Page 2357

Friday, 15 March 2002

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I wonder if I may make just a brief statement before the Court starts its session.

JUDGE MAY: Well, Lord Ashdown, we don't usually allow the witnesses to do so.

THE WITNESS: I hope it will be helpful to the Court.

JUDGE MAY: If it's relevant, yes.

THE WITNESS: The Prosecution counsel very kindly said yesterday that I have a pressing engagement and I would wish to be away from here, if at all possible, by 1.00. I just want to make it clear that my engagements are not as weighty as the matters before the Court, and I think it would be helpful if you were to know that I am at your disposal for today as long as you wish, and any other subsequent day. It seems to me that these matters are far more weighty than anything else I have to do.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

WITNESS: PADDY ASHDOWN [Resumed] Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. The system of -- listening to the French at a distance, Lord Ashdown, apparently is causing a problem, because it feeds through to them, so I'm going to give up that -- ²³⁵⁸

THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please speak into the microphone. Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. -- speak sufficiently slowly and leave a long enough gap not to cause a problem.

Yesterday we heard from you about your observations from the hills above Suva Reka and how you spent an hour looking at villages being destroyed. You gave us the account of the weaponry you believed to have been deployed.

There's a short video, and may we now, please, see that. It lasts about three minutes, and it may be that, providing there's no sound coming over, you'll add the odd comment to it as it's coming, but it will largely speak for itself, I think.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. This is you, of course, with binoculars. Now, at what are we looking here?

A. You're looking at villages in the area, which I can point out to you later on the map, but roughly in the area between Suva Reka and Budakovo, and the villages are being fired --

Q. Just pausing there. My screen is almost impossible to see.

A. Yes, as indeed is --

Q. -- the same. It's too light. Perhaps the booth may be able to help. I'm not sure.

A. Yes. That's better. ²³⁵⁹

Q. Thank you. So here you'll be able to point out the villages.

A. I think they are self-evident there, the ones that are burning. We're looking across the Suva Reka valley, and you can see various villages burning, to the left and in the centre of the screen now. We were able to see -- this is one of the houses taken later in the day. We were able to see in amongst those fires the burst of shell fire. I should point out --

Q. What are we looking at here?

A. This is really the following day.

Q. Let's pause there for a minute.

A. I wish perhaps to come to this on the following day.

Q. Thank you. Just pause there. We'll come back to that video in a minute, and let's just deal with what we've already seen. As you say, self-explanatory appearance of villages burning. And I think at the first stage, what was your impression about the amount of destruction that was going on?

A. Well, it was very extensive. I think I counted that day some 16 villages on fire. I should add that we were also able to see in the valley occasional large articulated trucks driving down the road.

THE WITNESS: It may be helpful if you had the map, Your Honour --

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

THE WITNESS: -- at this stage. I may be able to point out precisely --

MR. NICE:

Q. I can't remember the -- ²³⁶⁰

A. -- the location.

Q. -- number, I am afraid.

A. We were able to see a number of articulated trucks driving up into the villages. The villages, it appeared to me -- Here we are. Thank you.

So I was positioned approximately here near the village of Pecani. The -- as we calculated, the guns that were firing were up here in the area of Blace. The villages we were looking at were the villages of Budakovo, which is here, through to Vranic, which is over here, Maciteve, which is here, and Krusica. Both Gornji Krusica -- Gornji Krusica is up here, and Krusica is down here. All these villages were aflame, subject to bombardment and had been put to the flame. The trucks that we saw were in the area around here, which we were looking down on, on the main road between Prizren and Pristina, and some making their way up this small road here as far as I could tell. I'm bound to say that -- my conclusion, as indeed was that of the British Ambassador, was that this was indiscriminate in its nature, inconsistent with precise military targeting, systematic, and of a nature designed to terrorise or to drive out the general civilian population. While I was there, the British Ambassador set up his satellite phone on the bonnet of the Land Rover and contacted the Foreign Office and said to the Foreign Office that, absolutely contrary to undertakings given by then-President Milosevic and the Yugoslav government, that these indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population conducted by main battle units of the Yugoslav army, which had been taking place in the Drenica ²³⁶¹ area, would be stopped, the undertaking given that they would be stopped that day or the day previously.

I heard the ambassador say to the Foreign Office in London that contrary to that clear undertaking given to the international community, these operations had not stopped but were still probably, in an intensified fashion, continuing. Not in the Drenica region but had now been expanded to the Suva Reka region.

Q. Thank you. The following day to which the video has already brought us, and we'll ask them to turn the video back on in just a second or so, you returned to the same Studencani area, did you?

A. It may be helpful if I relate a brief story before that. We were met by a garage owner who showed us his house which had been destroyed and his business, who informed me that previous to -- in the last couple of days the village of Studencani, which is just below where we were -- where we were standing --

Q. Yes, to the west --

A. It's just approximately --

Q. -- of Suva Reka.

A. -- just below -- it's here in this area. It had been visited by the Serbs. He described them as the Serbs. I don't know whether they were the MUP or the army - I suspect the former - who had informed the village that they were to surrender weapons on the following day. The village claimed they didn't have any weapons. They went out. They were saying, "He told us to raise the money from the village, 10.000 Deutschmarks," as he described it, "to go and buy weapons on the black ²³⁶² market." The villager informed us that the specific threat made was to point to the villages aflame around the rim of the valley during that day and to point out that this is what would happen to them if they did not surrender weapons.

The ambassador and I, together with a military attache, then drove down into Suva Reka, sought to be able to get into the region that was under bombardment, was stopped by, I think, MUP forces and decided that it was time to return to Pristina so that we would get back before the curfew.

We did so by going back through, as I recall, the Podgerusa valley, which runs up to Malisevo. So back on the map again. It runs up through here and then join the main Pec-Pristina road close to Kumerane. At this point, we saw a large armoured convoy comprising perhaps of 20 T55 tanks and associated military armoured vehicles moving out of the Drenica area to the north of this road and moving, as we thought, towards the Suva Reka operation.

We went back to Pristina that night and decided that it was necessary to seek to get back into this area on the following day so that we could observe these operations.

The ambassador had to return to Belgrade. I, however, met up with the head of UNHCR, Mrs. Morgan Morris, and we arranged to leave the following day at dawn to get back into this area of operations as early as possible.

We did indeed do that the following morning, arriving in the Studencani area I should think around about 8.30, having made a very early ²³⁶³ start. The villages were still aflame. Indeed, by now, there were more villages aflame across the amphitheatre I've described. We've --

Q. How did the -- how did the percentage of houses destroyed accord with your earlier expectations when you had been seeing things from a distance?

A. I was not able, I fear, to get into the villages at this time, though we sought to do so. And if I may just explain how that happened, but I think it is necessary for the Court to hear a little of the preceding events, if I may describe them, Mr. May [sic]. We descended into the village of Studencani where we met with the elders of the village, old men in their 70s or 80s. We questioned them about the story we had heard the day previously in relation to arms. They described to us again the story of how they'd been visited, been given a deadline of noon that day, and after some persuasion agreed to show us the arms they claimed to have purchased.

They took us to a house, to an upstairs room, and they showed us a collection of arms that they were due to hand over to the Serb authorities that day. These arms were in no way hidden. They were in a cupboard. They were not in use. I inspected them. Some of them could have been immediately serviceable, but many were rusted beyond use. There were some hand grenades there which were fully armed, highly rusty, and in a deeply unstable state, and I recommended that these should be handed over as soon as possible.

JUDGE MAY: So we can follow this, they were saying that the Serb authorities or somebody had told them to purchase arms? ²³⁶⁴

THE WITNESS: No, sir. No, Your Honour. They were told that they were to give up arms at a deadline, which was noon that day. They were informed that if they did not, their village would be subject to what they were seeing going on around them.

They claimed that they had no arms in the village. They claimed that they therefore gathered together 10.000 Deutschmarks and went out to purchase arms on the black market.

JUDGE MAY: They did that, as it were, of their own initiative --

THE WITNESS: They did that --

JUDGE MAY: -- having been told --

THE WITNESS: -- because they knew if they did not deliver up arms to the Serbs when they returned, then their village would suffer the same fate as the others.

They described - I have no way of knowing whether this is true - that there was a sort of circular operation. And I -- I'm bound to say, Your Honour, that I do not believe that this means there were not arms being used by the KLA in any of these villages. I can only relate to what I was- informed. They said that the routine was that the Serbs would descend on a village - they described them as Serbs - descend on the village like their own, demand arms against the deadline with the threat that the village would be burnt.

They said that what happened was that they went out and raised the money in the village, purchased the arms on the black market, handed the arms over to the Serb authorities. Those arms then went back onto the black market so that the next villagers had arms to buy. And it was a ²³⁶⁵ circular means of removing the villagers from their money. Now, I have no way of knowing whether that's true, nor does that in any way indicate that there were not other forces of the KLA operating with effective arms in that area. All I can say is that about 30 per cent or 40 per cent of the arms that I saw, which were in no way hidden and prepared to be handed over - indeed, we recommended they should be handed over - could not have been usable and were not used and could not have been usable in somewhat of a deeply unstable state.

Q. Right. Now -- sorry.

A. May I just continue so that the story is absolutely clear? Following that, we sought to get into the area being bombarded by the Serbs and the area of the burning villages. We moved onto the main Suva Reka-to-Prizren road, which is -- Suva Reka-to-Prizren road. May I just -- here we are. And we were stopped almost immediately by a MUP checkpoint, interior police checkpoint, who ordered us to go to Prizren. We did not do that, Your Honour. We decided that it was more important that we should see what was happening at close quarters in this area, and we therefore drove down the road and then turned off before the village of Glinovc, which is here, and by my estimate, made our way across rough tracks to the village of -- around the area of Sopina, which is just here. And this is where we came across a dreadful convoy of refugees - and the video shows what we found - on the back of tractor trailers, sheltering under plastic sheets. A few old men, women, young children, some babes in arms, a mother who was pregnant and due to give birth in the very near future, tumbled together on the back of tractors under the ²³⁶⁶ pouring rain. These were the human tide of refugees that had been pushed out.

Q. Now, we've got the video and we've reached the place --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I wanted to find out from Lord Ashdown: He has said that he had no way of knowing whether this story was true, the story that they went to purchase arms in order to meet the demand from the Serbs for arms. But in the circumstances, did you find it to be credible?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it was consistent with other stories we heard of the same sort, and I'm bound to say I did find that to be credible. Now, I'm not saying that there were not other units operating which were effective, military operations, but there were three factors that made me believe this to be credible.

The first was that these weapons were in no way hidden. They were not weapons that were, as it were, tucked away somewhere where people couldn't find them. They had been gathered together in a cupboard, in a house, in the village.

Secondly, that the weapons themselves were either wrapped in greaseproof paper, i.e., showing no signs of immediately having been used, or indeed rusty beyond use. And that led me to believe that they were indeed weapons that could have been - could have been - passed from hand to hand in the way described by the villagers.

Thirdly, that they were not deployed in any form which would have been -- enabled them to be immediately used. They were not deployed in a military formation or in the hands of people who would have been using it. ²³⁶⁷

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. Was this something you heard only about on this particular occasion that this --

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the speaker, please.

A. Yes. It was a fairly --

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the microphone.

MR. NICE: Sorry. Thank you.

Q. Was this something you heard about only in relation to this particular site, or did you hear about it in respect to any other sites?

