no difference between the activities of the Quisling Government established by the Germans in Belgrade and the Yugoslav Government in London, for members of both were lumped together under the same condemnation. Even those in this country who were most bitterly disappointed with the conduct of General Mihailovich in the latter part of the war have never denied him credit for his early assistance in pinning down many Axis divisions. To maintain that his collaboration dated from 1941 when the Government of General Simovich in the words of Mr Churchill, “saved the soul of Yugoslavia,” merely raises fresh doubts as to whether it existed in 1944 and 1945.

Even though Mihailovich was found guilty this central paradox still remains. Why should the man who resisted the Axis invader at the darkest hour collaborate with him when the tide of battle had turned and Allied victory was in sight? There can be little doubt from his own testimony that Mihailovich did not regard himself at any moment as a collaborationist. In his mind, however, the freedom of Yugoslavia, not the speedy defeat of Germany, appears to have had priority. If he considered that freedom threatened as much by Russia and Marshal Tito's Partisans as by the Germans and Italians, his activities might have aided the Axis cause. It was simpler for other Allied leaders to take the objective view that nothing should be done to hamper any group fighting the Germans. Yet even here Mihailovich does not appear to have been entirely at fault, for on three occasions he sought to reach an understanding with Marshal Tito.

In the long perspective of history the true status of this controversial figure may be seen more clearly. His contemporaries can do little but conclude that he was a victim of fate caught in the whirlpool of events which he could not control.

Reprinted from an article in "The Whitehall News" (London) of July 19th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

POLITICAL MURDER

GENERAL MIHAILOVICH is dead, shot by a firing squad in Belgrade. This political murder, carried out by Marshal Tito's appointed judges, was committed on the national hero of Serbia and on the man who, in 1941, brought Yugoslavia into the war on the Allied side. It is, therefore, one of the most revolting examples of

abandonment by the Western Democracies of their former Allies in East-Central Europe.

The main accusation against Mihailovich who, after the collapse of Yugoslavia, was the first to start there guerilla warfare against the Nazis, was that after an initial period of great activity, he withdrew into the Serbian mountains and remained there comparatively passive. This was the basis of accusing him of "collaborationism."

The fact, however, is that Mihailovich was a true patriot of Yugoslavia and as such, considered it his first duty to appreciate realistically the interest of his nation. Consequently, he thought the price which the Yugoslav people were paying for his armed activity, the price of mass executions carried out by the Germans in retaliation, much too high for the actual results he could achieve. He was confirmed in this attitude when, after Teheran, the Allies gave up the plan of invading the Balkans.

Tito, on the other hand, was never a free agent; he was consistently carrying out the directives of Soviet policy in the Balkans, and so, was never hampered by any patriotic scruples. Thus, he could wage the Partisan war, disregarding the bloody reprisals taken by the Germans on the civilian population.

One may ask now what would have been the fate of Mihailovich if, being less realistic and more romantic than he actually was, he had continued his fight irrespective of the consequences. Would he, then, have escaped the accusation of the Belgrade court that he betrayed Yugoslavia?

The answer to this question is easily provided by the fate of another Allied commander, the Polish General Bor-Komorowski, who led the Warsaw rising. General Bor did exactly the opposite of what Mihailovich has done. In accordance with the romantic and heroic Polish mentality, he disregarded realistic political considerations—he fought to the bitter end and to prove the intransigence of the Polish resistance against the Nazis, he did not even hesitate to lay Warsaw in ruins. And yet, neither he nor the Polish Home Army commanded by him, have escaped the accusation by the present rulers of Poland of being pro-Nazi, Fascist, and collaborationists. General Bor avoided the fate of being tried like Mihailovich only because he was outside the grip of the Warsaw administration. His successor in the command of the Polish Home Army, General Okulicki, was, however, less lucky; ten years of penal servitude, the sentence of the Moscow trial against 16 Polish leaders, was his reward for his fine resistance record.

Thus the tragic fate of General Mihailovich is by no means a consequence of what he has done or left undone, but simply of the fact that, declining to be a Communist tool, he was a true representative of the independent spirit of Serbia—as Bor is of Poland. The political fate of both had been decided long ago, at the Conference of Teheran and Yalta, when East-Central Europe was then recognised as belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence. Both could do nothing to change this, but at least the realistic Mihailovich did not have to reproach himself with having destroyed Belgrade—in vain.

Reprinted from an article in "The Economist" (London) of July 20th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

TWO TRIALS OF GENERAL MIHAILOVICH

DURING the last two months there have been two trials of General Drazha Mihailovich—one in Belgrade and the other in New York. The former was an official trial before a military court constituted by the present Yugoslav Government and has resulted in his condemnation and execution; the latter was a shadow trial before a "Commission of Inquiry," composed of four private, but prominent, individuals, including Adolph Berle, formerly Assistant Secretary of State. The Commission in New York pronounced no verdict, but merely invited Americans who had served in Yugoslavia during the war to testify under oath concerning the charges made against Mihailovich. The "shadow trial" is a specially American institution which has been frequently invoked in cases where a miscarriage of justice is alleged to have taken place or to be intended; is comparatively unfamiliar in this country, though one was organised in London following the *Reichstag* Fire Trial in Berlin. The occasion for the shadow trial of Mihailovich was the refusal of the Yugoslav Government to agree to the American Government's request for American officers to have facilities for giving evidence at the trial.

The exclusion from the trial of both American and British officers who had served in Allied liaison with Mihailovich and were prepared to appear as witnesses for the defence was rendered the more striking by the freedom with which the names of these officers were bandied about during the trial and the most serious allegations made against them. Indeed, to judge from the reporting of the trial by the Soviet Press and radio, these officers and the Governments they represented were the real villains of the piece; Mihailovich in this version became a mere puppet manipulated by anti-Soviet "reactionaries" in London and Washington. In the absence of all foreign testimony the trial was conducted with no defence witnesses who were not liable to reprisals by the O.Z.N.A., and what this means can only be appreciated by those familiar with the methods of secret police pressure. The procedure of the trial was formally correct, but the shadow of the concentration camp lay across the courtroom clearly visible to Yugoslavs who have lived for the past year under the Tito Régime. Foreign journalists present at the trial commented on the "incoherence" of the defence witnesses; the wonder is that there were any at all thus to risk their lives for a lost cause. It seems that the authorities did not care to have foreign witnesses who could speak without fear for themselves or their families; at any rate, there is no other plausible explanation for the refusal to admit the evidence of persons who had the exceptional opportunities of observing the events under investigation and were not themselves directly involved in Yugoslav internal politics.

In the circumstances, the Belgrade trial cannot be regarded as a genuine judicial effort to ascertain the truth. This is not to say that there was no substance at all in the charges brought against Mihailovich. The real issue, however, was a world-wide controversy between East and West and between rival ideologies in which the fate of Yugoslavia happened, through the accidents of war and strategy, to become involved.

Reprinted from an article by the Diplomatic Correspondent of "The Catholic Times" (London) of July 26th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

WHAT IS TREASON?

GENERAL MIHAILOVICH has been put to death for having served his country to the best of an honest intention. He was shot by a band of foreign sponsored Communist revolutionaries who succeeded in conquering the country, and who, by virtue of their authority, so usurped, gave a legal veneer to the process of murder.

During the so-called trial no evidence was admitted except that collected by the murderers themselves. Neither American nor British evidence was allowed. Official representations made for instance, by the British Foreign Office, and transmitted in the correct diplomatic procedure to "the Yugoslav Government," were not passed on to what was called the "Court." Nor was such a suppression of the evidence in the least surprising, because the Government and the judges were one and the same people.

What General Mihailovich was accused of was labelled "treason." How serious was the legal pretence, could be gauged from the fact that in advance of the "trial" the Yugoslav Government issued a pamphlet about Mihailovich in which the word "treason" appeared in the title.

In fact there was no trial at all. What took place was an elaborately staged act of propaganda, which is the normal Communist way of life.

Now the interesting thing—interesting, that is as an indication of the depth to which the modern world has sunk, is that this "Yugoslav Government" was accorded all the privileges of diplomatic practice. In order (one must presume) not to jeopardise the technical state of peace obtaining between the British and Yugoslav Governments, *The Times* newspaper in London published a leading article on the condemnation of Mihailovich, arguing that as Mihailovich had taken action against the actual Government of Yugoslavia, he was in fact properly convicted of treason.

What does that argument amount to? Mihailovich had led the Yugoslav people in resistance against the German invader until he found that under the cloak of a rival resistance movement Marshal Tito was in effect engaged in conquering Yugoslavia on behalf of Moscow.

In so far therefore as Mihailovich continued to drive out the Germans he was merely helping to hand his country over to the Russians. It was a cruel dilemma.

In his honest belief the Communist menace was an even greater menace than that of the Nazis. He therefore resisted both. Inasmuch as the Communists (with the help of the British Government, which stopped their supplies to Mihailovich and sent them instead to Tito) won their fight and succeeded in setting up what was in truth a foreign occupying Government, Mihailovich became technically a traitor to that Government.

The world is upside down. Mihailovich, an honest Yugoslav patriot, fell a victim and a martyr to a successful Communist invasion from the East. The invaders are now engaged in suppressing Christianity in the country. Let us at any rate be honest and courageous, and recognise what has taken place for what it truly is.

Reprinted from an article by Robert Speaight in "Time and Tide" (London) of August 17th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

MEDITATION ON THE DEATH OF MIHAILOVICH

AS I sit writing these lines in the early dawn before a motionless sea, Mihailovich is facing the firing squad. I am not concerned with what the first of the *Maquisards* is supposed to have done or not to have done; what worries me is that nobody bothers about him . . . no, I am not going to pray for this world any longer, as it sits crouched on the atomic bomb, yellow with hatred, with its tongue babbling of social justice and its heart empty of love."

Soon after reading this extract from Georges Bernano's article in *La Bataille*, I came across a paragraph by Jean and Jerome Tharaud* which told me that the last book Mihailovich was known to read was a volume of Maupassant. It is tantalizing not to know which story or novel he had chosen or found at hand, but it is not surprising that the tortured and betrayed patriot should have gone to his death bilious with the hatred of humanity. And then, as if in confirmation of his pessimism, I read that *The Times* gave its imprimatur to the verdict. The gentlemen of fortune who now direct the destinies of Serbia do not believe in an undue preparation for eternity. But there were still twenty-four precious hours during which the remnants of the Christian world could have conveyed its opinion to the man whom convention compels me to call Marshal Tito. The Professors of Printing House Square did not lose a minute—they told him to go ahead. And so the murder of Drazha Mihailovich becomes, like the murder of Jeanne d'Arc, a case for the English conscience.

*See Jean and Jerome Tharaud's article in *Le Figaro* on page 120

It may be argued that after Miss Rebecca West's* conclusive article in *Time and Tide*, there is nothing more to be said about Mihailovich. In a sense, that is true; no further argument is necessary. But it is of the essence of this particular judicial murder that men will go on discussing it for a very long time to come and those Englishmen who retain a memory of justice will ask themselves how far they or their fellow-countrymen were responsible. If they have lived through the last few years, it is not difficult to take the questions out of their mouths. Not for the first time, they will say, men have betrayed their friends to placate their enemies; but all the same it was an ironic accident that the Prime Minister who did more than any other single man to save the shreds of European freedom in 1940, should have consummated the most ignoble, the most fatuous, the most gratuitous and certainly one of the most fatal errors in the annals of British diplomacy. Having said this, they will admit that Mr Churchill at least made the beginnings of an *amende honorable*—and for a great man that is already a great deal—but they will ask what happened to all those other voices that were so loud for liberty in 1940? Why were they so curiously silent, those *porte-paroles* of the national conscience, before the advance of an atheistic Communism, which, having no use for God, naturally has no use for man?

I am writing this far from home, and it is rueful to reflect that even here, where the Alps rise in their eternal poetry beyond the Lac de Bourget, one can still be asphyxiated by the fumes of English hypocrisy. Perhaps the old voices have spoken. I do not know. Perhaps Mr Priestley has returned to the microphone. Perhaps Mr Kingsley Martin has remembered that when Czechoslovakia was murdered at Munich he still considered murder a capital offence. Perhaps someone has even introduced the thin end of a principle into the foreign policy of *The Economist*. I am sorry to be so personal. But these were the people who once told us what was what, and their immense public will be curious to know what they think about the murder of Mihailovich. One is beginning to be able to count them on the fingers of two hands—the Just Men of the Left. Mr Gollancz, Lord Beveridge, Lord Pakenham, and a few others. They have been alone for all too long. The Labour Party, which has always derived its strength from English idealism and the English instinct for natural law, has need of some moral breakwaters. In the nature of things—or at least in the nature of politics—Mr Bevin cannot go on for ever. And there is always Dr Dalton.

These are speculations; but when we enter the realm of certainty to find out what has happened to the English conscience, we discover that *The Times* has approved the verdict. We know very little about the theology of Printing House Square, but somewhere among those panelled rooms there must surely be an altar dedicated to the *fait accompli*. The memory of *The Times*, which is more or less the same

*See Rebecca West's article in *Time and Tide* on page 70

thing as the memory of mankind, is presumably immune from the pain of inconvenient reminders; so I shall hardly flutter an editorial hair if I recall the good advice given to the Czechs to sacrifice themselves to the Germans, or to the Poles to sacrifice themselves to the Russians, or to the Greeks and Yugoslavs to hand themselves over to the same benefactors. They are quite simple—the formula of the new realism. Find out which of the Great Powers, at any given moment, is most imminently hostile to the basic principles of European freedom, then persuade all your friends to commit hara-kiri in order that the Power in question may become practically invincible; finally, “having exhausted every reasonable compromise”—for that is the official meiosis for the betrayal of an Ally—show a wide-eyed surprise and an immense moral indignation when your own positions are attacked. These are, in one respect of course, the politics of Bedlam; but they are also, viewed at a more profound level, the politics of a fundamental scepticism, and they illustrate very vividly the relation between Truth and Action. Like Pontius Pilate, *The Times* asks itself the question “What is truth?” and like Pilate it is careful to wash its hands. But somehow I doubt whether Pilate himself would have welcomed a leading article in approbation of his own sentence on the day when Roman justice succumbed to a show of hands.

The death of Mihailovich will have served its mournful purpose if it makes clear to the most confused intelligence that there have been two wars in Europe and that our Allies of the first are our enemies of the second. The professional revolutionary whom conviction compels me to call Marshal Tito, has explained it to us. The sentence on Mihailovich was “a sentence on international reaction”; after all, this convinced Orthodox Serb had not scrupled to have “certain dealings with the Catholic Church.” Very well, we know where we are; but if we are to be saved—for this is indeed a matter of salvation—we must recognize the enemy within the gates of our country, and, even more importantly, within the gates of our own conscience. There is an old formula which tells us the ways in which sin may be committed, *cogitatione, locutione, opere et omissione*; it is a formula from which there is no escape. Let everyone who has been occupied these last few years with politics or publicity ask himself whether he is wholly innocent of the blood of this just man.

Reprinted from an article by Donovan Touche in “*Truth*” (London) of December 27th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

THE MYSTERY OF MIHAILOVICH

WAS General Mihailovich a great patriot, foully done to death, or was he a collaborator? That is the mystery of Mihailovich. I would not have presumed to intervene in this delicate and disturbing debate but for the privilege of my acquaintance with a very

gallant gentleman, Major Kenneth Greenlees, who for eighteen months served with General Mihailovich as British Liaison Officer until our Military Mission was withdrawn in 1944. What the soldier said is evidence in this case.

In the dark days of 1941 Mihailovich was the loyal friend and Ally of Great Britain. Then in June, 1941, Germany attacked Russia, and the Communist Tito took to the hills. Tito was a Russian-trained revolutionary agent, and as head of the Communist party in Yugoslavia had opposed the war with Germany so long as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact held good. He now took up arms in the interest of Russia, although hitherto indifferent to the cause of Yugoslav independence. His intervention greatly complicated the problem of the patriot Mihailovich, who now had not only to defend his country from the Germans but also from eventual communisation, especially after he became the recognised representative in the field of the Royal Yugoslav Government. The astute Tito quickly grasped that the Russians would be unable to provide any material assistance for some considerable time. He, accordingly, set himself to win the confidence and support of the British, and later the Americans. By getting their support transferred from Mihailovich to himself, Tito would bring about the overthrow both of Mihailovich and of the King's Government, which he upheld, and obtained the control of Yugoslavia for Russia. The Anglo-Americans would thus be induced to co-operate in the destruction of the very government which they had recognised. To achieve this he had to convince the British that his Partisans were causing far more harm to the Axis forces than were the Chetniks, and exaggerated bulletins were issued as to the Partisan exploits and claiming credit for those of the Chetniks. The only reply Mihailovich could make to this was to increase his own action against the Germans, which entailed appalling reprisals upon the population out of all proportion to any possible value of his military action. He soon came to the conclusion that continuous small actions were more harmful to his people than helpful to the Allies. The meagre scale of his supplies did not permit of larger actions. As Minister of War and the King's representative in the field, he could not discard his responsibility for the Serbian people, on whom he was wholly dependent for recruits, food, shelter, and information, or weaken their loyalty to the King by exposing them to useless massacre. Tito felt no such compunction, and, indeed, had everything to gain by provoking reprisals in his rival's areas. Is not misery the seed-bed of Communism anyway? The Germans were quick to seize the opportunity of sowing the seeds of civil war, and killed first hundreds, and finally thousands, of innocent Serbs for any small act of sabotage. This policy was not nearly so marked in the Tito areas. To their eternal shame, the Anglo-Americans allowed themselves to be persuaded by the short-term military advantage of switching their supplies and propaganda support from Mihailovich to Tito, although this ensured the ultimate rulers of Yugoslavia being anti-British Communists. British arms and munitions were largely used against the

Mihailovich forces, which continued to rescue and evacuate hundreds of American airmen. The sacrifice of loyal and tried friends to their declared enemies has become a cardinal principle of British policy in these days of imperial decay; and who can say what craven motive of appeasing Russia entered into the sordid calculation? Just so was the Polish Government, which we had likewise recognised, abandoned to the Communist wolves. Never again can any European King be expected to ally himself to a country which has proved as false and treacherous to its true friends in adversity as contemptible in its habitual appeasement of the strong.

General Mihailovich was a good enough soldier to have confidence in the final victory of the Allies, and as trustee for the King's Government was in duty bound to weigh the advantages of any military action he could take against the reprisals it would bring down upon his people, and against the Communist threat embodied in Tito's Partisan movement. As the Germans, in his view, would be driven out of Yugoslavia in the long run anyway, it is understandable that he should have regarded a permanent Communist subjugation as the greater danger to his King and Country, as in fact it has proved to be. The General's plan was to organise his forces for a general uprising on the day of the Allied landing. It was difficult for him to understand why he should be called upon to sacrifice his men prematurely when every other resistance movement in Europe was being urged to lie low until *Der Tag*.

The followers of Mihailovich were for the most part Serbs and intensely pro-British, thanks to their memories of the Kaiser war, when the Serbian Army was re-equipped by and fought alongside the British Army. Old veterans of Salonika would tramp for miles over the mountains in any weather merely to shake the hand of a British officer. They would insist that British officers should share their homes, when discovery would entail their utter destruction, as it often did. The Communist intimates of Tito felt no sort of friendship for the representatives of "British imperialism" and only preserved appearances until such time as they had built themselves up with Anglo-American arms and supplies brought in at the cost of Anglo-American lives. All pretence of friendship was dropped once the Allies wished to land in Yugoslavia, when they found their entrance to the country practically banned.

The tragedy of it all is not only that our betrayal of Mihailovich forfeited the friendship and esteem of the Serbs. By our pro-Communist propaganda we drove them into the arms of Tito. We succeeded in turning a large part of the population of Yugoslavia from friends into enemies, and reduced our prestige in the Balkans to zero. Have we not already smarted for it? Greek Communists have not hesitated to fire on British troops, Albanian Communists to fire on British ships, and Yugoslav Communists to shoot down American aircraft.

The people of Yugoslavia, and, indeed, of the Balkans generally, are the natural friends of a Britain which can harbour no possible territorial ambitions at their expense and only desires their independence. With vain and pathetic eagerness they look to us for moral

leadership. Their traditional friendship and respect is being destroyed at an ever-quicken tempo by the continuous propaganda of their Communist Governments. This propaganda has for its theme the evils of a mythical British imperialism and the danger to world peace of British aggression. It is, in fact, rabidly anti-British. Our remaining friends behind the iron curtain are never allowed to hear our answer to these absurd charges. They see, on the contrary, our Press excusing and justifying their Communist régimes. What, indeed, are they to conclude when they read in the Titotalitarian *Times* of November 12th, that the Yugoslav elections were, by Balkan standards, relatively free and "democratic"? The *Times* leader also appears to accept the view that the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union in the liberation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria gives the Russians a claim to favourable commercial treatment, when such favourable commercial treatment means the barring of trade and intercourse between ourselves and these countries. The implied conclusion is that there is no alternative to the existing Communist régimes, and that their overthrow could only result in an anti-Semitic Fascist counter-revolution. Rather than risk that, *The Times* evidently prefers anti-British régimes. Far from any moral support, those who look to the West for inspiration find only abdication and exhortations to submit to the Communist tyranny, any encouragement being reserved for the Communist tyrants. Doubtless this conclusion will be made known throughout Balkania and will deepen despair among our dwindling supporters.

In the opinion of Major Greenlees there is no mystery about Mihailovich, who was a great Serbian patriot and no traitor. The man who had always been the friend of Britain, and threw in his lot with the British when their fortunes were at their lowest ebb, was not likely to be guilty of collaborating with the hated enemy when the Allies were heading for certain victory. "It is not treachery to decline to accept a revolution." The most responsible American newspapers have openly stated as an undeniable fact that Mihailovich was shamefully tortured before his trial. As to this, Major Greenlees comments that the aged and broken man who gave evidence at the trial was not the same Mihailovich he had known for eighteen months in the hills. No admissions that may have been wrung from him in these circumstances would be admitted as evidence in any British court of justice. The trial was just a frame-up to discredit Anglo-America in the eyes of the Yugoslav peoples. Major Greenlees asserts that every effort should be made to keep the Balkan peoples truthfully informed of British aims and policy, as was done during the German occupation. It certainly should, but the B.B.C., which delighted in creating the Great Tito Legend, is no fitting instrument for the purpose. Its voice would drown in the blood of Mihailovich. Imagine, in conclusion, what were the feelings of Major Greenlees and of his brother officers when, living under the faithful care and protection of the Chetniks, they heard the B.B.C. daily attacking those same Chetniks and their leader!

PART V

The Canadian Press

With admiration we are following your directed operations which are of inestimable value to our Allied cause.

August 16th, 1942.

ADMIRAL HARWOOD.

Reprinted from an article by Les Wedman in the "Edmonton Journal" (Edmonton) of May 11th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

SAVED BY SERBS—TWO CITY FLIERS SEEK RIGHT TO ASSIST RESCUER

BECAUSE they feel that they owe their lives to General Drazha Mihailovich's efforts when they were shot down in flames over Yugoslavia, two Edmonton air force veterans, Norman Reid and Tom Bradshaw, have petitioned the Canadian Government to be allowed to testify at the trial of the Chetnik leader in Yugoslavia for treason.

The youthful airmen bailed out of their plane over East Serbia in May, 1944, and 98 days later were back at their Italian air base at Foggia. With the war on, they never said how they got out of Yugoslavia, but Tuesday, ex-F.O. Reid, just back from Washington and Ottawa, told the full story.

Reid and Bradshaw, together with two American airmen and the assistance of Mihailovich, arranged for the mass evacuation from a hastily prepared airfield at Pranyané of 243 Allied airmen, all of them in hiding from the Germans.

Last week, when the call came in to the city veterans from the Committee for a Fair Trial for Drazha Mihailovich, they hopped a plane for Washington where they saw James Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State.

Reid and Bradshaw were the only Canadians in a delegation of 20 speaking for more than 600 Allied fliers who were spirited out of Yugoslavia by Chetnik forces and who now wish to testify on Mihailovich's behalf.

Reid said Mr Byrnes assured them the United States Government would appeal to the Yugoslav Government for a fair trial for the Chetnik leader. The airmen also said "there is a great sympathy in the United States for Mihailovich."

Famed columnist Dorothy Thompson, is honorary chairman of the Committee which paid the expenses of Reid and Bradshaw to make their appeals. The money has come from public donations all through the United States, Reid said.

Others on the Committee include Sumner Welles, Justice Ferdinand Pecora, Bishop William T. Manning, William Green, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, William Phillip Simms, Clare Booth Luce, John Dos Passos, Miriam Hopkins, Eddie Dowling, John Dewey, Roger Baldwin, Norman Thomas.

"We're not interested in Mihailovich's politics. We are part of 600 airmen who were saved by him, and all we ask is a fair trial. We're not saying the man is innocent or guilty.

"If the trial is going to be fair, just and democratic, we can't see why we can't be witnesses," Reid asserted.

That's the case they laid before Norman Robertson, Under-secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa, who said the matter would be taken up with the Yugoslav Government.

The airmen's petition said that during the 98 days with the Chetniks "we experienced only the utmost kindness and saw only the utmost devotion to the Allied cause . . . the debt we owe to General Mihailovich is the greatest debt one man can possibly owe another."

They said "it is our moral obligation to appear as witnesses for the defence at the forthcoming trial," and they ask the Yugoslav Government what arrangements can be made for them to appear.

There are 600 airmen and scores of veterans of the Office of Strategic Servicemen who were parachuted into Yugoslavia to organize guerilla warfare for the Allies—willing to testify, Reid said.

After Reid and Bradshaw joined forces with the Chetniks they travelled 25 hours dodging German patrols and planes, and after a time decided to get out of the country.

"Mihailovich told us where a British Mission was located, and we went there to find it gone. Relations with Mihailovich apparently had been broken, Reid recalled.

"We started hiking for the coast, but then went back to Mihailovich's headquarters, where with two American fliers, we figured some way to get out.

"Mihailovich had an old transmitter and radio receiver and for days we sent messages out trying to reach Italy, but no one answered. Finally they did and after we had identified ourselves, they told us help would come.

"Mihailovich showed us a field we could use as an airstrip, and hundreds of peasants went to work levelling off bumps, filling in holes and chopping down trees. We got some old maps from the General and over the radio sent our longitude and latitude and arranged times and signals for the rescue.

"On August 2nd, 1944, an American plane came over and dropped supplies and two men, complete with radio. The big night was set for a week later.

"Mihailovich sent out orders to his men throughout the country to bring all Allied airmen they were hiding to the airfield. On August 9th three planes landed and evacuated more than 60 Allied

fliers. We put the wounded aboard first, and then those who had been shot down the longest.

"The day before German planes had been scouting the field and we expected trouble. On August 10th, the 15th U.S.A.A.F. made a heavy diversionary raid, and while the raid was on six transport planes with fighter escort came over the field.

"About 3,000 Chetniks guarded the roads all around, and the 18 Mustang fighters kept watch in the air until we were all on board. . . . 243 all together, including two Russians," Reid said.

He said that Mihailovich was never repaid in any way and that despite the fact he was getting no Allied help, he evacuated other Allied airmen at a later date.

Reid said that stories of the Chetniks turning Allied prisoners over to the Germans for cigarettes "make me boiling mad." He said "they had plenty of chance to do that to us, but they did all they could to help us. We saw them fight Germans to rescue airmen from the Nazis and we saw no signs of weapons or supplies received from the Germans.

"Even if those things were true, we want Mihailovich to get a fair trial. That's all we ask."

Reprinted from the editorial article in "The Canadian Social Creditor" (Edmonton) of May 30th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor-in-Chief.

WHAT PRICE BRAVERY?

THE shameful treatment of General Mihailovich, one of the bravest men of history, is awakening the whole American continent. It has been notable that in our own Canadian Parliament, only one man—the Social Credit Member of Parliament for Weta-skiwin, Norman Jaques—had the courage to rise and say a few words in defence of this Chetnik hero, whose assistance to the Allied cause can never be calculated. It was Churchill himself who declared on March 27th, 1941: "Early this morning the Yugoslav nation found its soul!" That was the morning when the Regent Prince Paul and his pro-Nazi cabinet were ousted and the Yugoslavs decided to fight Hitler. One of the men who helped make the decision was Drazha Mihailovich. The man who screams for his murder, Tito, is the Russian agent who was collaborating with Hitler when Mihailovich was fighting the Germans!

Mihailovich, once described as the "White Hope" of the Allies in the Balkans, received the *Croix de Guerre* from General de Gaulle, who called him the "legendary hero who has never ceased to fight against the common enemy." In the fall of 1942, General Eisenhower sent the Yugoslav patriot a telegram of congratulation on his valiant resistance. For his part in ensuring victory in North Africa (by

tying up German divisions and holding up supplies), Great Britain's General Auchinleck, Air Marshal Tedder and Admiral Cunningham sent their warmest thanks and congratulations to Mihailovich. King George presented the famous Chetnik with a "purse" of \$10,000 in gold.

The story cannot be told even in volumes. Here in this country, many airmen owe their very lives to Mihailovich. And it is notable, too, that it is through their efforts that help is being mobilized for Mihailovich. Their plea of "He saved our lives, we'll save his!" is taking the country by storm. When the leaders are cowards, the people must act.

For it was cowardly (and in some cases, erroneous) leadership that put a gallant hero where he is to-day—in the torture chamber of Tito's Communists.

After the Teheran Conference, Mihailovich's name was replaced by a new name, Tito. The "sphere of influence" in the Balkans had been decided upon. Stalin got his way—and part of his price was Yugoslavia, *via* Tito. That meant the head of Mihailovich. The hero was sold down the river—and a lot of people know it.

Is this any subject for a Social Crediter paper? Start betting your life that it is—because Social Credit is a way of life, and that way of life recognizes honour and integrity where others think only of Mammon or political expediency, or both.

PART VI

The Dutch Press

With admiration we are following your directed operations which are of inestimable value to our Allied cause.
August 16th, 1942. GENERAL AUCHINLECK.

Reprinted from an article by H. J. in "De Nieuwe Eeuw" (The Hague) of June 6th, 1946.

RECHTBANK OF THEATER

TITO en zijn aanhangers hebben den Joego-Slavischen vrijheidsstrijder Mihailowitsj beschuldigd van verraad en nu wacht Mihailowitsj in Belgrado op zijn vonnis. Een simpele mededeeling, waarachter zich verwickelingen verbergen voor een drama in klassieken stijl. Men denkt aan Willem Tell, maar dit epos van nationaal heldendom is te tam en landelijk om zich te kunnen meten met de bittere genadeloosheid, die spreekt in het proces dat tegen Mihailowitsj in beweging is gezet.

Men zou het „geval Mihailowitsj” veel beter kunnen confronteeren met die cynische afrekeningen uit den hoogbloei van het Romeinsche imperium, toen het veto en het „schuldig” even definitief en meedogenloos waren als zij thans—in een nieuwe gedaante—zijn op het tooneel van deze wereld.

Het woord „afrekening” lijkt in dit geval niet misplaatst, al zal men voorzichtig dienen te zijn met het hanteeren der feiten. Zij worden immers van verschillende, even gezaghebbende zijde, uiteenlopend geïnterpreteerd. Over één ding kan men het eens zijn.

Het „geval Mihailowitsj” symboliseert het drama der illegaliteit, zooals zich dat in een periode van quasi-vrede, onder den druk der internationale verhoudingen, is gaan ontwikkelen.

De zuiverheid der illegaliteit zelve is in het geding gekomen. Zij wordt niet meer getoetst en gewaardeerd als een daad, met levensgevaar volbracht in 's lands belang. Zij wordt gezien als deel van een internationaal aspect, en het ligt er maar aan, aan welke zijde van dat aspect zij heeft gestaan, om goedkeuring en lof te verwerven van hen, die hans de lakens uitdeelen. In Joego-Slavië zijn dat de communisten van Tito, en deze—de illegaliteit verheffend in den adelstand van hun democratische levenswijze—schimpen thaus even hard op het het verzet van Mihailowitsj, als zij jubelen over dat van Tito.

Het proces te Belgrado is natuurlijk veel meer dan een dagvaarding in min of meer juridischen stijl. Het is een scherpgericht over het Joego-Slavisch nationlisme, in den persoon van Mihailowitsj, en een

versterking tevens van den Sovjet-invloed in de Balkanlanden. Het proces is de façade die het nieuwe huis markeert, waarin de Joego-Slaven zich zullen moeten thuis voelen, namelijk : filiaal van Moskou.

Dat Mihailowitsj moet worden opgeofferd is een van die tragische consequenties en ongerijmdheden van de politieke ontwikkeling, die dikwijls haar redders even gemakkelijk vermoordt als haar belagers. De encensering van Belgrado is volkomen berekend op een snelle „afrekening.” Bij voorbaat zijn alle verrassingen à décharge uitgeschakeld.

Talrijke Amerikaansche officieren, leden van een officieele missie in Joego-Slavië, overtuigd van de onkreukbaarheid van Mihailowitsj, dien zij leerden respecteren als een vaderlander in hart en nieren, gaven den wensch te kennen voor hem te mogen getuigen. Ofschoon hun verzoek door Washington werd ondersteund, stelde Tito geen prijs op hun aanwezigheid. Bevin deed namens Engeland een soortgelijk verzoek.

In Washington wil men het proces Mihailowitsj echter voeren, zooals het in alle rechtschapenheid gevoerd dient te worden. Sumner Welles behoort tot de commissie, die er zich heeft voorgespannen. Dit ceretribunaal zal alle getuigen hooren, en de geheele dagvaarding behandelen als was Mihailowitsj aanwezig. Het wereldgeweten zal dan straks kunnen uitmaken welk tribunaal rechtbank was en welk perfide theater. Daarmee wil de Amerikaansche openbare meening een fout herstellen, en tevens het proces van Mihailowitsj overbrengen op het plan van het geheele politieke dispuut dat met Rusland aan den gang is. Een fout, want het leek ondoordacht van de Angelsaksische wereld toen zij Mihailowitsj liet vallen voor Tito, want haar houding ten aanzien van Moskou en al haar satellieten is sindsdien wel grondig veranderd. Churchill, eens bewonderaar van Tito verklaarde omangs, dat hij een van zijn grootste vergissingen maakte toen hij vertrouwen in hem stelde. Toch verschijnen ook thans nog uiteenlopende lezingen over het gedrag van Mihailowitsj als illegaal.