A. No. It was a fairly commonly expressed story about what happened in these villages.

Q. Can we go back to the video? Because we've seen a burning house. And where we pick the video up - and we're going to ask them to start it again any second - you're talking about a woman in a street.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. First of all, without running back to it, can you remember where the burning house was? It doesn't much matter in the sense that it's just a burning house. Can you --

A. No, sir. I just can't remember. I saw so many burning houses that day that I can't accurately remember where that was.

Q. Very well. The position where we're going to pick the video up, can you tell us which village or town this was? ²³⁶⁸

A. Well, my -- it's difficult, of course, in a map of such large scale, but my view is that it was in the area of Sopina. We arrived in this village, we saw the convoy at a distance, we came up to it. It was a convoy of women, children, young babies, on the back of tractors. There were some men in attendance, as you can see. And they said that they had been moved out of the other villages; that they had been given a deadline to go; that if they were told if they did not go, they would be subject to bombardment; that they had left their village, they said, as the bombardments began; that they had been driven by these bombardments down the valley towards the village of Sopina; and that they had just received information that this village too was about to be subject to bombardment, and they were trying to flee desperately down the valley to get away from this, and they begged our help to escort them down the valley.

Q. Well, let's play the rest of the video - it's very short - and see what your comments will be. Thank you.

[Videotape played]

MR. NICE:

Q. Does this particular part of it trigger any particular --

A. Yes. I found it very difficult to cope with at the time, but this woman here with the blue shawl is actually sheltering a young child in arms, and you can see the old women and children around there sheltering. It was pouring with rain. I'm talking here to the interpreter, to the people we found. They were desperately frightened. And I found it a deeply terrible sight. I think the rest of the video speaks for itself.

Q. [Microphone not activated] ²³⁶⁹

A. They were absolutely clear, I should say, as indeed the soundtrack on this shows, that they fled the villages because of the bombardment. They described the routine to be that the bombardment -- the threats came first, then the bombardment. Then, as they described it - and other witnesses later on were consistent in their description - after the bombardment, the Serb forces move in. They described them as Serb. Whether they were Serb or Yugoslav army, I do not know. And first looted the houses. The articulated trucks that we had seen were consistent with their story that the houses were systematically looted and the goods taken away in these large articulated trucks, after which parties of soldiers, as they described them, came in and put the houses to fire.

Q. And here, what are we looking at here?

A. This is just another one of four or five trailerloads of desperate people, frightened out of their skins about what was happening, and fleeing from what they thought was an imminent further bombardment.

Q. Well, now, following your visit to that area, including the village of Sopina, did you travel on, I think, the same day to Belgrade?

A. Yes, I did. But first of all, I should explain that we sought to get further into this area. Having seen these refugees to safety, as we thought, we sought to get further into this area and were subsequently stopped a little further on than Sopina by an army checkpoint. They were dressed in blue uniform. I think they were probably MUP, who were highly correct but absolutely insistent that we should leave the area immediately. By this time we were within --

Q. On the grounds -- what grounds did they give -- ²³⁷⁰

A. For our own safety. They said that terrorist operations were taking place and that we had to be escorted from there. They absolutely insisted that we should go. I was keen to press on. I subsequently learnt that probably at about the time we were there in the village of Vranic, which of course is very close -- perhaps I could just identify Vranic again. Vranic is this village here. There was a massacre of civilians taking place almost at the time we were there. However, we had no alternative, not least because of the Albanian interpreters that were with us were at this stage being threatened to leave. So we left through Suva Reka, passing again up the Podgerusa valley and back to Pristina. On the way, Morgan Morris, the head of the UNHCR, took me to a group of 500 or 600 refugees she found in the forests, living in the forests. We actually met up with these people. They had been driven out of their villages in preceding operations. They had been living, they said, for six weeks, hiding in the forests. They had only recently been found, I think just clandestinely, by Morgan Morris, who had supplied them with food. They were all old men, women, and children, and they said they had been living off berries, cherries, at the time of year, for some weeks. I took a bag of cherries from them and told them that I was seeing then-President Milosevic the following day and would deliver them to him.

We returned to Pristina that night and immediately left for Belgrade, because I knew that I had an interview with President Milosevic on the following day. So by around 11.30 that night we were in Belgrade.

Q. I'm going to deal with a report you've prepared of this visit of ²³⁷¹ yours a little later, because it encompasses everything, but I think overnight you and Ambassador Donnelly took some legal advice; is that correct?

A. It is correct. We had -- the Ambassador Donnelly had access to some legal advice, and we described what we both had jointly seen. I should point out that Ambassador Donnelly had gone back to Belgrade the day before, and so he was not with us on the second day. He had been to see then-President Milosevic. President Milosevic had said that none of this action was going on, and he told him that it was. And he got access to legal advice which indicated that what we had seen was clearly in breach of international law and the options of the Geneva Conventions.

Q. You got a copy of a relevant document. As a politician and so on, of course you've had a lot to do with the law, but you're not yourself a lawyer, and therefore you got a copy of a Geneva Convention document, I think.

A. Mr. Nice, I did, and I should point out that it's been quite difficult for me to recall precisely what the document was, which was subsequently suitably marked up and we took with us to see President Milosevic. I've sought from my notes to recover what that document was.

Q. Your best estimate, I think, is that --

MR. NICE: Perhaps we can look at this and produce it as an exhibit. Coming your way in a second.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 75.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Nice, here I'm -- ²³⁷²

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment.

THE REGISTRAR: The videotape will be marked Exhibit 76.

MR. NICE: Thank you very much. If we can lay a copy of this on the ELMO, just to begin with, the overhead projector, just to begin with, so that viewers may see it. And this document, whether it is the precise document or not, but this document is the protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of the 12th of August of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Nice, I wonder if I may interrupt you for a moment. I'm at some embarrassment, Your Honour, because I gave the best evidence I could to Mr. Nice when he was constructing this. I had a look again at my notes overnight. I've always wondered whether or not this was the actual document we referred to when, as I shall subsequently relate, we went to see Mr. Milosevic. But on looking through my notes last night, I am now able with greater certainty to establish what that document was. Indeed, I'm almost certain that I'm now able to tell precisely what the document was. My embarrassment is that it isn't this document.

Q. Very well. Having reviewed -- that's not a problem at all, because we --

A. I have the document with me and I'm happy to produce it.

Q. Well, if you can produce it, we'll have it copied and that will be preferable.

MR. NICE: Perhaps we can withdraw this exhibit, then.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll return this document.

THE WITNESS: I'm bound to say that is my view, although I'm not a ²³⁷³ lawyer, that the document I shall put forward, which I'm now almost certain is the document to which I referred Mr. Milosevic, refers to this document and indeed draws from it, so it's not wholly irrelevant, but --

MR. NICE: May I see it? Because obviously we haven't been in contact at all since last night. May I just see the document myself first so that I can know what it is. Is it something we can print without --

A. It is, in fact, the founding Statute of this Court. Article 8(2)(d) of the Statute of this Court is the one that which I referred to.

Q. Thank you very much.

A. It's on page 3.

Q. Yes, certainly. Well, the document you've produced has got some handwritten annotations on it. Is that annotations you made last night or --

A. It is.

Q. Very well -- and the underlinings are made recently?

A. Those underlinings were made last night and reflect the marked-up document that I know I took to see Mr. Milosevic.

MR. NICE: I think our own Statute doesn't require to be exhibited. May the witness have the document back?

Q. Lord Ashdown, you're now satisfied from further consideration of your contemporaneous records that it was this document that you took with you?

A. Yes.

Q. It's, of course, a document of public record. Which parts of it do you -- ²³⁷⁴

A. Shall I place it on the --

Q. Yes, do place it on the ELMO. You've underlined it in certain places, and if you'll just take us to the parts --

A. The document is --

Q. -- you've underlined.

A. -- the Statute of the International Criminal Court, this court, of July 1998. And although this says it was as amended by 10th of November, 1998, in fact the original passages to which I shall refer are in the original document of July 1998.

Q. Very well. Well, let's have a look at the passages that you had in mind overnight, having taken advice.

A. Having referred to my notes, actually. But Article 8, War Crimes. "For the purpose of this Statute, `war crimes' means: "(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of the 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention." And then it highlights article subparagraph iv.

"Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully or wantonly."

Q. Thank you very much.

JUDGE MAY: It's the International Criminal Court.

MR. NICE: Ah. Sorry.

JUDGE MAY: So it appears from the top.

MR. NICE: In which case then it probably should be produced as an exhibit, and we can deal with that. But I think it would be preferable ²³⁷⁵ for the Chamber to have an unmarked copy as a --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, indeed.

MR. NICE: So we can deal with it.

JUDGE MAY: But for these purposes we can go on as we are.

MR. NICE: Yes.

THE WITNESS: My apologies to the Court for that confusion. It's been -- I'm not a lawyer, and I'm afraid it took me some time to uncover the precise document.

MR. NICE:

Q. Let's turn now to the meeting. Just reminding the Chamber that, of course, you were permitted access to the country and it was known that you were travelling. Would that be correct?

A. Correct.

Q. You --

A. I was also bearing a letter from Mr. Blair --

Q. Yes.

A. -- as indeed I had borne a letter from Mr. Blair to the presidents of Macedonia and of Albania.

Q. Yes. Your meeting with the accused was at the presidential palace in Belgrade. The meeting lasted about how long?

A. About an hour.

Q. The language?

A. The language was in English. We were in the presence of the British ambassador, and as I recall it, a note-taker for Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Did the accused have any -- ^{2376 BLANK PAGE 2377}

THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly make pauses between questions and answer for the interpreters. Thank you.

A. -- very high order.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, you were asked to have a pause between question and answer.

MR. NICE: Sorry. Slow down. I will.

Q. Let's deal then, first of all, with that letter from the Prime Minister. Did you hand that over to the accused at some stage?

A. I did. I think, if I recall, at the start of the meeting.

MR. NICE: Can we produce that, please?

JUDGE MAY: Do you have the date of the meeting for me?

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

Q. The date of the meeting, Lord Ashdown, please?

A. 29th of September.

THE REGISTRAR: This exhibit will be numbered number 75.

MR. NICE: Thank you. And if the usher could stand by the ELMO and move the letter up as I read the text so that viewers may see it.

Q. Dated from the 24th of September to the Prime Minister: "Dear President Milosevic. I wrote to you in June to express my deep personal concern about the situation in Kosovo and to appeal to you to take the necessary steps to work for a peaceful resolution of this difficult problem.

"I have continued to take a close personal interest in developments in Kosovo. I have to say that I have been disturbed and perplexed by the evidence of continuing hostilities and the rapidly ²³⁷⁸ worsening humanitarian crisis. As I said in my previous letter, no one disputes your right to deal with security problems. But the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by your security and armed forces is having an intolerable impact on innocent civilians who are being forced to flee their homes and whose livelihoods are being destroyed. The prospect of tens of thousands of people facing the winter without proper shelter is one which the international community cannot ignore. "The Resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 23 September underlines the deep international concern at the impending humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and the lack of progress towards a political solution. What is required is an immediate end to the current violence and rapid action to address the humanitarian situation. Above all, there must be speedy progress on a political dialogue, since only by resolving the core problem of the status of Kosovo can there be a lasting solution to the humanitarian problem.

"I am sending this message with Paddy Ashdown. I know that he shares my concerns, and will wish to discuss these issues with you following his visit to the region. I reiterate that Britain and our Contact Group and EU Partners stand ready to work with you in the search for a peaceful resolution. But the present situation is intolerable and cannot be allowed to continue.

"Yours sincerely, Tony Blair." You handed that letter over. Can you recall one way or another whether the letter was perused and apparently read by the accused at the time or not? ²³⁷⁹

A. I think the accused, as I recall it, and it is difficult to recall this four years later or so, but the accused, if I recall, looked at the letter, read it, and I -- read it quickly but read it, in my view, in detail.

Q. Now, the meeting lasted an hour, and we want it, I'm afraid, very much in summary form because that's all we require. Did you give the accused an account of what you'd seen on the previous day?

A. I did.

Q. How did you describe it, in the most general terms, to him?

A. I said to him that what I had witnessed could only be described as the actions of the main battle units of the Yugoslav army in an action which could only be described as indiscriminate, punitive, designed to drive innocent civilians out of their properties, could not be explained by any targeting military operation, that this was, in my view, not only illegal under international law, damaging to the representation of the Serbs and his nation, but also deeply counter-productive.

Q. What was his response to the account of things that you said you'd seen?

A. He first of all denied that these things were going on and said that they were not happening, and I informed him that they were because I was there on the previous day and saw them with my own eyes.

Q. Did he give any alternative explanation to things you'd seen on the basis that what you'd seen may have been accurate?

A. No. He said that in that case, he conceded that they may indeed ²³⁸⁰ have been going on but that they were the responsible -- they were the actions of forces beyond his control and that he would take steps to put a stop to them immediately and bring those responsible for any breaches of international law to account.

Q. Now, you had a document, and you believe it to be the document -- or a version of the document that you've produced this morning. How did you deal with that, and how did you deal with the issues of law upon which you'd been advised overnight along with Ambassador Donnelly?

A. Here again, I have to tell the Court that there is a slight difference of view here. It is my clear recollection and indeed was noted in my diary afterwards that having specifically pointed to the Geneva Convention, having specifically, as I recall it, referred to the paragraphs I have shown to the Court, I left the document with Mr. Milosevic.

I have subsequently checked the recollections of Ambassador Brian Donnelly, who was present. He remembers me doing the first of those two things, that is, specifically referring to the Geneva Conventions and specifically referring to the passages that I have shown the Court, but he does not recollect me leaving the document there.

Q. Did you, in the event, find yourself, as you recall it, still in possession of the document you'd taken?

A. I was in a very hurried programme. I do not -- I cannot recall having possession of the document, and I cannot recall leaving with that document. I certainly haven't found it since, but that does not necessarily mean that the only solution is I left it behind in the office ²³⁸¹ of Mr. Milosevic. But that is my clear recollection, and that's what I put in my diary, dictated about 90 minutes after this meeting. I should point out --

Q. What -- sorry, yes.

A. I should point out if I may, Mr. Nice, that Mr. Milosevic said to me in response to my description, as I recall the conversation, that what was happening was consistent with actions against terrorists and that his state had a right to act against terrorists. I said I accepted that right, that this was, however, not actions against terrorism. Mr. Milosevic said to me I knew nothing about terrorism, and I told him that I had indeed fought in four terrorist campaigns, had lost good friends to terrorists, and I knew that the kind of actions he was taking would not destroy terrorism. They would only create more terrorism.

Q. Can you remember any -- I'm sorry. I'm probably going too fast. Can you remember any particular exchange or -- yes, exchange with the accused about the Geneva Conventions or anything of that sort?

A. Yes. I recall specifically saying that the actions that he was taking were, in my view, clearly in breach of the Geneva Convention. As I have explained to the Court, I identified the passages of the Geneva Convention to which we have already referred. And I told him that in my view, if he were to continue with these operations, he would make himself indictable for war crimes because he was personally responsible for any further continuation after this meeting.

Q. You told us how on the previous day, when you visited the forest, you had made a promise to the people there about what you conveyed to ²³⁸² their president. How did you deal with that?

A. I have to say, and I somewhat regret it since, that I did not deliver -- I took the bag of cherries with me, but I did not deliver it to Mr. Milosevic. I believed at this stage that it would be an act of rudeness, but I did draw his attention to the condition of the refugees. I said I found it disgraceful that the president of a country could treat its citizens of whatever their ethnic origin, women, children, old men, in such a fashion. I told him that in my view, there was, as the winter approached, an impending humanitarian catastrophe of massive proportions. Mr. Milosevic told me that he thought the number of refugees in the woods was of a very small number. I said in my view there were probably, by the UNHCR's best calculations, some 20.000 people living in the woods and forests of Kosovo in similar conditions to those which I had seen and that any impending humanitarian catastrophe, if these people were not fed and housed, would --

Q. The last --

A. -- would --

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, let the interpreters finish. Yes.

MR. NICE: I may have cut you off.

A. Would inevitably fall to his responsibility.

Q. Two more things about the meeting. What, if anything, was said about the possibility of intervention by force by the international community?

A. I said, in more blunt terms than I think is strongly hinted at in Mr. Blair's letter, that if these gross, flagrant breaches of ²³⁸³ international law continued, the international community would be left with no option but to seek to intervene. And if Mr., then-President, Milosevic, were to underestimate the gravity of the situation or the determination of the international community to ensure that international law was upheld, then he would be making a very grave miscalculation.

Q. You made a note of this meeting, of course, in your diary, and it may be that it will be a good idea just to have this extract produced. I don't know if we've got copies of it. If we have, I'll ask that it be produced.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't think I've got enough copies of it in the form I think will be most valuable.

THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please speak into the microphone, please, for the interpreters.

MR. NICE: -- but --

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, could you speak close to the microphone.

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

Q. I'll produce that over the break at the very latest, but you have, I think, from your diary produced a little passage that is your best recollection at the time of how you really ended the meeting with the president; is that right?

A. Mr. Nice, I do have that. I can spend some time looking it up, but it might be most helpful if I could use the one you have available. I can, however, summarise it very simply to the Court.

Q. I think it would be better if we had the words as you best ²³⁸⁴ recorded at the time.

A. Could I then just make it clear that, as is made clear in the preface of my diaries, I do not pretend that these are verbatim. I merely say they are reconstructions of the conversation as best as I could produce it as I recall. My diary was recorded on the plane back, that is, 90 minutes after the end of the meeting. So although I cannot vouchsafe that these are perfectly the word-for-word statement that I used when I finished my meeting with Mr. Milosevic, it is, I believe, a very close reconstruction of that.

"Concluded the meeting by saying, 'Mr. President, you have been generous with your time, and if I may say so, also in allowing me to come to your country. I shall have some harsh words to say about what I have seen but I like the Serb people and I do not believe that you can condemn a nation. I must tell you, however, that the international community will act if you do not stop. You are, in my view, employing a policy that is entirely counter-productive and allowing the good name of the Serb people to be dragged down. I beg you to put a stop to this action which besmirches the representation of your country.'" I also made it clear to Mr. Milosevic that he was personally responsible for any further continuation of these policies and that that could lead ultimately to his indictment before this Court.

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 77.

MR. NICE: May we now please look at, as the next exhibit, your report or, to be precise, an extract from the report you made in respect of this visit. ²³⁸⁵

THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 78.

THE WITNESS: Perhaps it would be helpful, Mr. Nice, if I were to point out that this extract is merely the extract published in my book and that the editing of this was simply to take out extraneous matter which was regarded by the editors as being boring.

MR. NICE:

Q. So the current -- thank you for that. So the current situation is -- it's on the -- yes.

"While I was there, the Yugoslav army was ending its operation in the Drenice area and shifting it to the Suva Reka region, south-east of Pristina. President Milosevic told me that the operations had ended. I told him this was not so as I had seen myself. However, since the main Yugoslav objectives have now been achieved, I anticipate that Yugoslav operations will end very shortly and their main units will return to barracks, so as to give no pretext for NATO action ..." That was your judgement at the time, was it?

A. It was.

Q. Then under the heading "What we should do: Military action." Your report suggested that: "Troops on the ground in this phase would not, I believe, be militarily possible."

A. Indeed this was, because that was a discussion much -- currently going on in public and in private, and I believed that it was not a viable option at this stage.

Q. "Though they will be needed to guarantee a cease-fire and oversee the transitional phase that Hill," that's Ambassador Hill, "envisages." ²³⁸⁶ Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. "With the weather closing in and the Yugoslav troops returning to the barracks having achieved their objectives, it's almost too late to use air power, too. However, the air power option should be maintained on a `hair trigger' and used if Milosevic does not stop his current operations and returns to the use of excessive force. In due course this is bound to happen."

JUDGE ROBINSON: What was bound to happen?

THE WITNESS: My calculation was that the actions taken by the Yugoslav forces were bound to produce a stronger, more aggressive KLA, but contrary to what Mr. Milosevic claimed, the KLA would come back in greater force and determined to exact revenge. In other words, that -- as I say, that they were likely to re-occupy ground that they had been driven from by the Yugoslav army. And my calculation was, I regret, that this would provoke again Mr. Milosevic into the use of excessive force. In other words, that we were bound to get to a position where that would happen.

MR. NICE:

Q. And indeed you set that out in the next sentence.

A. And indeed it is what happened.

Q. Yes. "The KLA have not gone away, are likely to re-occupy the ground they have lost and will certainly return to (more effective) aggressive action.

"Urgent and unfettered access must be provided for accredited UN ²³⁸⁷ aid agencies and diplomatic observers to all refugee or internationally displaced persons sites. I was stopped by Serb police, in the company of UNHCR and a British Embassy diplomatic representative, from accessing a reported 18.000 IDPs in the middle of a battle zone `For our own safety'." Pausing there, that's the incident you described to us this morning?

A. It is.

Q. "This cannot be allowed to continue. The humanitarian drive should be to get people back to their homes as quickly as possible, after which large scale resources will be required to make these habitable and to heat them. Since, in most of Western Kosovo, the crops have not been harvested and the Serbs have been deliberately targeting grain supplies, it is likely that food will also be a problem through the winter. "The Hill plan," can you --

A. This was --

Q. -- remind us?

A. This was the plan currently being discussed by Ambassador Hill to bring a space for a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis. And as you will see, I specifically recommend that that is the best way forward rather than military action, that we should pursue that plan.

Q. Saying in this paragraph that: "The Hill plan offers the only realistic proposal on the table. It will need some adjustment to take a more intermediate position between the Serbs and the Albanians. But it should be supported. There is not time to `do a Dayton' where the West held the ring while the protagonists <sup>2388</sup> produced their own solution. This time, the West must put its own plan on the table together with appropriate sticks and carrots to encourage acceptance from both sides. This needs to be based around a cease-fire, an interim period, greater autonomy for Kosovo, along the lines of a `third republic' and a strong and enforceable framework to protect minority rights (in this case, those of the Serb population in Kosovo). We should not exclude outright independence for Kosovo as a long-term aim, even if we cannot yet foresee circumstances when it would be wise or safe to achieve it."

I'm not going to ask you to expand on the opinions there. Others may. But does that collection of opinions represent what you felt as a result of what you had seen?