Brigadier Maclean, die in 1943 per parachute in Joego-Slavië landde, als hoofd van de Geallieerde Militaire missie van de Joego-Slavische Partisanen (Hieronder verstaat men de aanhangers van Tito, ter onderscheiding van die van Mihailowitsj die Tsjetniks heeten), legt in de „Times” enkele bezwarende getuigenissen af tegen Mihailowitsj. Er wordt bij verteld, dat hij in den ondergrondschen. Joego-Slavischen strijd bij de Partisanen stond en nooit gevochten heeft met de Tsjetniks.

Hij komt tot de conclusie, en zijn rapporten schijnen betrouwbaar, dat de Tsjetniks zich nu en dan, gedreven door hun haat jegens de communisten, lieten verleiden tot uitvallen tegen de Partisanen van Tito. Enkele van die onderlinge vechtpartijen vielen samen met Duitse en Italiaansche aanvallen op de stellingen van Tito.

Wat lijkt eenvoudiger voor de regeerende communisten dan om hieruit den stok te snijden, waarmee zij Mihailowitsj en het Joego-Slavische nationalisme kunnen geeselen.

Voor het oordeel der Westerlingen en speciaal dat der Westelijke

illegalen, is het echter in het geheel geen vraag, van welk standpunt het gedrag van Mihailowitsj moet worden gezien. Beslissend is alleen, dat hij heeft gevochten voor zijn land en zijn volk en uitsluitend daarvoor. Mihailowitsj ware jegens zijn land te kort geschoten wanneer hij anders had gedaan, wanneer hij b.v. had gestreden, zooals Tito, in dienst van een vreemde mogendheid en voor een vreemde zaak. Men kan volmondig Tito's ontzagwekkende kwaliteiten als vrijheidsstrijder erkennen, om tenslotte toch tot de bevinding te komen, zooals Churchill en anderen, dat hij in de eerste plaats handelde namens en voor Moskou en pas daarna voor Joego-Slavië.

Het vaderlanderschap van Tito is oppervlakkig gezien ook niet zoo onverdacht als dat van Mihailowitsj. Tijdens een onderhoud dat Tito in 1941 in Strouganik had met Mihailowitsj, vertelde hij met een licht Russisch accent, dat hij deelgenomen had aan den Spaanschen burgeroorlog. Vroeger was hij secretaris geweest van de communistische partij in Joego-Slavië.

Alle onderhandelingen, die Mihailowitsj met Tito voerde over de samenwerking van Tsjetniks en Partisanen, waren op niets uitgelopen, in tegenstelling met Frankrijk, waar de communisten wel instructies hadden tot samenwerking met de Fransche illegalen, en waar het verschil in politiek niet den doorslag gaf in den ondergrondschen strijd.

Het essentiele meeningsverschil tusschen Mihailowitsj en Tito ging van den beginne over de oekomstige organisatie van Joego-Slavië, wanneer dat eenmaal bevrijd zou zijn. In de plaats van het normale administratieve bestuur, wenschten de Partisanen van Tito de politiek in handen te leggen van volkscomité's, die natuurlijk door communisten bemand moesten zijn.

Dit was onaanvaardbaar voor Mihailowitsj. De offers van zijn vrijheidsstrijd voor Joego-Slavië mocht hij nimmer uitleveren aan de politiek van een vreemde mogendheid. Daarmee was het conflict, dat thans zijn dramatische ontkenning tegemoet gaat, geboren. De strijd, die tusschen Tsjetniks en Partisanen ontbrandde, beteekende de laatste fase van den Joego-Slavischen vrijheidsstrijd. De eerste ging tegen Duitschers en Italianen. Nieuwe onderhandelingen tusschen Tito en Mihailowitsj waren overbodig. De nieuwe geestelijke fronten hadden zich, in het aangezicht van de overwinning, reeds afgeteekend. Joego-Slavië zou communistisch worden, en het „nationalisme” diende in het openbaar als verraad te worden gebrandmerkt.

De rol van de Geallieerden in deze onverkwikkelijke geschiedenis is niet zeer vooruitziend geweest. Men dacht met Tito in zee te kunnen gaan voor een Joego-Slavië, dat althans in de belangrijkste territoriale kwesties rond de binnenzeëen, de Geallieerden ter wille zou kunnen zijn. Tito vertegenwoordigde met zijn 150.000 Partisanen in 1943 ook verreweg het belangrijkste deel der ondergrondsche beweging. Toen het echter ging om het winnen van den vrede in democratischen zin, liet Tito, op instructie van Moskou, zijn ware blazoën zien, en de bewondering voor hem bekoelde dra. Eenigszins „après le repas”

slooft men zich nu uit in sympathieke verzekeringen aan het adres van Mihailowitsj, in wien men te elfder ure het wegglipend democratisch en nationalistisch idool meent te zien.

Maar het politieke proces in Belgrado vindt voortgang, zonder dat Mihailowitsj zich zal kunnen omringen met getuigen, die zijn vaderlandsche onkreukbaarheid kunnen bewijzen. Het getij in Joego-Slavië is voor de Geallieerden goeddeels verlopen zonder dat zij aldaar indrukwekkende pogingen konden doen om hun kansen te benutten.

Thans maakt Moskou uit, wie een goed vaderlander mag worden genoemd!


Reprinted from an article in the "Nationale Rotterdamse Courant" (Rotterdam) of July 18th, 1946.

RONDOM MIHAILOWITSJ

DE terechtstelling van Mihailowitsj zal, ook na nauwkeurig volgen van het procesverslag, door velen met afkeer vernomen zijn. Vooral in de eertijds bezette landen heeft deze man langen tijd het levende symbool beteekend van het actieve verzet en veel hoop is er verbonden geweest aan de nieuwe oorlogvoering, die hij in zijn land het eerst kon invoeren. De groep, waartoe hij behoorde en die in het proces als groot-Servisich en reactionnair is gekermerkt, hoewel aan Mihailowitsj persoonlijk stellig hogere idealen voor den geest stonden, heeft in de oogen van vele buitenstaanders, meer belangstellend in de nederlaag van den gemeenschappelijken vijand dan in een binnenslandschen partijstrijd, in elk geval één verdienste gehad. Zij heeft door den staatsgreep van generaal Simowitsj in Maart 1941 den vijand juist genoeg achterop geuracht om hem, den daarop volgenden winter in Rusland den eersten tegenslag te bezorgen, moeilijkheden, waarvan hij zich nooit weer heeft kunnen herstellen. Ook de Servische opstand nog in het najaar van 1941, waarover met Tito overleg was gepleegd, heeft den Duitschers grooten last bezorgd. Hier stelt zich niet het vraagstuk van de enkele afweging van goede tegenover verkeerde daden, zooals het zich in vele collaboratieprocessen heeft voorgedaan. Men heeft zich niet moeten afvragen, of iemand zijn verkeerde handelwijze naderhand heeft trachten goed te maken, integendeel, het uitgangspunt is goed geweest, maar latere omstandigheden, dwangposities dikwijls ook, hebben Mihailowitsj van den oorspronkelijken weg afgeleid. Dit was de grondslag van zijn verdediging en het heeft op vele buitenstaanders een oprechten indruk gemaakt. „Ik heb veel gewild, ik ben veel begonnen, maar de storm over de wereld voerde mij mee, mij en mijn werk.”

Tijdens het proces is niet in twijfel gesteld, dat Mihailowitsj Tsjetniks heeft gebruikt ter bestrijding van Tito's Partisanen en dat daarbij


misdrijven zijn begaan in den vorm van wreedheden en samenwerking met den vijand. Niet bewezen is daarentegen dat Mihailowitsj de hem toegerekende daden gewild heeft of had kunnen verhinderen. Men heeft hem er voor verantwoordelijk gesteld als organisator van de Tsjetniks. Hij zelf en zijn verdediger hebben die verantwoordelijkheid overgedragen op afzonderlijk werkende commandanten en op de aanmoediging, die zij ontvingen van Britsche en Amerikaansche zijde. In laatstgenoemden zin luidde ook de boodschap van den veel genoemden Engelschen kapitein Hudson, dat de guerilla niet mocht uitgroeien tot een strijd voor de Sowjet-Unie, ofschoon Hudson volgens een eigen verklaring, die niet door het Hof in overweging werd genomen, nauwkeuriger gezegd moet hebben „een strijd voor eenige mogendheid, het zij Rusland of Groot-Britannie.” Of dit aan de werkelijke bedoeling veel verandert mag betwijfeld worden in het licht van den invloed van andere Britsche en Amerikaansche vertegenwoordigers aan de zijde van de Tsjetniks. Het vonnis heeft aan dezen invloed veel aandacht besteed en er Mihailowitsj mede voor verantwoordelijk gesteld. Tito heeft in zijn eigen commentaar op de uitspraak het politiek karakter ervan nog duidelijker in het licht gesteld door de persoon van Mihailowitsj te vereenzelvigen met „alle vormen van reactie, met de Katholieke kerk en met de Kroatische boerenpartij, een coalitie van reactie die nu verslagen is en revanche zoekt door ons Istrië, Triëst en Julische provincies te ontzeggen.” Daarom zullen wij de Parijsche besluiten niet aannemen, aldus Tito, onzen strijd voortzetten, hoewel wij ons niet aan avonturen zullen wagen. Het zijn ook zulke uitlatingen, die voor de buitenwereld den indruk versterkt hebben van een proces, waarvan het vonnis van te voren vast moest staan, een geest, die ook sprak uit de procedure, die er niet op ingericht was om de waarheid vast te stellen, maar uitging van het schuldig behoudens tegenbewijs. Naast de groote tegenstellingen in de wereld is dit proces een der vele ondergeschikte incidenten, die zich opstapelen en, meer dan vermoed wordt, de geesten uit elkander drijven.



The American Srbobran, Pittsburgh

1941

SERBIAN DAVID and NAZI GOLIATH



The Lorain Journal, U.S.A.

1946

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

*Voice of Canada, Toronto*

1941

THE CHETNIKS AID TO RUSSIA

*Journal American, New York*

1946

SHALL THIS BE HIS MONUMENT ?

PART VII

The Egyptian Press

*With admiration we are following your directed operations
which are of inestimable value to our Allied cause.*

August 16th, 1942.

AIR-MARSHAL TEDDER.

*Reprinted from an article by Jean Lugol in "La Bourse Egyptienne" (Cairo)
of July 18th, 1946.*

LE SUPPLICE DU GÉNÉRAL MIHAILOVITCH

LE général Dragolyoub Mihailovitch, héros serbe de la II^{ème} guerre mondiale, a été fusillé hier par ses adversaires communistes et communisants.

Le supplice de cet homme, qui n'est qu'un acte de vengeance des partisans contre l'anticommunisme yougoslave, est un fait grave. Il prouve qu'à Belgrade, il n'y a plus place pour les sentiments de clémence. Alors qu'en France, on condamne les collaborateurs les plus compromis à la prison à perpétuité et qu'ailleurs seuls les quislings subissent la peine capitale, au pays du maréchal Tito on fusille ses adversaires même quand ils ont bien mérité de la patrie et de l'humanité. C'est là un symptôme extrêmement inquiétant pour l'avenir des relations internationales. Il est révélateur, en effet, de la mentalité de certains gouvernements d'aujourd'hui pour qui les décisions radicales—et nous nous servons là d'un euphémisme!—sont les meilleures. Il faut tenir compte, il est vrai, du caractère slave, tendre et cruel à la fois, capable d'un grand amour et d'une haine implacable. Mais la Fédération des Républiques Yougoslaves n'eut-elle pas été politiquement grandie si elle avait eu le geste magnanime qu'on attendait d'elle? Qu'elle ne l'ait pas fait, voilà qui pose à la conscience civilisée un douloureux point d'interrogation.

Car enfin personne ne croit sérieusement à la trahison du vaillant supplicié. Tout le monde sait qu'il combattait le communisme en Yougoslavie, comme l'Egypte le combat chez elle, comme les Etats-Unis, comme l'Amérique du Sud, comme tant d'autres pays. Sa prétendue collaboration avec l'Axe est un mythe. Après avoir défié Hitler à son apogée, collaborer avec lui en 1944 eut été une absurdité. Son seul crime est d'avoir résisté à l'emprise marxiste.

Aussi, en fusillant le général patriote, le communisme triomphant a voulu donner un exemple. Mais nous avons bien peur que les balles qui l'ont abattu ne soient les premières d'autres fusillades à venir et que, quel que soit l'effort des hommes de bonne volonté, parmi lesquels nous voulons nous ranger sans réserve jusqu'au bout, le conflit qui

dresse le communisme contre le monde libéral n'éclate finalement un jour. Craignons que les armes ne partent toutes seules.

Capitalisme et société marxiste peuvent vivre côte à côte, mais à condition de se consentir des concessions mutuelles, de s'adapter pacifiquement l'un à l'autre. Une de ces concessions était, par exemple, que Tito grâce Mihailovitch comme les Russes grâcièrent en Pologne, un de leurs pires adversaires. Qu'on le veuille ou non, le général serbe restera aux yeux du monde, un "bourgeois" assassiné par des révolutionnaires. Son exécution est une offense sanglante à l'opinion internationale et elle ne l'oubliera pas. Hitler avait été plus habile : il n'avait pas exécuté Dimitroff au procès de Leipzig. Et il aurait pu le faire. Seulement, il ménageait l'avenir. Ce qu'on néglige en 1946.

On a dit que le duel Tito-Mihailovitch n'était qu'un épisode de la lutte qui oppose Londres à Moscou. L'observation est juste surtout si l'on se souvient de ces mots du maréchal Tito : "Le verdict prononcé contre Mihailovitch est aussi le verdict contre la réaction internationale." La "réaction," c'est toute l'humanité qui n'est pas communiste, c'est nous, c'est le signataire de ces lignes. On entend donc tous nous fusiller ? Belle besogne en vérité qui consiste à décréter le mal mort à l'encontre de tous ceux qui ont le bonheur de ne pas faire profession de foi matérialiste !

Sans vouloir s'abandonner au pessimisme, on est bien obligé de constater, non sans une immense tristesse, que la réconciliation des nations alliées et victorieuses apparait de plus en plus difficile. Quelle chose de l'atmosphère lourde de 1935 et 1936 pèse à nouveau sur la planète. Pour dissiper ces fantômes, il eut fallu autre chose que l'exécution de Mihailovitch, dont le nom risque de devenir maintenant un symbole de raliement. Pourquoi le président Truman, M. Attlee, de Gaulle n'ont-ils pas essayé de sauver ce chef allié ? Le maréchal Staline eut pu empêcher l'irréparable. Il ne l'a pas fait. On dit que les diverses interventions étrangères furent maladroites. Il serait utile d'éclaircir tout cela.

Une loi éternelle veut que le sang de l'homme ne soit jamais versé en vain. Il retombe toujours sur les coupables. Ce sera là notre conclusion.

Reprinted from an article by E. Gallad in "Le Journal d'Egypte" (Cairo) of July 18th, 1946

PLUS QU'UN CRIME, UNE FAUTE

LE maréchal Tito vient de manquer un geste de haute et habile politique extérieure et intérieure : la grâce de Mihailovitch, qui lui aurait rallié des sympathies qui lui font défaut et un peu plus de confiance de la part du peuple serbe.

Pour tous les observateurs mondiaux et qui ne sont pas communistes, le procès du général Mihailovitch n'a été qu'une sinistre comédie et son exécution n'est qu'un assassinat.

Durant le procès, nous avons gardé une certaine réserve, croyant que réellement, c'était une cour de justice, entourant la procédure du procès de toutes les garanties d'impartialité et d'objectivité. Malheureusement, il devint trop rapidement évident que cette cour n'était pas un tribunal mais un comité de partisans jugeant un adversaire politique intérieur.

Seuls, les témoins à charge contre Mihailovitch et ses camarades étaient écoutés avec complaisance ; les principales accusations tournaient autour des querelles des hommes de Mihailovitch avec les suivants de Tito ; aucune preuve de collaboration réelle avec l'ennemi ne fut apportée.

Le prétendu tribunal refusa d'entendre les aviateurs américains à qui Mihailovitch avait sauvé la vie et les officiers alliés qui avaient lutté avec Mihailovitch contre les Allemands et les Italiens, et dont les témoignages avaient fait de lui "le Premier Résistant de l'Europe," d'après les déclarations officielles des chefs des gouvernements alliés.

Si plus tard, Mihailovitch ralentit ses attaques contre les Axistes, ce fut pour deux raisons majeures et qui n'altèrent en rien ses héroïques mérites des premières années de sa résistance. A chaque attaque, les Allemands ripostaient en massacrant des dizaines de milliers de Serbes innocents, en brûlant des villages entiers. Mihailovitch, ne voulant pas faire décimer le peuple serbe, sans aucun profit réel, informa alors les Alliés qu'il préférait attendre, grouper ses forces, les armer afin de déclencher une offensive synchronisée avec le débarquement des Alliés, pour prendre l'ennemi entre deux feux et libérer rapidement la Yougoslavie.

Mais continuer à épuiser ses forces et à faire massacrer les Serbes, avant l'heure décisive, ne lui permettrait pas de donner aux soldats alliés un coup de main utile, lors de l'attaque suprême. C'est pourquoi, il refusa au général Maclean de renouveler, trop tôt, ses exploits courageux du début, pour ne pas faire couler inutilement des flots grandissants de sang national.

L'autre raison fut le danger du communisme intérieur, dirigé par les Croates décidés à éliminer les Serbes—la grande majorité de la population yougoslave—à les dominer par un gouvernement dictatorial, appuyé sur l'étranger.

D'ailleurs les rencontres armées entre ses hommes et les partisans de Tito ne peuvent lui être imputées, des négociations de compromis ayant échoué et il y a autant de bonnes raisons d'affirmer que les partisans ont commencé, que les partisans n'en avancent pour soutenir le contraire.

De toutes façons, Mihailovitch voulut demeurer en force pour barrer la route au communisme croate et le premier, libérer Belgrade.

Dans tout ceci, aucune trahison de la cause yougoslave et de la cause des Alliés : aussi le procès de Mihailovitch ne fut qu'un règlement de

comptes entre les communistes et lui, qu'une vengeance. C'est l'opinion des grandes démocraties mondiales, les Etats-Unis en tête.

C'est pourquoi, le maréchal Tito aurait dû dominer les passions partisans, grâcier et libérer Mihailovitch. Il aurait alors agi en grand homme d'Etat. Les nations qui lui sont hostiles auraient dû malgré elles s'incliner devant son geste et commencer à lui faire crédit.

Il aurait, au point de vue intérieur, pris une heureuse initiative de réconciliation, apaisant la rancune serbe et facilitant une collaboration future.

Mais la Vengeance a pris le dessus. L'exécution de Mihailovitch est devenue pour l'opinion internationale un simple assassinat politique, accentuant la méfiance dans le nouveau régime, le classant comme un régime de parti irréductible et haineux, non comme un régime national.

Entre les Croates et les Serbes, il y a plus que jamais du sang, un fossé, celui ou tomba le corps de celui qui pour les Serbes, sera toujours un héros.

Ainsi, en écartant les considérations de simple humanité, du point de vue purement politique, l'exécution de Mihailovitch est "plus qu'un crime, c'est une faute" d'après la phrase de profonde philosophie politique de Talleyrand, apprenant l'exécution du duc d'Enghien. Et Napoléon, lui-même reconnu si bien la justesse de cette appréciation, qu'il voulut plus tard briser la carrière du ministre qui avait mis trop de zèle à exécuter ses ordres, sans lui donner le temps de réflexion et du contre-ordre.

La vengeance en politique, est une mauvaise conseillère et la clémence d'Auguste demeure la plus belle expression de l'habileté et de la sagesse politiques.

Tôt ou tard, on réalisera que l'exécution de Mihailovitch n'est pas le dernier mot du drame intérieur de la Yougoslavie et qu'au lieu de sceller l'union elle ne fera qu'envenimer les divisions. La vengeance attire la vengeance et les millions de Serbes pour qui cette exécution est une provocation directe et sanglante, ne sont certes pas hommes à l'oublier. Leur histoire est là !

PART VIII

The French Press

Regular Yugoslav forces under the command of that gallant warrior Mihailovitch are fighting the enemy in their own territory. This is a matter of military importance. At the present moment, when the enemy is in pressing need of all his divisions on the Russian front or on that of Egypt, they are being pinned down by the battles they are obliged to contest in Yugoslavia.

September 24th, 1942.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Reprinted from the leading article in "Le Monde" (Paris) of June 12th, 1946

LE PROCÈS DU
GÉNÉRAL MIHAILOVITCH

LUNDI dernier s'est ouvert à Belgrade le procès du général de l'armée royale yougoslave Mihailovitch, grand procès dont le déroulement est suivi avec un immense intérêt non seulement dans la Yougoslavie toute entière, mais également un peu partout dans le monde. Celui qui fut l'un des premiers insurgés d'Europe, sinon le premier comme il le prétend lui-même, celui qui représenta pendant des mois l'honneur yougoslave, le général Mihailovitch a-t-il collaboré avec les Allemands et le quisling yougoslave Neditch ? A-t-il lutté systématiquement contre les Partisans, et commis toutes sortes de sévices et de crimes contre la population ? Tels sont les chefs essentiels de l'accusation que les débats du procès doivent confirmer ou infirmer.

En aucune manière n'avons-nous anticipé sur les conclusions du tribunal. Nous savons seulement que certains points restent obscures dans l'histoire de la résistance yougoslave. Il semble en effet que le général Mihailovitch, après quelques durs revers, se soit montré timoré et d'une prudence excessive ; il semble également que son autorité fut faible sur certains de ses lieutenants qui se compromirent avec l'occupant, et que lui-même ait accepté certains contacts pour éviter d'effroyables représailles. Il apparaît enfin que les partisans de Tito manifestèrent dans la résistance un courage, un mordant, une volonté de lutte qui en firent bientôt les plus redoutables adversaires des Allemands, à telles enseignes que le gouvernement anglais se détourna bientôt de Mihailovitch pour leur apporter toute son aide.

Tout cela ne peut tout de même effacer les magnifiques pages d'héroïsme qu'ont écrites les tchetniks au prix de leur sang. Les

Alliés eux-mêmes ont reconnu que leur action en retardant l'arrivée des renforts allemands a joué un rôle important dans les succès de la campagne d'Afrique.

Les messages adressés par les généraux Auchinleck, Eisenhower, etc., en témoignent. Le général Mihailovitch fut même, le 2 février 1943, décoré de la Croix de Guerre avec palme par le général de Gaulle. Par la suite les tchetniks sauvèrent des centaines d'aviateurs alliés. Ils peuvent enfin être considérés comme les libérateurs d'une grande partie de la Serbie.

Donc, en toute justice, le moins qu'on puisse dire, c'est que le cas Mihailovitch est un cas très complexe qui ne peut être résolu qu'après un examen extrêmement attentif, dans un esprit de parfaite équité et avec toutes les garanties nécessaires pour la défense.

Ces conditions sont-elles réunies à Belgrade ? On est en droit de se le demander, à considérer certains aspects de ce procès. En premier lieu, le fait même que le procureur général, les substituts et les membres du tribunal soient tous des "partisans," ennemis jurés des tchetniks, que le gouvernement yougoslave ait fait savoir aux Etats-Unis que les crimes commis par Mihailovitch étaient si grands et si terribles qu'il ne pourrait y avoir de discussion sur sa culpabilité, réduisent fortement les chances d'un verdict serein.

Est-il d'autre part tout à fait équitable de réunir à côté de Mihailovitch sur le banc des accusés, comme si on voulait tous les confondre dans le même crime, des hommes aussi différents que les "collaborateurs" avérés de Neditch d'une part, les hommes qui sauvèrent l'honneur de la Yougoslavie en rompant avec l'Axe en 1941 d'autre part, et enfin les ministres yougoslaves qui décidèrent à Londres de lutter aux côtés des Alliés en leur apportant toute l'aide possible du pays ?

On aura du mal à croire que ces derniers hommes, qui vivaient au sein de la première capitale de la résistance mondiale, à Londres, aient accepté de collaborer avec les dévastateurs de leur patrie à seule fin de réduire les combattants communistes. On aura encore plus de mal à croire que les Anglais et les Américains aient été, comme on le laisse entendre, beaucoup plus intéressés par la lutte contre l'influence soviétique en Yougoslavie que par le combat contre les armées allemandes. On se demanderait alors pourquoi les Anglais ont abandonné Mihailovitch pour Tito.

Il est facile, dans ces conditions, de s'expliquer l'émotion ressentie par l'opinion mondiale, qui craint d'assister en somme à un procès d'anticommunisme et d'antisoviétisme. La constitution aux Etats-Unis d'un tribunal, présidé par M. Sumner Welles, chargé de statuer en toute équité sur le cas Mihailovitch, n'obéit pas à une autre raison.

La publicité des audiences de Belgrade et les facilités accordées aux journalistes étrangers manifestent toutefois un certain souci d'objectivité, et permettent d'espérer que les considérations de politique intérieure et de politique extérieure ne prévaudront point absolument au cours du procès.

Reprinted from an article by Walter Mansfield in the "Carrefour" (Paris) of July 4th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

NON, MIHAILOVITCH N'EST PAS UN TRAITRE

NOTRE bombardier lourd survolait dans la nuit les régions montagneuses de la Yougoslavie occupée par les Allemands. Soudain, nous aperçûmes au sol des signaux convenus : cinq feux formant une croix. Quand le signal de bord passa au vert, je sautai dans le vide. Ma mission commençait : j'étais parachuté comme officier de liaison américain auprès du général Draja Mihailovitch et ses guérillas.

Un groupe de six hommes dégueunillés, à barbes noires, vêtus de toutes sortes d'acoutrements, allant du simple pantalon de paysan aux uniformes pris à l'ennemi, me conduisirent par des sentiers de montagne jusqu'à un bois où m'attendait le général Mihailovitch.

Devant moi se tenait un homme d'environ quarante-cinq ans, trapu, portant une épaisse barbe grise, habillé comme ses troupes : veste de cuir, calot noir avec l'insigne de l'armée yougoslave et culotte de paysan. Il souriait largement et me souhaita la bienvenue dans un excellent français. Pendant les six mois qui suivirent, je devais avoir l'occasion d'approfondir cet homme et son œuvre.

Durant les années 1942-43, Mihailovitch fut célébré comme un courageux patriote qui combattait avec ses tchetniks les occupants nazis, en dépit de la disproportion des forces, et cela au moment où le reste du monde paraissait sur le point de céder sous la pression des forces de l'Axe. Soudain, en septembre 1943, il fut "lâché" en faveur du chef de guérillas communistes Tito. Au moment où j'écris ceci, Mihailovitch est jugé par un tribunal militaire sous l'inculpation de haute trahison et de collaboration avec les nazis.

Comment expliquer ce renversement ?

C'est au début de 1943 que des officiers anglais, abandonnant la vie facile du Caire, se firent parachuter chez lui. Excités par la défaite de Rommel à El-Alamein, ils voulaient obtenir de Mihailovitch qu'il commençât lui aussi, une offensive générale. Mihailovitch retorqua :

"Me donnerez-vous des armes ?"

Les Anglais envoyèrent moins de quarante cargaisons de secours par air pendant les six mois suivants ; appoint dérisoire pour nourrir une armée de plus de cinquante mille hommes. A la vérité, il n'était pas en leur pouvoir d'en offrir d'avantage.

Ayant manqué ce premier objectif, les Anglais essayèrent de persuader le leader serbe de se livrer au sabotage des principales lignes de chemins de fer ennemies qui reliaient la vallée de l'Ibar à la Grèce. Un tel sabotage signifiait de lourdes représailles allemandes sur d'innocentes populations. Les Américains virent des villes entières brûlées à cause d'une simple embuscade. Je me souviens de la vision pitoyable de Stragari en flammes à la suite d'un coup de main organisé par le capitaine Kalabitch contre une colonne de camions nazis ; j'ai

eu sous les yeux les listes allemandes des personnes exécutées. Une affiche, en novembre 1943, désigna deux cent vingt-trois Serbes que l' "Oberkommandant" Olur à Belgrade avait été "forcé" de fusiller à cause des "actes néfastes de ce brigand : Draja Mihailovitch." Voyant cela, Mihailovitch demanda aux officiers anglais :

"Qu'allez-vous faire pour protéger mon peuple contre de telles représailles ? Ceci fait-il partie du plan général allié concernant les Balkans ? Au jour J, je suis prêt à attaquer partout, sans considération de représailles."

Les anglais ne répondirent rien. Ils ne savaient probablement pas que le jour J se ferait encore attendre pendant plus d'un an et demi.

Pendant ce temps, les Anglais observaient Tito (Joseph Broz), agent secret communiste formé en Russie et renvoyé en Yougoslavie. Après l'attaque allemande contre la Russie, Tito organisa les communistes yougoslaves en "partisans" et commença une campagne de noyautage dans les rangs mal coordonnés des tchetniks. Au début, ils tentèrent l'infiltration par des méthodes pacifiques et par la diffusion de la propagande communiste. Des Américains virent les tracts qu'ils diffusaient, avec l'étoile rouge, la faucille et le marteau, ainsi que le portrait de Staline. A peu d'exceptions près, cette campagne échoua. Les officiers américains sont tous d'accord sur le fait que le paysan serbe, qui a une forte tradition de nationalisme, est convaincu de l'origine étrangère du communisme et n'en veut pas. De plus, les paysans qui possèdent en propre leur petit coin de terre se demandent : "Que gagnerons-nous avec le communisme ?"

Un bref essai de collaboration entre Tito et Mihailovitch à la fin de 1941, près d'Oujitzé, échoua. Après quoi, selon les rapports de paysans qui en furent les témoins visuels, en divers endroits les guérillas de Tito commencèrent à attaquer les groupes de tchetniks isolés, dans le but de les dominer ou de les disloquer. A la fin de 1942, les partisans virent leurs rangs se grossir de Croates mécontents qui ne voulaient pas rallier Mihailovitch parce que ce dernier était Serbe. Or Tito était Croate.

Des missions anglaises, auxquelles étaient attachés des officiers américains du O.S.S. furent alors parachutées chez Tito. De l'avis de beaucoup de ces Américains, Tito était un vrai maquignon, "bluffant" des visiteurs tel que Randolph Churchill, qui était muni d'importants pouvoirs. Au contraire de Mihailovitch, il promit n'importe quelle action immédiate contre les Allemands, sans tenir compte du jour J et, pour l'après-guerre, une Yougoslavie forte et unie, bien disposée à l'égard de l'Angleterre. Il prouva aussi qu'il était un fameux illusionniste. Des démonstrations de force furent organisées à l'intention des missions alliées. Des communiqués quotidiens paraissaient annonçant sans cesse des attaques couronnées de succès contre les garnisons allemandes. Les forces des tchetniks étaient chaque jour accusées de collaborer avec les Allemands dans des actions contre les partisans. Les Anglais se laissèrent convaincre. Tito devint leur homme.

Avec l'invasion de l'Italie en Septembre 1943, les Anglais furent enfin à même de parachuter de très importants secours destinés aux guérillas des Balkans. Tous les envois allèrent à Tito, tandis que Mihailovitch ne recevait même pas un fusil. La B.B.C. de Londres et le station russe "Yougoslavie Libre" diffusèrent alors ces communiqués quotidiens de Tito qui furent connus du monde entier.

Les Américains qui étaient avec Mihailovitch virent à quel point étaient fausses les informations émanant de Tito et publiées par les Anglais. En voici seulement quelques exemples, choisis entre beaucoup d'autres :

1. Octobre 1943. Après que les forces de Mihailovitch eurent enlevé d'assaut Vichégrad aux Allemands et poussé jusqu'à Rogatitza, la B.B.C. annonça que les partisans, au cours d'un glorieux combat contre les Allemands, avaient pris la ville. Or les Américains ne virent pas un seul partisan, jusqu'au moment où les tchetniks eux-mêmes furent attaqués par les partisans.

2.—Août 1944. Tito prétendit à plusieurs avoir libéré le nord et le centre de la Serbie autour de Lazarevatz, Belanovitza et Lyig. La mission américaine trouva ces régions sous le contrôle des tchetniks, qui en avaient chassé les garnisons allemandes. Et pas l'ombre d'un partisan.

3.—Septembre 1944. Un communiqué de Tito annonça que les membres de l'état-major de Mihailovitch avaient été capturés. La mission américaine, qui se trouvait avec ledit état-major à ce moment-là, a pu constater qu'il était au complet.

4.—Octobre 1944. Tito annonça la libération de Gratchanitzza en Bosnie orientale et la destruction de la voie ferrée allant à Doboy. La mission américaine, qui était dans la région depuis dix jours, découvrit que la voie ferrée avait été détruite par les tchetniks trois mois auparavant et qu'il n'y avait pas trace de partisans aux alentours.

Voici ce que j'ai vu personnellement : le 6 Septembre 1943, deux semaines seulement après mon arrivée, alors que je campais au quartier général de Mihailovitch, dans les monts de Tchemernitza, un détachement de plus de trois cents soldats allemands réussit à nous surprendre à la faveur d'un épais brouillard matinal. Ce fut un déchaînement infernal de mitrailleuses et de grenades de tous côtés. Au bout de deux heures, les Allemands furent repoussés, et j'ai pu personnellement voir et questionner les Allemands capturés au cours de ce combat inattendu. Quelques jours après, quand nous reçûmes par radio, les premières nouvelles du débarquement allié en Italie, Mihailovitch, croyant que le grand jour J était arrivé, diffusa à tous ses lieutenants l'ordre d'attaquer partout les Allemands. Je vis personnellement le texte de cet ordre d'attaque au moment de sa transmission.