A. It does.

Q. You went on to conclude on this, and shortly, on the following page:

"But Kosovo is not a Yugoslav problem. It is a regional one and will need a regional solution. There will be no point in stabilising Kosovo if, in particular, Albania, but also Macedonia, remain in such a precarious state. Action to support the present Albanian government against the mischief of Berisha is important -- "

A. Sali Berisha.

Q. " -- especially to enable Tirana to regain effective control of the border area of Tropoje, which is, at once, Berisha's home and the area through which the main route for arms to the KLA pass. Regaining control of this area would diminish the power of Berisha and give us real leverage ²³⁸⁹ over the KLA."

Of course, these topics you touched on yesterday --

A. Indeed.

Q. -- Macedonia's vulnerability --

A. Indeed.

Q. -- the area of lawlessness and the passage of arms.

A. Indeed.

Q. Your report, so far as the extract is concerned, concludes: "The Hague trials have had a profound effect on senior Serbs. If it is now too late to use military sanctions against the Serbs for their latest actions, then the British should ask the International Court to investigate the recent Serb operations in Drenica and Suva Reka and, if appropriate, take action against any guilty parties. I believe that this would have a profound effect, both on local military commanders and on their political directors in Belgrade and could make them think twice about doing it again."

The last point of the evidence that I want --

[Technical difficulty]

[Microphone not activated]

MR. NICE:

Q. -- is your follow-up visit on the 12th, and between the 12th and the 17th of December of 1998. On that visit, did you go to some of the villages that you had seen being attacked earlier on the occasion when we see you with binoculars looking down from the hill?

A. I did. I paid in particular -- I wanted in particular to see the ²³⁹⁰ village of Vranic, which I referred to earlier, and the site of the alleged massacre there. I visited, I think, probably three or four of the villages I had seen under bombardment.

Q. What was your impression of the damage done? How did it compare with what you had expected?

A. Well, I had expected to see whole villages burnt down. That's what I had seen previously. And indeed, if you've seen the video, you'll see why I believed that was what I was likely to see. What I discovered, however, was that although there was extensive damage to a large number of properties - it's been estimated that in some of those villages up to 50 or 70 per cent of the houses were fired - in fact, it was individual houses which had been deliberately fired by the troops who had moved in, and these houses, I was told, were those which had been earlier earmarked as houses where there were either KLA sympathisers or people who the Yugoslav government believed should suffer reprisals. The houses themselves, however, had been deliberately fired, and the evidence of indiscriminate shell fire, which I had seen, whose purpose could only have been to drive out the population, was also evident.

Q. Just yes or no to this, please, Lord Ashdown. I think you also had a visit on one of the days, I think Thursday, the 17th, probably, with Miroslav Sainovic?

A. Nikola Sainovic. I think there's a mistake there.

Q. Yes. Nikola Sainovic. Thank you. The mistake was indeed in the original document. Thank you for the correction. He then being the Deputy Prime Minister? ²³⁹¹

A. That's correct.

Q. You formed a view of him, which you've set out in your statement?

A. I'll need to be reminded of what I said in my statement.

Q. I'm not going to take you through it. I'm just observing that it's there for others to ask you about it if they wish to.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, subject to producing a full version of the witness's diary entry for the meeting with the accused, which is on its way down, as a exhibit, that's all I ask of the witness. Thank you.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] Do you think that everyone who is responsible for war crimes --

A. I wonder if I could have the translation of that again. I was on the French at the time.

Q. Do you think everyone who is responsible for war crimes -- do you think that everyone who is responsible for war crimes should be held responsible?

A. That's a matter for the courts. I am against war crimes and I believe that all those who are responsible should be subject to investigation and, if the courts believe appropriate, to the Court procedures.

Q. Everywhere in the world or only in Yugoslavia?

A. There is a legal statute that requires everybody who has signed up to those legal statutes and international law to be subject to those tribunals and investigations. ²³⁹²

Q. I'm asking you about your opinion. I'm not asking you for a legal interpretation; I'm asking you about your views on this. You're a politician, a diplomat, a military man, according to your curriculum vitae. So do you think that those who committed war crimes should be held responsible?

A. That's exactly what I've said. The answer is yes.

Q. Yes. Everywhere in the world or only in Yugoslavia?

A. Everywhere in the world. The statutes are international and they should be enacted.

Q. And what do you think? Why are people not being held accountable for war crimes except for Yugoslavia? What are the reasons for that?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I'm not here to speculate upon the reasons for that. You and I may have opinions. I'm here to give evidence about a particular series of events, which I presented to this Court. You and I can have a long, extensive political discussion about this, but this does not seem to me to be the appropriate time for that. I have presented evidence to this Court about specific events which occurred during the periods that I have referred to. I'm happy -- I'm happy to --

Q. I understand what you are saying, but could you please just answer my questions.

JUDGE MAY: No. The witness is right. He's come here to give evidence, not to proffer opinions. Now, ask him about that.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what I'm asking him about. He explained here that he had a conversation with me about all issues, even the Geneva Conventions and the Second Protocol. These are the most ²³⁹³ general of issues. So I'm asking him about that.

JUDGE MAY: Ask him about the conversation. That's what's relevant in this case.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware of the war crimes of your country committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, together with the crimes --

JUDGE MAY: That is a total irrelevance. It's not what he's giving evidence about.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He represents a country that took part in the war against Yugoslavia. I'm asking this witness, who is a politician from that country, whether he is aware of the war crimes committed by his country against Yugoslavia. Are you forbidding me to put such a question?

JUDGE MAY: He is not here as a representative of any country; he's a witness giving evidence about what he saw and heard, including a conversation with you. Now, if you want to suggest he's biased in some way, of course you can, but you've got to put the grounds for it.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You spoke about the Geneva Convention, about the Second Protocol. You mentioned that now, during your testimony. Do you believe that the aggression against Yugoslavia constituted a violation of the UN Charter?

A. Mr. Milosevic, if you're asking me for an opinion, I'll give you one, but it is wholly irrelevant to the information I have provided here today. I'm ready to be questioned on that information about a specific incident and a series of incidents, and I look forward to hearing your ²³⁹⁴ questions on those incidents, which perhaps you'll come to in a moment. My opinions are completely irrelevant. Now, if you want my opinion to your question, the answer is no.

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. One moment, Mr. Milosevic.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: We've been considering this. The question you ask is wholly irrelevant. Now, what may be relevant is your case that there was aggression against Yugoslavia by the KLA. Now, about that, the witness may be able to help, so you can ask him about that, but his general opinions as a politician or as an individual are irrelevant to this Tribunal.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As concerns the NATO aggression, that the entire world is aware of, that is irrelevant for you; did I understand you correctly?

JUDGE MAY: You can ask this witness if he knows anything about the NATO aggression, if he can give any evidence about it; not about his opinions, which are irrelevant, but you can ask him if he knows anything about it, the NATO aggression, as alleged by you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for this suggestion. That is precisely how I'm going to put it to the witness.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know anything about the NATO aggression that was carried out against Yugoslavia on the 24th of March, 1999?

A. Mr. Milosevic, the evidence I've given before this Court took place before that date and is therefore -- that event is wholly ²³⁹⁵ irrelevant, I would put it to you, to the evidence I have presented. This took place six months before that took place. Furthermore, I think it's worth pointing out that the estimates are that in this period, long before the NATO aggression, more than 300.000 Albanians had been driven from their homes by the action of your troops. So these were entirely the responsibility of you, of your troops, or perhaps of some other reasons that you may be identifiable -- that it may be able to identify. They are nothing to do with the NATO aggression. Indeed, if I may remind you, the very purpose of my visit was to seek to persuade you to take action which would have prevented that intervention. I said to you, in specific terms, that if you went on acting in this fashion, you would make it inevitable that the international community would have to act, and in the end they did have to act. And I warned you that if you took those steps and went on doing this, you would end up in this Court, and here you are.

Q. Very well. Very well. This is the question that we are going to explain right now. But could the witness please answer my questions rather than make speeches.

JUDGE MAY: He's dealt with it. Now, move on to another topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Later on you are going to say that I have used up the time that was used up by this witness, as you usually do. That's why I'm saying this. Otherwise, as far as speeches are concerned, he can make as many as he wants.

JUDGE MAY: We would all get on much more quickly if you asked short questions. If the witness is too long in his answers, we will tell him. ^{2396 BLANK PAGE 2397}

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] All right.

Q. So let us just briefly go through this. You believe that the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia did not violate the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've already ruled that as irrelevant. Now, go on to another topic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, I'm going to continue along the lines of your speech, that this action against terrorism caused an escalation. Are you aware that until the end of 1997, it was quite calm and peaceful in Kosovo, until before the end of 1997, that is to say, for a total of ten years? Are you aware of that?

A. I am aware that although, as I recall this period, and I can't pretend to be an expert on it, but as I recall this period, the province of Kosovo, the Kosovo area, was relatively calm and peaceful, but behind that there was what many regarded, certainly Kosovar Albanians regarded, as a long campaign of discrimination against their nation.

Q. This, for instance, is an example of a question that can be answered by a simple yes or no, without going into big explanations. Are you aware that until before the end of 1997, it was peaceful in Kosovo? Yes or no. So could you please save up time as much as possible. Because you are the one who is opposing a discussion. As far as I'm concerned, I can engage in a discussion, but as you can see --

JUDGE MAY: Let's not have a commentary. Lord Ashdown, the question is simply: Were things calm, leaving ²³⁹⁸ aside discrimination or anything of that sort, to your knowledge.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware that in October 1997, at Crete, a Summit conference was held of the south-eastern European countries, a Summit conference, including Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, at which an exceptionally high degree of understanding was reached with regard to mutual cooperation, including the establishment of proper cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, and the statement of then-Prime Minister of Albania Fatos Nano, that the problems of Kosovo are the internal affair of Yugoslavia? Are you familiar with that and do you remember that, as a politician who has been following events in the former Yugoslavia? October 1997, the Summit in Crete: A high degree of understanding, similarity of views, statement by the Albania Prime Minister, my statement before the cameras, Nano's statement before the cameras, Kosovo being an internal affair of our country.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... the question.

A. The answer, Mr. Milosevic, is no. But then I've never denied, neither did the British government, nor did I, in any of the visits that I've made, that the responsibility, the sovereignty, of Kosovo lay with the Yugoslav government.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I am putting this question to you because I would like to give an introduction to the time that you say you have been assessing here and now. Are you aware that at that point in time, and after ten years of ²³⁹⁹ peace and prospects for a large-scale cooperation, that after about a month or two, after that Summit, that is, an initiative was launched by the German diplomacy Kinkel Vadrin - they wrote a letter expressing their concern about Kosovo - and, at the same time, actions taken by the BND and the other services in order to instigate, organise, train, and establish terrorism in Kosovo under the guise of this so-called KLA? Are you aware of that?

A. No.

Q. No.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please be so kind as to show this? You'll see. I have this here. It has explanations in the English language. This is a survey of terrorist attacks in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, dated January 1991 to the 20th of June, 1999. You will see what this looks like.

Let me just make a few notes in this regard. During all these years - the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, even the seventh year - involved terrorist attacks against policemen or buildings are in the single digits, or double digits at the most. However, after the seventh year, the number sky-rocketed to 1.865, as a consequence of what I've been saying, and in 1999 it went down as a consequence of the extinction of the KLA. But --

JUDGE MAY: Let us see this document. Yes. Let it be put on the ELMO.

But Mr. Milosevic, you could tell us where you got it from, where those figures come from. ²⁴⁰⁰

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These are official figures that were published every year. I can give you the exact source.

JUDGE MAY: Who by?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By the Yugoslav government, official figures, the government of Serbia.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Please take a look at this.