Le colonel Bailey, officier de liaison britannique, conduisit un détachement de mille tchetniks jusqu'à Bérané où, après une bataille sanglante, il obtint le contrôle de la division italienne "Venise,"

comprenant huit mille hommes. Le colonel Hudson et moi-même avec un petit groupe de tchetniks réussîmes à nous rendre maîtres d'une garnison italienne à Priboy, sur la rivière Lime. Pendant deux semaines, trois mille tchetniks se massèrent pour une attaque sur Vichégrad, point vital allemand situé sur la ligne de chemin de fer Belgrade-Sarayévo, sur la rivière Drina. Au cours d'une bataille de six heures à laquelle assistèrent des officiers anglais et américains, les tchetniks finirent par avoir raison des dernières défenses allemandes et prirent la ville. En deux heures, ils détruisirent l'énorme pont de chemin de fer de la Drina.

Pendant l'hiver 1943-44, Mihailovitch manquant de ravitaillement et assiégé par les partisans, marqua un temps d'arrêt. Mais après le débarquement en Normandie, pendant l'été et l'automne 1944, ses forces commencèrent une offensive de nettoyage contre les garnisons allemandes du nord-est et du nord-ouest de la Serbie. Elles coupèrent toutes les voies de communication ennemies au sud et à l'ouest de Belgrade afin que les forces allemandes puissent être cernées et détruites. Des officiers américains assistèrent à la plupart de ces attaques.

Où qu'elles soient allées, les missions américaines constatèrent que les tchetniks étaient sans cesse attaqués par les partisans. Ce n'était pas une propagande émanant du côté tchetnik. Je n'oublierai jamais ce jour de décembre 1943, près de Slikovo. D'un village à flanc de montagne, j'observais cette troupe de plus de mille partisans s'avançant lentement vers nous en file indienne à travers la vallée. Nous dûmes évacuer en hâte n'évitant pas cependant les premiers coups de feu à Slikovo. Nos troupes étaient déjà en loques et presque sans munitions. Or ces attaques de partisans étaient dirigées non seulement contre les soldats tchetniks, mais aussi contre les populations civiles sympathisantes. En janvier 1944, d'une montagne près de Kalinovnik, en Herzégovine, je pus voir un groupe de partisans entrer dans la ville. Peu après des flammes s'élevèrent haut dans le ciel ; c'étaient les maisons des pro-tchetniks qui venaient d'être incendiées par l'assaillant. Il arriva même plus d'une fois qu'au cours d'actions contre les Allemands, les tchetniks furent attaqués dans le dos par les partisans. En voici un exemple frappant : en octobre 1943, après notre succès à Vichégrad, alors que nous repoussions les derniers éléments allemands en direction de Sarayévo, un groupe de partisans tomba sur notre flanc droit, nous força à la retraite et nous empêcha ainsi d'exploiter notre victoire.

Nos archives contiennent toutes les protestations adressées par Mihailovitch aux Alliés à propos des attaques de partisans. Il nous suppliait de lui parachuter davantage d'observateurs militaires américains qui pourraient vérifier la situation ; est-ce là le fait d'un traître ou d'un collaborateur ?

Cependant, l'aide que les Alliés apportaient à Tito accentuait le déséquilibre au détriment de Mihailovitch. Des pilotes américains appartenant à la 15e division de l'*Air Force* m'ont raconté plus tard

que, sur la foi d'information émanant des partisans, ils ne faisaient aucune distinction entre les régions tenues par les tchetniks et celles tenues par les Allemands. Notre mission a vu des avions américains balayer des troupes tchetniks, en croyant qu'il s'agissait d'Allemands. Pendant la nuit, nous pouvions entendre des transports américains C-47 qui venaient parachuter des munitions dans les rangs des partisans.

Néanmoins, le leader serbe continua à aider les Alliés autant qu'il le put. En 1944, Mihailovitch, en coopération avec une équipe américaine de sauvetage commandée par le lieutenant Georges Muselin et Nick Lalich, porte secours à plus de quatre cents vingt-cinq aviateurs de la quinzième division de l'*Air Force* que les Allemands avaient contraint d'atterrir. Les tchetniks, souvent sous le feu de l'ennemi, construisirent de leurs mains un champ d'atterrissage près de Ravna Gora, où les C-47 américains venaient chercher les aviateurs rescapés pour les ramener en Italie. Nous possédons les noms, les grades et les numéros matriculaires de ces citoyens américains qui seront éternellement reconnaissants à Mihailovitch de leur avoir sauvé la vie.

S'il était véritablement un collaborateur, pourquoi donc ne livrait-il pas ces aviateurs aux nazis ?

A la lumière de ces faits, les charges réunies contre Mihailovitch paraissent choquantes. La plupart des cas retenus contre lui sont des faux purs et simples.

Quant au reste, ce n'est qu'un amas de grossières déformations. Dans cette dernière catégorie rentre l'accusation portée par Tito selon laquelle les tchetniks auraient signé des accords avec l'ennemi et auraient été ravitaillés par lui en armes. Des messages de radio allemands interceptés ont montré que quelques-uns des nombreux commandants locaux de Mihailovitch manquant d'armes et harcelés des deux côtés négociaient des trêves locales avec les Allemands plutôt que d'être annihilés.

Les témoignages des Américains réclament un seul verdict : l'acquittement pur et simple.

Reprinted from an article by F. Picard in "L'Epoque" (Paris) of July 16th, 1946.

LE GÉNÉRAL MIHAILOVITCH EST CONDAMNÉ À MORT

APRÈS l'effondrement de la Yougoslavie en avril 1941, le colonel Draja Mihailovitch se réfugia dans la Ravna Gora, en Serbie, avec des officiers et soldats échappés du désastre. C'est l'"Etat-Major de Montagne" qui va chercher à reconstituer une armée régulière pour renouer la lutte contre l'occupant. Mihailovitch devient le premier héros de la résistance ; de nombreux patriotes s'enrôlent sous ces drapeaux. Il prend contact avec le haut commandement allié en vue d'établir, avec son aide, un second front dans les Balkans.

Mais après l'entrée en guerre de la Russie, d'autres Yougoslaves prennent le maquis et forment un second noyau de résistance autour d'un Croate, ancien commandant des brigades internationales, Broz-Tito. Les deux chefs essayent de conjuguer leur action. Ils se rencontrent à Strouganik en septembre 1941, à Braïtcha le mois suivant.

L'entente ne se fait pas : les "partisans" de Tito sont pro-russes et, en fait, communistes. Les "tchetniks" de Mihailovitch sont monarchistes et anticommunistes. Entre les deux clans s'ouvrent une lutte inexpiable, telle que seules les Balkans en connaissent : la guerre civile se greffe sur l'occupation.

Ce drame met les Alliés devant la nécessité de choisir. Les Anglais avaient envoyé en septembre 1941 une mission à Mihailovitch. Mais à Téhéran, il semble entendu que la Yougoslavie tombera dans la zone d'influence russe. Aussi, en décembre 1943, Tito conclut-il à Alexandrie un accord avec le commandement allié : Churchill lui adjoint son fils, Randolph. Interrogé aux Communes sur ce revirement, il déclare le 22 février suivant : "Le Général Mihailovitch, j'ai le regret de le dire, a peu à peu adopté une nouvelle attitude et certains de ses chefs ont transigé avec des troupes italiennes et allemandes." Il renouvelle ces griefs le 24 mai, tout en reconnaissant que Mihailovitch détient une "position solide, mais locale."

Du côté de Mihailovitch, on a rétorqué que ces groupements irréguliers dirigés par des "voïvodes" paysans ont pu se mettre en rapport avec l'ennemi, mais à l'insu du général et à l'encontre de ses instructions.

Reprises par Tito et ses partisans, ces accusations ont été démesurément grossies. On a reproché à Mihailovitch, non seulement d'avoir fait pendre des communistes, mais encore d'avoir "collaboré" avec les oustachis de Pavelitch, avec le quisling serbe Neditch, avec les Allemands, les Italiens et les Bulgares.

Le Gouvernement actuel a réuni ce faisceau d'accusations dans deux gros in-quarto de 800 pages, comportant des centaines de photographies et de fac-similés. Ce fut la base du procès actuel.

Il est superflu d'ajouter que beaucoup de Serbes refusent énergiquement de donner créance à la "trahison" du général. Aux États-Unis et en Angleterre, les milieux militaires se sont émus de l'atmosphère passionnelle dans laquelle le procès allait s'ouvrir. Le Département d'Etat a demandé le 30 mars 1946 à Belgrade des facilités pour les officiers américains qui désirent témoigner. Le gouvernement yougoslave a refusé d'anticiper sur la décision du tribunal en ajoutant que les "crimes reprochés à Mihailovitch étaient trop grands et trop horribles" pour justifier cette mesure. Peu émue par ces qualificatifs, l'Amérique est revenue à la charge dans une note du 7 mai, qui n'a pas été honorée d'une réponse mais a soulevé une protestation de la Skoupchtina contre les "ingérences de l'étranger."

De son côté, M. Noel Baker, ministre d'Etat britannique, a fait connaître le 8 mai que son gouvernement était intervenu à Belgrade pour que l'accusé puisse se défendre avec les moyens de droit usuels et dans un procès public.

Si louable qu'en ait été le mobile, ces interventions n'ont pu qu'aller à l'encontre des buts que se proposaient leurs auteurs. Elles ont rendu à Mihailovitch le mauvais service que rendit en janvier 1793 l'Espagne à Louis XVI.

La question est, en effet, de savoir si le procès n'est pas surtout un règlement de comptes et si l'esprit de vindicte qui règne à Belgrade ne transforme pas le verdict en défi aux Anglo-Saxons.

Ce procès a, en effet, un arrière plan international. Il met en cause, à côté de Mihailovitch, les anciens membres du cabinet yougoslave d'émigration à Londres, que l'on peut difficilement inculper de collaboration avec l'Allemagne, mais qui ont connu les tractations menées avec l'U.R.S.S. au sujet des affaires balkaniques. La Russie est, en effet, dans toute cette affaire, le témoin invisible mais décisif.

D'autre part, la rivalité Tito-Mihailovitch se profile sur celle des états-majors alliés au temps où ceux-ci hésitaient sur le choix du deuxième front. Churchill et d'autres membres du haut commandement opiniaient pour les Balkans. La Russie y était opposée. Se fut Tito qui alla en Roumanie demander l'intervention de l'armée rouge ; celle-ci s'installa dans la péninsule. Elle y est encore.

Enfin, le colonel Robert McDowell, ancien chef de la mission militaire américaine auprès de Mihailovitch, a révélé que le 16 septembre 1944, le colonel allemand Staeker s'est abouché avec Mihailovitch et avec lui-même pour obtenir une capitulation de la *Wehrmacht* devant les troupes anglo-américaines. Il consulta ses chefs, qui ne lui répondirent pas : la Yougoslavie était l'affaire des Russes, partant de Tito investi de leur pleine confiance. Mais Mihailovitch aurait alors refusé de traiter avec l'ennemi. On a supposé par la suite qu'entre le jour de son arrestation (13 mars) et celui où elle fut annoncée (24 mars) Mihailovitch aurait été emmené en Russie pour y être sondé sur ce qu'il connaissait de cette entrevue.

Les jeux sont faits. D'ordre de Moscou, le général Draja Mihailovitch est condamné à mort.

Nulle surprise.

C'est tout le drame de l'Europe. Le communisme négateur de la patrie jouant la comédie du patriotisme sous le masque de la résistance.

Winston Churchill voulait le débarquement allié en Méditerranée, à Trieste.

Les Anglo-Saxons eussent été ainsi maîtres de l'Europe centrale. Le débarquement s'est fait en Normandie. La France en a fait les frais. Le général Eisenhower le reconnaît. Il oublie de dire : "Qui casse, paye."

Aujourd'hui, la Russie est en tête, maîtresse de l'Europe centrale, et aspire à étendre de bolchévisme.

Mihailovitch, patriote serbe, condamné à mort. Où était le devoir ? La justice partisane selon Moscou, le condamne aujourd'hui.

L'histoire impartiale dira. . . .

Aujourd'hui, la justice selon Moscou condamne le premier résistant d'Europe.

Son crime fut de croire à sa patrie avant de s'agenouiller devant Moscou.

Le procès Mihailovitch pose la question de l'Europe : pour ou contre le tzar rouge de Moscou ?

Reprinted from an article by Jérôme et Jean Tharaud in "Le Figaro" (Paris) of July 27th, 1946.

LA DERNIÈRE LECTURE

C E jour-là, comme tout le monde, j'avais appris par les journaux, l'exécution du général Mihailovitch. Ils étaient avarés de détails. Ils nous disaient seulement que le général avait sur sa table des biographies d'illustres gens de guerre de l'ancienne Russie, les généraux Koutousof et Souvarof, une histoire de la Bulgarie, d'autres livres encore, mais qu'il s'était dégoûté de ces lectures, et qu'il avait demandé pour distraire son esprit des sinistres pensées dont il était assiégé, un volume de Maupassant.

Je fus d'autant plus frappé par cette information qu'à ce moment je me trouvais, entre Dieppe et Le Havre, dans le pays du grand conteur normand. Tout m'y parlait de lui : le château où il était né ; la villa d'Etretat où il avait passé de si nombreux étés ; les falaises lumineuses, si étrangement éclairées par ces belles journées mêlées de soleil et de pluie ; la mer dure et peu rassurante ; les vallons verdoyants et profonds ; les petits havres où il aimait à s'entretenir, au cabaret, avec des pêcheurs et autres gens du cru ; et, dans la campagne, les fermes isolées, perdues, presque invisibles derrière leurs hauts talus plantés de chênes et de hêtres.

J'étais là au coeur d'une nature qui lui appartient plus qu'à personne. Un domaine où il est sans rival. Mais si beau que soit son génie, et si puissant que soit cette Haute-Normandie par son ciel, sa mer, ses champs et ses forêts, et sa population hardie, marine et terrienne à la fois, elle est remplie d'une douceur et, si je puis dire, d'une tendresse qui n'a rien à voir avec la rude, violente et montagnaise Serbie. Aussi, me demandais-je pourquoi, par quel étrange suite de pensées, au moment de mourir, le héros yougoslave s'était tourné soudain vers un écrivain dont l'oeuvre devait lui sembler si lointaine. Et cette question me paraissait d'autant plus remplie d'intérêt que tous les connaisseurs des pays balkaniques s'entendent pour nous dire que, notre littérature a perdu tout attrait.

Mais Mihailovitch appartient, par son âge et sa formation, à une génération de Serbes qui, eux, furent élevés dans l'admiration de la France, et aucun écrivain français, à l'exception peut-être de la seule

George Sand, n'a su aussi naturellement que Maupassant trouver le chemin du coeur des Slaves orientaux, et des Slaves tout court, comme en témoigne son influence sur Tolstoï, Tchekov et tant d'autres grands littérateurs de Russie.

Cela dit, il n'en restait pas moins surprenant qu'à deux doigts de la mort Mihailovitch ait été chercher du réconfort dans l'oeuvre d'un écrivain totalement dénué d'esprit métaphysique, indifférent à l'au-delà, et chez lequel on ne sent qu'un morne et profond désespoir.

Peut-être le général n'a-t-il cherché dans Boule de Suif, ou je ne sais quel autre conte, qu'un divertissement et une minute d'oubli, mais on peut aussi penser que toute l'expérience de sa vie l'avait conduit au profond dégoût des hommes, et que la sinistre vision du monde, qui était celle de Maupassant, correspondait, à cette heure, exactement à la sienne. Le premier en Europe, il s'était levé, les armes à la main, contre la tyrannie allemande ; il avait souffert, combattu ; et le résultat de tant d'efforts, s'était ce jugement inique, sa condamnation à mort, l'exécution en masse de ses compagnons d'armes et l'anéantissement d'une bonne partie de son peuple. Au bout de la terrible aventure de sa vie, le froid mépris d'un Maupassant dut lui paraître la seule attitude convenable à un homme tel que lui. Quant aux livres restés sur sa table, les biographies de Koutousof et de Souvarof, et l'histoire de la Bulgarie, je comprends du reste qu'il en ait abandonné la lecture. C'étaient des Russes qui le sacrifiaient ; et pour ce qui est des Bulgares, en sa qualité de Serbe, il ne les avait jamais aimés. Leur évolution récente les lui faisait aimer moins encore. Il écarta ces pages importunes. Mais on voudrait savoir, conte ou nouvelle, le nom de sa dernière lecture.

Reprinted from an article by M. Garail in "La Croix du Gard" (Nîmes) of August 8th, 1946.

MIHAILOVITCH !

M A mission n'est point de défendre—à titre posthume—une victime. Mais la conscience garde des droits et . . . des exigences. . . .

De quoi et de qui s'agit-il ?

De la Yougoslavie—notre alliée—et du commandant en chef des armées yougoslaves qui—dans les maquis—continuèrent la lutte depuis le printemps 1941.

Rappelez-vous . . . 1940 conduit Hitler à Hendaye, Brest et Narvick,—au début de 1941—avant d'attaquer Staline, il prend les Balkans et la Crète.

Belgrade—ville ouverte—sauvagement bombardée et en quelques jours le pays conquis. . . . Mais fidèles au roi et au commandement,

beaucoup d'officiers et soldats se retirent dans les montagnes pour continuer la lutte. Le premier commandant de ce premier maquis européen s'appelle Mihailovitch.

Plus tard, la Russie est en guerre avec l'Allemagne, et les communistes de tous les pays soutiennent L'U.R.S.S. Alors un militant yougoslave—aujourd'hui appelé Tito—se rallia, avec retard à la résistance. Mais, vite, il se dégagea du commandement unique et rompit avec Mihailovitch. Contre l'ennemi commun—Allemands et Italiens—deux camps s'installent. . . . Sans autre ambition que celle de servir sa patrie et son gouvernement, Mihailovitch exécute ponctuellement toutes les missions imposées par le grand Q.G. allié. Soldat de carrière il ménage ses hommes et aussi les populations (qui d'habitude payent pour les maquis).

Tito, lui, fidèle partisan communiste, prépare la conquête du pouvoir : à la manière "russe" sacrifiant sans scrupules vies et biens (ce qui, évidemment, sous l'influence du fils de Churchill, lui valut plus de sympathies anglaises !)

Mais, à Téhéran, la Yougoslavie est reconnue zone d'influence soviétique et toutes préférences sont accordées à Tito.

Malgré tout, jusqu'au bout, Mihailovitch poursuit le combat. Même après l'arrivée des Russes, malgré le danger, il reste. . . .

Capturé un jour à l'aide de gaz endormants (au mépris des règles du droit), jugé par un tribunal dit "populaire," interrogé à l'aide de la fameuse "drogue des aveux"—expérimentée à Dachau et qui vous "vide" un homme en deux heures—confondu en un même procès avec de notoires "collaborateurs," il a été exécuté à l'aube du 17 juillet par un peloton "très sûr" de la garde de Tito.

Nous rappelons ces faits symboliques afin de préciser quelques questions :

1. Un "anticommuniste" mérite-t-il de ce seul fait la mort d'après les lois d'un pays démocratique et libre ?

2. La confiance des Trois Grands accordée, à Téhéran, à un homme, lui donne-t-elle blanc-seing pour organiser—dans la terreur—la dictature de son parti ?

Après tant de meurtres et tant de sang, est-ce là la voie de la Justice et de la Paix ?

3. Quand tant de plaintes s'élèvent contre Franco, "dictateur et fasciste," pourquoi ce concert laisse-t-il tranquilles d'autres dictateurs bien plus "totalitaires" ? "Comédia."

4. Pourquoi—et jusqu'à quand ?—la radio et les journaux de France déformeront-ils des faits aussi notoires ?

Astuce, ignorance, bêtise, ou lâcheté ? Trêve de niaiseries ! Evidemment, aux champs, le dur travail "commande" . . . à la ville, la chaleur, la soif, et . . . les congés !

Mais la roue tourne toujours . . . les jeux se font . . . et la vérité se doit de secouer des apathies monstrueuses.

Reprinted from an article by Tony in the "Tel Quel" (Paris) of March 18th and 25th, 1947.

DRAJA MIHAILOVITCH, ÂME DE LA RÉSISTANCE BALKANIQUE

M. TRUMAN, président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, vient d'annoncer l'entrée en scène officielle de son pays dans les Balkans et dans le Moyen-Orient.

Pourquoi les hommes d'Etat d'outre-Atlantique ont-ils choisi plus spécialement ce coin de notre vieille Europe, pour barrer la route à la poussée soviétique ?

Parce qu'ils se trouvent devant un état de fait aussi vieux que notre Vieux-Monde : la résistance et l'unité des peuples balkaniques devant l'oppression étrangère.

Au moment où nous écrivons ceci, que ce soit en Yougoslavie, en Bulgarie, en Grèce ou en Albanie, des milliers et des milliers d'hommes de toutes races, de toutes religions, combattent au coude à coude contre les régimes de dictature communistes soutenus par l'occupation militaire soviétique.

Le Balkan est à la pointe de la lutte contre l'impérialisme de Moscou, comme il le fut contre l'impérialisme de Stanboul, puis contre celui de Vienne.

L'Amérique au Balkan, c'est peut-être la dernière chance, pour notre pays, d'être sauvé.

Les Balkans ont été l'objectif constant, au cours des siècles, des convoitises des puissances asiatiques et européennes.

Cela a débuté avec Gengis-Khan. Puis déferlèrent tour à tour Ottomans, Autrichiens et, au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale, Allemands et Russes.

Pendant les six dernières années, ce que l'on pourrait nommer la "tragédie classique balkanique," s'est déroulée de nouveau devant nos yeux : invasion étrangère, immédiatement suivie d'une résistance, puis d'une organisation unique dans le combat de tous les peuples balkaniques.

Car cette unité existe. Elle constitue le fond même du problème balkanique, et elle se manifeste toujours devant le danger de mort !

Nous pouvons ainsi comprendre pourquoi, un an après la mort du général Mihailovitch, des milliers de tchetnicks continuent à se battre contre l'"usurpateur" Tito.

Le mouvement de Mihailovitch n'a comporté aucun caractère particulier. Ce fut le mouvement de tous les Balkans contre Hitler, l'envahisseur numéro 1 ; c'est encore le mouvement de tous les Balkans contre Staline, l'envahisseur numéro 2.

Unité d'abord, liberté ensuite.

Il n'est pas besoin d'aller enseigner la démocratie à ces peuples. Ils la connaissent depuis qu'ils se font tuer pour elle. Ce n'est pas d'hier.

Pour eux, il n'est point de démocratie "à l'occidentale" ou "à l'orientale."

Ce qu'ils savent, c'est que les régimes actuels instaurés tant en Yougoslavie qu'en Bulgarie sont en réalité les pires des dictatures.

C'est pourquoi ils se battent.

C'est pourquoi continue la tragédie classique du Balkan.

Déjà, sous l'occupation ottomane, un mouvement de résistance clandestin s'était créé, sous le nom d'Hétéria. Karageorgevitch y participa. Il fut tué.

Plus près de nous, le roi Alexandre Ier s'efforça, en 1934, d'unir les peuples balkaniques grâce au système de la fameuse Alliance Balkanique, et de coopérer avec les grandes démocraties occidentales.

Il fut tué lui aussi.

On peut dire que le premier combat qui se déroula aux Balkans entre l'esprit démocratique et l'esprit totalitaire eut lieu à la date du 25 mars 1941.

N'oublions pas qu'à cette époque le Reich et l'U.R.S.S. étaient alliés.

Le 25 mars 1941, le gouvernement pro-nazi de Belgrade était renversé.

Et naturellement, comme en France à la même époque, le parti communiste yougoslave était pro-allemand !

Alors que, devant le danger hitlérien, l'état-major de l'armée yougoslave avait ordonné à tous ses aviateurs de se regrouper sur la Côte Adriatique, pour rejoindre les Alliés, les bandes communistes tentèrent de leur fermer le chemin, le 17 avril 1941, à Grahovo, non loin du Monténégro, pour les empêcher "d'aller combattre aux côtés des capitalistes."

Ce fut le premier engagement entre communistes et démocrates.

Le premier acte du dernier drame balkanique.

Lors de l'occupation des Balkans par les troupes allemandes, l'union germano-russe durait toujours.

Le 9 avril, le ministre yougoslave à Moscou, Milan Gavrilovitch, chef du parti paysan, devait quitter la capitale soviétique, car l'U.R.S.S. avait, entre temps, reconnu officiellement le gouvernement fantoche croate nommé par les nazis, tandis que le consul soviétique de Zagreb rendait une visite officielle à Anté Pavelitch !

Les Allemands, de leur côté, libéraient en France les membres yougoslaves communistes des anciennes brigades internationales, les munissaient d'ordres de mission allemands et les renvoyaient aux Balkans faire leur œuvre de Quislings !

Quant aux instructions du *Komintern*, voici en quoi elles constituaient à cette époque :

1. anéantir les restes de l'armée yougoslave ;
2. s'infiltrer dans les milieux collaborateurs et travailler avec eux

L'application de la première instruction s'effectua de la façon suivante : les communistes dénoncèrent 160.000 officiers et intellectuels yougoslaves qui furent déportés en Allemagne.

La seconde instruction fut exécutée à la lettre par Joseph Broz, futur Tito, alors secrétaire du parti communiste.

Il vivait à cette époque, protégé par la *Gestapo*, chez Vladimir Ribnikar, propriétaire du grand journal *Politika*.

Ce Vladimir Ribnikar après avoir été reçu l'un des premiers à la *Kommandantur* de Belgrade, créa la " Société Serbe de Publications " (*Srpsko Izdavatchko Prédouzetché*), organisme qui édita pendant trois ans tous les livres et brochures pro-nazies.

Pendant trois ans, Joseph Broz travailla chez lui.

Car communistes et nazis partageaient la même haine : la haine de la dynastie serbe.

Le 8 mai 1941, la radio de Londres lançait sur les ondes une petite nouvelle sans importance : un colonel de l'armée yougoslave refusait de capituler et se retirait dans la montagne pour poursuivre la résistance, après avoir tenu tête, avec un seul canon, sur le pont de Srpsko, à une puissante attaque ennemie.

La première armée du colonel Mihailovitch se composait en tout et pour tout de cinq officiers et de trente soldats !

La nouvelle fut accueillie dans le camp de l'Axe par un immense éclat de rire.

Et pourtant. . . .

Pourtant, en la personne du colonel Mihailovitch et de sa petite troupe retirée dans la montagne, venait de renaître le vieil esprit de résistance et d'unité balkanique.

Dès le début, Mihailovitch eut à lutter avec les communistes, alors alliés de l'Allemagne.

Cependant, le 21 juin 1941, l'Allemagne attaquait l'U.R.S.S.

Aussitôt, la légation soviétique de Sofia tenta de se mettre en rapport avec le colonel Mihailovitch, si bien que le premier compte rendu que reçut le *Foreign Office* sur l'activité des guerillas yougoslaves fut transmis par la représentation russe en Bulgarie.

A Belgrade même, un congrès secret du P.C. yougoslave se réunissait, présidé par Joseph Broz et prenait les deux décisions suivantes :

1. Les communistes en contact avec les autorités allemandes, devaient continuer leur collaboration, afin de tenter d'anéantir le mouvement Mihailovitch.

2. Former un nouveau mouvement clandestin en liaison avec les collaborateurs des Allemands.

La légation soviétique de Sofia donna alors l'ordre à Joseph Broz d'entrer en négociations avec Mihailovitch.

Ce qu'il fit. Il le rencontra trois fois, sans d'ailleurs avoir en aucune manière l'intention de conclure un accord !

Le *Komintern* s'inquiétait de plus en plus des proportions que prenait le mouvement du général Mihailovitch, qui étendait son action, outre en Serbie, en Bulgarie, en Grèce et même en Slovénie.

Les Russes ne voulaient à aucun prix la répétition des événements qui, aux Balkans, succédèrent à la première guerre mondiale, c'est-à-dire la création d'une Grande Serbie, et la réalisation de l'unité balkanique. Mihailovitch était devenu l'ennemi numéro 1 de l'U.R.S.S.

Le 8 mars 1941, le colonel Mihailovitch arrivait à Ravna Gora, une

vallée de haute montagne entourée de forêts, accompagné de 5 officiers et de 30 soldats, et y plantait le drapeau de l'armée royale yougoslave dans les plis duquel se lisait l'inscription : " Pour le Roi et la Liberté."

Une science militaire approfondie, alliée à un sens aigu de la diplomatie l'amena à établir une soigneuse hiérarchie des ennemis qu'il avait à combattre :

Ennemi numéro 1 : la *Wehrmacht*.

Ennemi numéro 2 : le parti communiste, collaborateur des nazis, acharné à l'anéantissement de l'armée royale.—L'unité balkanique était en effet, et le demeure actuellement, le cauchemar de l'impérialisme soviétique.

Ennemi numéro 3 : les " Quislings," c'est-à-dire l'Etat croate d'Anté Pavelitch, le commissariat serbe de Milan Neditch et toutes les autres organisations collaboratrices des Balkans.

Lorsque l'U.R.S.S. fut attaquée par Hitler, l'action du colonel Mihailovitch aida considérablement la résistance soviétique, en harcelant l'arrière des troupes allemandes.

Qu'il nous suffise en cela de citer la déclaration du général Jodl au procès de Nuremberg :

" Les Allemands ont perdu la guerre contre les Russes parce que l'attaque a été retardée de deux mois à cause des Yougoslaves."

Ce qui n'empêchait pas le *Komintern* de dénoncer Mihailovitch comme " collaborateur " :

Au moment même où les Allemands donnaient l'ordre de fusiller cent Serbes pour un soldat de la *Wehrmacht* tué par les tchetniks.

Où les mêmes Allemands offraient 10.000 marks pour la tête du héros yougoslave.

Où Hitler, dans une lettre à Mussolini, écrivait : " Mihailovitch est l'ennemi numéro 1 de l'Axe dans les Balkans."

Car Mihailovitch avait le tort d'être également l'ennemi numéro 1 de la pénétration soviétique dans la Péninsule !

Un soir de l'automne 1941, un sous-marin britannique aborda la Côte Adriatique.

Il amenait auprès de Mihailovitch le commandant Hudson Bill et deux officiers de l'état-major de l'aviation yougoslave : Zaria Ostoyitch et Miroslav Lalatovitch.

La première liaison entre les Alliés de l'ouest et la résistance balkanique était faite.

Un rapport, envoyé par Hudson au haut commandement britannique dans le Moyen-Orient, et transmis à Londres, eut comme premier effet de faire accepter Mihailovitch comme ministre de la guerre par le gouvernement yougoslave en exil.

De Londres où l'on fut frappé de l'importance du mouvement, on envoya par la suite chez les tchetniks le colonel Bailey.

Bailey ne ménagea pas aux Serbes encouragements et promesses, comme naguère Lawrence à l'égard des Arabes.

Mais, pas plus que Lawrence, Bailey ne fit respecter les engagements qu'il avait contractés.

L'*Intelligence Service* a ses traditions !

Nous verrons tout à l'heure comment Mihailovitch, couvert de fleurs par les chefs militaires des Nations Unies, fut trahi par leurs diplomates.

A ce peuple serbe, qui laissa sur le champ de bataille 1.700.000 hommes pour la liberté du monde, après le président Roosevelt, c'est le général de Gaulle, qui rendit hommage à son chef, le 2 février 1943 par une citation à l'ordre de l'Armée : général Dragolyoub Mihailovitch :

" Héros légendaire, symbole du patriotisme le plus pur et des vertus militaires yougoslaves les plus grandes, ce général n'a jamais cessé de combattre sur le sol de sa patrie occupée. . . . travaillant ainsi pour préparer le dernier assaut qui amènera la libération de sa patrie, côte à côte avec ceux qui n'ont jamais accepté qu'un grand pays puisse se soumettre à un occupant brutal."

En août 1943, une mission américaine, commandée par le capitaine Mansfield, était parachutée à son état-major, tandis que septembre voyait l'arrivée du général anglais Armstrong.

L'état-major des tchetniks prenait de plus en plus figure de véritable haut-commandement allié dans les Balkans.

Cependant que, parallèlement, se déroulait, implacable, le jeu diplomatique.

Jeu diplomatique qui allait trahir l'homme qui avait tout misé sur la victoire des démocraties occidentales.

" Je crois," disait-il lors de son procès, " que le monde tend à suivre la révolution russe, mais j'avais décidé de suivre le chemin des démocraties occidentales."

Ce dilemme est de nos jours posé à tous les chefs d'Etats.

Mihailovitch a eu le mérite d'avoir été le premier à choisir. Ses seules récompenses furent l'abandon des démocraties et le peloton d'exécution soviétique.

Le coup de théâtre eut lieu au moment de la capitulation de l'Italie.

Le chef de la mission britannique dans les Balkans fut alors informé que " les divisions italiennes devaient se rendre au mouvement partisan de Joseph Broz."

Voilà quel était le résultat des négociations entre les grandes puissances : la liberté des Balkans vendue au plus offrant !

D'un côté, un homme pur, n'ayant en vue que la liberté des peuples balkaniques. De l'autre, un terroriste professionnel, membre de la fameuse organisation secrète *Tayna Internatzionalna Terovistichka Organizatzia** (d'où les initiales T.I.T.O. qui devinrent le nom de guerre de Joseph Broz), responsable de l'attentat de 1924 contre le roi Alexandre et Pachitch, du meurtre du ministre de l'intérieur Milorad Drachkovitch et de l'attentat de Marseille.

Les Alliés avaient choisi !

Les conséquences de ce marchandage n'allaient pas tarder à se manifester.

*Organisation Internationale Secrète Terroriste.

Le haut-commandement britannique enjoignait à Mihailovitch de se rendre dans les monts Kopaonik et de traiter avec Tito, désigné par les Alliés comme futur dictateur des Balkans.

La réponse de Mihailovitch fut cinglante :

“ Je vous remercie de votre offre, mais Tito est un criminel. Nous n'avons pas capitulé devant nos ennemis, nous ne capitulerons pas devant nos alliés ! ”

Mihailovitch, lui aussi, avait choisi.

Cependant le mouvement de Tito était anéanti, et celui-ci avait fui en Italie à bord d'un avion anglais.