A. I'll need my screen on. For some reason or another, it seems to have gone off. No, it doesn't appear. I can read it here, though.

Q. Yes. As you can see, all the way up to 1998 -- at the end of 1997 it went up a little bit, but that is nothing compared to the action that was coordinated because the Crete Summit sounded an alarm for all of those who wanted to destabilise Yugoslavia. All of a sudden, in 1998, there was this immense terrorist activity launched. And, as you can see, I have here another one that can perhaps give a better explanation of all of it. Terrorist attacks against citizens belonging to the Albanian national minority that were launched by members of the so-called KLA. In 1991, 1992, 1993, there aren't any; two in 1994; four in 1995; two in 1996; and towards the end of 1997 it went up to 13; but in 1998, 327 Albanians were attacked; and in 1999, of course, again it went down because the KLA was neutralised.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please show both. Please show both. You can see here both, both the charts and also the consequences involved.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness see this. ²⁴⁰¹

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what the question is, Your Honour.

JUDGE MAY: We're waiting for the question. Would you look at those two documents, please.

Now, Mr. Milosevic, the witness has seen the documents. What is the question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Is the witness aware of anything related to external activities? I mentioned in this sense Kinkel's letter, and, along parallel lines, the activity of the BND in order to render support to these terrorist activities. So do you know anything about these activities coming from the outside in order to destabilise Kosovo and thereby Serbia and Yugoslavia as well?

A. Beyond that which has been given in my evidence, no, by which I mean, of course, Your Honour, the evidence that I provided. Indeed, I've provided the evidence to this Court as well, if it wants to use this at some future time in similar trials, for instance, against those who perpetrated these actions against the Yugoslav government and Yugoslav and Serbian citizens, that there was KLA activity, that there was external support through the northern areas of Albania. Indeed, I made recommendations as to means to put that to an end. But beyond that, I have no knowledge of the sort that Mr. Milosevic is asking me.

Q. All right. And why was it necessary, then - I'm getting to what you've been saying - to establish the structure and the way in which the KLA functioned? You spoke of your visit to Albania, when it was a well-known fact that these were terrorists, that this was a terrorist ²⁴⁰² organisation.

A. Mr. Milosevic, I never denied that it was a terrorist organisation. I've never in any sense sought to excuse the suffering, the pain, the murder of innocent Serbs or Serb civilians by this organisation. I took steps, indeed, to make recommendations as to how that could be ended. I have never denied, either in my evidence or, so far as I know, in any other speeches or articles that I've written, that there was KLA activity, that innocent Serbs were suffering. But none of this, none of it, justifies or excuses the use of excessive, outrageous force by your armed forces, under your control, in an indiscriminate, punitive manner, across the whole of the civilian population, in direct --

Q. You've already said that.

A. -- contravention of international law. So you can prove this --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Lord Ashdown, you have said that.

THE WITNESS: My apologies.

JUDGE MAY: One more question, Mr. Milosevic, and then it's time to adjourn.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. This question that you've just answered when you said that you never denied that this was a terrorist organisation, I can tell you that you are the first person sitting in that chair who said during these proceedings that he does not deny that the KLA was a terrorist organisation. Everybody before you denied that.

JUDGE MAY: That's a matter of comment, and on which note we will adjourn. We will return those documents. Mr. Milosevic, if you want to ²⁴⁰³ produce those figures, you can do so in due course and they will be exhibited as part of your case. Meanwhile, they will be returned to you. Could you be back, please, Lord Ashdown, at half past 11.00.

--- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. We saw on the previous graph in 1998 a figure of over 1.800 terrorist attacks. Does that figure seem to you be frightening and alarming?

A. Mr. Milosevic, any single terrorist attack is frightening and alarming. Having been the subject of them myself, I'm only too aware of that. My case is simple, that none of these facts that you present to the Court, and I can't vouch for the accuracy or inaccuracy of the figures you have presented to us, though I note that you claim a decline in 1999 was a significant fact. I think the significant fact was that things were so bad at that stage that NATO was forced to intervene, and you presumably were not --

JUDGE MAY: Lord Ashdown, I think we've said that's all irrelevant.

THE WITNESS: The point is that these figures, accurate or inaccurate, do not justify the actions that I saw on that day. I wonder if I may, Mr. Milosevic, direct you -- return you to the conversation you and I had on the 29th of September, 1998, in which I reminded you that in Northern Ireland, we in Britain had fought a campaign ²⁴⁰⁴ against terrorists, in which I was personally involved, for 30 years. I dare say the figures of terrorist attacks, the numbers killed, the extent of terrorist actions, was even greater than those you now present to us, but the British government has never used tanks, artillery, looting, burning, driving people away from their homes. And if we had, we would be before this Court; and because you did, you are.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You, therefore, consider that we in Yugoslavia perpetrated crimes and that you didn't anywhere.

JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter about anything that the British government may or may not have done in Northern Ireland. What matters is what happened in Yugoslavia.

Perhaps you could deal with that part of it, Lord Ashdown.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the witness mentioned Northern Ireland.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, but it wasn't relevant.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And it is common knowledge -- actually, the event is well known. It was called the Bloody Sunday incident.

JUDGE MAY: We're not concerned with that. Now, the witness can deal with Yugoslavia.

THE WITNESS: I merely drew the comparison as to whether or not the actions of the Serb forces were justified on these days. None, it seems to me, of the information Mr. Milosevic has presented to us so far justifies actions which were in gross breach of international law. ²⁴⁰⁵

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And did you during your stay and trip, which was designed to inform you of the situation in the field, were you at all interested in the facts and figures with respect to the victims of terrorist activities? Were you interested in that?

A. Yes. As I've given evidence, I went to view an alleged site of executions of Serb citizens, as I understand, by terrorist forces. I collected that information. I've put that information before this Court, and I stand ready to make sure that that information is used in this Court against the perpetrators of those crimes too.

Q. You witnessed one event, as far as I was able to gather from your testimony. There were seven or eight bodies, as you yourself said. It was in the village of Gllogjani, which is where the execution took place over large -- over many people. There were 39 bodies, in fact, 39 corpses. Did you happen to see that?

A. I didn't see any of the corpses, as my evidence made clear. I saw the area after those bodies had been removed. Who perpetrated those actions, how many corpses, how many people were killed, I do not know. The evidence that I have indicates that this was an execution. It was, therefore, a crime. The evidence I have is presented to this Court. But none of that justifies the actions of your forces which I have described to this Court.

Q. And did you have information at the time, amongst the other information that you had with respect to victims and casualties, information and facts and figures about the fact that the terrorists ²⁴⁰⁶ killed Albanians, too?

A. I was aware of that claim. I cannot either substantiate nor reject it. But again, none of that justifies the actions I saw your forces taking on that day.

Q. Well, you've already said that, around your position is clear on that point as to the explanations and justification for the NATO aggression. What I'm asking you is: Did you ever ask yourselves why they were killing Albanians civilians and policemen?

A. Of course I asked myself that question, but none of that is relevant to the facts I presented to this Court, which is that -- irrelevant. It is not relevant as to what the provocation was. The actions your forces took on that day were illegal under international law.

Q. All right. A moment ago, you said that what was relevant or what was irrelevant is something that the courts should ascertain. That is what you declared a moment ago. So I assume that you wish to be consistent in your position there on that point.

JUDGE MAY: There's no need to answer that. What's the next question?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware of the fact that at that particular time, precisely when you were there in 1998, when you were visiting Kosovo, that in many villages a police force was set up, made up of the Albanians themselves, a local police force made up of local policemen, and these policemen were elected by the inhabitants of the villages for these people to be able to ²⁴⁰⁷ see to law and order in the village, and the state provided them with uniforms and with weapons, but they were selected and elected by the Albanians themselves in those villages to do the kind of things that the normal police force does? Are you aware of that?

A. I was aware that that was going on, but I don't see how that justifies the actions taken by your forces.

Q. You met - and you spoke about this a moment ago - Christopher Hill, and I know full well that he was abreast of the broad drive to set up this local police force in the Albanian villages. Did he speak to you about that?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that the terrorists of the KLA very frequently targeted the local Albanian policemen and that many of those local policemen were either killed by them or wounded?

A. I know that many innocent people suffered on both sides. I know that there were claims and evidence of terrorist activity against both Albanians and Serbs. Nothing that I say here excuses that. But that is completely irrelevant, it seems to me, to the central question, which is that the actions taken by your forces on this day were contrary to international law, irrespective of what actions had been taken by the terrorists beforehand, that you were responsible for that and that you did not take the steps necessary to stop that.

Q. Mr. Ashdown, you have repeated that several times, and I see no reason for you to repeat it in each of your answers.

A. Mr. Milosevic, if I may suggest to you, it is the central point. ²⁴⁰⁸ Whatever happened -- and I am not able to confirm or deny your conspiracy theories or, indeed, such facts as you have that you can prove, but the central question is this: Did any of these actions that you claim happened or that did happen justify your forces taking indiscriminate, excessive action against civilians in the way that you did, contrary to international law? My judgement on that matter - ultimately, that's for the Court to decide - is that they did not.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Lord Ashdown, you've made the point. There's no need to repeat it. And as you rightly say, it's going to be a matter for the Court to determine that or not.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. We'll come to that question of international law in due course. I am talking about the legitimate right of a state to fight against terrorism, and you are questioning that right.

JUDGE MAY: No. He -- Lord Ashdown, there's no need to reply.

He has made the point that the use of force was excessive. Now, that is the point that he's made.

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may, I most explicitly said before, during -- during my meeting with Mr. Milosevic and afterwards, that I did not question the right of the Yugoslav forces to take such action as was consistent with international law to control the threat of terrorism. I have never denied that. Indeed, I explicitly made that right clear and my support for that right to Mr. Milosevic during our meeting. ²⁴⁰⁹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Where's the problem, then?

JUDGE MAY: What does the question mean?

A. Mr. Milosevic --

JUDGE MAY: What do you mean, Mr. Milosevic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the witness says that he doesn't question the right of a state to fight against terrorism. The state in this case did fight against terrorism, and in those battles against the terrorists, of course, and necessarily the citizens who happened to be in the area contained in the conflict fled from those conflicts. Therefore, where is the problem? And it is, of course, quite clear that the state took care of those refugees. It fed them, it assisted them, it returned them --

JUDGE MAY: One thing at a time. Lord Ashdown, what is put to you is that this was a fight against terrorism, and the citizens who happened to be in the area of the conflict fled. Now, in relation to what you saw in Kosovo and what you saw in the various villages which you've described, is that a fair description of what was happening or not?

THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. What is a fair description of what was happening is that excessive force was used, with the deliberate aim of a policy of scorched earth, with the intention of driving innocent civilians indiscriminately from their villages, burning their houses, destroying their means of livelihood and looting their property, all of which is illegal under international law, as I understand it. ²⁴¹⁰

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And on what basis do you conclude that it was the intention of the authorities to exert pressure or commit crimes against the innocent population? Why would anybody do that?

A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, I can only present the evidence that I have. The refugees told me that they were fleeing from the bombardment of your forces. I have no reason to doubt that. It may be that you will claim that in the operations that I saw, it was necessary and part of a targeted military operation to shoot cattle, to burn houses, to break up the individual stoves in those houses, to urinate on or otherwise destroy seed corn, that all of these were part of a targeted campaign. That is for you to prove to this Court. I have to say to you that the most likely evidence - indeed, I would have said to any rational person the only conclusion you can draw from those actions - is that they were part of a campaign of indiscriminate terror operated against a civilian population as a punitive attempt to drive them from their houses, in ways which have not been seen as perpetrated by a government since the days of the German occupations, and that those are illegal, as is explicitly stated under the terms of the Geneva Convention which I have quoted.

Q. This does not refer to what you are claiming, but we'll get to that in due course.

Do you know anything about the activities of the Government of Serbia and Yugoslavia to assist those refugees?

A. I know a little about it. I also know that I saw many hundreds and believe there to have been many thousands of refugees who were so ²⁴¹¹ unconvinced by that activity that they would prefer to have lived for weeks, some claim months, in the forests off what they could gather. They were so frightened of your forces that they put themselves under pathetic forms of camouflage and lived under conditions of extreme privation because they believed that that was the only and safest option open to them to survive.

I know the testimony of a woman that I found amongst others, 500 or 600 others from a village, in the forests on the day that I referred to, who when I asked her whether she would return to her village in the forthcoming bitter winter of Kosovo said that she would rather die in those forests of cold and starvation with her children than to submit herself again to what you claim is the care of your government.

Q. I still claim that in the forests, apart from brief periods, there were not many refugees. I still claim that, that there weren't many. Do you know that when the citizens fled from the conflict area they usually went to villages where they had family or cousins, or other cities where there were no terrorists activities? They didn't wander around the forests, as you claim, for days and weeks.

A. Mr. Milosevic, I know certainly that some did that. Indeed, I referred to that in my testimony. But there were many hundreds. I saw, as I said, a very considerable number who preferred, nevertheless, to remain hidden from your forces, from your government that you claim was prepared to care for them, and were prepared, as they described to me, to die there than to return to the care of your forces and your government. Now, I think you must reflect on whether or not that belief was ²⁴¹² justified.

Q. You claimed that there were 20.000 of them, 20.000 who had fled from the effects of those activities. A moment ago, you said that there were even 300.000. Where do you come to this astonishing figure? Who gave you that astonishing figure of 300.000?

A. Mr. Milosevic, you may have misunderstood or wanted to misunderstand. I said I saw of the order of 300 - not 300.000, 300 - in the particular forest which I visited. Not 300.000, 300. I was told, on the calculation of UNHCR, who I believe probably had a more accurate judgement of the total numbers, that in their views, there were up to 20.000 either living in the forests - of which the 300 individuals that I saw were obviously a very tiny proportion - who were either living in the forests or in the forthcoming winter would be at jeopardy for their lives as a result of the conditions which your forces brought about in Kosovo.

Q. That was our -- do you know that in the autumn of 1998, to all practical terms the KLA had been defeated, that they returned weapons and that all the refugees returned to their homes and that the state helped by giving construction material and money for them to be able to rebuild their houses, the houses which had been damaged or destroyed during the terrorist activities? Are you aware of that fact?

A. I am aware from a return visit that I made in December that as a result, I must say, of the enactment of the Hill proposals there was a brief ceasefire and that during that ceasefire the KLA intensified their operations, just as I told you they would as a result of what you did, ²⁴¹³ that there was some return of refugees to their houses. But I have to say to you that that was nothing to do with the Yugoslav government. It was far more to do with the internationally policed ceasefire in operation at that time.

Q. And are you bearing in mind the following fact, and how can you actually explain the fact that as terrorism had been defeated, as the situation had quieted down and as the Verification Mission had arrived, then once again terrorist activities began to be on the increase? Do you bring -- do you connect those two facts?

A. I certainly believe that the ceasefire broke down in part because, as I predicted to you would happen, the KLA returned to aggressive action in part, in my view, because your own forces did what they could to undermine the effectiveness of the international monitoring and indeed to return to the aggressive action which, in my view, had caused this, at least in part, in the first place. But with respect, Mr. Milosevic, I don't believe that any of the events that happened subsequent to the days of which -- upon which I have given evidence to this Court are at all relevant to the circumstances that I have given evidence upon, and so --

JUDGE MAY: Let us be the judge of that.

THE WITNESS: Although we --

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You therefore claim that these efforts, the efforts to maintain a calm situation during the time of the Verification Mission, was destroyed by the forces of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Am I reading you correctly? ²⁴¹⁴

A. Mr. Milosevic, you and I can wander the thickets of what happened afterwards at very great lengths. We will have our competing views of what happened. They are, I submit to you, not relevant to the events that I have provided about these events on these particular days, and I really would be very willing to answer any more questions you have on the events about which I've given evidence to this Court.

JUDGE MAY: What you can tell us about -- just a moment. One moment.

What you can tell us about, Lord Ashdown, what you saw or directly heard yourself. If you have any evidence on those matters, you should give it. But when I say "heard," I mean on visits and that sort of thing or any direct knowledge which you have which can shed light on these matters. But hearsay and the rest and what you read in the papers, that sort of thing, isn't of any great assistance.

So if the -- the accused can ask questions about what happened afterwards. If you've got any direct evidence about it, tell us. But if you haven't, it's merely general knowledge, then say so.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I wanted to clear up one matter. You said a moment ago and what you're saying here now is also part of your testimony, and a moment ago you said that this situation of calm or ceasefire, as I think you said, was disturbed by the Yugoslav side and violated by the Yugoslav side.

A. I said I had opinions that in my view that a subsequent ceasefire which took place - what? - three months after the events which I am giving evidence before the Court, was unfortunately -- did not, unfortunately, ²⁴¹⁵ hold, and that my opinion, if you seek them, as to the reasons for that was that it was a combination of both a return to aggressive action by the KLA and the actions of your forces in undermining that ceasefire. But that's an opinion.

Q. Can I read out to you a passage which speaks of something different? And it is the following --

JUDGE MAY: Lord Ashdown, do you have any direct knowledge of what happened when the ceasefire broke down? Do you have any direct experience yourself of it?

THE WITNESS: I visited Kosovo again in, if I recall, Your Honour, December of the -- December of the same year, 1998, and made a trip including, as I've already referred to in my evidence here, back into this area to inspect the damage that was done. I spent some time with the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission, in the Prizren area. At that time, I watched the actions of the Yugoslav armed forces. I was there when a terrorist outrage took place in Pec in which some Serb civilians were killed. I condemned that action. I was there when there was a KLA incursion from Albania. I have opinions as to why that ceasefire subsequently broke down and why we then moved to the next stage of the events which forced NATO finally to intervene, but I can only express those as opinions.

JUDGE MAY: You can ask the witness about what he saw or heard, but his opinions are completely irrelevant.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness is presenting his opinion as testimony, and I should like to ask him a question after ^{2416 BLANK PAGE 2417} reading out a brief quotation by his Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, dated the 18th of January, 1999.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Milosevic, if I may -- I apologise for the discourtesy of interrupting you. I'm seeking not to present my opinions as testimony. That's exactly what I'm seeking not to do. I'm seeking to present facts as testimony.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] But this is contrary to the facts that you are presenting, contrary to them.

JUDGE MAY: What is it that you want him to comment on? Let us hear it, and then we'll see if he can.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The basic point that the witness is making and claiming is that disturbing the situation is the fault of the Yugoslav and Serb government, and I would like to read out something which speaks of quite the opposite being the case. May I read it out? It's not a lengthy passage.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Bear in mind the interpreters.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What? Yes, I will. I will bear in mind the interpreters.

I'll skip over a portion, to make it briefer, but here it is. And it is Robin Cook, at a meeting, an official meeting. This is a report from the meeting:

[In English] "[Previous translation continues] ... Army has committed more breaches of ceasefire and until this weekend was responsible for more deaths than the security forces. It must stop undermining the ceasefire and blocking political dialogue. Neighbouring ²⁴¹⁸ countries, in particular, Albania -- "

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, could you stop? We don't have on the monitor who has committed, and I think that is quite important. That didn't come out in translation. Could you just read that again, and give us the date as well.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is -- what you have on the ELMO is the graph. The monitor shows the graph, and I see this on my screen, too. What I'm reading out to you is a report, and they are the words of Robin Cook, in fact. Have you got that?

[In English] "[Previous translation continues] ... Liberation Army has committed more breaches of ceasefire and until this weekend was responsible for more deaths than the security forces. It must stop undermining the ceasefire and blocking political dialogue. Neighbouring countries, in particular, Albania, must be more resolute in halting the flow of weapons which fuels the conflict. The Kosovo Liberation Army cannot defeat the Yugoslav army, and instead of liberating the people of Kosovo, can only prolong their suffering. The Kosovo Liberation Army has repeatedly broken the ceasefire, and last month seized a number of Serb hostages. Part of the complexity now applying pressure to the Kosovar Albanian side is that there are different perspectives from the elected leadership of the Kosovar Albanian around Dr. Rugova and from members of the KLA, who do not regard Dr. Rugova as someone from whom they will accept leadership or as a representative of their people. That makes it difficult to build a meaningful negotiating team from the Kosovar Albanian side." ²⁴¹⁹ [Interpretation] There is a reaction to this by one of the representatives.

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let us find out: What is the date of this statement by Mr. Cook?

THE ACCUSED: The date is 18 January 1999, 18 January 1999. Mr. John ^ Randall:

[As read] "We are all aware of sanctions and threats that have been used against Belgrade. As the Foreign Secretary said, that responsibility for the breakdown of ceasefire could be placed equally with the Yugoslav forces and KLA."

What sanctions and threats could be used against the KLA? Mr. Cook:

[As read] "We have vigorously denounced the KLA in just about every international forum. We have also, through Security Council resolution, called on states neighbouring Kosovo, and on others in Europe, to act to try to cut off the flow of both funds and weapons to the KLA. We are actively reviewing what more we can do to apply pressure to the checkpoints in the supply of weapons to the KLA. We are not dealing with the state or, indeed, an organisation with any clear political leadership or representation," and so on.

And then again Mr. Cook: "The position taken by the International Community, in all its different manifestations, including the European Union, the Contact Group, and the Security Council, is that we do not support independence for Kosovo. That is partly because the countries in the neighbourhood would ²⁴²⁰ strongly resent and resist any attempt to establish an independent Kosovo because of the destabilising effect on themselves, and we should always remember that the agenda of the KLA is not independence for Kosovo but Greater Albania."

That is Mr. Cook saying. "It would also have an effect in Bosnia, about which all Honourable Members should be concerned. It would be very difficult to resist the demand of Republika Srpska for independence if Kosovo were to succeed in achieving it."

And so on. So --

JUDGE MAY: What is the question for the witness? Now, you've read out a very lengthy statement by the British Foreign Secretary in January 1999. Now, what is the relevance of that to the evidence of the witness about what he saw in Kosovo the previous autumn?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is because this shows that it is quite incorrect that the Yugoslav government, the Yugoslav authorities, the Yugoslav army, the police of Serbia, attacked and terrorised the population. This was a conflict with the KLA, and the KLA, as a terrorist organisation, which even the witness is not questioning, bears the responsibility for destabilisation and for the conflicts that took place, not the army and the police, who legitimately tried to bring law and order in their own territory. That is the relevance.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. Very well. That is -- that is -- just a moment. Just a moment, so we can understand the position. That is your case, and it is the case which this Trial Chamber is going to have to ²⁴²¹ judge to see whether that account is correct or not. It will be a matter for the Trial Chamber, at the close of the case, to weigh the evidence to determine what happened. Meanwhile, this witness can't answer for the statements of Mr. Cook in January 1999. What you can ask about is what he's told you: what he saw and heard in Kosovo in September, and in particular, his meeting with you. Those are the matters you should be asking him about, as opposed to a general political discussion. Now, have you any questions about the evidence?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not any kind of general political discussion. I have been presenting facts.