L'armée allemande était en pleine débâcle et, le 16 septembre 1944, un délégué du haut-commandement allemand, le colonel Starker, se rendait auprès de l'envoyé américain à l'état-major de Mihailovitch. Robert McDowell pour offrir la capitulation de toutes les forces allemandes des Balkans.

McDowell, après avoir immédiatement télégraphié à Washington, ne reçut jamais de réponse !

C'est ce même McDowell qui déclara lors du procès du général :

“ Les Alliés ont commis un crime contre la mémoire de tous nos morts. En acceptant la capitulation, la guerre était terminée huit mois avant ! ”

Au même moment Tito, réfugié en Roumanie, organisait avec l'aide des Russes une nouvelle armée, composée de prisonniers de guerre croates capturés à Stalingrad.

Le commandant de la garde personnelle du dictateur, le colonel Messitch, fut décoré en 1943 de la Croix de Fer par Hitler !

Un autre dignitaire de la Croix de Fer, le général Pirtz, se trouve à la tête de l'aviation titiste.*

La méthode est classique, le parti communiste, ici comme ailleurs, ne pouvant s'appuyer sur le peuple, utilisa les traîtres !

Lorsque les troupes soviétiques atteignirent les rives du Danube, le commandant de la Serbie de l'Est, le colonel Sinicha Pazaratz, prit contact avec eux au nom de Mihailovitch.

Le colonel soviétique :—Où sont les partisans ?

Le tchetnik :—En Serbie, il n'y a pas de partisans, mais les soldats de l'armée royale, ceux que le peuple appelle “ tchetniks ” !

Le colonel soviétique :—Camarade, j'ai l'ordre de prendre contact uniquement avec les partisans, tous les autres sont des ennemis !

Mihailovitch dépêcha aussitôt le colonei Velya Piletitch, à la tête d'une mission militaire, au Q.G. soviétique. Ils furent reçus à Bucarest avec les honneurs militaires, puis arrêtés par la NKVD et transportés à Moscou en avion.

Seul Piletitch a pu s'évader. Les autres sont encore en U.R.S.S. !

La fin de la guerre trouva Mihailovitch et ses tchetniks dans les montagnes de Bosnie. Il avait d'abord interdit à ses troupes, tant

* Nous avons en notre possession la photographie de ce personnage en uniforme allemand.

que le combat contre le Reich restait engagé, tout acte d'hostilité envers les soldats soviétiques. Cependant, se rendant compte que le Balkan avait simplement changé d'occupant, que la croix gammée avait simplement fait place à l'étoile rouge, qu'une section spéciale D.M. (Draja Mihailovitch) existait à la NKVD comme naguère au sein de la *Gestapo*, il donna, en octobre 1945, le signal de la nouvelle résistance.

Il revint pour la deuxième fois à son vieux repaire, d'où était déjà parti le premier combat, Ravna Gora, accompagné, cette fois encore, de 5 officiers, et de 20 soldats !

De ses forêts, il jeta les bases du mouvement qui lutte, en ce moment même, contre le fascisme rouge dans les Balkans.

Les puissances occidentales tentèrent alors d'entrer en contact avec lui.

Mihailovitch fut informé qu'une mission, envoyée par un Etat étranger, dont nous ne pouvons encore donner le nom, désirait se rendre auprès de lui.

Le général leur fit connaître la date et le lieu de rendez-vous. Lorsqu'il fut arrivé, des parachutistes soviétiques l'attendaient. Il fut enlevé et conduit à Belgrade.

Pour la seconde fois Mihailovitch avait été trahi par ses alliés.

On a beaucoup écrit sur son procès. Ce que l'on ignore généralement, c'est la façon dont il fut exécuté.

A quatre heures du matin se rendirent à Dedinyé, où le général était détenu, les écoliers de l'Académie Militaire, accompagnés d'un coiffeur. Après que ce dernier lui eût coupé la barbe, on lui fit revêtir son uniforme de général de l'armée royale, avec une seule décoration : la Croix de Karageorges avec glaives, que lui avait naguère décernée le roi Pierre.

Tito désirait aussi, en exécutant Mihailovitch, anéantir symboliquement et la dynastie et l'armée royale yougoslave.

De Dedinyé on le transporta au champ de tir de Yayintzi.

Le prêtre officia. Le commandant du peloton donna l'ordre de tirer. Mihailovitch tomba en criant : “ Vive le roi Pierre.”

Mais la résistance continue. . . .

PART IX

The German Press

In the name of the General Imperial Staff I cannot let the 24th Anniversary of the Unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one Kingdom pass without expressing my felicitation for the wonderful undertaking of the Yugoslav Army. I am not thinking only of the forces which have joined the ranks of our Army in the Near East in the triumphant hour, but also of your undefeatable Chetniks under your command, who are fighting night and day under the most difficult conditions.

December 1st, 1942.

GENERAL ALAN BROOKE.

Reprinted from an article by J. Altmayer in the "Hamburger Echo" (Hamburg) of July 20th, 1946, by kind permission of the Author.

MIHAILOWITSCH

ALS am serbisch-orthodoxen Ostersonntag des Jahres 1941 die Hitler, Göring und Keitel ihren Flugzeuggeschwadern den Befehl gaben, die offene und unverteidigte Hauptstadt Jugoslawiens mit Bomben zu belegen, wurden an diesem einen Tag in Belgrad zehn Prozent der Bevölkerung, etwa dreißigtausend Menschen, getötet. Am gleichen Tage wälzten sich die deutschen Panzerwagen, ohne Kriegserklärung, von drei Seiten in das unglückliche Land, und aus drei anderen Richtungen marschierten italienische Regimenter, die bulgarischen und die ungarischen. Selbst die bezahlten albanischen Leichenfledderer rissen sich einen Fetzen aus dem aus tausend Wunden blutenden Körper. Mit den Deutschen und Italienern kamen noch die seit langem dazu ausgeschalteten kroatischen Ustaschi-Banden und Quislinge, die eine halbe Million ermordeter Serben auf ihrem Konto haben. Es kam die Gestapo mit ihren Vergasungswagen und Maschinengewehren. Wenn der Goebbelsche „Soldatensender Belgrad“ seine „Lillimarlen“ in den Äther sandte, so hatte diese „zackige“ Melodie nur das Todesröcheln und die Todesschreie von achtzigtausend ermordeter Juden übertönt, von Zehntausenden und Zehntausenden vor die Maschinengewehre gestellter Geiseln, Männer, Frauen und Schulkindern. Jugoslawien war in ein einziges Menschenschlachthaus verwandelt. Vor dem Kriege wohnten in Jugoslawien rund acht Millionen Serben. Davon sind eine und eine halbe Million dem Krieg und Bürgerkrieg zum Opfer gefallen. Das ist der Hintergrund, auf dem sich die Figur jenes Drascha Mihailowitsch

erhob, der am vergangenen Montag vom Volksgericht „wegen Zusammenarbeit mit dem Landesfeind“ zum Tode verurteilt und 48 Stunden später in Belgrad erschossen wurde.

Beim Kriegeausbruch war er Militärattaché in Sofia. Bevor er noch als Oberst seinen Truppenteil erreichen konnte, war die jugoslawische Armee zerschmettert. Sich ergeben? Mihailowitsch folgte dem uralten Brauch der serbischen Bauern: er sammelte einige zersprengte Truppenteile und ging mit ihnen in die bewaldeten Berge. Das war der Beginn jenes Guerillakrieges und Freiheitskampfes, der wie ein Stern in der tiefen Nacht eines unglücklichen Volkes leuchtete. Mihailowitsch war der erste Soldat und seine Tschetnizi die ersten Freischärler, die sich im unterjochten Kontinent gegen die Sklaverei von Faschismus und Hitlerismus mit den Waffen erhoben. Sie waren damals die einzigen europäischen Verbündeten Englands.

Und jetzt als gemeiner Verbrecher erschossen? Wie reimt sich das? Es reimt sich nur für den, der die jahrhundertelange und unsagbar blutige Tragödie der Balkanvölker und vor allem der Südslawen kennt. Von eh und jeh war es ihr Schicksal, Sandkörner zu sein zwischen den Mühlsteinen der rivalisierenden Großmächte. Ein solches Sandkorn war auch Mihailowitsch. Er ist zwischen die Steine gekommen. Es hat ihn zermalmt.

Mihailowitsch, Typ des serbischen Patrioten und Bauersoldaten, der nichts anderes mehr besitzt, als seine Waffe und seinen Mut; der nichts anderes will als heimkehren in die Freiheit seines Landes und in den friedlichen, ungestörten Besitz seiner Scholle. So hat er gekämpft, fünfzehn Jahre gegen das türkische Joch, bis endlich 1912 die Paschas und ihre Janitscharen aus dem Balkan hinausgefegt waren; so hat er gefochten gegen den habsburgischen Imperialismus von 1914–18, wobei fast ein Drittel des serbischen Volkes unterging, so ging es weiter 1941, beim faschistisch-hitlerischen Raubzug. Bis zum Tag, als Hitler seinen Freundschaftsvertrag mit Rußland brach und seine Heere gegen Moskau in Bewegung setzte.

Bis zu diesem 21. Juni 1941 hatten sich die Kommunisten Jugoslawiens offiziell neutral verhalten, getreu der These, immer folgsam der Parole. Jetzt hieß es anders! Jetzt tauchten die Kommunisten als eigne Freischaren und „Partisanen“ auf und machten sich unter der Führung des kommunistischen Parteifunktionärs Josip Broz—genannt Tito—selbständig.

Der Serbe Mihailowitsch, das war der demokratisch-bürgerliche Patriot. Bei dem Kroaten Tito und seinen Partisanen jedoch hatten nicht nur der Soldat und das Gewehr ihren Appell. Täglich und stündlich wurde auch der Klassenkämpfer mitaufgerufen und wahllos eingereiht, selbst wenn er gestern noch Serben erschossen oder als Ustaschi und Faschist im deutschen Heer gekämpft hatte. Krieg gegen den äußeren Feind, der in Rußland eingedrungen war; zugleich Klassenkampf und, wenn nötig, Krieg auch gegen den inneren Feind, selbst wenn er Tschetnik und Patriot ist. Der Kampf um die Macht im künftigen neuen Staat und der Machtkampf um Südosteuropa hatte

begonnen. Tito, das war außenpolitisch der unbedingte Verbündete des Ostens, der Verfechter der Einheit aller Slawen von Wladiwostok bis Triest. Mihailowitsch hingegen, das ist der kleine Bauernsoldat, der immer noch von 1789 träumt, von Brüderlichkeit und Menschenrecht, von Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung des Einzelnen und der Völker. Da lacht nur der Neo-Demokrat über jenen Mihailowitsch, der der Verbündete ist des Westens und zugleich Rußland als „die Mutter“ liebt, Mihailowitsch, diese tragisch-heroische Mischung von Coriolan und Hamlet auf slawisch-Dostojewskijschem Grunde. Aus diesem innen- und außenpolitischen Gegensatz Mihailowitsch—Tito ist mitten im Krieg jener schreckliche Bürgerkrieg zwischen Tschetnizi und Partisanen entstanden, behaftet mit allen Lasten und Greueln, wie wir sie aus den deutschen Bauernkriegen ebenso kennen wie aus der Französischen Revolution und so fort, bis zum Bruderstreit der Anarchisten, Kommunisten und Sozialisten im jüngsten spanischen Bürgerkrieg.

Mihailowitsch ein Verräter und Verbündeter der faschistisch-hitleristischen Armeen? „Volksgericht“ in Belgrad mit gestellten Statisten? Wir kennen das Lied, wir kennen die Melodie! Man hat die Rechnung der besiegten Tschetnizi aufgemacht. Wer macht in Belgrad die Rechnung der Partisanen auf? Unterlegen ist dieser Mihailowitsch und deshalb wurde er mit gemeinen Verbrechern auf eine Bank gesetzt, im gleichen Atemzug mit ihnen verurteilt und vor die gleichen Gewehrläufe gestellt. Christus und Barnabas, es gibt nichts Neues unter der Sonne.

Ost und West standen sich im Gerichtssaal von Belgrad gegenüber; östliche Orientierung oder westliche? Es ging um nichts anderes, und deshalb mußte Mihailowitsch sterben. Deshalb waren all jene angeklagt und wurden jene Männer—wenn auch in contumaciam—mitgeächtet, die die Vertreter waren der alten serbisch-demokratischen Parteien, und des traditionellen demokratisch-serbischen Staatsideals. Wir nennen nur drei der mit bis zu zwanzig Jahren Zuchthaus verurteilten Volkstribunen: Professor Slobodan Jowanowitsch, der 73 jährige Historiker und Ministerpräsident der jugoslawischen Exilregierung, der eine Art demokratisches und freiheitliches Gewissen seiner Nation darstellt; Dr Milan Gawrilowitsch, ehemaliger Minister und Präsident der Serbischen Bauernpartei, und drittens Dr Schivko Topalowitsch, Führer der jugoslawischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung und der Sozialdemokratischen Partei, international bekannt durch seine Sozialarbeit beim Völkerbund und als Exekutivmitglied der II Internationale. Drei Männer und Vertreter der Westorientierung, von europäischem Format, des Wissens und der Kultur, von einer Lauterkeit des Charakters, von einer Sauberkeit der politischen und demokratischen Gesinnung, daß jeder aufrechte und ehrliche Mann tief den Hut vor ihnen ziehen muß.

Warum dieser Schauprozeß, der so unwürdig war eines so heroischen Volkes und unwürdig selbst eines tapferen Mannes wie Marschall Tito? Um der Opposition des jugoslawischen Volkes willen gegen

den totalitären Staat. Hätte ein freies Volk über Mihailowitsch und seine politischen Freunde abgestimmt, es wäre ein anderes Urteil geworden.

In vielen Tausenden von Bauernhäusern brennt heute zu Ehren des Erschossenen die Talgkerze vor dem Bilde des Sveti Sava. Der tragische Akt in der Tragödie der Südslawen ist zu Ende. Ein neues Kapitel hebt an. Darin wird jedoch wiederum der Name Drascha Mihailowitsch stehen, denn der tote Volksheros wird stärker sein als er der lebende je war und als er es mit der Beschränkung seines Könnens und seiner Kraft je hätte sein können.

PART X

The Greek Press

... These brave men who joined your ranks in their birth places in order to expel the enemy from your Homeland, are fighting with complete devotion and sacrifice for the mutual cause of the United Nations. May this struggle bring them complete success.

January 1st, 1943.

GENERAL EISENHOWER.

Reprinted from the leading article (written in the Greek language) in the "Acropolis" (Athens) of July 18th, 1946.

MIHAILOVICH

LIEUT-GEN. MIHAILOVICH was the War Minister of the young King Peter. It was he who, together with two or three courageous politicians, in the spring of 1941 overthrew the régime of the Regent, Prince Paul, the King's uncle, which had sold itself to the Germans and bound Yugoslavia to the wheels of Hitler's chariot.

The young King, helped by Mihailovich and his supporters, led the country once more into the path of honour, by the side of Britain and Greece. But, before they had time to establish themselves firmly in office, Hitler assailed them with overwhelming force. The Croats (Tito is a Croat) flung away their arms. A terrific raid by German *Stukas* reduced to dust the country's administrative centre. The *blitzkrieg*, in all its horror, was nowhere so effective as in the case of Yugoslavia. It was all over in a moment.

King and Government quitted the country. But one man remained behind in Yugoslavia: Dragolyub Mihailovich.

He rallied the remnants of the Yugoslav Army, he organised a new army up in the mountains and he began at once "resistance to the enemy." He was the first resistance-leader of the World War.

His name echoed throughout the world—Mihailovich the example, Mihailovich the demi-god, Mihailovich the legendary hero.

Time passed. Another aspirant to Mihailovich's glory made his appearance on the Yugoslav scene—a Croat locksmith, an adventurer. He came from Russia where he had studied Communism. He too took to the hills. It was Tito.

A rival guerilla-domain. But the standard of the new Robin Hood, which at the beginning remained furled, bore a hammer and sickle for Liberty, for the Rule of the Proletariat.

At that time there had been formed, in the Allied countries, certain large para-Government organizations—of which M.O.4 was the most

important—whose task it was to encourage resistance movements in the occupied countries. The funds came from certain private sources. But their activities were directed by the Allied military and political staffs.

The Allies, working through these organizations, began to help Mihailovich and Tito in Yugoslavia. They sent them officers and instructions. By parachute they dropped to them arms, equipment of all sorts, most important of all, gold. It was the same in Greece with E.L.A.S.

Tito, working on the Communist system, began to spread his tentacles, side by side with Mihailovich. The Allies' favour swung, uncertain, from one side to the other; tick-tack, Mihailovich—Tito. But Tito had the upper hand, because he enjoyed the support of World Communism.

After the collapse of Italy, Mihailovich occupied the whole length of the Dalmatian coast. But, not long after, these fell into the hands of the Germans, like the Italian coast opposite.

It was then that the B.B.C. attacked Mihailovich. It accused him of having been bribed by the Germans to surrender the Dalmatian Coast. The B.B.C. also announced that, after this act of treachery, most of Mihailovich's officers had gone over to Tito. Was it true? A mystery. It is a fact that, at the time, the B.B.C. was under E.A.M. influence. Don't you remember what we used to listen to from London about the situation in Greece?

The fact remains that, little by little, the Allies abandoned Mihailovich and gave all their support to Tito. They did almost exactly the same thing here in Greece with E.L.A.S.—until old Churchill openly admitted that two of his worst mistakes had been the help given to E.L.A.S. and Tito.

Then came the Axis collapse. The Soviet Army occupied Yugoslavia and, with its support, Tito became master of the country—the little Stalin of the Balkans.

Mihailovich, with his followers gradually dropping away, still remained at large in the mountains. His only help was the latent anti-Communist spirit still to be found throughout Yugoslavia, now subject to the Red tyranny of Tito.

But Tito's Communist Yugoslav state could not rest unless it laid hands on Mihailovich. It is for Communism a matter of life and death to get rid of its opponents. Don't you remember Trotsky? The dominant Communist faction of Stalin pursued him as far as Mexico where the Soviet secret emissaries ran down and exterminated the true father of Soviet Democracy. In March, Tito caught Mihailovich up in the mountains. How? There are two versions. The one is that he was tracked by aeroplanes which gassed him with poison-gas. He was transported to Belgrade and made to recover so that he might be "tried." Poison-gas? Even Hitler did not use it. What matter? For Communism, all means are good. Another version, unpublished, is that Mihailovich was informed that British officers would arrive by

plane to make arrangements with him or take him away. The planes came, with their supposed British passengers. But the marks on the wings of the planes and the uniforms of the men were false. Some of Tito's partisans, armed with automatics, stepped down from these bogus British planes, surrounded Mihailovich and captured him.

The trial took place and Mihailovich was sentenced to death. During the trial, the General made certain "confessions." He half-admitted that he had not always fought the Germans.

These unexpected "confessions," more than any amount of forged documents and testimonies, arouse one's suspicions. For we know how those who are accused before the Communist tribunals "confess." Everybody remembers those incredible "confessions" of the leading Bolsheviks who, having incurred the displeasure of the dominant Soviet faction, were tried, confessed, were sentenced and executed. Ten years ago there was an endless succession of such dramas. All the tallest trees of the Soviet paradise were felled—the elms and the planes—only one oak survived.

Under such conditions the accused "confesses" whatever is suggested to him. He is persuaded to do so at night, every night, throughout the whole duration of the trial. One method, said to have been used in the case of Touchashevsky, is to bring the children of the accused to the cell. The executioners hold them brandishing a knife above their heads, and the accused is asked:

"Will you admit tomorrow before the court that you did so-and-so?"

"How can I," he replies, "when it is not true?"

But the children struggle in the executioner's grasp as he applies the knife to their neck.

"Yes, yes. I will say so—anything you like."

There are other methods as well—more scientific, more studied. The State of the Soviets is very thorough in its methods.

The tortures of the Inquisition? . . . The monks of the Middle Ages were mere children in such matters. Here more up-to-date systems are applied—for instance, the torture by light and sound. Inside the cell in the evening they turn on powerful searchlights—thousands of volts—which literally blind the prisoner, while enormous electric bells keep up a constant deafening noise. A man's brain sways, he becomes mad. Who can stand up to these latest inventions of technology and science? And there are many other systems as well.

So much for the "confessions" before the court.

One thing only we know as the result of our own recent experience here at home: whenever Communism wishes to strike a foe, aided by its countless agents throughout the world, it launches against its victim such a campaign of libels that, in the end, the accused himself begins to have doubts about himself. One thing more we know: that Britain and America asked to be allowed to send witnesses to Mihailovich's trial—airmen, officers and a host of others who had known the General personally, who had worked with him and knew all about him. Tito's justice refused. Then "Courts" were set up in England and

the United States to "try" Mihailovich. They heard the witnesses, consulted the official documents, and acquitted Mihailovich. Tito's colonels found him guilty of high treason and condemned him to death.

Mihailovich's wife asked for a reprieve but her petition was rejected. Tito made a public statement to the effect that, by carrying out the sentence, he would make Britain and America, who had wanted to save the General, eat dirt.

Wanted to save him. . . . King Peter had asked those Governments to intervene to prevent this ghastly judicial murder. But did they really want to save him?

Once upon a time Greece had become involved in an arduous campaign in Asia Minor. Her Allies—Great Britain and especially France—had left her in the lurch because, so they pretended, Greece had disobeyed them by bringing back King Constantine.

Greece, with her back to the wall, decided to evacuate Asia Minor. But Lloyd George whispered privately to Gounaris:

"Go on. Try and hold on and perhaps things will change."

He tried and tried. But finally defeat came. The armed forces which had been saved from the débâcle mutinied, overthrew the Government and tried Gounaris on the charge of having wilfully gone his way and being the cause of the disaster. All eyes were turned anxiously towards Britain and waited for Lloyd George to say the word. But nothing came, and Gounaris, together with five of his collaborators was shot.

In the same way the friends of General Mihailovich turned their eyes, from the first days of the trial, towards England and America.

The small peoples look to the great for great actions. When nothing happens, they lose their faith. But what does it matter? They are small, they will get over it.

PART XI

The Irish Press

Je reçois Roatta . . . je parle du problème des tchétniks. Lui aussi de rend compte du danger qu'ils représentent et qu'ils représenteront plus encore à l'avenir. Mais il déclare que pour exécuter le programme d'extirpation établi par les Allemands, il faudrait disposer de beaucoup plus de force que nous n'en avons, les Allemands et nous ensemble.

Le 6 Janvier 1943.

COMTE GALEAZZO CIANO.

Reprinted from the leading article in "The Irish Press" (Dublin) of July 16th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

THE CASE OF MIHAILOVICH

DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH, Minister for War and later Commander-in-Chief of the Army under the former Yugoslav Government, has been condemned to death for treason. It is a verdict which, in view of what is known of Mihailovich's career and of the circumstances of his trial, is likely to come as a shock to the conscience of the world.

Unlike the man who has superseded him and who is responsible for his trial, Mihailovich had no loyalties outside his own country. The documents produced in the indictment merely show that he was faithful to the King to whom he had sworn allegiance, that he regarded both the Germans and Marshal Tito's Communist Party as enemies of his country and that he fought against both. As far as one can judge, his was the legitimate Government at the time the offences with which he was charged were committed, so that if he committed treason, it was against a Government that did not exist at the time.

All that can be said against him is that he acted in what he deemed to be the best interests of his own country, and refused to take his orders from a foreign Government. If it was a question of services to the Allied side in the war, the prosecution put themselves out of court by refusing to hear testimony of British and American officers offered in his defence. Moreover, whilst the case was still *sub judice*, the Yugoslav authorities, through their embassies, circulated an *ex parte* indictment, entitled "The Treason of Mihailovich," and the trial was conducted in a manner of which nobody with a sense of justice could approve.

Marshal Tito's Government may execute Mihailovich, but his execution will not convince the world that he is guilty.

PART XII

The Palestine Press

Héros légendaires, symbole du patriotisme le plus pur et des plus hautes vertus militaires yougoslaves, cet officier général, n'a cessé de continuer la lutte sur le territoire national envahi. Grâce à l'aide des patriotes, harcèle sans cesse l'armée d'occupation, préparant ainsi l'assaut final qui conduira à la libération de sa patrie et du monde entier aux côtés de ceux qui n'ont jamais admis qu'un grand pays pouvait se soumettre à un brutal envahisseur.

Le 2 février 1943

GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE.

Reprinted from an article by David Courtney in the "Palestine Post" (Jerusalem) of July 18th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

MERCY

MERCY is a sign of weakness in a world of political pygmies. Mihailovich has been shot. King Peter and the exiled Yovanovich, who scheme to bring Tito down, were hardly honest pleaders; and as for the British Government, it washed its hands of the whole business: washed its hands in the full two thousand-year-old connotation of that expression. It was a trial according to the laws of a Sovereign State, said Mr Bevin: Sovereignty indeed—that blessed totem which a Socialist Government bows down to like any Tory tribesman. Mr Bevin has forgotten his history. British Governments of the past, stirred by Liberal principles that made England the refuge of men like Zola and the hope of the oppressed in every land, were not always stopped in their indignant tracks by the incantations of sovereignty.

The extraordinary thing in this matter of Mihailovich is that the Germans tried so hard, and for so long, to shoot him. Justice beat them to it; this strange, post-war justice with the bandage off her eyes to ensure better markmanship, and the scales put aside for a coil of barbed wire. Bit by bit a crazed world seems bent on finishing Adolf Hitler's job for him; and so it is that more and more people every day dread the breaking of the dawn as Mihailovich dreaded its breaking yesterday morning; and it doesn't matter whether the dawn rises behind what Mr Attlee calls the iron curtain or behind what *Pravda* calls the velvet curtain of the West. It doesn't matter whether it rises in Kielce or Belgrade or Madrid or Salonika, fewer and fewer people are glad to see it; and Mr Bevin can do nothing about it because of the grinning hobgoblins carved on the totem-poles of sovereignty.

Mihailovich was not a Fascist even by the Soviet interpretation of the word; and the Soviet interpretation is probably the right one. There are plenty of people running loose who answer more readily to that word of epithets. They are running loose from one end of Italy to the other. The tolerance of the present Government, coupled with the recent amnesty, has provided an effective corps of *agents provocateurs* at a time when the Italian people hungry, dissatisfied and humiliated, are only too easily provoked. The Government believes it is better to keep the Fascists and the Monarchists in sight than to let them brew their poisonous broth in the darkness. It may be a right policy. The British Government thinks so, and applies it in dealing with its own brand of Fascists. But the risk is great; and yesterday's tale of strikes and demonstrations throughout the whole of Italy emphasizes the danger. The March on Rome began out of the chaos of Italian Socialism in its struggle with clerical and industrial reaction. Reaction faces Italian Socialism today; and if the present coalition Government fails to stabilize the country there will be a new March on Rome: the marchers, having changed their shirts, are waiting.

The brush in the House of Commons on Tuesday over the B.B.C., and the hints of Government investigation into the monopolistic character of the big British newspaper groups, indicate a widespread uneasiness about the stage of public information in Britain. If the general public were better informed, the conduct of public business at home and abroad might be levered up to a higher standard. The bigger the newspaper circulation and the louder the blare of the radio, the less the ordinary citizen knows. What is called a free Democratic Press is for a large part free only to do what the Proprietor and Board of Directors think will make them the most money. It is the entertainment value of a newspaper that counts these days; and most of the highly-paid newspapermen are on a par with wisecracking comedians and a pair of Hollywood legs. The editor today more nearly resembles a combination of Hollywood director and pin-table manager than he does the great editors of the old days; and instead of a Gardiner, a Spender or a Scott, we get Milords Beaverbrook, Kemsley, Camrose and Rothermere. The B.B.C., which is beginning to worry Mr Churchill, is a very different matter. It is built along Civil Service lines and its boss is Parliament, which in practice means the Government. It claims to be objective, but its objectivity lies in its presentation rather than in its selection; and some reform is needed here as well as in the big newspaper groups.

PART XIII

The Polish Press

Having in view the danger contained in Mihailovich's movement, I have already, in anticipation of all eventualities, issued orders for the destruction of all his supporters on the territory occupied by my troops. . . . The liquidation of Mihailovich's movement at the present time will no longer be an easy matter because of the forces which he has at his disposal.

February 16th, 1943.

ADOLPH HITLER.

Reprinted from an article by Zygmunt Nowakowski in the "Wiadomości" (London) of July 4th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

CHUSTA WERONIKI

ZBRODNIA, dokonana przez sąd w Belgradzie, sprawia, że ogarnia nas uczucie głębokiego wstydu i straszliwej bezradności. Chciałoby się wyjść gdzieś, na jakiś wielki plac, na skrzyżowanie ulic, zatrzymać ruch, zahamować miasto, osadzić w miejscu każdego przechodnia i zawołać wielkim głosem, że stała się rzecz przekraczająca w swej nikczemności wszystko, czego świadkami jesteśmy od początku tej nikczemnej wojny. Zabito jednego człowieka, ale w tym jednym człowieku dokonano egzekucji na całej ludzkości.

Michajłowicz padł a jego śmierć jest śmiercią masową, śmiercią tego, co w człowieku jest ludzkie i boskie zarazem. Niech uderzą dzwony wszystkich kościołów! Niech uderzą raz, ale tak mocno, iżby im serca pękły. Niech nastanie cisza. Niech zgaśnie słońce. W ciemności módlmy się szeptem za ludzkość umarłą.

Nie wiadomo, czy kule przeszły pierś skazańca czy też strzaskały mu czaszkę, ale na pewno krew bluznęła szeroko. Jej plamy są wszędzie, na mapie całego globu, na rękach tych ludzi, którzy nie wstydzą się ścisnąć ręki katów. Zbrodniczy rząd Tita jest i będzie uznawany w dalszym ciągu. Z jego przedstawicielami stykają się przedstawiciele innych rządów. Mordu dokonali sędziowie w Belgradzie, ale współodpowiedzialnych szukać należy w stolicach innych państw. Zabili Michajłowicza ci, którzy wyparli się go, uznając Tita. Na ich dłoniach jest krew. Nie zmyją tych plam nigdy.

Norymberga nakręca film zwolniony, posługując się bogatwem techniki, którego by jej pozazdrościć mogło Hollywood. Jupiterzy o sile milionów wolt zalewają scenę potokami światła, w którym sprawiedliwość tańczy kankana. Na ławie oskarżonych siedzą gwiazdorzy największego thrilleru w dziejach świata. Mają możliwość nie tylko obrony ale i popisu. Doskonałe role, choć niektórzy psują

je, uciekając się do szarzy. Pozują się do zdjęć, wdzięczą się, krygują. Scenariusz pozwala im na grę od kulisy do kulisy, na bisowanie efektowniejszych momentów, niemal na rozdawanie autografów, a w każdym razie na wywiady udzielane korespondentom pism. W roli prokuratora występuje. . . . Rosjanin. On oskarża. I on, gdy wypływa rzecz taka, jak np. Katyń, ukręca tej rzeczy głowę. Kino trwa. *Glorious technicolour!*

Tempo Norymbergi, ten komfort procesu, ten flirt ogłupiałej, starej Temidy z oskarżonymi, którzy dawno powinni już wisieć albo być rozerwani w sztuki przez ludzi, jacy wyszli żywi z obozów niemieckich, słowem, cała ta *Displaced Justice* norymberska, jakże piekielnym kontrastem odbija od błyskawicznego skrót, którym posłużył się Belgrad. Tam—zasady humanitarne stosowane wobec łotrów, którzy zabili czy zamęczyli na śmierć miliony ludzi; tu—męka i tortury człowieka, który walczył o wolność swego kraju. W Norymberdze oskarżeni wypoczywają, miewają week-endy, wakacje i t.d. Michajłowicza i jego sztab badano bez przerwy przez 74 godziny. Dwóch oskarżonych zmarło w trakcie śledztwa, odmówiwszy zeznań. Generał, po ukończeniu wstępnego badania, zaniesiony został do celi jako jedna krwawa masa. Podczas rozprawy oświadczył na pytanie sądu, że był traktowany dobrze.

Podczas rozprawy. . . . W lipcowym numerze „*The Nineteenth Century and After*“ znajduje się wstrząsający opis procesu, który odbył się w Moskwie, w r. 1930, przeciw niejakiemu Sternowi. Od tego czasu metody prowadzenia śledztwa i procesów doznały wielu ulepszeń. Autorka tego opisu, Anne Cobb Hurry, była naocznym świadkiem rozprawy, w ciągu której wielokrotnie wyprowadzano oskarżonego z sali w towarzystwie jakiegoś milczącego osobnika. Po chwili wracali obaj. Stern za każdym razem wracał coraz bardziej czerwony na twarzy i za każdym razem zmniejszała się jego zdolność formułowania odpowiedzi. Gdy przecież odzyskiwał mowę, następowała przerwa. Wychodził, wracał, ciągle z tym samym osobnikiem, który tajemniczymi zabiegami doprowadzał Sterna do stanu paraliżu języka czy woli. Pod koniec rozprawy oskarżony zaniemówił zupełnie. Ten krótki fragment, zatytułowany „*The Stern Trial*“, jest wysoce pouczający.

Pouczająca jest także dola Jugosławii w tej wojnie. Jugosławia mogła się ocalić. Nie zagrażała jej niewola. Regent, ks. Paweł, i premier, Cvetkovicz, okazali wiele „*common sense*“ u, wdawszy się w układy z Hitlerem, który żądał otwarcia mu dróg przemarszu przez Jugosławię. Lecz 27 marca 1941 nastąpił zamach stanu, i Jugosławia, na swą zgubę, znalazła się w wojnie z Hitlerem. Zaczęła się jakby nowa pieśń o Kosowym Polu. Zagrał honor, zagrała rycerska krew w narodzie, zagrała w młodym królu.

Czy wystąpienie Jugosławii pośrednio uratowało Rosję? Możliwe. Bardzo możliwe. Kto wie, czy Moskwa i Leningrad nie padłyby, gdyby wojna z Rosją zaczęła się wcześniej? Jugosławia, podobnie jak Polska we wrześniu 1939, podstawiła się Niemcom, wiążąc




Photo: ACME, Newspictures, Inc., New York

After the War

DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH

STANDING TRIAL

znaczne ich siły i opóźniając najazd na Rosję. Lecz Polska była w sytuacji przymusowej, podczas gdy Jugosławia miała wolny wybór. Wybrawszy drogę honoru, zapłaciła za to cenę straszliwą. Zdrada, jakiej dopuścili się sprzymierzeńcy wobec Jugosławii, jest mimo wszystko jeszcze większa niż zdrada ich wobec Polski. Ten sąd wydaje się być paradoksem, jednakże odpowiada on prawdzie. Doświadczenie wykazuje, że nie tylko w teorii ale w i praktyce można dopuścić się zdrady jeszcze gorszej niż zdrada w stosunku do Polski.

Gdy młodzieńczy król wziął na siebie odpowiedzialność za decyzję w skali dziejowej, opinia brytyjska nie szczędziła mu pochwał jak najgorętszych, podziwiając rezolującą rycerską tego młodzieńca. Gdy w rezultacie wojny utracił tron, opinia brytyjska znalazła doskonały argument, mówiąc, że trudno rokować z królem . . . niepełnoletnim. Przecież to właściwie dziecko.

Ta sama opinia grzmiała pochwałami na cześć Michajłowicza, dopóki Michajłowicz w przeciwieństwie do nas, ciągle ślepych—nie przejrzał i nie zrozumiał, że interes jego ojczyzny nie da się pogodzić z jej całkowitym zniszczeniem. Pozbawiony pomocy, nie mogli prowadzić walki na dwa fronty, więc równocześnie przeciwko Niemcom i przeciwko bandom Tita. Wielka Brytania żądała od Michajłowicza, by spokojnie patrzył na zagładę kraju, dokonywaną przez komunistów, oraz by prowadził wzmocnioną ofensywę przeciwko Niemcom. Od nas domagano się, byśmy w r. 1944 zarzynali Niemców a sami dali się zarzynać bolszewikom. Michajłowicz był mądrejszy. Odmówił a raczej postawił warunki. Gdy stało się jasne że chce przede wszystkim bronić swej o czynny i że nie chce być Quislingiem moskiewskim, los jego był przesadzony, jak przesadzony był los Jugosławii. Wydano ją Sowietaom, jak Sowietaom wydano Polskę.

Sama narzuca się krwawa analogia z gen. Okulickim i z armią krajową. Dopóki jej działalność był na rękę Anglikom, dopóty trwały hymny na cześć bohaterstwa polskiego i dopóty trwało żądanie dalszych ofiar. Gdy przyszedł moment próby, Wielka Brytania długo ważyła decyzje, czy żołnierzy armii krajowej uznać za kombatantów. Gen. Okulicki współdziałał ze sztabem brytyjskim. Z Wielkiej Brytanii wybrał się w trudną podróż do Polski, opatrzone instrukcjami brytyjskimi i wiatykiem. Dziś siedzi w Moskwie, w więzieniu. Nie jest rzeczą pewną, czy żyje. Nie było nawet najmniejszej próby, nawet komedii zainscenizowania jakiegś interwencji. Przeciwnie, gdy w Moskwie odbywał się proces przeciw gen. Okulickiemu i przeciwko przywódcom życia politycznego w Polsce, z Anglii delegowano do Moskwy deputację polskich Quislingów z Mikołajczykiem na czele.

Król Piotr w ostatniej chwili interweniował, wysyłając błagalne depesze do brytyjskich mężów stanu z prośbą o ocalenie Michajłowicza. Młody król tym bardziej nie mógł spać spokojnie, że mu sen z oczu spędzać musiała świadomość, iż on także wyparł się Michajłowicza. Dziś wysłał depeszę do obecnego premiera, p. Attlee. Niestety,

premier poprzedni, p. Churchill, wymusił swego czasu na królu Piotrze, by zdradził Michajłowicza. Król zgodził się na to upokarzające żądanie. Nagroda? Wielka Brytania przestała go uznawać.

Mysząc o tych rzeczach, należy sobie zadać pytanie, czy już dopełniona została miara nikczemności. Czy to już kres, czy też świat zejdzie jeszcze niżej, by w końcu, jak Atlantyda, zapaść się i szczeznąć? Czy ludzkość oczekuje dalsza seria upodzeń? Kat, krwawy Greiser, sprawca śmierci i tortur wielu, wielu tysięcy, próbuje . . . apelować. Ten łotr miał możliwość uzyskania interwencji samego . . . papieża. Wyrok nie został natychmiast wykonany. Michajłowicza morduje sąd belgradzki w terminie jak najszybszym.

Zwycięża bezwarunkowo Wschód, idąc szeroką ławą. Zwycięża mongolsko-rosyjska etyka, którą już zaraził się Zachód, przyjmując, godną żołdaka czy muzyka, zasadę niesprzeciwiania się złu. Było rzeczą wiadomą z góry, przesądzoną, ustaloną, że Michajłowicz zostanie zabity przez sędziów belgradzkich. Ale gdzie jest Europa? I gdzie jest świat cywilizowany? Gdzie są mężowie stanu, prawnicy, uczeni, artyści, przedstawiciele kościoła? Przecież, jeszcze tak niedawno, Europa zdobywała się na protest w sprawach o znacznie mniejszym ciężarze gatunkowym. Czy naprawdę pewni mężowie stanu musieli czekać na telegramy króla Piotra? Czy nie czuli ani odrobiny odpowiedzialności za wyrok belgradzki?

Powstała świeżo we Francji Liga Obrony Praw Człowieka, ale nie zdążyła wypowiedzieć się w kwestii mordu belgradzkiego czy też nie zainteresowała się tą sprawą tak daleką i nikogo już nie obchodzącą. A protest powinien być zrodzić się sam, ogarnąć wszystkie kraje, których dotychczas jeszcze nie ogarnęła Rosja. Powinien być głośny, śmiały, taki, by połączył w jednym, zgodnym wołaniu cały świat cywilizowany, stwierdzając, że dzieje się zbrodnia nad zbrodniami, godząca na istotę człowieczeństwa.

Motywy „wyroku“ belgradzkiego jest to, że Michajłowicz współpracował z Niemcami. Oczywiście, kłamstwo. Ale to kłamstwo domaga się kontrpary. Michajłowicz nie współpracował z Niemcami lecz z nimi walczył, dopóki mógł. Natomiast jego oskarżyciele, Rosjanie, współpracowali z Niemcami przez blisko dwa lata, t.j. dopóty, dopóki współpracować mogli. Jeszcze w dniu wybuchu wojny neimieckorosyjskiej odeszły do Niemiec transporty ropy rosyjskiej. Gdyby Hitler nie uderzył pierwszy, Rosjanie służyliby mu przez długi czas. To Hitler zerwał współpracę ze Stalinem, nie Stalin z Hitlerem. Rzecz ta powinna być podkreślana mocno zawsze, szczególnie zaś w trakcie procesu.

Zamiast protestu przeciwko „wyrokowi“ belgradzkiemu ozwały się gdzieś tam jakieś szepty, ściszone, tchórzliwe i dyskretne, podczas gdy powinna była odezwać się burza. Nie odezwała się. Jesteśmy świadkami zdumiewającej dekadencji wszystkiego, co zwykliśmy zwać kulturą duchową. Zamiast niej panoszy się nie-nawieść, zdrada, podłość. Śmierć Michajłowicza nie wywołała wstrząsu, nie zbudziła ludzkości, leżącej od siedmiu lat w letargu.

Dzienniki przyniosły niedawno fotografię, przedstawiającą tego męczennika wolności w kajdanach. Miał na niej rysy uduchowione, wyrte bólem, skamieniałe. Nie zapomnimy o nim, my—Polacy. Moga zapomnieć narody, które podczas tej wojny wyspecjalizowały się w handlu innymi narodami. My—nie.

Lecz, jeśli by na przekór naszej rozpaczliwej wierze, miała naprawdę zginąć ludzkość, rysy jej ostatnie utrwalił nie aparat fotograficzny, ale chusta Weroniki, chusta najświętsza, biała i krwawa. Tragiczny negatyw. Klisza śmierci.

Reprinted from an article by St. M. in the "Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza" (London) of July 22nd, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

MICHAJŁOWICZ

DOPEŁNIŁA się tragedia Jugosławii przez zamordowanie gen. Draży Michajłowicza i jego towarzyszy.

Michajłowicz i jego towarzysze sponiewierani i zamordowani zostali w stolicy własnego kraju, a ich „sędziami“ i oprawcami byli zdrajcy jugosłowiańskiego narodu.

Nie ma jako tako oświeconego człowieka na świecie, który by nie znał prawdy o Michajłowiczu i jego rzyźnie. Głęboko moralna romantyczność jego ofiary przejdzie do legendy i pieśni narodowej. Słusznie gdzieś indziej o tej ofierze napisano, że „w zapadłych wioskach serbskich starzy guślarze przekażą imię bohatera narodowego przyszłym pokoleniom i śpiewać będą o nim tak, śpiewali ich ojcowie i dziadowie o carze Łazarzu, Kraljewicu Marku i braciach Jugovicach“. Ale obok pieśni gminnej, która „ujdzie cało“, historia polityczna i historia kultury nigdy nie zapomni, że Michajłowicz oddał po równi bécenną usługę sprawie wolności własnego narodu, jak idei wolności i demokracji całego świata.

To jemu, Michajłowiczowi alianccy mężowie stanu składali hołd jeszcze cztery lata temu, to do niego jeszcze w roku 1942 gen. Auchinleck marszałek lotnictwa Tedder i admirał Harwood pisali: „Z podziwem śledzimy prowadzone przez pana operacje, które oddają nieocenione usługi sprawie sojuszniczej.“ Michajłowicz walczył w górach serbskich z faszyzmem niemieckim na śmierć i życie, gdy dzisiejsi jego „sędziowie“ związani byli jeszcze sojuszem z Hitlerem Michajłowicz przygotowywał swój ruch powstańczy przeciw Niemcom już wówczas, gdy pan Mołotow toastował w berlińskiej *Reichskanzlei* na cześć Ribbentropa.

Zamordowany został kilka dni temu przez komunistów gen. Draży Michajłowicz—cieszy się natomiast dotychczas życiem p. Ribbentrop, *dramatis persona* najdziwaczniejszego w dziejach, chociaż nikogo dziś już właściwie nie interesującego procesu norymberskiego.

Gdy zaś do tych paradoksów dodamy, że zamordowanie rzekomego „kolaboracjonisty” Michajłowicza następuje w chwili startu Moskwy do wyścigu o zjednanie sobie Niemców, w chwili, w które; wczorajsi naziści, a dzisiejsi koncesjonowani socjaliści niemieccy w rosyjskiej strefie okupacyjnej wiwatują na cześć pana Mołotowa, obiecującego Niemcom rewindykację terytorjalną na wschodzie—to dopełni się upiorny obraz krzywdy i zagłady jakichkolwiek zasad moralnych, rządzących znanym dotychczas, historycznym rozwojem życia społeczeństw.

Każń Michajłowicza jest tej zagłady śmiertelnie przerażającym symbolem. Tym bardziej przerażającym, gdy milczą głucho o straszliwej zbrodni ci, którzy jeszcze pare lat temu na szczyty chwały wynosili bohatera jugosłowiańskiego, którzy z jego imienia czynili sztandar wolności i demokracji, a dziś brak interwencji w obronie jego życia usprawiedliwili niemożnością mieszania się w wewnętrzne sprawy drugiego państwa.

Wśród tego potopu najelementarniejszych prawd i pojęć moralnych ani przez chwilę wszelako nie tracimy wiary w przesilenie zła. Wierzymy głęboko, że wśród tylu ofiar narodów Europy, walczących o prawo do wolnego i godnego życia—również i ofiara Michajłowicza jest ofiarą celową, siejbą męczeńską, która przynieść musi żniwo sprawiedliwości i swobody ludzkiej.

On sam te ofiary przewidywał, nazwał ją „świętą” i na tej świętości budował niezłomną wiarę w zwycięstwo—choćby pozagrobowe—słusznej sprawy. W ostatnim swym liście, pisany 12 lutego 1946 r., do przyjaciół—powiedział; „W tej świętej walce mogę zginąć. Ale to nie znaczy, aby razem ze mną zginąć miała słuszna sprawa o którą walczy nasz naród. Ja bowiem jestem jedynie wykonawcą woli narodu i w tym duchu prowadziłem walkę przeciw okupantom, a potem przeciw komunistom.”

PART XIV

The Portuguese Press

Il y a en Yougoslavie 17 divisions italiennes, 7 divisions bulgares, 3 divisions allemandes et 4 divisions hongroises, c'est à dire un total de 31 divisions ennemies. Ces forces sont clouées sur le sol yougoslave grâce à l'activité du général Mihailovitch, ministre de la guerre.

Le 7 juin 1943

SLOBODAN YOVANOVITCH.

Reprinted from an article by Pedro Correia Marques in "A Voz" (Lisbon) of April 1st, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

O DRAMA IUGOSLAVO

NA verdade custa a crer que se guardasse durante tantos dias—nada menos de 12—a grande notícia de que o general Draga Mihailovich ardente e valoroso chefe dos “chetniks” caíra em poder das forças governamentais da Iugoslávia. E ainda está vivo! Mas a verdade é que tudo isto se anuncia na Imprensa baseado na informação que o general Rankovich, ministro do Interior de Belgrado deu aos parlamentares da Skupchtina, (se é que Assembleia Nacional de Belgrado ainda dá por esta denominação). Rankovich acrescentou:

“Entre numerosos criminosos que procuram fugir às suas responsabilidades, o famoso Mihailovich era o mais esperto. Andava de montanha em montanha, de floresta em floresta. Era esperto, mas as nossas forças de segurança foram mais espertas ainda.”

Acrescentou o ministro que o último refúgio do primeiro adversário sério que os invasores da Iugoslávia encontraram era uma oficina de ferreiro, onde se encontrava com mil soldados apenas. A sua utilidade nacional e aliada foi reconhecida e mantida até Maio de 1944. Mas a partir dessa data o chefe do Governo inglês cedeu a pressões que facilmente se adivinham. Pretexto: Mihailovich não combatia o inimigo. E o auxílio que a Inglaterra dava ao caudilho sérvio passou a ser dado a Tito. O filho de Churchill, Randolph Churchill, então no exército, foi lançado dum avião sobre território iugoslavo para servir de oficial de ligação junto das forças de Tito. Por sinal que depois terminada a sua missão oficial e regressado à vida jornalística, Randolph Churchill havia de vir dizer gentes que o regime actual da Iugoslávia é um regime semi-comunista, totalitário e vigente por domínio policial; e que a “Ozna,” a terrível polícia secreta, exerce uma acção irritante cerca dos diplomatas e das firmas comerciais inglesas e americanas; e que a perseguição religiosa é implacável, etc.

Mas deixemos tudo isto e revertamos ao nosso ponto :

Por três vezes, durante o ano de 1943 procurou o futuro chefe dos "partidários" entrar na Sérvia. Os sérvios repeliram-no sempre, por que não são comunistas. Mas foi mais fácil encontrar ambiente e território, onde fincar pé no Montenegro e zonas de população albanesa. Os camponeses sérvios mantiveram-se fieis a Mihailovich, apesar de todas as pressões, mesmo ocidental.

Mas o exército vermelho entrou na Iugoslávia e encontrou ali, como na Grécia e na Bulgária, o terreno bem preparado. O ex-búlgaro Dimitrov, secretário do Cominterne, preparara bem as "Frentes de Libertação Nacional," formadas com elementos comunistas, a que os patriotas não podiam deixar de dar cooperação. No fim elas ficariam senhores da situação ou com larga preponderancia no país. O plano era bem concebido. Mihailovich continuava a lutar bravamente com os alemães, entregando aos russos todas as posições que os seus homens iam tomando. Procurou muitas vezes chegar a acordo sobre uma colaboração regular. Mas foi sempre repellido. Depois de haverem entregado aos russos as cidades e aldeias, que haviam conquistado, os oficiais e soldados de Mihailovich internaram-se nos bosques, porque os russos não queriam aqueles libertadores.

Como na Polónia, só admitiam na libertação do país quem servisse a política russa. E o exército soviético avançou. Na sua cola iam as formações "partidárias." Tomavam conta da administração do país e executavam os oficiais e soldados de Mihailovich, que lhes caíam nas mãos. Foi uma acção paralela á ocorrida na Polónia com o exército do heroico general "Bor." E o país ia, na linguagem então usada e admitida nas grandes reportagens, que se publicavam nos jornais do Mundo, sendo "libertado e pacificado." *Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.* . . .

Depois da vitória russa em Belgrado entraram os "partidários." A cidade ficou espavorida com a "libertação." Todas as ruas estavam desertas, todas as casas cerradas. E elegeu-se nova Assembleia Nacional. O general que na cidade representava a nova autoridade leu a lista dos candidatos. Claro : foi votada de chapa. E começou a "depuração." Desapareceram, sem se saber como, milhares de pessoas. Os tribunais ordinários foram abolidos e substituídos por tribunais castrenses, discricionários. Surgiu a nova polícia, a OZNA, que nada ficara a dever à GPU e à Gestapo. Todas as autoridades foram demitidas e procedeu-se à eleição de novas "autoridades nacionais." Só votaram, como está bem de ver, os comunistas. Aboliu-se o ensino religioso. Criaram-se as "Casas da Juventude," onde rapazes e raparigas dos 10 aos 16 anos são "educados" simultaneamente. Cantam as canções do partido e exaltam em hinos os seus homens representativos. É uma imitação perfeita da "*Hitlerjugend*." Não se faz ideia do que foi a limpeza realizada em diversas regiões do país. O que era católico ou ortodoxo foi vítima duma sangrenta perseguição. Na Croácia foram logo de entrada assassinados cerca de 200 sacerdotes católicos, como "inimigos do povo." Numerosos elementos do partido camponês de Matchek tiveram a mesma sorte.

Entretanto o país está sofrendo uma fome horrorosa. Os auxílios que o Vaticano quis enviar foram recusados. Os da UNRRA são distribuídos aos amigos políticos, aos membros do partido.

E estamos assistindo ao que resultou da Vitória : a entrega de 30 milhões de polacos e 13 milhões de iugoslavos a uma espantosa escravidão. Entretanto o amigo da primeira hora, o heroico e indomável Mihailovich está, ao que dizem as agências, prisioneiro e será "julgado" e, sem dúvida alguma, fuzilado. A Europa tem muitos pecados na consciéncia. Este da Iugoslávia não é dos menores.

Reprinted from an article by C. M. in "*A Voz*" (Lisbon) of June 28th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor

FILME APREENDIDO . . .

AS notícias, que nos chegam do "julgamento" de Mihailovich são um tanto contraditórias. O caudilho da Grande Sérvia ora se confessa culpado de colaboracionismo, ora repele com energia a acusação. Estamos em dizer que ele se encontra sob coacção física ou moral e que sofre de mais alguma coisa que do choque dos gases asfixiantes utilizados para o liquidar e aos seus fieis. É certo que o Governo de Belgrado fez anunciar que o julgamento seria revestido de todas as certezas de juridicidade e poderia ser observado por todos os jornalistas que o quisessem ver. Mas algo de estranho acontece naquele processo, porque um operador da "*Paramount*," Lewis Cass de nome, foi fazer um filme para as "Actualidades" da famosa casa cinematográfica, mas esta não o poderá exhibir, pois foi apreendido pelas autoridades iugoslavas. Que "diria" a fotografia para não se querer que na terra livre se visse em imagens como decorre aquele "julgamento?"

O estado de Mihailovich não deve ser bom. Sabe-se como na Rússia há "métodos suasórios" para obrigar acusados a reconhecerem que são muito claramente culpados e que são tratados com toda a humanidade. Os leitores devem estar lembrados de que Estaline quis em 1935 "depurar" o seu regime e o fez duma forma perfeita. O brilhante marechal Tukhachevsky, Radek, Aykow, Bujarin, Kamenev e Zinoviev foram presos e "reconheceram" em pleno tribunal—também e esse "julgamento" assistiram jornalistas estrangeiros—haverem cometido tais crimes de traição, que mereciam a morte e até a pediam como justa punição. . . .

Ora o regime iugoslavo sai direito dos moldes soviéticos e até os que methor o servem vieram do Cominterne e andaram nas famosas Brigadas Internacionais, que em Espanha combateram.

Mihailovitch, depois de entoxicado por gases asfixiantes, lançados por aviadores que falavam russo, esteve entre a vida e a morte. Por efeito dos gases? Talvez por alguns motivos suplementares. . . .

A revista espanhola "Mundo" conta o que aconteceu ao herói depois que os captivos, fardados de iugoslavos mas falando russo, o entregaram à OZNA, uma organização policial que em processos de inquirição deixa a perder de vista a "falecida" Gestapo. Tanto o general como os seus companheiros, caídos em poder da OZNA foram sàbiamente torturados até fazerem as "confissões" desejadas. Conta aquela revista que Lazich e Bedecovich, experimentados elementos daquela polícia, torturaram os presos durante dias seguidos, sob a inspecção do vice-primeiro ministro Kordej. Dois dos presos morreram na tortura, recusando heróicamente fazer declarações. Os outros perderam a moral e ficaram reduzidos a míseros farrapos, que dizem o que for conveniente. Mihailovich foi torturado dias e noites seguidos. Em tal estado ficaram aqueles míseros, que os médicos afirmavam precisar de três meses para os restituírem a forma apresentável. Mas queria-se o espectáculo do "julgamento" imediatamente para efeitos políticos. O que ali se julga não é, com efeito apenas um caso de política internacional da Iugoslávia, mas principalmente a política externa do país. Pretende-se infligir à Grã-Bretanha e à América uma severa humilhação, Jane O'Malley, filha dos srs. Embaixadores da Inglaterra em Lisboa, descreve numa crónica enviada ao "Sunday Times" como na sessão de 15, o tribunal repeliu enérgicamente nova solicitação de americanos que queriam depôr e declaravam ir de avião dos Estados Unidos até Belgrado, a fim de não retardar os trabalhos. E conta um episódio, a que também a "Reuter" se referiu: perguntado pelo promotor se havia dito "sim" à acusação de colaboracionismo, julgando dizer "não" e isso talvez devido à depressão física, Mihailovich respondeu:

"Eu tenho grande dificuldade em usar das palavras exactas, mas não confundiria um *sim* com um *não*."

Esta declaração—"eu tenho grande dificuldade em usar das palavras exactas"—são um indício que não se deve perder de vista. . . .

A grande jornalista admite que as contradições e a depressão do preso são devidas a uma intensa e não muito amável inquirição e sugestão. . . .

Reproduzamos as palavras da ilustre "reporter", que está fazendo um jornalismo corajoso e digno naquele difícil e complicado case balcânico:—. . . *his admissions represent anything but the effect of intensive and too gentle cross-examination and suggestion.*

Ora por tudo isto é que certamente o filme foi retido pelas autoridades iugoslavas. Provavelmente a imagem "diria" o que jornalistas não chegam a dizer. E por isso não se querem no tribunal testemunhas que dizem: *He saved our lives. We'll save his!* (Ele salvou as nossas vidas; nós salvaremos a sua). E por isso, porque Belgrado quer humilhar os Estados Unidos, pois tal é a política de Moscovo, o general será condenado apesar de todos os esforços do *Fair Trial Committee*.

PART XV

The Rumanian Press
(IN AMERICA)

We do not know what will happen in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. . . . Mihailovich certainly holds a powerful position locally as Commander-in-Chief, and it does not mean that in ceasing to be Minister of War it will rob him of his local influence.

May 24th, 1944.

WINSTON CHURCHILL.

Reprinted from an article by Prof. Ion Anghel in "La Roumanie Indépendante" (Detroit) of March 1st, 1947.

LE SOUVENIR DE DRAJA MIHAILOVITCH

QUELQUES jours avant qu'il ait lieu, la convocation à l'Office du Souvenir pour Draja Mihailovitch a été transmise d'homme à homme: Dimanche . . . au cimetière . . . à Paris.

Points de rencontre, vérification des hommes de liaison, consigne de reconnaissance, le maximum de discrétion!

Pendant ce temps, les journaux publient les débats à la Conférence de la Paix, l'échange de notes diplomatiques entre Joseph Broz et l'Amérique giflée par la destruction de quelques avions et la perte de 10 à 15 soldats américains envoyés dans l'autre monde par les mitrailleuses de Tito, et tout dernièrement la honteuse capitulation ou peut-être son arrangement d'avenir à Henry Wallace par dessus les luttes, les sacrifices, les tombes et les aspirations des millions d'hommes tombés pour une paix construite sur le respect de l'homme, par l'homme!

C'est dans ces conditions que nous nous glissons aujourd'hui inquiets, en nous chuchottant, en nous serrant les mains, en nous embrassant même à la séparation avec le soupçon dans l'âme que nous pourrions nous rencontrer le même jour, à côté de Draja, à côté de nos innombrables tombes qui nous commandent de mépriser la lâcheté et la souillure et d'affronter avec énergie la dernière forme de la tyrannie totalitaire.

Je parlais à *tchika** Radé tard dans la nuit, après qu'il m'eût montré sur une carte tracée au crayon sur un morceau de papier, les chemins, les passages, après avoir réciproquement échangé le nom des hommes de liaison et après m'avoir confié la formule de laissez-passer et de reconnaissance au quartier du *voïvode*† Draja: "*Ya sam bio kod*

* Père.

† Maréchal.

rodbine na Triglavou,”* je lui parlais et lui demandais avec inquiétude :

“ Et si, à la fin de cette guerre, nos peuples tombaient sous une tyrannie plus cruelle que celle sous laquelle nous luttons actuellement ? ”

“ Soyez tranquille, maître, ” me répondit doucement *tchika* Radé.

“ Draja ne laissera pas tomber son sabre de la main avant que nous respirions libres dans ce coin de l’Europe ! ”

“ Et si Draja tombait ? ”

Avec un sursaut de terreur et un tremblement dans la voix *tchika* Radé conclua :

“ *Onda tché to biti prva nacha velika jrtva protiv komounizma.* ” †

“ Oh ! *Tchika* Radé, nous avons déjà fait le plus grand sacrifice contre le communisme ! ”

Alors ! Frères de sacrifice, frères de nouveaux combats, nos *voïvodes* des tombes vont nous conduire sous la direction de leurs successeurs, en tempête de soleil, sur le sommet de notre victoire, sur les sommets de la liberté et de la fraternité des peuples du sud-est européen.

Dans l’honneur des martyrs réside la chute même de leurs bourreaux.
živio! Draja Mihailovitch !

* J’ai été chez des parents sur le Triglav.

† Alors ce sera notre premier grand sacrifice contre le communisme.

‡ Vive.

PART XVI

The Russian Press

(IN AMERICA)

General Mihailovich was throughout the war the organiser and the leader of the Yugoslav resistance against the invaders.

March 26th, 1946. THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Reprinted from an article (written in the Russian language) by VI. Lebedev in the “*Novoye Russkoye Slovo*” (New York) of March 28th, 1946, by the kind permission of the Editor and Author.

L’ARRESTATION DU
GÉNÉRAL MIHAILOVITCH

LA police de Tito a découvert le lieu de retraite du général Draja Mihailovitch et, le 13 mars, il fut pris aux confins de la Serbie et de la Bosnie, après deux années de vie clandestine.

Douze jours passèrent avant que le gouvernement de Tito eut trouvé nécessaire d’informer le monde de cet événement sensationnel.

Draja Mihailovitch est le chef qui fut le premier à commencer la lutte armée en Europe après que les forces anglaises eussent quitté le continent. A cette époque, on nommait sa lutte “ le second front ” et cette lutte fut le commencement de la résistance à l’intérieur de l’Europe. Les Allemands lancèrent contre les armées de Mihailovitch une force énorme.

Pendant deux années, Mihailovitch fut le symbole de la résistance contre les Etats de l’Axe. C’est à lui que furent dédiés des articles enthousiastes, c’est de lui que parlèrent les membres des parlements alliés. Les chefs d’Etat, les ministres, les commandants parlaient de lui comme d’un héros. Il devint très vite l’une des personnalités les plus aimées du monde.

Dans la presse soviétique même, en 1942 encore, le chef des communistes tchèques, l’actuel ministre de l’éducation nationale, Zdenek Nédlogo, fit publier un article plein de sympathie pour Mihailovitch. Mais en 1943, après la conférence de Téhéran, son étoile commença à décliner.

Mais certains communistes avaient déclanché la lutte contre lui beaucoup plus tôt. Ils l’avaient déclanchée immédiatement après que M. Molotov eut proposé à Londres, en 1942, au gouvernement yougoslave la signature d’un pacte d’amitié pour une durée de vingt ans, et après que M. Nintchitch eut répondu qu’il n’était pas encore temps de penser à de tels traités.

Cette réponse irréfléchie s’explique par la politique anglo-soviétique de l’époque. Ceci est de même la raison pour laquelle les tentatives

de faire collaborer les forces de Mihailovitch et celles que Tito venait de créer, échouèrent. Entre les deux commandants commença une guerre au cours de laquelle les communistes accusèrent Mihailovitch de "collaboration avec les Allemands."

Quand les zones d'opérations militaires furent déterminées, la partie orientale de la Serbie, celle où se trouvaient les forces de Mihailovitch, fut allouée à la sphère soviétique, la partie occidentale, celle où opéraient les forces de Tito, à la sphère britannique.

Le reste est connu de tout le monde. Mihailovitch étant devenu un poids pour les alliés à cause de son attitude anti-Tito et anti-communiste, ils commencèrent par le dépouiller de la gloire dont ils l'avaient couvert. Le rôle principal dans cette pièce fut joué par Churchill qui prit une attitude pro-Tito. Il affirma aux Communes qu' "un certain nombre" de commandants tchetniks et de subordonnés de Mihailovitch avaient traité avec l'ennemi (les Italiens). Mihailovitch, de son côté, nia catégoriquement avoir jamais autorisé ces pourparlers qui auraient pu avoir un caractère de collaboration. Il fut toujours soutenu par le gouvernement du roi Pierre dont il était ministre de la guerre.

Néanmoins les Britanniques d'abord, les Américains beaucoup plus tard, rappellèrent leurs missions militaires. Tito, signataire de l'accord déterminant les zones d'occupation militaire au profit de l'Italie selon lequel Trieste et la Vénétie Julienne étaient compris dans la zone anglaise, devint l'unique bénéficiaire de l'appui allié.

Les forces de Tito furent renforcées et par les secours alliés et par les divisions italiennes qui s'étaient rendues avec leurs armes. Selon les dernières déclarations faites par les adhérents de Tito, le gouvernement soviétique lui avait aussi envoyé de considérables secours.

Une grande pression fut en même temps exercée sur le roi Pierre qui finit par congédier Mihailovitch et confier le commandement à Tito. Le nouveau gouvernement royal, celui de Choubachitch—qui ne fut jamais reconnu par Mihailovitch—prit une attitude pro-Tito et Choubachitch, devenu plus tard ministre de Tito, promettait de faire fusiller son ancien collègue du gouvernement de coalition.

Le dénouement du drame yougoslave fut paradoxal. La partie orientale de la Yougoslavie fut occupée par les Russes auxquels Mihailovitch, sous l'influence de ses sentiments russophiles et de ceux du peuple serbe, ne résista pas. Tout au contraire. Dans un ordre du jour aux troupes il salua l'entrée des troupes russes. Tito, que les Alliés soutenaient toujours, passa avec ses forces dans la partie de la Serbie déjà occupée par les Russes et y organisa son gouvernement, son armée et sa police. Mihailovitch refusa de fuir et resta dans le pays pour y mener la vie d'un proscrit.

L'abandon de Mihailovitch ne porta bonheur ni au roi Pierre ni à Choubachitch. Le roi fut détroné et Choubachitch congédié.

Quant aux Anglais—y compris Churchill—ils ont à présent une autre opinion de Tito et de son gouvernement que pendant la lune de miel de leur amitié passée. Tito accuse Mihailovitch de collaboration

avec les Allemands. Selon lui, ces gens ont vécu pendant quatre ans dans des conditions inimaginables, ils ont combattu l'ennemi sous le contrôle des missions militaires britanniques et américaines, ils ont sauvé au nez et à la barbe des Allemands des centaines d'aviateurs anglais et américains. Mais, tout ceci ils ne l'auraient fait, selon Tito, que pour mieux camoufler leur collaboration. Cas jusqu'à présent inconnu dans l'histoire.

La presse américaine a déjà publié l'opinion des militaires américains qui avaient été attachés aux armées de Mihailovitch et qui protestent contre de telles accusation.

Quant aux adhérents du général emprisonné, tombé entre les mains d'un adversaire sans merci et condamné à mort avant d'avoir été pris, le tribunal de Tito ne saura les convaincre de sa culpabilité. Il ne fera qu'ajouter aux lauriers d'une gloire militaire, la couronne de martyre.

Seul la décision d'un tribunal international—correspondant à la haute position occupée par Mihailovitch en sa qualité de commandant en chef d'une armée alliée—seul un jugement rendu en pleine liberté et objectivité, serait à même d'éclaircir cette histoire tragique aux yeux des gens sans préjugés.

Reprinted from an article (written in the Russian language) by Vl. Lebedev in the "Novoye Russkoye Slovo" (New York) of July 22nd, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor and Author.

THE DEATH OF DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH

DRAZHA MIHAILOVICH has been shot. . . . He was a hero to the end of his life and now takes his place in this epoch of Serbian nationalism bearing a martyr's crown.

His execution and his sordid betrayal—not an unknown occurrence in the history of so-called "legal" murders—was preceded by that shameless comedy called a "trial" which ended in a death sentence being passed by three unknown officers, subordinates of Mihailovitch's political opponent, Joseph Broz "Tito."

At that historical trial, even the most elementary forms of justice were not observed. The defence was denied the right to call the main witnesses, namely: members of the American and British Military Missions to Mihailovitch, members of the Yugoslav Government in exile who had expressed their readiness to appear in the Court, and Allied prisoners of war including airmen rescued by the armies of the accused. The defence was not even allowed to make use of their evidence. . . . The prosecution did not so much take the trouble to call members said to have collaborated with the Germans, accused on the same grounds as Mihailovitch, although they and their records were

in the hands of the Allies. . . . The chief witnesses at the trial were of minor importance, many of whom had been denounced by Mihailovich.