JUDGE MAY: You have presented your case and you've put a statement which was made, which I have already described, and I'm not going into again. What I've ruled is that it's not a matter for the witness to comment on, and what you should ask him about are the matters he can deal with, his evidence.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. We shall then continue with direct testimony, because this obviously denies the essence of his examination-in-chief, and this is quite logical to everyone. That's why I've been saying it. That's why I've been presenting this.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Milosevic, again, forgive me for interrupting you. To be honest, I'm rather disappointed that you've quoted Mr. Cook's statement when you could have quoted mine, on many occasions over that period, which said exactly the same thing. Now, what you didn't mention, of course, was the massacre at Racak, and so on. I never said that the breakdown of the ceasefire was wholly and ²⁴²² solely the responsibility of the Yugoslav government. It was a complex matter in which both the Yugoslav government, in my view, and the KLA contributed. But that is, if I may say so, completely irrelevant to the evidence that I have given here. And I note so far that you have challenged none of the specific evidence relating to these three days, not January, but 27th, 28th, 29th of September 1998. That's what I'm here to provide the Court with.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. I shall challenge that. Don't you worry. I am referring to your testimonies regarding your first mission to Albania. Since it is quite clear that you consider the KLA to be a rebel terrorist organisation and that it had its structure in Albania, in your report, did you bring up this issue how a rebel terrorist organisation that operates on the territory of a neighbouring state can have a structure of its own in a neighbouring state which has its own army and police and, therefore, this structure has to constitute an illegal factor, as far as they are concerned?

A. Well, of course, Mr. Milosevic. That's precisely what I said in my testimony, that in my view, the right way to control, to end, the activities of the KLA was, as I clearly said, for the Western nations to help Albania take control of the lawless spaces in north Albania through which that organisation was getting arms.

Q. You were saying that you wanted to familiarise yourself with the command structure of the KLA. On that occasion, with which high commanders of the KLA did you talk to when you visited Albania? ²⁴²³

A. On that occasion, as I recall, none.

Q. And on other occasions?

A. On another occasion, I think, when I visited Albania later on, I had a meeting with somebody claiming to be a representative of the KLA in Tirana, and I made it clear to them, exactly as I have to you, that the actions of the KLA were, in my view, illegal, destabilising Kosovo. And I said no more than I have said here.

Q. And in your statement in relation to your visits to Albania or that particular visit, does it say that they were in a position to assist logistically and in other ways? I mean, the state of Albania to help the KLA, that the KLA was helped by the Albania government. Well, yes, answer that part of the question first.

A. Mr. Milosevic, I can't answer to all of your conspiracy theories. We heard some of them earlier on.

The reason why, in my view, the KLA was able to use Northern Albania for the supply of arms was because that it was a criminal space outside the rule of law of the Albanian government. And in recommending to my government what action we could take about that, I recommended that we should assist the Albanian government to take control of that space in order to control that activity.

Q. Yes. But during your first statement, you said that the head of the Albanian regional police indicated to you that a truckload of weapons was intended for the KLA; is that right?

A. Correct. It wasn't, in fact, the head of the Albanian police, as I understood. It was an Albanian politician who either at that time -- I ²⁴²⁴ think actually beforehand had been the Minister of the Interior. He took me to the area. He showed me the matters on which I have given evidence here.

It became immediately evident to me that the police force that were operating in that area were incapable, I mean physically incapable. They didn't have the materials, and they didn't have the forces on the ground to be able to assert the rule of law in Northern Albania. It was for that reason that I recommended to my government that one of the actions we could take to end the activity of the KLA was to assist the Albanian government with materials and with advice and with positive assistance to enable them to take control of that area.

Q. However, the fact remains uncontested that this entire operation of procuring weapons for the KLA was taking place with the knowledge of the Albanian authorities. If the chief of the regional police knows that, it means that the Albanian authorities, the Albanian government, know about that. That fact is not being contested; right?

A. I cannot attest to what the Albanian government knew, but I imagine they knew that they had a problem of lawlessness in Northern Albania. It would have been difficult enough for them to think otherwise.

I don't contest for a moment the reason I went to Northern Albania was to look at this. It was a deeply dangerous, lawless area in which people were regularly shot.

My judgement, if you wish for it, is that the Albanian government knew that. The Albanian government of that time was serious about seeking ²⁴²⁵ to impose the rule of law in that area. It would not have been in their interest to do otherwise since that area was controlled by Mr. Sali Berisha, who was doing his very best to undermine the Albanian government of the time, that the supply of weapons to the KLA through that area was, however, principally organised by criminal elements who delivered weapons to the area from where the KLA collected them. That is my view of what I witnessed.

Q. Does that mean that it is your claim that the supply of weapons for the KLA did not take place under the auspices of the Albanian government?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I simply am unable to give a firm and definite answer on that matter. I can only give you the opinion which I drew from what I saw, and I've given you that.

Q. Since there was a UN Resolution 1160 that prohibited the supply of weapons, did you think that the Albanian government was duty-bound to abide by that Resolution?

A. Mr. Milosevic, again, I'm going to say to you that I think the Albanian -- you asked me for an opinion, and I'll give you one. I think the Albanian government was doing its best, that Albanian government was doing its best to ensure that it had control of Northern Albania and that it was seeking to apply the UN Resolution. That's the impression I gained. But I cannot be considered to be an expert, and I do not come before this Court as an expert on what the Albanian government knew, what it thought, what it was doing, openly or secretly. I can merely tell you of the evidence that I have presented this Court of what I ²⁴²⁶ saw in Northern Albania.

Q. All right. But you drew a conclusion of your own. The Albanian government did its best in order to prevent the KLA from doing things, and the Yugoslav government did its worst in its domain and in suppressing terrorism in its own territory. That is your own conclusion.

A. I did not draw that conclusion, Mr. Milosevic. I mean, I understand --

Q. Well, that's what can be inferred. That's what can be inferred on the basis of what you've been saying?

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Milosevic, I didn't say that at all. I said -- I gave an opinion as to what was happening in Northern Albania. I merely said that whilst it is the Yugoslav government's absolute right to combat terrorism and lawlessness in its own area - I never denied that - some of the methods that you used in order to do that were illegal under international law. That's my case; no more, no less.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You mentioned also in your statement and now during your comments that en route to Tropoje, or to be more precise, that point at the border where you were viewing things from the Albanian border, you saw this black market, this arms black market, with your very own eyes, and your comment in this respect was that this is a zone, an area where there was lawlessness.

Later on, you said that someone from the Serb police, when weapons were being taken away from Albanians, returned these weapons to the black ²⁴²⁷ market, if I understood you correctly.

Since there could not have been such a black market of this nature in Kosovo or anywhere in Yugoslavia, are you trying to suggest that Yugoslav policemen were taking these weapons to the black market in Albania in order to resell it there? I mean, today for the first time in my life I heard that, that the Yugoslav police were selling weapons in the black market, weapons that had been seized. So I'm looking for some kind of an explanation.

JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

THE WITNESS: No, Milosevic, I never suggested that Yugoslav or Serb police were operating a black market in Albania, as I think you very well know. What I said was an account that was narrated to me, subsequently repeated in consistent detail by others, that there was a circulating internal market, that weapons were demanded from a village. If a village could not provide those weapons, they had to go out and purchase them locally. I don't say they went back to Albania. They did those from the black market. They believed that the weapons they then handed over to the MUP or to Yugoslav forces were then by some means returned to that localised black market from which they purchased them. I'm merely passing on a hearsay story that was given to me. I claim it to be no more, although it was confirmed in consistent detail by others. There was no involvement with Albania, and nor do I claim any.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Fine, Mr. Ashdown, but if you know anything about Kosovo or the Kosovo Albanians, you will certainly not deny the fact that over there, ²⁴²⁸ there was not a single house where there were not weapons. There was not a single family that did not have weapons. I'm going to say right now that I believe that even now, there's not a single house in Kosovo without any weapons.

Do you know about that? That is simply a tradition there. Are you aware of the fact that everybody has weapons there?

A. Mr. Milosevic, unfortunately, one of the curses of the Balkans is that weapons are indeed readily available on all sides. Albania is awash with weapons. No one has to go very far to get hold of weapons. I do not say that I believe the story that was told to me. I am aware that in circumstances like this, all sorts of rumours will circulate. I am not so naive as to believe every one of them. I have simply related to this Court the story that was told to me.

Q. All right. You are talking about descriptions. Did it occur to you, in view of the assumption that everybody has weapons, that this story that they did not have weapons and that they had to buy weapons in order to hand it over to the police, was that for your ears only? Who could believe that first assumption, that they did not have weapons? Who could believe that? Only a person who would be naive, and you are not naive, obviously.

A. And I am not so naive as to consider the fact that I may have been being told something less than the truth. I present it to this Court as no more than the story they told me confirmed by others. It is up to others to decide whether or not that's true. I merely say this: that from what I saw, that is that these weapons were not in any way hidden, that ²⁴²⁹ they were not usable, some of them, indeed that some of them were in a deeply dangerous state, that they were not hidden, they were just in a cupboard in a house, that that seemed to be consistent with the story that was told to me that they did not readily have available weapons to hand over to the Serbs. Any other story about a circulation or a black market was their claim. I cannot comment on it. I did not see evidence to prove it. I am not so naive as to believe every word that I am told. I present this story to the Court because it is consistent with other stories of a similar nature which you may or may not have heard on previous occasions and on the basis that it was hearsay alone.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Lord Ashdown, how many weapons did you see?

THE WITNESS: I think it's difficult --

JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm talking about the weapons that --

THE WITNESS: In the -- in the house that I -- the weapons that were said to be collected?

JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. For this purpose, to meet the Serb demand.

THE WITNESS: I think, Your Honour, there were six or seven. They ranged from Klashnikovs to a Simonov rifle and some hand grenades and a number of rounds. Of those - and this is from memory - of those, if I recall, one or two were wrapped in greaseproof paper, two or three were in readily operable condition, and the remainder, three or four, were in a condition which, in my view, they were unusable. They were completely rusted up and totally unusable.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you have any information as to whether other weapons of the same kind and for the same purpose could be found ²⁴³⁰ elsewhere?