Yet, in actual fact, the trial contributed towards the integrity and prestige of Mihailovich.

Mihailovich might have been condemned and executed by a false declaration that he had confessed to his "crimes." It was the greatest mistake on the part of Joseph Broz to attempt to make use of this mockery of judicial proceedings for the purpose of propaganda. The leader of the Yugoslav National Resistance Movement was tortured (a fact corroborated in the leading articles of *The New York Times*) and Tito presumably supposed that in consequence he would publicly denounce himself in a bid for life; he would plead "guilty" or "repent" according to the dictates of his merciless enemies; that he would accuse the opponents of his foes, namely his Allies-in-brief, wreck his whole life-work in the presence of the foreign correspondents which would have furnished inexhaustible propaganda for Tito and his masters. Of course those who knew Mihailovich did not believe any such thing. It was only his enemies who could be so easily led astray. Before the trial they took it for granted that he would make a "public confession" and went so far as to say that he had done so already in private. . . .

The hero of this tragedy was clever in his tactics right up to the end. At the "trial" it was not to the "judges" but to the world that he declared:

"I loathed and hated the Germans. . . . I wanted to persevere in opposing and resisting their forces and on this account I was accused of being a rebel and of defying Hitler and his Reich. During the early struggle only England and I took up the cudgels against the aggressors. . . ."

The fallacy of any so-called "confession" was thus made clear.

Those who marched under his banner and those who sympathised with him will find in the statement quoted above a definition of his noble character. The martyrdom of Mihailovich serves to reveal all the more vividly his rôle in the European and Yugoslav war of liberation. The only facts disclosed by this "tribunal," and "admitted" by Mihailovich, were already known to the world, namely: that terrible civil war broke out within the limits of the National Resistance Movement and that he was the leader of forces ideologically opposed to the forces which gathered round Tito. The question inevitably arises: who was responsible for this fratricidal war? The answer will be found in history—unprejudiced, international history—and not in the "sentence" of three insignificant officers from Tito's ranks.

Victory in this internal strife was awarded to Mihailovich's enemy; it was not achieved according to merit, but in accordance with the agreement of the "Big Three,"—America, England and the U.S.S.R.—who for political reasons have recognised Tito and his Government. Consequently, recognition of Mihailovich and the Government to

which he was appointed Minister of War and deputy Commander-in-Chief, was withdrawn.

Civil war brings terrible unwritten "laws" in its wake. Tito, the "victorious," having "won" by no matter what means, was now prepared to settle accounts with his "vanquished" political opponent. He likewise wished to "dishonour" the opponent, who refused to save his life by flight; Tito also sought to "discredit" all those who were with Mihailovich and planned to try and provide proof that the Allies had "collaborated" with the Nazis. In this way he hoped to convince the Yugoslav people that only the Communists and their partners had succeeded in rescuing the country. The Communists adopt this line of action in all countries where they have wrested power, either by separate Bolshevik agreement or according to the decision of the "Big Three."

The "sentence" passed on Mihailovich was immediately made use of by Tito as a means of propaganda, both against the victim awaiting execution and other opponents. This extraordinary dictator, the present ruler of Yugoslavia, brought accusations to bear on the case that have no place in the prosecutor's indictment.

In speaking at a meeting in Montenegro, Tito said:

"The sentence pronounced at the recent trial in Belgrade is also a sentence against the reactionaries. Mihailovich did not hesitate to establish links with the Roman Catholic Church and the Croatian Peasant Party. This was as good as a coalition with the reactionaries which has now been crushed. By way of revenge," Tito concluded, "the reactionaries deny our rights to Istria and Venezia Giulia."

Thus at the eleventh hour Tito endeavoured to justify the "sentence" passed on Mihailovich, in an attempt to prove that the Yugoslav patriot was responsible for his own undoing.

It is a commonly known fact, that the Croatian Catholic Church did not protest against the German invasion and the atrocities of the Ustashis; that its attitude towards the "Orthodox-Serbian" movement led by Mihailovich was hostile. It is also commonly known that the high prelates of the Catholic Church were left undisturbed by Tito who dismissed and arrested Orthodox dignitaries, obviously hoping for an agreement with Catholicism.

Another well known fact is that the Croatian Peasant Party, representing the overwhelming majority of the Croatian people, did not collaborate with the Germans despite the efforts of Anté Pavelich and his Ustashis, and that this Party is the most progressive in Croatia.

In securing members of this party for his Government, namely Shubashich, Shutey and others, Tito erroneously thought that an agreement with them would likewise mean an agreement with the Croatian Peasant Party. This, however, did not come to pass. In persecuting the Croatian Peasant Party, Tito not only accuses it of being reactionary, but also blames Mihailovich for having any dealings with it. Combined with these facts Tito considers Mihailovich

responsible for Yugoslavia's "failure" to acquire Trieste and Venezia Giulia.

There is no question today but that it was Tito and not Mihailovich who twice signed an agreement with the British (1944-45) whereby the Allied Forces, and not the Yugoslav Forces, were to occupy Trieste including the controversial territory of Istria and Venezia Giulia. This agreement determined, as it were, the fate of Trieste, and strengthened the position of Tito in the eyes of the British. Increased help for Tito resulted from this agreement. The failure over Trieste was the price which Tito paid in part to the Allies for their final recognition of him and his Government. . . . And, let it be remembered, it was, not Mihailovich, but Tito who conducted the negotiations about Trieste. . . .

Tito's statements, made after Mihailovich was "condemned," are in themselves among the most convincing admissions that the Belgrade "tribunal" had definite political aims.

All accusations of "collaboration" with the Germans, intended to veil these political aims, were obviously fictitious. In order not to disclose indubitable falsifications—although only to a very carefully chosen audience in the tribunal—neither the "judges" nor the prosecution called witnesses or made use of documents which were in possession of the four Allies then in Germany. Here also a fatal mistake took place.

One of the main charges made by the prosecution was that Mihailovich, including Colonel McDowell, an American officer at Mihailovich's H.Q., reached an agreement with Hitler's special plenipotentiary Hermann Neubacher. The simplest thing would have been to call McDowell as a witness; to call the most important witness from Germany, or at least to demand his documents in order to accuse McDowell of collaboration with the Nazis; to demand that McDowell be tried by an international or American court, and to force a statement from the State Department and the War Office whose policy was condemned at the trial. But the "tribunal," that is to say Tito, not only failed to call McDowell but refused to give him a hearing, and even his sworn evidence, which was accepted by the War Office, was not submitted to the court. McDowell declared that the allegations of the prosecutor were base inventions; Mihailovich made a similar statement; and Neubacher did not appear in court.

McDowell declared that Mihailovich fought relentlessly and with great heroism against the Germans, and was willing not only to put his armies under Anglo-American command, but also to co-operate with Tito and the U.S.S.R.

One cannot seriously speak of justice being accomplished when witnesses, who were also among the accused, were denied hearing. In their stead the evidence of local traitors was considered who, in pleading for their lives, were ready to make any kind of declaration.

Mihailovich was accused of collaborating with the enemy and yet during the trial it was stated that he twice made an armistice with Tito in 1944.

We must consequently ask ourselves was it really possible that Tito should have signed an armistice with one who collaborated with the Germans? Mihailovich maintained that it was not he but Tito who broke the agreement. The judges, however, refused to admit this, being oblivious to the logical conclusion which would be bound to follow this denial, namely that either Tito himself did not believe in his own accusations, or that the armistice with this "traitor" was so significant that Tito found it necessary to bring his adversary to trial for having broken it. . . .

It is quite clear that the case has nothing to do with treason, but is the upshot of civil war.

At the trial of Mihailovich men appeared in the dock who had actually collaborated with the Germans, including Mihailovich's bitterest enemies and those hostile to the Yugoslav Government in exile. Among the accused were Tasa Dinich, former Colonel in the Yugoslav Army, Home Secretary in the puppet "Serbian" Government during the occupation, and some weak-minded "ideologists," adherents of the small band of Fascists belonging to Lyotich's Party. By bringing Mihailovich before a court of justice, where at the same time traitors were tried and condemned to death, Tito thought to cast a slur on the name of the Serbian patriot. . . .

The list of the accused included the names of Tito's political opponents who are obliged to live abroad and, in actual fact, are patriots of the highest integrity.

Among these are Slobodan Yovanovich, a venerable scholar, President of the Belgrade Academy of Science, founder of the Yugoslav Constitution and President of the Government in exile; Milan Gavrilovich, journalist, leader of the Serbian Peasant Party, the first Yugoslav diplomatic Envoy to the U.S.S.R.; also a Cabinet Minister, Zhivko Topalovich, head of Yugoslav Socialism during the past thirty years, a man of energy and patriotism with well-known anti-German sentiments.

Sentence was passed on the above mentioned, although absent, on the accusation that they supported Mihailovich in his "collaboration" with the enemy.

One is at a loss to understand why only a comparatively small number of these so-called "criminals" were brought to trial, for according to the verdict in court Mihailovich was "guilty" of collaborating with the Germans ever since 1941. Until the autumn of 1944 he had the support of the entire Yugoslav Government in exile, including diplomatic representatives and all the members of the Yugoslav Forces abroad. Today in Tito's administrative system there are many former supporters of Mihailovich and the same may be said concerning the Diplomatic Corps. If the matter be considered from a logical point of view, Mihailovich's "guilt" should be shared by all who supported him.

Why accusations were restricted it is easy to surmise, namely: the court would have been obliged to condemn all Yugoslav patriots who

fought against the Germans but refused to accept Communism. Such a shameful procedure might have been carried out *ad absurdum*. A more convenient method was to deal a blow at the symbolic figures representing the chief political opponents of the present régime and to count upon acquiescence from the others. This is what is actually happening in Yugoslavia at the present time.

Those willing to accept the Tito régime are not accused of collaborating with the enemy. The Yugoslav Government in exile was certainly not guilty of any such collaboration, but this was taken as a pretext on purely political grounds.

Mihailovich is a victim of the agreement made by the "Big Three" and of his refusal to abandon his native land.

The accusations by which his captors sought to dishonour him and to divest him of his place in history as a soldier "who was first to take up arms against the Germans in Europe shattered by Hitler" could not be justified west of the "iron curtain," where stretching from Stettin to Albania, the Press is free; public opinion is free; historians are free to write the truth; judges are free to pronounce true judgment. In the archives of the Allied Foreign Ministries and military authorities, in the archives of the Yugoslav Government abroad, in the German archives and the reports of German commanders who fought against Mihailovich there is all the material which the court did not find necessary to consider.

And finally West of that "curtain" there are competent witnesses of Mihailovich's military operations, his former Allies and Allied servicemen saved by him, including his numerous collaborators and subordinates.

In this colossal free area it is impossible to go on distorting the truth to the bitter end, or to accept a shameless, libellous political tribunal intended to represent an objective people's court.

The history of Mihailovich and of his armies will one day be written based on actual documents.

As for Yugoslavia, there are some glorious pages in her eventful history, but there are also many dark ones. It has happened to this people more than once that those who attained dominion over them, attempted to over-rule justice. The Yugoslavs, particularly the Serbs, are used to such attempts, but they know full well that justice is indestructible. Long ago they learned to grope their way amid a labyrinth of fratricidal contentions, clinging to the inspiration of their legendary heroes.

Neither the State Press nor party propaganda will succeed in deceiving a nation who for centuries has fought for the cause of justice and nationalism.

PART XVII

The Spanish Press

When, in 1941, the Germans overran Yugoslavia it will be recalled that General (then Colonel) Drazha Mihailovich organized and led important resistance forces against the occupiers . . . but remained in his native land and without adequate supplies and fighting under greatest hardships contributed with his forces materially to the Allied cause so heroically participated in by Yugoslavia.
March 30th, 1946.

JAMES BYRNES.

Reprinted from the leading article in the "ABC" (Madrid) of July 19th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

EL PROCESO POLITICO CONTRA
MIHAILOVICH

MIHAILOVICH ha sido condenado a muerte y ejecutado. Episodio, por cierto, muy revelador de las corrientes atravesadas y recónditas que luchan por una preponderancia política en el mundo moderno. Corría, al parecer, mucha prisa deshacerse de aquel bravo guerrillero, que contó durante dos años con el apoyo de Gran Bretaña; que estuvo en relación continua y bélica con los políticos y los emisarios de Gran Bretaña; que prestó a la causa común de los aliados servicios inestimables; que fué, en fin, un día, el símbolo del patriotismo y resistencia de Yugoslavia. Corría prisa ejecutar a Mihailovich, y ni consideraciones humanas, ni deferencias diplomáticas se han rendido a las muchas demandas de gracia que, procedentes del Rey Pedro, de quien fué servidor leal el guerrillero, o de la familia de éste, o de sus amigos británicos, que con él simpatizaban y que a él estaban ligados por esfuerzos comunes, solicitaron o un esclarecimiento de los presuntos crímenes, o una conmutación de la pena.

Se le ha acusado de mantener relaciones con Alemania y de haber sido, por lo tanto, traidor a la causa de la independencia yugoslava, identificada, por los azares de la guerra, con la causa de las Naciones Unidas. Combatió al lado de los ingleses, y fué el fautor de las guerrillas y el paladín arriesgado de los guerrilleros? Puede seriamente pensarse que este hombre, en quien Gran Bretaña fiaba tanto, mantuvo con su enemigo irreconciliable—la Alemania nazi—contactos peligrosos?

Tito, el famoso jefe algunas de las brigadas internacionales despachadas por Rusia a España en los años de nuestra Cruzada contra el marxismo, ha confesado descaradamente que la sentencia que a

Mihailovich condenaba a muerte era "una sentencia contra la reacción internacional." Sentencia, por lo tanto, de tipo político; reto fanfarrón, dirigido por el comunismo a la opinión pública universal. No se condena y ejecuta al guerrillero como criminal de guerra, sino como hombre político. Se reconoce paladinamente, y con acento provocador, que Mihailovich era un procesado político, víctima de las corrientes atravesadas y subterráneas a que aludíamos antes.

En el mundo ajeno al comunismo no se ha iniciado siquiera una campaña para salvarle del proceso ominoso: no se ha intentado sustraerle, por la presión o por la persuasión, al brazo de sus verdugos. Las tenues protestas que han visto, aisladamente, la luz en los periódicos anglosajones, habrán tenido quizá un eco prolongado en la opinión pública, pero no se han manifestado calurosa y eficazmente. No han repercutido en el mundo oficial, ni han llegado hasta los comicios de la O. N. U., ni han provocado bullicios callejeros.

La conclusión lógica es evidente: en el confuso mundo político de la postguerra, la voz preponderante es la voz de Rusia, y las naciones débiles, que por Rusia están amparadas y que al marxismo han tenido que unirse, a golpes de rebenque, abandonando su propia soberanía, tienen la recompensa, un poco humillante, pero eficaz en el juego político, de verse respaldadas incluso en sus arbitrariedades jurídicas, por el "dueño" poderoso. Mihailovich, en el terreno individual, y Polonia, en el colectivo, prueban que los apoyos prestados por otros países, cuando no son tímidos, son inútiles, frente a la poderosa y constante presencia de Rusia. Interesa a ésta "marcarse puntos" en las disputas, públicas o solapadas, con las potencias occidentales. Rusia sigue, imperturbable, su camino, acumulando exigencias (que acaban casi siempre prosperando) o ejerciendo presiones, que tienen en muchos casos el efecto negativo de coartar las contrarias.

Es, sin duda, cierto que también las potencias occidentales siguen su camino, aunque no se entrevea todavía la meta. Pero el triste episodio individual de la ejecución de Mihailovich, y el colectivo del abatimiento de la nación polaca, sacrificada, como tantas cosas y entidades, en el turbio cambalache internacional, prueban que no se ha cerrado el período de la avenencia y sometimiento a una política que no es la política del Occidente.

PART XVIII

The Swedish Press

He it was who took the lead in making the revolution in Yugoslavia which played a part in delaying the German attack on Russia by several weeks.

May 14th, 1946.

WINSTON CHURCHILL.

Reprinted from an article in the "Obs" (Stockholm) of August, 1946.

MIHAILOVITJ

MIHAILOVITJ, Dragoljub, f. 1893, som arkebuserades den 17 juli, var redan som helt ung med i Balkankrigen 1912-13 och befordrades harunder till löjtnant. Efter genomgången generalstabskurs deltog Mihailovitj likaledes i första världskriget och avancerade så småningom till överste i generalstaben. Han utnämndes efter krigets slut till militärattaché i Sofia och kritiserade som sådan försummelserna i den jugoslaviska arméns motorisering, vilket renderade honom någon tids arrest. Under andra världskriget kommenderade Mihailovitj en arméfördelning i Kroatien, men flydde när Jugoslavien kapitulerade i april 1941 till sina serbiska hemtrakter. Här skapade han på några veckor en francitreurarmé om 30.000 man och deväpnade den med vapen, som bortkastats av den reguljära jugoslaviska armén. Mihailovitj trädde per radio i förbindelse dels med sitt eget lands exilregering och dels med de allierades högkvarter för mellersta Östern. Detta senare gjorde honom till ledare för en förbundsarmé och skickade honom bl. a. flera officerare som hjälp.

När Tyskland vid midsommartiden 1941 gick till anfall mot Ryssland fick Mihailovitj understöd av styrkor, som organiserats av dåvarande legationsrådet Lebedjeff, som flytt från Belgrad, och under några månader etablerade de båda arméerna samarbete. Under tiden anlände från Ryssland den kroatiska agitatorn Josip Broz till Jugoslavien och övertog ledningen av Lebedjeffs trupper under namnet Tito. På hösten samma år erövrade han staden Usjitse, som hade stora vapen- och ammunitionsfabriker samt dessutom var säte för riksbankens sedeltryckeri. Mihailovitj fordrade nu, att Tito, skulle överlämna till honom hälften av sin armés beväpning och framför allt det sedeltryckeri, som påträffats i Usjitse. Denne vägrade och följden blev en blodig kamp mellan de båda frihetsarméerna. Mihailovitj fick nu befallning av västmakterna att så mycket som möjligt störa axelmakternas etapplinjer men undvika avgörande strider tills de allierade företogo en invasion i Albanien eller Dalmatien. Efter mötet i Yalta tvungos gossekonungen Peter II och

hans rådgivare att underordna sig Tito och några av dennes anhängare fingo plats i den jugoslaviska regeringen. Sedan Mussolini störtats överlämnade de italienska Balkandivisionerna sina vapen till Titos armé och denne blev sitt lands diktator. Mihailovitj demobiliserade sina trupper och flydde jämte några få anhängare upp i bergen. Till sist blev han tillfångatagen genom en list i maj 1946. Tito hade erfart var Mihailovitj höll sig dold. Han lät då maskera flygmaskiner, som han erhållit från Ryssland, med engelska igenkänningstecken och dessa släppte ner ett förfalskat brev över Mihailovitj: s uppehållsort. I detta uppmanades Mihailovitj att infinna sig på en bestämd plats där han skulle avhämtas av de allierade och föras till Bari. Mihailovitj gick i fällan, tillfångatogs och underkastades långvariga förhör. Flera framstående amerikanska jurister, vetenskapsmän och generaler anhöllo, att han måtte ställas inför en allierad domstol eller åtminstone erhålla en försvarsadvokat och vittnen från amerikanskt håll. Tito avböjde emellertid varje "inblandning" och som redan nämnts avrättades Mihailovitj den 17 juli tillsammans med åtta medanklagade.

PART XIX

The Swiss Press

The last American officer on duty at General Mihailovich's Headquarters, at a time when all Allied recognition and supplies had been long ago cut off, offered General Mihailovich an opportunity for evacuation with him by air to Allied territory. The General refused, saying that he felt that it was his duty to stay with his country to the end.
May 24th, 1946. ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS.

Reprinted from an article by R. Ourset in the "Curieux" (Geneva) of April 25th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

MIHAILOVITCH, HÉROS OU CRIMINEL ?

EN 1941, le nom de Draja Mihailovitch était sur toutes les lèvres. La presse et la radio, faisant écho à M. Churchill à la Chambre des Communes, exaltaient la gloire du seul adversaire d'Hitler qui, sur le continent, n'avait pas mis bas les armes.

En 1946, la photographie de Mihailovitch en prison, en habits de forçat, figure à la rubrique des faits divers. Est-ce lui qui a changé ou est-ce le sentiment public ?

Qu'on se rappelle ce printemps de 1941 : la France battue, l'Angleterre éliminée du continent, les Etats-Unis encore neutres et désarmés, l'U.R.S.S. liée à l'Allemagne par le pacte de Moscou. Malgré l'écrasement de tous les petits pays qui n'avaient pas voulu se plier au maître de l'Europe, deux Etats balkaniques, la Grèce et la Yougoslavie, osèrent le braver. La foudre s'abattit sur eux. En trois semaines, ils furent engloutis par la *Wehrmacht*.

Mais, devant un monde frappé de stupeur, les Serbes, une fois de plus, dirent "non" ! La lutte continua contre les envahisseurs allemands, bulgares et hongrois, sous la conduite de ce jeune général que le roi Pierre nomma ministre de la guerre dans son gouvernement. L'Angleterre était encore trop faible pour appuyer efficacement ce premier vrai maquis. La Russie, résolue à éviter toute brouille avec Hitler, mettait à la porte M. Gavrilovitch, ministre de Yougoslavie à Moscou, avec qui elle venait de signer un pacte d'amitié. . . . Ce qui ne l'empêcha pas d'être attaquée à son tour, en juin.

Ce n'est que plus tard que parurent les noms d'autres chefs de la résistance yougoslave : un Ivan Ribar, un mystérieux Tito. Ensuite on apprit que les "tchetniks" de Mihailovitch ne s'entendaient pas très bien avec les partisans communistes de Tito. Vers la fin de 1943, Churchill marqua sa préférence pour ce dernier. Après la conférence

de Téhéran, on laissa carrément tomber Mihailovitch. En 1945, Eden aux Communes, gratifiait d'ironies le roi Pierre, dont la déchéance fut acceptée quelques mois plus tard par Londres et par Washington comme un fait accompli.

On a affirmé que Mihailovitch s'était entendu avec les Allemands—ou avec le général Neditch—pour combattre Tito. Les passions soulevées de part et d'autre sont trop vives et les faits trop obscurs encore pour faciliter un jugement objectif.

L'accusation est très grave. Mais pour l'instant, ceux qui l'ont lancée n'ont pas apporté une preuve décisive à l'appui. Les défenseurs de Mihailovitch s'élèvent avec indignation contre ce qu'ils appellent une monstrueuse calomnie. Celle-ci serait basée sur le fait que les "tchetniks," insuffisamment équipés et ravitaillés, étaient obligés parfois de ménager leurs efforts. Par sa nature même, la guérilla n'est pas une opération continue dans le temps et dans l'espace, elle suppose au contraire des feintes, des accalmies provisoires, des retraites dans un repaire où l'on puisse mieux préparer les coups suivants. A telle enseigne, disent-ils, que les partisans de Tito y auraient eux-mêmes recouru. Et de citer à ce propos, le texte, d'un accord de suspension d'armes, signé entre le général de S.S. Globotnik et un commandement local des partisans de Tito.

Quant à Mihailovitch, voici des témoignages inattendus, que vient de livrer la correspondance secrète d'Hitler et de Mussolini, publiée ces derniers jours.*

"Plusieurs milliers de 'tchetniks' ont été armés, sur une base locale par les chefs d'unités italiens, pour mener une guérilla pour laquelle, comme tous les habitants des Balkans, ils ont des dispositions particulières," dit Mussolini dans une lettre du 9 mars 1943.

Dans l'imbroglie yougoslave, les "tchetniks" ont bel et bien tiré avec des fusils italiens contre les partisans de Tito aussi bien que contre les Allemands, tout comme les partisans ont tourné les armes anglaises contre Mihailovitch. (En Grèce ce sont les balles britanniques qui ont tué les soldats anglais). D'où est parti le premier coup de feu ? Quelle a été la part exacte de l'initiative étrangère, allemande, italienne, anglo-saxonne ou russe ? Qui a été la dupe de qui ?

Voici maintenant l'avis d'Hitler :

"En dehors des opérations actuellement menées contre les communistes, je discerne, Duce, un danger particulier dans les plans à long terme qu'établissent les partisans de Mihailovitch pour anéantir ou désarmer vos propres troupes en Herzégovine . . . J'ai ordonné l'annihilation de tous ses partisans sur les territoires occupés par mes troupes. . . De toute façon, la liquidation du mouvement Mihailovitch ne sera pas une tâche aisée, étant donné les forces dont il dispose à présent et le grand nombre de 'tchetniks' armés." (16 février 1943).

*"Les Lettres Secrètes Echangées par Hitler et Mussolini" Introduction d'André François-Ponset. Paris, Editions du Pavois.

Mussolini se rallie finalement à cette opinion :

"Le général d'armée Pirzio-Biroli a reçu l'ordre de prendre contact avec l'O.K.W. afin de coordonner notre attitude envers le mouvement du général Mihailovitch. Bien que traité de traître par la radio des partisans, ce dernier n'en est pas moins notre ennemi, puisqu'il est ministre de la guerre du gouvernement yougoslave de Londres."

Lord Alanbrooke, chef de l'état-major impérial britannique, et le général Eisenhower n'en jugeaient pas autrement, qui envoyaient à Mihailovitch des messages reconnaissant la valeur de sa contribution, l'un le 1er décembre 1942, l'autre le 1er janvier 1943.

Cependant une chose est certaine. C'est que toutes ces divisions intestines ont accru l'immense souffrance du peuple yougoslave, tout en diminuant sa contribution effective à l'effort militaire allié. La presse mondiale était pleine des exploits d'innombrables divisions et corps d'armés du maréchal Tito. D'ailleurs la valeur du combattant yougoslave est unanimement reconnue. Pourtant, au moment de la capitulation allemande, un bon tiers de la Yougoslavie n'était pas encore libéré. Même à Trieste, la libération fut l'oeuvre des forces locales, avant l'arrivée de Tito.

D'autre part, il semble que toute cette question de collaborationisme soit interprétée de manière très diverse dans les Balkans. Nombreux sont, en effet, parmi les adhérents actuels de Tito, les suppôts du quisling Neditch et des Oustachis du *Poglavnik* Pavelitch. On ne peut s'empêcher d'en déduire que, si Mihailovitch est désigné aujourd'hui comme l'ennemi public No. 1, avant Neditch et Pavelitch, ce n'est pas parce qu'il se serait vendu aux Allemands, mais parce qu'il représente un obstacle à la politique de Tito. Hors, la "démocratie" de celui-ci est de celle qui n'admet pas d'opposition.

Il n'en reste pas moins un grand point d'interrogation : l'attitude de Churchill. Pour la comprendre, il faut la situer dans le cadre de la politique orientale des Anglo-Saxons. Il faut se souvenir que ceux-ci ont abandonné, à un certain tournant de la guerre, tous ceux qui, situés entre l'Allemagne et la Russie, avaient tourné leurs espoirs vers Londres et Washington : les Etats baltes, la Pologne du socialiste Arcziszewski, les rois de Grèce et de Yougoslavie.

Tout ce drame s'est joué entre Casablanca et Téhéran. Après le débarquement en Afrique du Nord et la débacle de Stalingrad, lorsque l'initiative militaire fut définitivement arrachée à Hitler, les Alliés ne craignirent plus que son initiative diplomatique. Mais ils furent jusqu'à la fin hantés par cette crainte. De là, la formule de la capitulation sans conditions. De là, surtout, toutes les concessions faites à la Russie en Europe orientale et ailleurs, pour prévenir toute tentative—ou tentation—de paix séparée.

Au début, cette politique orientale fut assez nuancée. En Yougoslavie, Churchill voulut faire d'une pierre deux coups : gagner les bonnes grâces de Staline, en appuyant les communistes contre les nationalistes, mais aussi capter Tito par de bons procédés.

A la conférence de Téhéran, où les "Trois Grands" arrêterent le plan de la guerre sur deux fronts, les Russes exigèrent d'être laissés seuls maîtres du théâtre d'opérations balkaniques. Ce qu'il leur fut accordé, de même qu'à Yalta il leur fut concédé le privilège d'entrer les premiers à Berlin. Les occidentaux ne mesurèrent pas l'étendue de l'hypothèque politique consentie sous le couvert des nécessités stratégiques.

Dans ce partage de l'Europe, Churchill garda l'illusion d'avoir censuré un pion balkanique. Il se basait sur les excellents rapports qu'entretenait son propre fils, le major Churchill, avec le sympathique maréchal Tito, auquel son gouvernement n'avait marchandé ni les munitions ni l'appui massif de la propagande.

Le bilan de cette politique est fait : la propagande de Tito rend la politesse en reprenant contre les Anglo-Saxons les thèmes favoris de Goebbels, les Britanniques sont expulsés d'Albanie—quasi annexée par Tito—tandis qu'à Trieste c'est tout juste si l'on ne leur tire pas dessus.

Partout, en Europe orientale, tous les amis des Anglo-Saxons sont mis à l'index. En Pologne, le général Anders qui fut choisi par les Russes en 1942 pour reconstituer une armée polonaise en Russie, est traité de fasciste. Le général Bor, le héros de Varsovie, est accusé du crime exactement inverse de celui qu'on reproche à Mihailovitch. Il est criminel pour avoir déclenché le combat contre les Allemands . . . trop tôt ! En Roumanie, Maniu, chef de la Résistance anti-nazie, feu le prince Stirbey, qui avait négocié le ralliement du pays aux Alliés, le général Radesco, qui avait goûté du camp de concentration sous les Allemands et qui fut nommé premier ministre en 1944 avec l'assentiment de Vychinski, sont tous des "fascistes." En Bulgarie, les chefs des partis démocratiques sont en prison. Par contre, la ligue des officiers d'extrême droite "Zveno" y est associée par les communistes au pouvoir, de même qu'en Roumanie on voit parmi les ministres d'anciens membres de la Garde de Fer, ou des pro-nazis du genre de Tataresco.

Mihailovitch attend son jugement. Il n'y a aucun doute quant à l'issue du procès. "Les crimes de Mihailovitch sont si grands qu'aucune discussion quant à sa culpabilité ne peut être admise." C'est ainsi que s'exprime une note du gouvernement yougoslave adressée aux Américains. On se plaît à appeler justice une condamnation acquise avant l'ouverture du procès. Dans ces conditions, il est évident que les débats ne sauraient apporter une lumière complète sur le "cas Mihailovitch." Il faudra laisser à l'histoire le soin de le trancher. A défaut d'une conclusion judiciaire valable, y aura-t-il au moins une conclusion politique nette ? Il est permis d'en douter "Celui qui sème le vent récolte l'orage," enseigne la sagesse biblique. Tous ce que nous savons de l'obstination et de la violence des passions politiques dans les Balkans nous portent à croire que le procès de Draja Mihailovitch ne sera qu'un épisode dans la guerre civile qui se poursuit, ouvertement ou sourdement, mais sans merci.

D'autres villages brûleront en Yougoslavie, d'autres enfants mourront de faim ou du typhus, pour le triomphe d'une doctrine ou d'un parti. C'est ce qui, s'appelle, en 1946, reconstruire l'Europe.

Reprinted from an article in "L'Express" (Neuchâtel) of June 18th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

POURQUOI ET COMMENT LE GÉNÉRAL MIHAILOVITCH A AVOUÉ SES "CRIMES"

DEPUIS quelques jours se déroule à Belgrade, le procès du général Mihailovitch. L'opinion occidentale s'émeut des conditions dans lesquelles l'inculpé peut ou ne peut justifier sa conduite. Il faut se souvenir qu'il fut le premier en Europe à prendre les armes contre les Allemands alors que la Yougoslavie subissait le terrible joug nazi.

On s'est étonné que Mihailovitch qui se battit contre les Allemands puis qui tint longtemps en échec toutes les tentatives de Tito de l'emprisonner, avoue si facilement tous les crimes dont on l'accuse. Les renseignements ci-dessous, tirés du journal britannique "Review of World Affairs" explique beaucoup de choses :

Tout de suite après sa capture, le général Mihailovitch a été transféré dans un pénitencier de Belgrade où il a été mis dans la chambre des tortures de l'O.Z.N.A. pendant 74 heures. Selon les déclarations de personnes bien renseignées, on a entendu ses cris jusque dans la rue. Pendant cet "interrogatoire," le vice-premier ministre Edouard Kardelye a visité deux fois la fameuse cellule.

Jusqu'au dernier moment, Mihailovitch a supporté les tortures et tout à coup il a "commencé à parler." Il est sorti nu et sans connaissance de cette salle et on lui a dit que s'il retirait un seul mot de sa "confession" lors du procès, on recommencerait l'interrogatoire de A à Z.

Mihailovitch se trouvait dans un état tellement grave qu'on n'a pu annoncer sa capture que onze jours plus tard, ne sachant pas s'il allait survivre à ces tortures.

Le correspondant de la "Review of World Affairs" ajoute qu'il ne faut pas s'étonner si Mihailovitch commence à accuser tout le monde et même lui-même en demandant pour lui la peine capitale.

Reprinted from an article by Mt. in "Le Journal de Lausanne" (Lausanne) of July 10th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

LE CAS MIHAILOVITCH

COMME prévu, le procureur général, le lieutenant-colonel Miloche Minitch a requis la peine capitale contre le général Mihailovitch qu'il accuse de haute trahison et de collaboration avec l'ennemi ; de plus le général se serait—selon son accusateur—rendu "coupable de crimes de guerre."

Ce tribunal ratifiera certainement les peines requises par le ministère public. Car ce procès est de ceux dont l'issue était connue d'avance.

Ce dont il s'agit, en l'occurrence, c'est moins de condamner un homme qui a—quoi qu'on en dise—rendu des services éminents à la cause alliée, que de faire le jeu politique du maréchal Tito en décapitant l'opposition serbe et anti-communiste.

Car—et cela c'est un fait—les tchetniks se sont opposés de toutes leurs forces à l'instauration de la dictature communiste du maréchal Broz-Tito. Mihailovitch n'en faisait du reste aucun mystère. L'un des dix-huit aviateurs américains qui ont été sauvés par lui alors qu'ils avaient fait un atterrissage de fortune au milieu des lignes allemandes, relate les conceptions politiques du général :

“ J'aimerais, lui dit-il, que nous eussions en Yougoslavie une démocratie comme celle que vous avez en Amérique au lieu de la lutte, frère contre frère, pour chasser l'ennemi commun, le communisme.

Car nous ne voulons pas du communisme en Yougoslavie, pas plus que vous n'en voulez chez vous en Amérique. Nous ne l'admettrons jamais. Nous nous battons jusqu'à la fin pour éviter son avènement.”

Or, avec Tito, le communisme l'a emporté. Il entend se venger et abatte ses adversaires. Le destin du général Mihailovitch est donc scellé.

Mais ce procès, qui appartient à l'histoire, a été conduit selon les méthodes partisans qui ne satisfont qu'imparfaitement aux règles d'une sereine justice. Les témoignages en faveur de l'accusé ont été systématiquement écartés. Tandis que la propagande gouvernementale donne la plus large publicité à ceux qui accablent le général. Il n'est donc pas sans intérêt de reprendre quelques uns des renseignements apportés par les officiers anglais qui ont été, après la débacle de 1941, accrédités auprès des tchetniks comme officiers de liaison et qui ont constaté les conditions quasi désespérées dans lesquelles Mihailovitch a poursuivi la lutte contre les Allemands. Tel est le cas du colonel Rootham, qui fut parachuté en Yougoslavie en mai 1943, et qui écrit :

“ La mission britannique se vit envoyée dans un pays qui se prête admirablement à la guérilla, dans un peuple étrange, brave et extrêmement généreux. Il y avait dans les troupes de guérilla un grand nombre d'hommes, mais pour ainsi dire pas d'armes ; il existait un excellent réseau radiographique de communications, mais la chaîne des commandements entre les quartiers généraux et les chefs de groupes locaux manquait. Par conséquent, l'obéissance aux ordres supérieurs fut plus ou moins aléatoire, et les hommes, craignant des représailles des Allemands et des Bulgares sur les femmes et les enfants restés sans défenses, répugnaient à leur en offrir l'occasion ; ils furent naturellement enclins à poursuivre la politique, recommandée par les Alliés aux maquisards français, de ne pas se battre excepté en défensive et d'attendre que le jour ‘ D ’ soit venu pour leur pays. Cette attitude fut fermement appuyée par le général Mihailovitch.”

D'autre part, le colonel Rootham explique comme suit les combats qui se produisirent entre les bandes de Tito et celles des tchetniks.

“ A tort ou à raison ces derniers étaient persuadés que les partisans croates, sous le commandement du maréchal Tito, se vengeraient d'anciennes rancunes politiques en massacrant tous les Serbes hors de la Vieille Serbie. Il y eut certainement de ces massacres. Et ils se sentaient dans la nécessité absolue de retenir hors de la Vieille Serbie les partisans qu'ils craignaient et haïssaient autant et pas moins que les Allemands. Ces événements menaient inexorablement vers une guerre civile yougoslave, et la propagande nazie fut très habile en encourageant cette tendance.”

Un aviateur américain, Joseph T. Harmuth de Bridgeville, qui fut abattu en Yougoslavie en avril 1945 a apporté son témoignage dans le *Sun Telegraph* de Pittsburgh du 7 avril 1946 :

“ C'est Tito qui est en traître à son peuple et non Mihailovitch.”

Harmuth et d'autres aviateurs américains, cachés sur une colline, virent comment les partisans de Tito rasèrent un village, brûlant les maisons et fusillant les habitants.

Il dit avoir participé à des attaques de nuit exécutées par des tchetniks contre les forces allemandes pendant que les tchetniks eux-mêmes étaient attaqués par les partisans.

Il dit également qu'il avait découvert des documents concernant la reddition de 12.000 tchetniks aux Britanniques en mai 1945, après que ceux-ci eurent défendu un pont contre les partisans pendant que les Britanniques le traversaient.

Le *Daily Telegraph* du 14 avril 1946, a publié une lettre de M. J. J. Hasper, ancien Lt.-Comdr. de Finton (Sussex) qui dit notamment :

“ J'ai été chez le général Mihailovitch, dans son quartier général, depuis août 1942 jusqu'en janvier 1945, et je peux bien constater que les histoires concernant sa collaboration avec les Italiens sont complètement fausses.

Nous les avons tout le temps combattus. Admettons que nous n'ayons pas fait tout ce que nous aurions voulu pendant les deux dernières années. Mais cela était dû uniquement au manque d'équipement et au fait que nous étions coupés de l'aide du monde extérieur.

Je possède une affiche publiée par les Allemands en novembre 1944, sur laquelle ils offrent des récompenses pour la prise de Mihailovitch, ainsi que celle de Tito. J'estime que le général Mihailovitch était reconnu par nos ennemis, au moins comme chef de la résistance.”

Enfin, M. Winston Churchill lui-même tout en constatant dans le *Reynolds News* du 19 mai 1946 que l'aide au maréchal Tito ait été une erreur, reconnaît les services éminents rendus par Mihailovitch à la cause alliée :

“ Ce fut lui qui prit le commandement de la révolution en Yougoslavie, qui retarda de plusieurs semaines l'attaque contre la Russie.” Ainsi, Mihailovitch aurait, tout comme les armées de la Grèce

voisine, donné suffisamment de tablature à la *Wehrmacht* pour l'obliger à reporter au 22 juin 1941 l'invasion de la Russie qui devait être déclenchée plusieurs semaines auparavant. Or, au début de décembre, les divisions allemandes étaient arrivées jusqu'en vue de Moscou et seule l'intervention brutale du "général Hiver" les obligea à suspendre leur offensive victorieuse. On peut se demander, dès lors, si le sacrifice des tchetniks yougoslaves et de l'armée hellénique n'as pas sauvé la capitale de la Sainte Russie. Mais de cela on ne veut pas se souvenir au Kremlin. Une seule chose importe maintenant : exploiter au maximum la victoire remportée en commun par les Alliés pour réaliser les buts politiques de l'U.R.S.S.

Tout comme les Républiques, les dictatures sont ingrates.

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LE JUGEMENT DE BELGRADE

PAR la personnalité du principal accusé, par ses incidences sur la politique européenne et par les violentes réactions qu'il a provoquées à l'étranger, le grand procès qui vient de se dérouler à Belgrade déborde le cadre de ces épurations judiciaires dont les Balkans nous offrent le spectacle et qui, s'inspirent bien plutôt des méthodes expéditives de la justice soviétique que des principes du droit, tel que nous le concevons encore en Occident. En réalité, le général Mihailovitch était déjà virtuellement condamné à mort depuis le mois de décembre 1943, époque où fut conclu, à Téhéran, l'accord secret par lequel le président Roosevelt et M. Churchill, cédant aux instances du maréchal Staline, lui abandonnèrent la Yougoslavie.

Jusqu'à ce moment, le président des Etats-Unis et le Premier britannique avaient maintes fois exalté eux-mêmes la fidélité et la bravoure de celui que avait été le premier en Europe continentale, à lever l'étendard de la résistance. En le décorant de la Croix de Guerre avec palme, le général de Gaulle avait également salué en lui le "héros légendaire, symbole du patriotisme le plus pur." Les trois grands chefs des forces britanniques en Méditerranée et dans le Moyen-Orient, le maréchal de l'air Tedder, l'amiral Harwood et le général Auchinleck l'avaient remercié aussi, dans un ordre du jour commun, pour la "valeur inestimable" des services rendus par lui à la cause de la liberté. D'autre part, des centaines d'aviateurs alliés proclament qu'ils lui doivent la vie, et parce qu'ils se sont déclarés prêts à déposer en sa faveur, aujourd'hui la presse partisane les traite de suppôts de la réaction et d'affreux fascistes. . . .

Dans toute son action, le général Mihailovitch était parti de la conviction que ce seraient les Anglo-Saxons qui libéreraient son pays. En outre, il s'appuyait essentiellement sur les milieux vieux-serbes.

Ses "tchetniks," qu'on présente maintenant comme des brigands à la solde des Allemands, étaient les descendants directs de ces paysans et de ces montagnards qui avaient opiniâtement résisté, pendant des siècles, aux oppresseurs turcs et aux envahisseurs austro-hongrois, et pour lesquels l'église orthodoxe se confondait avec l'idée même de la patrie. Ils étaient passionnément attachés aussi à cette dynastie des Karageorgevitch qui était, à leurs yeux, l'incarnation même de la nation, et dont le dernier représentant devait finalement les renier dans les lamentables circonstances que l'on sait.

A la suite des effroyables massacres auxquels les nationalistes croates s'étaient livrés sur la population serbe, sous les regards narquois des armées de l'Axe, le général Mihailovitch et ses lieutenants avaient cessé de croire à la Yougoslavie et mettaient leur meilleur espoir dans la résurrection de la Serbie. Ils avaient également une profonde aversion idéologique pour l'U.R.S.S. et vouaient une haine implacable aux communistes, en qui ils ne voulaient voir que les ennemis jurés de la couronne et de l'église. Mais survint l'agression allemande contre la Russie. Aussitôt le *Komintern*, qui avait eu jusque-là une attitude très ambiguë, ordonna la mobilisation générale de toutes ses sections. C'est alors qu'apparut le maréchal Tito. Croate d'origine, ayant brillamment fait ses preuves dans les brigades internationales, en Espagne, c'était un extraordinaire entraîneur de foules en même temps qu'un excellent tacticien, et il sut attirer à lui une grande partie des masses populaires écoeurées par le souvenir des abus et des erreurs commis sous la triste régence du prince Paul.

A plusieurs reprises, les officiers anglo-saxons essayèrent de patronner une réconciliation entre le nouveau-venu, qui donnait de grandes espérances, et celui qui avait été leur frère d'armes des plus mauvais jours. Ce fut en vain. Entre le vieux Serbe, farouchement attaché à ses traditions, et le Croate, tout imbu d'idéologie marxiste et panslaviste, l'accord était impossible. Abandonné à lui-même, après Téhéran, le général Mihailovitch mena dès lors une guerre solitaire sur deux fronts, contre les armées de l'Axe puis contre son rival qu'avec sa conception simpliste de militaire, il considérait uniquement comme un emissaire de l'étranger. De son côté, le maréchal Tito était froidement résolu à faire table rase des anciennes élites et de tout ce qui rappelait le temps de la monarchie. Et ce fut, dans le cadre de la guerre mondiale, l'une des guerres civiles les plus atroces que les Balkans, dont l'histoire et pourtant riche en sanglantes péripéties, aient jamais connues.

Dans quelle mesure, le général Mihailovitch, se sentant débordé et trahi par tous ceux qui l'avaient d'abord poussé dans la voie qu'il avait choisie, à commencer par le roi en personne, a-t-il pu pactiser avec les envahisseurs ? Qu'il y ait eu, comme toujours et comme partout dans les guerres de guérilla, des suspensions d'armes, des trêves tacites, des armistices locaux, des échanges de prisonniers et des défections de chefs subalternes, c'est assez probable. Mais de là à conclure qu'il y a eu trahison, il y a une distance immense et les

conditions dans lesquelles fut conduit le procès de Belgrade, n'ont apporté que des lumières extrêmement troubles. En tout cas, le fait subsiste que les officiers alliés dont le témoignage aurait pu être très précieux, ont été brutalement tenus à l'écart. En outre, le général Mihailovitch lui-même aurait pu, très facilement, chercher refuge à l'étranger. Il ne l'a pas fait et a préféré aller jusqu'au bout de son sacrifice. Ce n'est pas là le fait d'un traître ou d'un lâche.

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LES FAITS DU JOUR

LE général Draja Mihailovitch a été condamné à mort. Cette sentence n'est pas faite pour nous surprendre. Un verdict moins sévère nous eût, au contraire, étonné. Mihailovitch était condamné d'avance avec ou sans procès.

Nous avons déjà fait part de notre opinion sur la comédie qui s'est déroulée à Belgrade, où le public applaudit à la lecture du jugement comme à la fin d'une pièce bien montée. Car peut-on appeler autrement que comédie un procès où se joue la tête d'une vingtaine d'hommes et où le tribunal se refuse à entendre les témoins de la défense ?

Quand on veut tuer son chien, on dit qu'il a la gale. Ce fut exactement la thèse du tribunal militaire. Comme il fallait condamner Mihailovitch, on l'accusa des pires méfaits.

Mais les instigateurs de ce procès visaient encore plus loin. A travers l'accusé, ils ont essayé d'atteindre non seulement le roi mais encore les grandes puissances anglo-saxonnes. Par une suite de témoignages dont la valeur est discutable, ils ont tenté de discréditer les gouvernements de Londres et de Washington en faisant croire qu'ils avaient engagé le général à collaborer avec l'ennemi.

La commission d'Etat yougoslave pour les crimes de guerre a publié, l'an passé, un volumineux ouvrage dans lequel les autorités de Belgrade s'efforçaient de prouver la culpabilité de Mihailovitch. Mais—et c'est ce qu'il faut souligner—cette commission s'est trouvée dans l'impossibilité de rendre public un seul document portant la signature de l'inculpé et prouvant irréfutablement sa collaboration avec les forces de l'Axe.

Toutefois, pour être juste, nous devons préciser qu'il semble avoir été au courant des relations ayant existé entre l'occupant et certains de ses subordonnés. Des groupes de tchetniks ont, en effet, eu des rapports soit avec les Allemands soit avec les Italiens. Mais, en aucun cas, on n'a pu parler d'une véritable collaboration.

Cette accusation peut, du reste, être portée également contre les partisans du maréchal Tito. En avril 1941, alors que les appareils de la *Luftwaffe* venaient de bombarder Belgrade, les communistes yougoslaves déclaraient : "La guerre ne nous regarde pas." A peu

près à la même époque, le comité du parti communiste serbe adressait à ses membres un ordre les invitant à déposer les armes. "Ne vous battez pas—disait-il—pour les ploutocraties occidentales."

On pourrait éventuellement justifier cette attitude par le fait qu'au mois d'avril 1941 la Russie collaborait, elle aussi, avec le Reich. Mais cette excuse n'est plus valable pour les événements ultérieurs.

Que dire, par exemple, de l'accord signé par le général de S.S. Globotnik et MM. Kidritch et Bebler, aujourd'hui respectivement président du gouvernement populaire de Slovénie et remplaçant du ministre des affaires étrangères yougoslave ? Cet accord ne prévoyait-il pas la cessation des hostilités en Istrie et en Slovénie et la libération des prisonniers ?

La haine idéologique a prévalu sur la simple justice. Pouvait-on attendre autre chose ?

Le fait que le tribunal ait condamné, à côté du général, des hommes tels que MM. Slobodan Yovanovitch, vice-président du gouvernement yougoslave constitué après le coup d'Etat du 27 mars 1941, Gavrilovitch, qui signa, le 5 avril de la même année, le pacte d'amitié avec l'U.R.S.S., et Radoyé Knéjévitch, l'un des principaux organisateurs du coup d'Etat, prouve qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une affaire de collaboration avec l'ennemi.

Le procès de Belgrade n'a été qu'un procès politique, semblable à ceux de Moscou en 1936, destiné, avant tout, à servir la propagande communiste.

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DAS URTEIL VON BELGRAD

DER Prozess gegen den ehemaligen Kriegsminister der jugoslawischen Exilregierung, General Drascha Mihailowitsch, war nicht nur ein Verfahren gegen den gestürzten Führer der allen Partisanen verhassten Tschetniks, sondern auch ein Hochverratsprozess gegen die verschiedensten Gruppen serbischer Politiker, die im Verlauf der wechselnden Phasen des Befreiungskampfes mannigfaltige Beziehungen zu Deutschland, Italien und Grossbritannien unterhalten haben. Wer vom Prozess in Belgrad, der fünf Wochen dauerte, eine objektive und überzeugende Klärung der gesamten Stellung der Tschetniks und ihrer Zusammenarbeit mit anderen politischen Gruppen erwartet hat, erfuhr eine Enttäuschung. Mit Ausnahme einiger Einzelheiten, die vorwiegend die militärischen Vorgänge und die gefährlichen Querverbindungen betrafen, sind keine neuen politischen Zusammenhänge bekannt geworden. Eine Beurteilung der Politik, der Fehler und der Irrtümer Mihailowitschs erschien in dem Masse unmöglich, als sich der Kreis der Anklage erweiterte. Das Verfahren hat nämlich fünf Dinge verknüpft, die

nur in der revolutionären Perspektive Titos eine Einheit bilden, nämlich die Zusammenarbeit mit den Deutschen, das Regime Neditsch, den Fall Mihailowitsch, die Politik der Exilregierungen und das Verhältnis zu den angelsächsischen Mächten; der Hauptangeklagte war nicht Mihailowitsch, sondern der Geist der „Quisling“ Regierung Neditsch.

Im engern Fragenkomplex um Mihailowitsch brachte der Prozess eindrucksvolle Schilderungen über die „Paschawirtschaft“ seiner Unterführer, die eine selbständige Politik verfolgten und bald nach dem Aufstand in der Ravna Gora vollkommen desorganisiert waren. Diese Unterführer, bei denen sich, besonders in Dalmatien und Montenegro, zweifellos Kollaborationisten befanden, besaßen oft gar keine Verbindung mit der Zentrale und missbrauchten den Mythos, den das Serbentum um den Kriegsminister der Exilregierung gewoben hatte. Es war viel von der Schuld der Tschetniks, aber wenig von den schweren Opfern die Rede, die das serbische Volk während des Aufstandes und bei allen späteren Aktionen Mihailowitschs gegen die Deutschen gebracht hat. Das Gesamtbild der Tschetniks und Partisanen hat sich im Lauf der vier Jahre des Befreiungskampfes oft verschoben. Nur die erbitterte gegenseitige Feindschaft ist ohne Aenderung bis zum Ende geblieben. Der Prozess in Belgrad hinterlässt daher eine Atmosphäre der Unklarheit. Erst die Geschichte wird das endgültige Urteil über die Tragödie Mihailowitschs fällen.

In Serbien herrschte während der deutschen Okkupation eine äusserst komplizierte Konstellation. Während sich Deutschland, Bulgarien, Italien und Ungarn an der Besetzung der national-serbischen Gebiete beteiligten, war in Kroatien die Ustascha Pawelitschs an der Macht und im verstümmelten Klein-Serbien die Verwaltung des General Neditsch, eines alten Feindes Mihailowitschs, der sich auf die fascistische Gruppe des „Zbor“ und die Dobrowolcen des General Muschitzki stützte. Da der serbische Aufstand im Herbst 1941 von den Deutschen mit Massenerschiessungen bestraft wurde, beschwor Neditsch während langer Zeit die Tschetniks, sich ruhig zu verhalten und keine neue Unternehmungen zu beginnen, die bei den damaligen Machtverhältnissen nur Repressalien provoziert hätten. Die Feindschaft zwischen Neditsch und Mihailowitsch bestand während des ganzen Krieges, obwohl sich die beiden Generäle zweifellos in ihrem Kampf gegen die Partisanen Titos zuerst von Fall zu Fall und später sogar systematisch unterstützt haben. In der inneren Politik Serbiens bildeten die Tschetniks, die Partisanen und die Dobrowolcen damals drei militante Fronten, die sich nur von Zeit zu Zeit bekämpften, um je nach der Lage wieder vorübergehend einige Bindungen einzugehen. In dieser Situation entwickelte sich der merkwürdige Zustand, der während des Prozesses als „zufällige und stillschweigende Kollaboration“ bezeichnet worden ist. Der Kampf der Serben gegen die Okkupationsmächte war vielfach von einem Bürgerkrieg begleitet, wobei die Serben selten das grössere Jugoslawien, sondern vor allem ein grosserbsische Regime vor Augen hatten. An diesem Punkt stiess Mihailowitsch auf Tito,

der seinen Plan des „permanenten Aufstandes“ mit eiserner Konsequenz durchführen konnte, weil er nicht nur einen militärischen Sieg über die Okkupationsmächte erreichen, sondern als Kommunistenführer auch eine soziale Revolution einleiten wollte. So wurde Titos Partisanenbewegung bis zuletzt in Serbien stets bekämpft, und deshalb hat das neue Regime nachträglich einen grossen Personenkreis zur Verantwortung gezogen, der zwar nicht die Deutschen unterstützt, aber doch die linksstehende Befreiungsarmee bekämpft hat.

Das Regime Tito hat daher zugleich mit den wirklichen Kollaborationisten zahlreiche serbische Politiker auf die Anklagebank gebracht, womit der wahre Sachverhalt freilich vernäbelt wurde. Unter den Persönlichkeiten, die in Belgrad verurteilt worden sind, befinden sich zunächst die Hochverräter, die zu den Stützen des Regime Neditsch gehörten. Der ehemalige Innenminister Tanasije Dinitsch, der einige Attentatsversuche gegen frühere jugoslawische Ministerpräsidenten organisiert hat und viele Jahre des Exils in Prag verbringen musste, war, ebenso wie der Polizeichef und Präfect von Belgrad, Dragomir Jowanowitsch, nur der verlängerte Arm des deutschen Nationalsozialismus. General Muschitzki, ein ehemaliger Adjutant König Alexanders, beteiligte sich in Aktionen gegen die Tschetniks und Partisanen. Dann gab es unter den serbischen Politikern eine Reihe von rechtsstehenden Persönlichkeiten und Anhänger eines autoritären Regimes, die, wie der frühere Ministerpräsident und General Ziwkowitsch, von jeder Linksdiktatur verfolgt würden. Dagegen ist es vollkommen unerklärlich, wie man den ehemaligen Ministerpräsidenten Slobodan Jowanowitsch, die Botschafter Konstantin Fotitsch und Boschidar Puritsch, den Schwiegersonn Paschitschs, den früheren Minister Kumanudi und den einstigen Führer der serbischen Bauernpartei, Milan Gawrilowitsch, einer Zusammenarbeit mit den Deutschen beschuldigen konnte. Da Mihailowitsch als Kriegsminister verschiedenen Exilregierungen angehörte, sollte der Prozess auch die prominenten Mitglieder der bürgerlichen, bäuerlichen und sozialistischen serbischen Parteien treffen, die Mihailowitsch lange Zeit unterstützt und sich immer gegen die Partisanen ausgesprochen hatten. Die Urteile von Belgrad richteten sich auf diese Weise sogar gegen die Balkanpolitik Grossbritanniens und der Vereinigten Staaten. Auf den Prozess gegen Mihailowitsch lag der Schatten der neuen Spannung zwischen Ost und West. Besonders klar sind diese Zusammenhänge im Falle des ehemaligen Justizminister Lazer Markowitsch, der schon lange vor dem Krieg als exponierter Anhänger Frankreichs und Grossbritanniens, ein erbitterter Gegner Deutschlands und Italiens war. Wie jeder serbische Politiker unterhielt Markowitsch in einer gewissen Phase politische und persönliche Beziehungen zu Mihailowitsch. Man kann ihm gewiss eine zeitweilige Zusammenarbeit mit dem Führer der Tschetniks und vor allem gute Beziehungen mit Westeuropa, aber niemals eine Kollaboration mit der Okkupationsmacht vorwerfen, die ihn ja verhaften liess. In diesem Sinne erscheinen die Urteile von Belgrad als eine Strafe für die Mitarbeiter Neditschs, eine

Vergeltung für die Anhänger Mihailowitschs und eine Warnung für alle Freunde Grossbritanniens.

Die politischen Folgen der Urteile lassen sich schwer überblicken. Durch die Erweiterung des Kreises der Angeklagten dürfte das Verfahren gegen Mihailowitsch an suggestiver Wirkung eingebüsst haben. Da es sich um einen Prozess gegen die serbische Politik handelte, wird die nördliche Staatshälfte in den Urteilen vor allem eine Verdammung der alten grossererbischen Ideen erblicken, und die Kommunisten können als die treibenden Kräfte des Regimes Titos einen neuen Markstein gegen die „Reaktion“ feststellen. Die Hinrichtungen in Belgrad werden aber die inneren Schwierigkeiten kaum verringern. Schon seit Monaten ist der Bruch zwischen Tito und dem neuen serbischen Bauernführer, Dragoljub Jowanowitsch, offenkundig. Die russische Orientierung hat die Spannung zwischen den klerikalen Slowenen, den kroatischen Bauern, den orthodoxen Serben und den revolutionären Montenegrinern nicht gemildert, sondern eher vertieft. Der Bruch mit den Jugoslawien im Exil ist kaum mehr zu überbrücken. Es wäre gewiss verfehlt, aus diesen Tatsachen sowie aus den Meinungsverschiedenheiten die über die Wirtschaftspolitik des Industrieministers Hebrang bestehen, weitstehende Schlüsse zu ziehen; aber die stillen und offenen Gegner und Kritiker des Regimes haben sich in den letzten Monaten zweifellos vermehrt, so wie die Entscheidung der Grossmächte über Triest für Tito ebenfalls einen Rückschlag bedeutete. Dennoch zeigen die Belgrader Urteile Tito auf dem Höhepunkt seiner Macht. Für die Serben, die zur Legendenbildung neigen, wird Mihailowitsch freilich auch nach seinem Tode ein Symbol der ersten militärischen Widerstandsbewegung gegen die deutsche Okkupation bleiben. Diese ist—welches auch ihre späteren Irrtümer gewesen sein mögen—im wesentlichen doch ein Opfer der grossen Politik geworden, weil dem Kompromiss auf der Konferenz von Teheran zwangsläufig der Szenenwechsel in Jugoslawien folgte, der den Aufstieg Titos brachte und den Untergang Mihailowitschs besiegelte.

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LA CONDAMNATION DE MIHAILOVITCH

LA cour militaire suprême de Yougoslavie a prononcé son jugement dans le procès intenté au général Mihailovitch et à vingt-trois de ses partisans. Comme on s'y attendait le général a été condamné à mort, et s'il ne fait pas appel au président de l'Assemblée Nationale, il sera exécuté aujourd'hui. Cette décision a causé dans le monde entier, ou plutôt dans les pays où il est permis d'avoir des opinions

libres, un sentiment de malaise; et la déclaration faite par le maréchal Tito ne l'a pas atténué: il a constaté que la sentence était une condamnation de la réaction nationale. On ne pensait pas que ce fût cette créature symbolique qui devait comparaître devant les juges de Belgrade, mais un homme dont il convenait d'apprécier impartialement les mérites et les torts, les services qu'il avait rendus et les erreurs qu'il a pu commettre. On dit que le tribunal l'a reconnu coupable d'avoir commis des crimes de guerre de tous genres dans le dessein de recréer en Yougoslavie un régime antidémocratique et antinational. On lui a donc fait un procès politique au premier chef, et le maître actuel de la Yougoslavie envoie à la mort un homme dont il détestait les idées et contre lequel il mena pendant des années une lutte acharnée. Tito ayant triomphé,—et avec lui une conception de l'Etat et une politique extérieure,—il n'y avait plus de place dans l'Etat qu'il reconstitua pour un adversaire autour de qui l'opposition aurait pu se regrouper.

La sentence est ainsi l'aboutissement d'une querelle âpre et sanglante qui accrut singulièrement les massacres des héroïques et courageux peuples de Yougoslavie. L'étranger ne saurait néanmoins oublier que, immédiatement après l'écrasement de sa patrie, le général Mihailovitch avait organisé la résistance. Il l'avait fait à un moment où les communistes répandaient des brochures proclamant que la guerre impérialiste ne les regardait pas. Jusqu'à l'agression hitlérienne contre la Russie, on n'entendit pas parler de Tito: Mihailovitch apparut comme l'incarnation du fier patriotisme des Serbes; son mouvement déclanché d'Oujtze, en avril 1941, s'étendit à la plus grande partie de la Serbie; les Allemands, qu'il gênait par des attaques répétées sur les voies de communication, mirent sa tête à prix, et les Anglais s'efforcèrent de le soutenir en lui envoyant des officiers de liaison et en parachutant des armes. Nous croyons même savoir que les Russes auraient désiré entrer en relations avec lui et qu'ils en parlèrent aux représentants de la Grande-Bretagne à Ankara, qui ne montrèrent pas beaucoup d'empressement à transporter par avion une mission soviétique dans les montagnes serbes.

Quoi qu'il en soit, Mihailovitch fut le premier créateur d'un maquis dans un pays occupé, et c'est pour honorer son attitude qu'en 1943, le général de Gaulle lui conféra la Croix de Guerre. Ce qui se passa, après l'arrivée de Tito, n'est pas très clair. Ils s'entendirent encore, semble-t-il, pour organiser le soulèvement de l'automne 1941, puis les divergences entre eux commencèrent d'apparaître. Plus énergique, plus décidé, plus ambitieux, et ayant d'ailleurs un programme politique, Tito se brouilla avec son prédécesseur dans la résistance. Celui-ci demeura foncièrement monarchiste, attaché à l'idée de la Grande-Serbie et peu enclin à sympathiser avec les communistes; il considéra, à tort, les partisans comme des ennemis de sa patrie selon l'idée qu'il s'en faisait, et certains de ses lieutenants eurent une attitude assez équivoque. Il n'eut pas l'autorité suffisante pour tenir en mains toutes les organisations qui se réclamaient de lui. Dans l'acte d'accusation, on lit qu'à certains moments, des trêves furent conclues avec les

Allemands, et des rapports établis avec les Italiens (qui d'ailleurs lui vendirent des armes). Il est difficile d'apprécier si ces armistices locaux étaient justifiés par la situation ; mais on les mit à sa charge et ses ennemis intérieurs eurent beau jeu pour lui reprocher sa conduite. L'histoire établira sans doute que Mihailovitch ne fut pas une très forte personnalité, mais il est excessif de dire qu'il agit en traître ; son premier geste ne peut être effacé, et le fait qu'il est resté dans son pays, alors qu'un avion aurait pu facilement le soustraire à ses poursuivants, témoigne en faveur de son courage personnel.

Il a été pris dans les remous d'une de ces farouches luttes intérieures dont l'histoire de la Serbie offre tant d'exemples ; il représentait—et cela le dépasse sans doute—tout ce qui faisait obstacle à l'ambition de Tito : le sentiment royaliste, l'exaltation de l'idée serbe, la haine du communisme. C'est à dire que sa perte fut décidée bien avant que Tito fût devenu tout-puissant ; il n'y avait pas de place pour lui dans le régime imité du régime russe, que l'ancien officier des brigades internationales d'Espagne se promettait d'introduire en Yougoslavie. Comme les institutions du passé, l'homme devait être éliminé, bien qu'il eût rendu d'indiscutables services à la cause alliée, à un moment où l'Angleterre ne comptait pas beaucoup d'amis et que, par la suite, malgré les erreurs de tactique générale, il eut continué d'en rendre, notamment en sauvant des aviateurs. Mais ceux-ci ne furent pas entendus par le Tribunal, composé d'ailleurs uniquement de ses ennemis. Il fallait que Mihailovitch fût sacrifié, afin que, comme l'a dit le maréchal Tito, la réaction fût non seulement battue sur les champs de bataille, mais aussi dans le domaine politique. Cette victoire-là est facile ; on se demande seulement si elle n'est pas trop facile et disproportionnée par rapport aux fautes que le premier résistant serbe a pu commettre ou laisser commettre. On se demande surtout si un peu plus de magnanimité n'aurait pas été plus utile à la réconciliation des Yougoslaves. La générosité est souvent meilleure conseillère que la vengeance.

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DER SCHUSS GEGEN MIHAILOWITSCH

FREMDE politische Beobachter haben seit je dem Wetterwinkel Europas viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Wenn sich über dem Balkan schwarze Wolken zusammenziehen, dann kommt der Sturm. Der verhängnisvolle Schuss in Sarajewo bedeutete den ersten Weltkrieg und der mazedonisch-kroatisch Schuss in Marseille war ein Vorzeichen des zweiten Weltbrandes. Heute wittern wir Ungewitter wieder von Südosten und mancher fragt sich

bange, ob es einen dritten Balkanschuss geben werde ? Serbische Politiker sind geneigt, der Kugel, die Mihailowitschs Leben auslöschten wird, eine historische Bedeutung zuzuschreiben.

Die serbischen Politiker können recht haben ; denn es handelt sich nicht so sehr um den Tod eines vom Schicksal schwer geschlagenen Helden, sondern, vielmehr um einen Schlag des Ostens gegen den Westen, was auch im Laufe des Prozesses klar zum Ausdruck kam. Heute ist einem Europäer durch die Analyse der europäischen Verhältnisse, die langsam balkanisiert werden, viel leichter Balkanprobleme zu verstehen. Früher war der europäische Mensch geneigt, chaotische Zustände auf dem Balkan der primitiven und wilden Natur des Balkanmenschen zuzuschreiben. Dieser ist zwar primitiv, seine natürliche Begabung ermöglicht ihm jedoch die normale Entwicklung auf dem Wege der Kultur und der Zivilisation ; er ist zwar leidenschaftlich, die Leidenschaft kann jedoch auf edle Seiten aufweisen, wenn man sie in die richtige Bahn lenkt. Man kann nicht genug betonen, dass der Hauptgrund der chaotischen Balkanzustände die rivalisierenden Einflüsse der Aussenmächte sind, die dort für ihre Lebensinteressen kämpfen. Es ist der sogenannte Fluch der geographischen Lage. In ähnliche Lage ist heute ganz Europa geraten und man wundert sich, wie hochstehende Völker Europas schnell balkanisiert werden können wenn sie der zersetzenden Macht der fremden Rivalität zum Opfer fallen. Der Wetterwinkel Europas ist heute wieder schwer geladen, das Pulverfass kann leicht entzündet werden.

Der Pessimismus der serbischen Politiker ist nicht ohne Grundlage. Die grösste Gefahr besteht nicht nur in der Abschliessung des Balkans von der westlichen Welt, sondern vielmehr in der aggressiven Tendenz, die sich dort ideologisch und militärisch herauskristallisiert. Drei schwarze Wolken lasten über den Wetterwinkel. Die erste ist der Panslawismus, der nur ein Mittel zum Zweck ist. Russland hat die panslawische Idee nie ernst genommen. Der Vater des Gedankens, ein kroatischer Jesuitenpater, wurde vom zaristischen Hof mit lebenslänglicher Verbannung in Sibirien belohnt. Die meisten seiner Nachfolger waren Slawen deutscher Abstammung, wie der Bischof Strossmayer. Während die kleinen slawischen Völker die panslawische Idee sentimental auffassen : Russland benützt sie kühl und rücksichtslos je nach Bedürfniss. Die zweite Wolke ist eine systematische Organisierung des Kampfes gegen die Katholische Kirche. Man darf sich nicht beirren lassen : das ist eine Kampfansage gegen das gesamte Christentum. Das Endziel der Moskauer Politik ist und bleibt eine materialistische Zukunft ohne Gott und das Liebäugeln mit den nationalen Kirchen ist nur eine Kampfaktik, wie es Stalin selber vor dem Parteiausschuss zugegeben hat. Die dritte Wolke ist die Kampfansage an die westliche Demokratie und der tödliche Schuss gegen Mihailowitsch kann als erster Schuss gegen die Westmächte gelten und historische Bedeutung haben.

Mihailowitsch wird in die Geschichte als ein Freiheitskämpfer

eintreten. Er war der erste Widerstandsführer, und wenn man ihm vorwirft, seine Männer hätten aus taktischen Gründen mit dem Feinde eine Art Waffenstillstand abgeschlossen—was man noch lange nicht als Kollaboration bezeichnen kann,—so geschah dies aus der Liebe zum serbischen Volk, das massenhaft und ohne irgendwelche Abwehr vom Feinde geschlachtet wurde. Diese Haltung der Mihailowitsch Verbände im Jahre 1941, als sie ohne fremde Hilfe für ihr Volk kämpften, war nicht nur vernünftig, sonder notwendig. Man darf nicht vergessen, dass Tito zu dieser Zeit auch ein taktischer „Kollaborationist“ war, indem er aus deutscher Gefangenschaft durch eine Pawelitsch-Legion, die gleich nach Entstehung des „Unabhängigen Staates Kroatien“ in Wien organisiert wurde, in die Heimat gelangte, um sich dort ruhig zu verhalten und auf die Anweisungen aus Moskau zu warten. Titos Kampf war vom ersten Augenblick an ein Kampf um die Macht. Ganze Scharen Kämpfer verliessen im Anfang die Tito-Reihen, als sie sahen, mit welcher Rücksichtslosigkeit er gegen sein eigenes Volk vorging, wenn es sich um seine Macht handelte. Amerikanische Flieger, die bei Mihailowitsch landeten, schauten mit Entsetzen, wie die Tito-Armee ganze jugoslawische Dörfer „ausradierte,“ obwohl kein Deutscher anwesend war.

Die weitere Entwicklung war tragisch für Mihailowitsch. Sie lag auf der Linie der alliierten Kompromisse, die den Russen immer neue Zugeständnisse machten. Tragisch ist, dass der Moskauer Anhänger Tito durch London gross geworden ist. Churchill bekennt das heute als Irrtum—zu spät. London liess seinen Mann und seine Interessen fallen, seinem Gegner die Waffe in die Hand zu drücken, die gefährlich sein könnte. Mihailowitsch als Politiker war kurz-sichtig für sich selbst, weitsichtig für sein Volk und für die Menschheit. Den amerikanischen Fliegern hat er immer wieder gesagt, er wolle nichts anderes als eine wahre Demokratie der westlichen Prägung, er wolle sich für sein Volk und seine westlichen Freunde opfern, jedoch nicht den Weg einer neuen und noch schlimmeren Diktatur ebnen.

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EINE IDEE VOR GERICHT

MAN schreibt uns : „Die skandalöse Geschichte des Abenteurers einiger angelsächsischer Vertreter am Balkan zeigte sich der ganzen Welt im richtigen Licht . . . Die gleiche Doppeltätigkeit, mit der sich die Tätigkeit der Engländer und Amerikaner zur Kriegszeit am Balkan auszeichnete. Heute sehen wir die Spuren dieser Zweideutigkeit sowohl in der Tätigkeit der alliierten Verwaltung

in Triest, als auch in den anglo-amerikanischen Versuchen zur ‚Internationalisierung‘ der Donau im Kampf gegen die junge Balkan-Demokratien und in der Unterstützung aller möglichen antidemokratischen Gruppierungen. . . .“ So schliesst Isakow sein Urteil über den Belgrader Prozess in der Moskauer „Prawda.“ Treffender, präziser liess es sich nicht fassen! Was sollte also bewiesen werden in der drei Wochen des „Monstre-Prozesses gegen die Verräter und Kriegsverbrecher?“ Die Schuld General Mihailowitschs, die Schuld Englands oder die der ganzen demokratischen Welt?

Die grosse Aufmachung des zum Tribunal gewandelten Instruktionssaales in der Gardekaserne am Töptschider, wo die Hauptmacht der Partisanen untergebracht ist, die Tito von der „überschwenglichen“ Liebe seiner Belgrader zu schützen hat, die gut funktionierende Inszenierung übertraf bei weitem alles, was jemals die serbische Hauptstadt zu sehen bekommen hat. Für tausend Zuschauer war Platz vorhanden, die „nach tagelangen Fussmärschen aus den entlegensten Dörfern kamen, um ihre Blutsauger vor Gericht sehen.“ Siebzig Journalisten wurden von dem Regime gewogenen Übersetzern betreut. Und wohl der Ausländer wegen musste die Würde einer „unantastbaren.“ Institution peinlich gewahrt werden: ein Schimpfkonzert, Pfeifen und Johlen („An den Galgen mit ihm!“) erwartete die Angeklagten täglich vor der weitläufigen Kaserne, während im Saale selbst nur dem Gerichtshof stürmische Ovationen dargebracht wurden. Der sehr müde aussehende Mihailowitsch, bebrillt, mit dem bis an die Augen reichenden Tschetnikbart, trug gewöhnliche Militärbluse ohne Distinktion oder Abzeichen. „Ich bin so erschöpft, das ich ja sage, wenn ich nein meine,“ sagte er wiederholt, oder: „Ich errinere mich nicht, dies gesagt zu haben.“ Als er einmal beteuerte, er besitze viele Dokumente für die Richtigkeit seiner Aussagen, frug ihm zynisch der Gerichtspräsident wo sich denn diese befänden; da straffte sich die gealterte Gestalt und entgegnete fest: „Sie haben sie mir genommen!“

Ein weiteres Bild kommunistischer Justiz: demokratische Gesetze gewähren dem Angeklagten und seinen Verteidigern Einsicht in alle Beweismittel der Klageführung. Als die Verteidigung wiederholt die Vorladung alliierter Entlastungszeugen und Einsicht in die „Dokumente“ erbat, entschied der Gerichtspräsident: „Ich erwarte sogar noch einen dritten Antrag, dass wir Mihailowitsch gestatten, in den Strassen Belgrads zu spazieren!“ Und als die Verteidigung wiederum bat, Mihailowitsch Fragen stellen zu dürfen, bekam sie die Antwort: „Die Anklage hat Mihailowitsch schon genügend Fragen gestellt!“ Ein Korrespondent der „United Press,“ der sich mit den Verteidigern unterhielt, musste den Gerichtssaal verlassen. . . .

Neben Mihailowitsch auf der Anklagebank sassen auch die widerwärtigsten Verräter am Serbenvolk, die Mordgesellen der Quisling-Regierung, Dinitsch, Jonitsch, Muschitzki, Dokitsch, Pawlowitsch und Dragi Jowanowitsch. Damit sollte Heimat und Fremde gezeigt werden, deren verruchte Taten seien gleichwertig denjenigen der

wegen „volksfeindlicher,“ d.h. antikommunistischer Haltung Angeklagten. Gewiss ein genialer Regieeinfall war es, alle diese Serben, auch die Mitglieder der ehemaligen Exilregierung, die Titos Hand nicht erreichen konnte, vom „Obersten Gericht der Volksrepublik“ aburteilen zu lassen, das wiederum nur—aus Serben bestand. Als besondere, viel kommentierte Pikanterie sei vermerkt, dass die nicht-serbischen Mitglieder der gleichen Exilregierung nicht auf der Anklageliste standen, auf der aber for allem der grösste Kriegsverbrecher Jugoslawiens, der kroatische „Poglawnik“ Pawelitsch und sein Stab fehlten. . .

Verurteilt wurden alle Angeklagten, entweder zum Tode oder—was gleichbedeutend ist—zu Zwangsarbeit; darunter auch jene Serben, die am 27. März 1941 die Revolution verschuldeten, welche das Regime des Prinz-regenten Paul unsaft aus dem Lager der Achse an die Seite der Alliierten riss. Und die jetzt über sie zu Gericht sassen, waren die damaligen Kollaborationisten der Achse, die Roosevelt und Churchill öffentlich als Kriegshetzer beschimpften! Mihailowitsch begann als erster sofort gegen Deutsche, Italiener, Bulgaren, Kroaten und später auch gegen die kommunistischen Partisanen zu kämpfen. Es mag gewiss schwer sein, dies immer gleichzeitig zu tun, um so mehr als die erste alliierte Unterstützung gering war und nacher ganz ausblieb. Mihailowitsch musste—ebenso wie Tito—nach den Gesetzen des Guerillakrieges einen Gegner gegen den anderen ausspielen. Der grösste Oportunist, Tito, blieb Sieger. Mihailowitsch-Tito: zwei Namen, zwei Welten!

Wyschinskis Inszenierung der seinerzeitigen „Reinigungsprozesse“ in Moskau schien vorbildlich gewesen zu sein für Belgrad. Die 600 Seiten umfassende Anklage mit allen „Dokumenten,“ ein Meisterwerk der „OZNA,“ wurde statt russisch, die bisher übliche „zweite Landesprache,“ englisch übersetzt. Das tragische Schauspiel galt eben nicht der Begleichung einer alten Rechnung zwischen Kommunisten und Demokraten in Jugoslawien, sondern der Bereinigung der anglo-amerikanisch-russischen Rechnungen. Was wegen internationaler *Courtoisie* an der gleichzeitigen Pariser Konferenz unausgesprochen blieb, kam unverblümt in Belgrad zur Sprache. Viel Schmutzwäsche wurde gewaschen; auch die Brutalität der Kämpfe wurde breitgetreten; der Balkan spricht eben seine eigene Sprache! Erbarmungslos ist er für den Gegner, der dem eigenen Volke entstammt. Auch Tito hätte eine grossmütige Geste gegenüber seinem machtlosen Gegenspieler gut gestanden.

Titos getreuer Mitarbeiter in der Regierung, der frühere Journalist list Djilas, stellte einmal in einer Rede fest, die 30,000 Opfer, die am Militärschiessplatz von Belgrad, in Jajintzi, allein im Jahre 1943 von den Deutschen fusiliert wurden, seien nur zum verschwindend kleinen Teil Kommuniste gewesen. Wer also waren diese Patrioten, die da unter den Kugeln deutscher Mitralleusen hinsanken? Es waren Anhänger des „Rebellenführer“ Mihailowitsch; Serben, die noch ein Jahr nach der „Befreiung“ für ihre unerfüllten Ideale in den

Bergen weiterkämpften. Bis auch ihr, fast schon legendärer „Drascha“ jetzt auf dem gleichen Schiessplatz von Jajintzi fiel. England und Amerika kehrten ihrem verbündeten, vielfach ausgezeichneten General Dragoljub Mihailowitsch seinerzeit den Rücken; möglicherweise aus taktischen Gründen. Sind es strategische Gründe, die heute Marschall Tito veranlassen, den Anglo-Amerikanern die kalte Schulter zu zeigen?

Reprinted from an article in "Le Journal d'Yverdon" (Yverdon) of August 16th, 1946, by kind permission of the Editor.

COMMENT LE GÉNÉRAL MIHAILOVITCH FUT CAPTURÉ PAR LES PARTISANS DE TITO

LES jouneaux américains donnent de larges commentaires du récit de la capture du général Mihailovitch. Comme on le sait, le gouvernement de Tito, jusqu'à présent, n'a jamais révélé comment le général Mihailovitch avait été pris. D'après un document sorti clandestinement de Yougoslavie, Mihailovitch a simplement été kidnapé par les Partisans de Tito. Le document porte la signature du major de la résistance du général Mihailovitch, Miloche Markovitch, commandant du corps de Pojéga. Voici ce qu'il dit :

“ Au mois de février, Mihailovitch est tombé gravement malade du typhus. Il était avec son état-major dans les environs de Roudno. Une nuit nous avons aperçu des avions alliés, anglais, qui jetaient des feuilles volantes disant qu'ils venaient nous aider avec des armes et des munitions. La nuit suivante, les mêmes avions sont revenus, volant très bas et jetant plusieurs paquets avec des armes et des munitions et surtout du matériel sanitaire dont nous avons un besoin urgent. Dans un des paquets, nous avons trouvé des instructions pour préparer des places d'atterrissage à des avions, des indications pour les insignes des aérodromes, etc. . .

Le 13 mars, en effet, dans l'après-midi, 3 avions sont arrivés. Nous leur avons indiqué la place d'atterrissage et nous en avons vu sortir des officiers anglais qui, presque tous, parlaient également bien français. Après les échanges de documents et lorsque nous avons vu qu'il s'agissait vraiment des Alliés, nous les avons conduits à l'E.M. du général Mihailovitch. Constatant que notre général était dans un état assez désespéré, ils proposèrent tout de suite de prendre Mihailovitch et de le conduire, avec sa suite en Italie. Mihailovitch fut transporté dans un des avions avec 2 de ses officiers, tandis que dans les 2 autres avions prirent place 8 officiers de sa suite. Les avions prirent l'air presque aussitôt.

Tout de suite après arrivèrent 2 escadrilles de partisans yougoslaves qui commencèrent à jeter des petites bombes à gaz et à parachuter des

partisans très bien équipés, munis, de masques à gaz. Les troupes du général Mihailovitch, non atteintes par les gaz commencèrent une lutte sanglante avec les partisans. On compta d'un côté et de l'autre de nombreuses victimes, mais comme les partisans furent vite renforcés par les troupes mobiles motorisés venant de Briboj, les troupes de Mihailovitch furent obligées de se retirer.

Il était clair que Mihailovitch avait été simplement kidnapé. Les avions qui l'emportèrent sont descendus tout d'abord à Sarayévo, puis le général fut transporté à Belgrade."

On ajoute que c'est le docteur personnel de Mihailovitch, fait prisonnier par les partisans, qui avait été contraint de dire où se trouvaient les postes du général.

PART XX

The Syrian Press

My people see in General Mihailovitch the principal representative of their resistance against the enemy.

July 15th, 1946.

PETER II.

Reprinted from an article by XXX in "Le Jour" (Beyrouth) of June 14th, 1946.

UN PROCÈS

LE procès du général Mihailovitch et de ses principaux collaborateurs dépasse le cadre d'une affaire yougoslave. Il n'est que de considérer l'intérêt qu'on lui porte à l'étranger, notamment en Grande Bretagne et aux Etats-Unis où les démarches des chancelleries pour obtenir des garanties minima de justice ont été vigoureusement appuyées par l'opinion publique.

Le but recherché par le gouvernement Tito est-il vraiment comme l'écrit le correspondant du "*Times*," de faire porter des accusations contre les puissances occidentales, c'est-à-dire en définitive, d'essayer de compromettre les Alliés? A une heure où les relations internationales ne sont pas précisément excellentes, on se demande à quoi répondent les intentions des Yougoslaves, si les intentions qu'on leur prête sont bien les leurs et s'ils ont—surtout—les moyens de parvenir à leurs fins?

Quand on songe à la variété et à l'étendue des secours envoyés au maréchal Tito, ou seulement à la propagande que les Anglo-Saxons ont faite autour de lui, il semble étrange, qu'on veuille, sans grave défaillance de mémoire, compromettre ces derniers de quelque manière que ce soit. Le service de la paix commande en tout cas autre chose que ces vaines tentatives, et nous savons la Yougoslavie nouvelle fortement attachée à la Paix.

Sans insister d'ailleurs sur sa portée diplomatique, il reste que l'instance engagée à Belgrade vise des hommes que le peuple yougoslave—peut-être trompé, mais c'est un fait—a longtemps tenu pour des héros.

Inculpé Mihailovitch se présente avec une auréole.

Les témoignages des missions militaires alliées, accréditées auprès de son état-major jusqu'au dernier jour, sont irréfragables. Il s'est battu contre les Allemands. Incontestablement, il a personnifié la résistance. Jusqu'en mai 1944, il était ministre de la guerre dans un cabinet reconnu par tous les ennemis de l'Allemagne.

Ceux qui devraient comparaître à ses côtés sont également des personnalités connues: Slobodan Yovanovitch a été président du

conseil des ministres, lorsqu'il n'y a avait qu'un seul gouvernement, et que ce gouvernement siégeait à Londres. Constantin Fotitch est, de loin, le plus brillant des ambassadeurs yougoslaves. Représentant de son pays à Washington, il vit encore aux Etats-Unis. Deux frères Knéjévitch sont impliqués simultanément : le professeur Radoyé, ancien précepteur de Pierre II, ancien ministre de la cour, un des leaders du parti démocrate, et le colonel Jivan, ancien attaché militaire à Washington. Ce dernier, alors commandant de la garde royale, est pratiquement l'auteur du coup d'Etat du 27 mars 1941 qui a mis fin à la régence du prince Paul et rangé la Yougoslavie dans le camp des démocraties. . . .

On ne se résigne pas facilement à croire que tous ces gens soient des traîtres. Le consentement universel signifie quand même quelque chose, et on se reconnaît vivement impressionné par les manifestations de sympathie dont ces "criminels de guerre" sont l'objet par des étrangers, et par leurs compatriotes à l'étranger.

Quelles que soient les nécessités de la politique, il faut faire confiance à l'équité des magistrats.

S'il n'y a pas beaucoup d'avocats—il ne s'en est pas trouvé un, disait un télégramme, pour défendre les collaborateurs du général—le maréchal Tito a, ici, une belle occasion de montrer que, du moins, il y a encore des juges à Belgrade.

PART XXI

The Turkish Press

The trial of General Mihailovich is only the outcome of an extensive series of similar perpetrations. This soldier, who was the first to fight the occupying enemy in Yugoslavia and who was always loyal to the Allies, has been brought before a tribunal of his political enemies whose verdict is nothing more than another act of party vengeance.

July 16th, 1946.

PETER II.

Reprinted from a leading article in "La République" (Istanbul) of July 18th, 1946.

L'ÉNIGME MIHAILOVITCH

L'ÉNIGME Mihailovitch qui s'achève—qui s'est peut-être déjà achevée—par une exécution sommaire, étrangement précipitée, est un de ces faits, si nombreux, hélas ! dont l'histoire de ce temps n'aura pas à s'enorgueillir.

Qui est-ce enfin ce général que les alliés ont encensé durant des années, que le roi Pierre II avait nommé son ministre de la guerre et qui menait contre les Allemands une lutte de maquisard ?

Est-ce un traître ? Est-ce un héros ?

Est-ce un patriote ? Est-ce un vendu ?

Mieux encore, et surtout :

Est-ce un Yougoslave ? Est-ce un communiste ?

Car enfin il est ridicule de vouloir condamner Mihailovitch parce qu'il a collaboré avec les Anglais et avec les Américains. Il est tout aussi illogique de vouloir le condamner parce qu'il a collaboré avec le gouvernement émigré de Londres car nous nous souvenons d'un temps où certains hommes d'Etat yougoslaves actuels n'ont pas dédaigné, dans leur propre intérêt, de faire un pacte avec ledit gouvernement.

Certes Mihailovitch a eu un tort : celui d'avoir été battu dans la lutte intérieure qui opposait deux partis yougoslaves et deux idéologies.

Victorieux, il aurait été héros ; vaincu, il est devenu traître. Cette guerre nous a donné de bien nombreux et bien plus illustres exemples de ce genre. Et ce n'est guère à l'honneur de notre siècle.

Ce qui l'est encore moins, c'est que cet homme ait été abandonné par ceux qu'il a jadis servis.

Mihailovitch mourra sans doute—est mort déjà peut-être. Mais avec lui meurt aussi l'honneur de bien de gens qui auraient dû le couvrir de leur autorité et le sauver par reconnaissance.

PART XXII

The Uruguayan Press

The recent trial of General Mihailovich comes as a rude shock to the people in this country. The General was considered a guilty man. . . . The behaviour of the people in the Courts was reminiscent of the crowd of Roman pagans in the Colosseum cheering the murder of an early Christian.

July 23rd, 1946.

BERNARD CARDINAL GRIFFIN.

Reprinted from an article in "El Dia" (Montevideo) of July 17th, 1946.

EL CASO MIHAILOVICH

EL Superior Tribunal Militar yugoeslavo, acaba de condenar a muerte por fusilamiento, al general Draja Mihailovich, exjefe del ejército de aquella nación, aceptando la acusación de traidor a la patria y de colaborador con el enemigo.

Claro está que no ha existido ninguna confesión de parte del acusado que permita sostenerlo así, pero, según sostienen los acusadores, las comprobaciones producidas han sido muchas, por lo cual el Tribunal no ha dudado en calificarlo de ese modo. De nuestra parte, nos permitimos dudar de la exactitud de ese resultado, tratándose de un hombre como el general Mihailovich, basándonos en la resistencia opuesta tanto por el gobierno como por el Tribunal, a que dieran su parecer algunos testigos ingleses y norteamericanos, que actuaron en consonancia con el acusado, que conocieron muy bien, y que, imparcialmente, podrían dar idea de su comportamiento. Esa resistencia opuesta a lo que podrían decir esos ciudadanos que fueron soldados, que sirvieron a la causa de la libertad, y que hubieran deseado hacer nada más que algunas declaraciones, ha impresionado a todo el mundo, teniéndose la seguridad de que el proceso contra Mihailovich ha tenido un carácter mucho más político que militar, y que su sacrificio ha sido dictado por razones muy distintas a las que se pretende hacer pasar como verdaderas. Esperábase que ese tribunal tuviera alguna prudencia al dictar la sentencia, pero está visto que respondió solamente a las solicitudes partidistas, lo cual no recomienda su actitud. El sacrificio de Mihailovich fué considerado como necesario, y se le sacrificó. Tal política no tiene nada de nuevo, ya que está dictada por lo que se ha aplicado en Rusia desde hace veinticinco años, no siendo, por lo tanto, más que una simple imitación de lo que allí ha ocurrido. El de Mihailovich no es más que un caso, que se repite, de la insensibilidad humana del comunismo, que allí donde llega a imponerse, trata de eliminar todo lo contrario, buscando, de ese modo, hacer desaparecer

las resistencias. No creemos que con ese procedimiento pueda llegarse a algo bueno. A lo más, lo que se logra es aumentar la oposición y llevarla a reacciones desesperadas.

No es nuestra intención sostener la absoluta inculpabilidad del general Mihailovich. Sabemos que fué, en una Yugoslavia dominada por alemanes e italianos, el primer patriota que se levantó contra ellos, rodeándose de cuantos voluntarios quisieron ayudarlo. Sabemos que sólo, sin otra ayuda, combatió valientemente, sin descanso, contra los invasores de su país. No esperó, como otros, a que determinada nación entrara en la guerra para rebelarse y actuar. Cuando llegó ese momento y surgió en su país una nueva rebelión, no quiso aceptar las imposiciones de su jefatura, y comenzó la doble lucha, que bien pudo haberse evitado, pero de la cual él tuvo parte de la culpa, correspondiendo la otra parte el lado contrario. Temió, por un motivo muy explicable de dignidad personal, que su acción no tuviera el andamiento debido, y protestó contra esa posibilidad. De ahí surgió el desacuerdo y todo lo demás. Las potencias que lo ayudaban, Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos, le negaron su asistencia cuando comprobaron su debilidad, pero jamás lo condenaron, atentas, especialmente, a lo más importante en aquellos momentos. En vez de aliado fué considerado como enemigo por las bandas de guerrilleros comunistas, y así, sin otra razón, fueron empeorando las cosas. En el juicio, se comprobaron faltas bien claras, cometidas fuera de su influencia, por algunos de sus tenientes, pero no se pudo esgrimir un solo cargo grave en su contra. No se puede decir, tampoco, que haya faltado sinceridad a lo largo de las sesiones del proceso. Todo lo aclaró, aún cosas en contra suya, pero protestó enérgicamente, en favor de su inocencia, de la pureza de sus intenciones, de la firmeza de sus actos. A pesar de todo, fué declarado culpable y se le sentenció a muerte, como si en verdad se hubiera tratado de un traidor. El Tribunal Militar de Belgrado, ha extremado su severidad, llegando a una solución que de ser aplicada no tendrá, como en todas las sentencias de muerte, ninguna manera de ser corregida. El general Mihailovich habrá caído como producto de odios y rivalidades políticas, fríamente ejecutadas, y no como consecuencia de su conducta. Quedábale, como único lugar de donde esperar clemencia, el Congreso de Belgrado, pero según parece en él tampoco ha encontrado, justicia. Habrá, pues, de ser ejecutado, pero nada podrá impedir que esa ejecución pueda ser considerada como un verdadero "asesinato legal."

EPILOGUE

"IN the First World War I was wounded and received medals for valour. I stayed at the front all the time when I could have left it. I never used brutality to the enemy, still less to my own people.

As Military Attaché between the wars I was one of the few who visited the Soviet Embassies. I was always against our old régime and tried to find the moment for revolt, but the General Staff were corrupt and would do nothing.

I had contacts just before this war with the British Military Attaché, Major Clark, for which Nedich punished me with 30 days' imprisonment.

I loathed and hated the Germans, forbade Nazi meetings, and strove to rouse and train our youth for the fight I knew must come. I wanted to modernize our army, and was imprisoned again for my efforts.

When war came and our front broke I was left with a broken-spirited people and with a legacy of the rottenness of two decades. I went into the forest and told the people to hide their weapons. I wanted to continue resistance, and thus I became a rebel against Hitler's Germany.

At that time only England and I were still in the war.

I proclaimed that my army would be a Yugoslav Army. Some of my subalterns wished to have only a Serbian Army, but I proved to them the greatness of Yugoslavia as an idea. Other commanders would not accept this.

Partisans appeared immediately Soviet Russia entered the war. The Germans began to take reprisals, and some of the people begged me not to emerge. My first success was when ten plunderers come over to me. I had an action against the Partisans, who, peasant women told me, had been pillaging. I released those I captured, and warned them not to behave in that way.

I had three meetings with Marshal Tito, to which I went sincerely. I told him I believed we could come to an understanding, and that both sides had made mistakes, but unfortunately we spent our time in mutual accusations, and even before I met him the battle had begun.

The Germans began to withdraw and I decided to attack. It is not true that I gave orders not to attack. I had little material, and had to tell some officers who wished to join me to stay in Belgrade.

My first contact with the outside world was by the Soviet Legation in Sofia ; my second by wireless made by an amateur. After this, Captain Hudson arrived from Britain with a message that I was not to transform the struggle into a fight for the Soviet Union, and announced that all troops in Yugoslavia were to come under my command.

I had wanted to send units to their areas, but the Partisans attacked, lost territory, and had to leave Serbia, as I had known would happen, as they were led by inexperienced men.

I deny that I had ever handed over Partisan prisoners to the Germans. The blame lies therefore entirely on the witness who had given evidence against me, and was, in fact, a collaborator.

German reprisals had been terrible, and I had seen flames burning the villages. My 5,000 men were not anything against five divisions. I told the London Government but got no instructions, and so I went myself with two others to the meeting. We took grenades in case of treachery from the Germans.

The Germans would not parley. All we got from them was demand for unconditional surrender, and I was called a rebel. I was astonished, and said I was fighting for my country, and they must as soldiers understand this. I was afraid that one of my two commanders would throw his grenade in anger. I refused to drink wine with the Germans, and there was no agreement. I told the Germans I would fight. This is a true account of what happened, which one of the witnesses mixed up.

Very soon after the Germans attacked my headquarters on Ravna Gora and killed many of us. I escaped by their lines. Once they passed within a few yards of me, but I was covered over with leaves.

Some of my commanders, against my orders, collaborated, others fought one another, others tried to put a rival in my place. Jurich, now a Colonel in Marshal Tito's Army, who had given evidence against me, had failed to carry out several orders for sabotage, and the people under him had finally turned against the woman, Vera Peshich, who lived at Jurich's headquarters, and killed her, and Jurich had then gone over to the Partisans.

The Partisans had 20 years' experience of underground work, and I had to take things as they were and improve with what I had. I had many hindrances, and little time to do as I intended and put the organization in order.

I deny that I had ever had a representative at Italian headquarters.

I had never ordered action against civilians, and could not ever approve it. I cannot believe that such a thing happened as we heard it in Court, even less in any unit of mine. The 'Black Troikas' were necessary to clean up my own organization, and I could never have favoured killing any man without trial.

I tried to make contact with those people in neighbouring countries whom I hoped to link up in one Balkan organization. Colonel Bailey had sympathized with the idea of making contact with Colonel Zervas in Greece, but the British authorities had been against it. I had refused arms from the Rumanian Iron Guard when they made it a condition that I should cease fighting the Germans. The whole purpose of these contacts was a rising against the Axis.

I reminded the Court of Hitler's message to Mussolini saying that I was the greatest enemy of the Axis, and was only waiting for the moment to attack.

The British Mission left me. Colonel McDowell, from the American Mission, stayed with me, and told me that my fight against the Germans was no longer interesting, but I must stay among the people.

Finally, with 70 per cent of my men ill with typhus, I was losing more and more ground and the Red Army was approaching. My wish to send them a Mission came to nothing.

My other meeting with the Germans, with Colonel McDowell, had been to negotiate a surrender of German arms and not for collaboration, and I had never ordered any legalization of my troops.

I had hopes that at the end of the war there might be some kind of plebiscite of the whole nation.

I wanted nothing for myself.

The French Revolution gave the world the Rights of Man and the Russian Revolution also gave us something new, but I did not wish to start to-day where they started in 1917.

I never wanted the old Yugoslavia, but I had a difficult legacy.

I am a soldier who sought to organize resistance to the Axis for our own country and for the rising of all the Balkan peninsula.

I am sorry that anyone should think I have been disloyal to the Government, but documents exist concerning that. I was caught in a whirlpool of events and the movements of the new Slav unity which I have favoured for a long time.

Believing that the world would take the course of the Russian Revolution I was caught among the changes of the Western Democracies. They are for our peoples' good, and so are the Russians.

I had against me a competitive organization, the Communist Party, which seeks its aims without compromise. I was faced with changes in my own Government, and accused of connections with every possible secret service, enemy and Allied.

I believed I was on the right road and called for any foreign journalist or Red Army Mission to visit me and see everything. But fate was merciless to me when it threw me into this maelstrom.

I strove for much, I undertook much, but the gales of the world have carried away both me and my work.

I ask the Court to judge what I have said according to its proper value."

This is an extract of the speech which General Mihailovich made in his defence before the Court in Belgrade, on June 11th, 1946. The full text of this dignified and calm speech which lasted for four and a half hours, has not been published anywhere. The State Printing House in Belgrade published in 1946 the stenographic record and documents in a book entitled *The Trial of Drazha Mihailovich*. In this book of 556 pages only 8 pages, less than 1,000 words, were given to Mihailovich's defence.

The extract published here is taken out of reports sent by the Special Correspondents of *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* who were at the trial in Belgrade.

"He spoke without oratory, without rancour towards political opponents or private enemies, lucidly and in detail. It was the professional soldier presenting a military report,

compelling because of its simplicity. He showed himself throughout respectful to the Court and oblivious of the crowd, who for once forgot their hisses and listened in complete silence," said the Special Correspondent of *The Times**.

"His speech, which lasted until nearly midnight, was delivered with simple dignity. When he finished the Courtroom was silent," added the Correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post*.†

Tito's Court passed its sentence on Mihailovich. Tito's executioner carried it out. But the roused conscience of the world has given its own verdict. . . .

**The Times* of July 12th, 1946.

†*The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* of July 12th, 1946.

APPENDIX

THIS book was already in the press when the following report from a highly reliable source—which cannot be disclosed for obvious reasons—was received from Belgrade. In view of its importance we are reproducing it in its original form.

The report reads :

A FEW EXTRACTS FROM THE DEPOSITIONS OF GENERAL MEISSNER AND COLONEL FUCHS DURING THEIR PUBLIC TRIAL IN BELGRADE, ON DECEMBER 13TH, 1946.

General Meissner, G.O.C., of the S.S. troops in the Balkans declared :

“ I did nothing but my duty as a soldier. I know the fate awaiting me : the gallows or a firing squad. Therefore, I will only speak the truth.”

Questioned why such a large number of Serbs were murdered, General Meissner answered :

“ The Communists are guilty for these crimes. It is regrettable that such a large number of innocent people perished as the result of the reprisals undertaken by the Germans in carrying out the orders of their superiors. But, it must not be forgotten that the instigators of these troubles were the Communists, who never had the courage to engage in fighting the German armed forces, but who swept down from their mountains into the towns and villages killing a few German civil servants, and, at the approach of German armed forces, immediately withdrew again into the woods.”

When Colonel Fuchs, of the Gestapo, was questioned about the connection of General Drazha Mihailovich with the Gestapo, his reply was :

“ Not only that the Gestapo did not have any connection with General Mihailovich, but always considered him enemy No. 1 of the German people. Men in the movement of General Mihailovich were persecuted and severely punished by the Gestapo, and the Germans had always believed that his national movement in Serbia represented the greatest danger to the security of the German troops in the Balkans. Besides, it was this movement which was most damaging to Germans.”

No sooner had Colonel Fuchs made this statement when the proceedings in court were interrupted. After a short pause, the President of the Court ordered the Court-room to be cleared. Since then, the trial of these two Nazi leaders in Belgrade has taken place behind closed doors.

The Belgrade papers, which otherwise published long reports on the numerous trials of this nature, only printed three very short notices concerning the Meissner and Fuchs trial : the first that the trial had started ; the second that they had been condemned ; and the third that the sentence had been carried out.

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