THE WITNESS: None. I was told the story the day before, if you recall, when I visited on the 27th, by the garage owner we met, that the village had been told that they should provide weapons, that they didn't have any, that they had to raise 10.000 Deutschmarks, that they were going out to buy the weapons on the black market. I can relate no more than the story that I was told. I place no veracity on it except as a piece of hearsay. Apart from the fact that I saw the weapons and the weapons and their means of -- of, as it were, storage were consistent with the story I was told.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Any information as to whether the weapons you saw, the quantity, would have cost the --

THE WITNESS: I --

JUDGE ROBINSON: The sum of 10.000 Deutschmarks?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I can't -- unhappily, weapons are very cheap. So I can't tell you what they would have cost. I can tell you that on the subsequent visit, I took it -- I was very concerned indeed about this village because I was worried that the people I had seen may well have been subjected to the treatment by Yugoslav forces as I believe that I had seen on that day on the hill surrounding. So I returned to the village in December, sought out the same people. The village had not been attacked, had not been burnt, had not be subject to the looting and depredations I had seen in the other villages. I was told that the Serbs had turned up, Yugoslav forces, Serbs had turned up at the appointed time, some two hours after we were there. The weapons ²⁴³¹ were handed over and that was the end of it.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. For this entire question of weapons, in order to make it clear, do you remember that during the preceding year in relation to your visit, there was that chaos in Albania when all military warehouses were looted in Albania, when several hundreds of thousands of weapons of the Albanian army went through various criminal channels into arms trafficking? According to reports I read then, they were selling automatic rifles for 100 Deutschmark or 50 Deutschmark, even when there was a large supply. To put it quite simply, if you remember correctly, a large amount of these weapons went to Kosovo. And this was general knowledge. Does it seem to you then that it is illogical that the police was searching houses and looking for --

JUDGE MAY: Let's just, first of all, establish whether the witness knows anything about these events in Albania before we go any further.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I do. In fact, that formed part of my report from the first visit, that obviously Albania was awash with weapons. What had happened when the pyramid scandal collapsed and Sali Berisha fell from power was that the arsenals of the Albanian security forces were broken open and that there were literally millions of weapons in circulation. So, yes, I was fully aware of that.

JUDGE MAY: When did that happen?

THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm sorry. I think -- ²⁴³²

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] 1997.

THE WITNESS: On this matter at least, I think the witness's [sic] knowledge and -- is probably better than mine.

JUDGE MAY: 1997, I think he said. 1997.

THE WITNESS: 1997.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon?

JUDGE MAY: 1997; is that right?

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, 1997.

Q. If you remember, that's when the pyramid scheme went down, when they robbed their own people. There was chaos all over and there was total unrest and lawlessness, and that's when they broke into all the military warehouses. And more than a million weapons was the figure that was being bandied about, and all those weapons found themselves in free circulation. Kosovo was a magnet that attracted these weapons?

A. I think that anywhere of instability was a magnet that attracted these weapons. I suspect a certain number ended up with the IRA in Ireland as well. Wherever there is -- forgive me. Sorry to go so fast. Wherever there is conflict, it attracts the sales of weapons. There is good evidence to say that this huge stock of weapons passed into criminal hands and will have ended up in conflicts across the world.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And it is precisely at this point that we come to your testimony about the zone of Junik. Do you know that it was precisely in this zone, the Junik zone, that there were more mountain paths and passages via which, mostly at night and in the early morning, large convoys were ²⁴³³ passing by with horses and weapons for Kosovo; and that the army that you saw, because you were looking at this from the border points, secured the border and reacted to this infiltration of terrorist groups from Albania; and the infiltration of these convoys loaded up -- where animals were loaded up with weapons? Are you aware of that fact?

A. Yes. Having participated in similar operations against terrorists in other countries, I was well aware of that fact. However, I have to say that what I saw was consistent with an army which may or may not have been fulfilling those duties but was also indiscriminately attacking a civilian population, not specific military targets, with the intention of causing the refugees - who may have contained amongst them individuals, but the large proportion were women and children - to flee their homes, in what I can only describe, once again, as an indiscriminate attack consistent with the policy of scorched earth.

Q. Do you have any idea of the distance between what you've just mentioned -- you mentioned watching this from this vantage point. I heard you say Gegaj - did you? - at the Albanian border, and the place called Junik, in Kosovo, from which you were observing the tanks that you saw across the way from Yugoslavia.

A. I think I said that in my testimony. I think the distance from where I was observing, which is above the border crossing, a little bit further up the border, on a higher piece of ground, was of the order of two kilometres. Junik is further away, of course, but I was -- in my testimony, I said it was in the area of Junik. There were some houses below us, which I would estimate at about two kilometres range, perhaps ²⁴³⁴ slightly less, that were being individually targeted by a tank. Further away, on a small knoll, there was a deployment, standard military deployment, of what I believe to have been a mortar platoon, with associated armoured vehicles. There were other villages in the valley, and there were collections of armoured personnel carriers and tanks gathered, waiting to conduct further attacks. And as I recall it, there were two tanks going away from me, towards Djakovica, in that direction, who were on the roadside and were systematically, and in turn, firing at one house in the village after another, from the roadside. I should say that it was perfectly possible to hear small-arms fire as well as tank fire. Indeed, before we reached the ridge on which I spent three or four hours, we could quite clearly hear the rattle of machine-guns: light machine-guns and heavy machine-guns, as you would have on a tank, and indeed the individual small-arms fire. So I could hear small arms from this distance. It was a very warm, still summer's afternoon. And although I cannot, of course, say to the Court that there was no return fire from any of these houses, I can say that I never heard or observed any return fire from these houses.

Q. Yes, but that means, in fact, that there were people there who were shooting at the army and the police, or the army. You mentioned the army in this case.

A. Well, I understand that although certain armoured vehicles were occasionally handed over to the MUP and repainted in blue, unless Mr. Milosevic has contrary information, no tanks were handed over to the MUP and all tanks remained under the control of the Vojska Yugoslavia, the ²⁴³⁵ Yugoslav army. Mr. Milosevic says there were people in these houses. I have to say to you that I saw no return fire from these houses. I cannot tell you whether or not there were innocent civilians in those houses. I saw no return fire, and so far as I was concerned, the scene below me was consistent with a deliberate and systematic attempt to use heavy weapons of the Yugoslav army to destroy citizens' houses.

Q. And at what distance were the tanks from the houses that were targeted?

A. Dear, this is three or four years ago, but I would have said 200 metres, 300 metres.

Q. A tank targeted a house from a distance of 200 metres: Is that what you saw?

A. Not one tank, Mr. Milosevic; several.

Q. And do you know that when we're talking about these terrorist groups of the KLA, KLA terrorist groups, that the most usual form of weapon that they used against armoured vehicles was a hand-held mortar, that they used extensively, and they used these hand-held mortars to shoot at police stations, police vehicles, military transporters, and so on and so forth, these hand-held launchers? Are you aware of that?

A. Mr. Milosevic, the translation that came through to us was "mortars" that you used, and I --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter apologises. It was launchers.

A. Well, it was, if I may say so, precisely for that conclusion that I reached the conclusion that the tanks were not under attack. No tank would position itself as close as 200 metres to a position in which there ^{2436 BLANK PAGE 2437} were anti-tank weapons. A tank would do what it was more normal for a tank to do, which would be sit at about two or three thousand metres in order to target these, and it is for precisely the reason you have just described that I believe that these tanks were not under attack from the villages on the houses they were about to destroy.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You know what Albanian houses look like and the large walls that they have around each house. I'm sure you saw this, didn't you?

A. Yes. I've been to many Albanian houses, Mr. Milosevic, in my time. You, however, are imagining that these were substantial Albanian farmhouses. I have to tell you they were not. They were rather thin structures, built, as I'm sure you have seen on many occasions, of this very light construction: red - how do I describe it? - halfway between brick and concrete block. But they're very easy to knock down, and as I saw when I was there. We're not talking about a traditional Albanian farmhouse of some hundreds of years old here. We're talking about a very poor population living in recently constructed, rather modern-looking houses.

Q. Yes, but Junik was a real fortress. Have you ever been to Junik?

A. Indeed. I went to Junik when I was subsequently there. I have to say to you that I saw no particular sign of Junik as a fortress. It may have been, you would claim, a concentration of KLA activity, but I do not recall seeing a town which was a fortress. Indeed, when I subsequently visited Junik, most of the houses were destroyed. I don't claim for a second that there was not KLA activity in this area. There clearly was. ²⁴³⁸ What were the weapons going over the mountains that I was seeing going to be going for? All I say is that what I saw was consistent with an army not targeting a military enemy but indiscriminately attacking the houses and livelihoods of citizens in order to drive them out, a scorched-earth policy of the sort that Yugoslavs will remember very well from the days of German occupation.

Q. You couldn't have known what had happened before that. You just saw an excerpt. So if I understood you correctly, you first said that you saw Serb forces shelling Junik, and then you said that you saw Serb forces shelling the zone where the refugees were, and then you said that you did not see a single shell which had exploded or fell on the positions where the refugees were, but you saw their trajectory and that it wasn't in the direction of the village. Now, I'm not quite clear what we're talking about. If I understood you correctly, of course.

A. Well, then let me say it again. I didn't say "Junik." I said, "the villages in the Junik area." I've described what I saw. I was very clear in saying that the, I presume, mountain gun that I saw firing in the opposite direction was firing to the - let me get this right - to the north-west, that is, along the ridge where there were no villages. There were forests and there were the passes through which the refugees passed. I'm not saying, nor did I -- I specifically did not say that it is not impossible that they were shelling those passes because those were the passes being used by the KLA. All I was saying was that the fact that they were shelling to the north-west, where there was no habitation, and into the areas through which, by description, the refugees told me they ²⁴³⁹ had passed, that was, therefore, consistent with the stories that the refugees told me in Bajram Curri about where and how they had been injured on their flight from their homes in Kosovo.

Q. Let's move on to your visit to Kosovo from the 26th to the 29th of September. If it is true and correct that Ibrahim Rugova - if, I say if that is correct - that Ibrahim Rugova did not have control over the mainstay of the KLA, but just the DSK, which organised units, as he said, for the defence of the village, did you establish how and in what way the DSK managed to arm the civilians? Did you, when you talked to him --

A. You have to give me -- I don't --

Q. -- discuss that question?

A. I don't pretend to be an expert on Kosovo. I'm merely giving evidence on the days that I saw the -- the DSK. Can you explain? As far as I know, Mr. Rugova is the head of a party called the LDK. Is that to what you're referring?

Q. I understood that you said that Rugova did not have any influence on the KLA. I understood you to say that.

A. No. Actually, my report says rather the contrary. It says that Mr. Rugova claimed to have control over the KLA. I asked him specifically: If the KLA were -- if you were to call for a ceasefire, would that be obeyed by the KLA forces? He told me it would. It was my judgement, however, that Mr. Rugova did not have control, as he said, over the KLA. I think Mr. Rugova had effective control, through the LDK structure, of the rural areas of Kosovo, but he was not in such a powerful controlling position over the urban areas of Kosovo. ²⁴⁴⁰ Mr. Milosevic, it may help if I were able to explain that my view at the time was that there were, in effect, three KLAs. There was a KLA which was a village defence force, little more. I suspect that Mr. Rugova did have effective control - and this is an opinion, no more - over the what you might call Home Guard elements of the KLA. I suspect that this was predominantly the case in rural areas.

There was a second KLA, which was probably the KLA which I saw more clearly in the Bajram Curri area, probably much better organised politically, over whom, in my view, if Mr. Rugova had control, it was a diminishing control, if you like, the radicalised KLA. Then there was a third KLA, which was known as FARK - and I have no doubt you're aware of them - who were of a different political persuasion, and the control lines from them, it seemed to me, ran back to Mr. Sali Berisha.

Now, if you -- those are opinions, judgements. I can't prove any of them, but that was what I said. And in my view, Mr. Rugova had a good control over the LDK elements in the countryside and therefore of the Home Guard elements of the KLA. We used "KLA" as a - I'm sure you did, too - as a sort of umbrella term within which, I think, several organisations lived.

Q. Did you become aware of, if not then, then later on, of the fact that the KLA killed some of Rugova's functionaries, the functionaries of the DSK or LDK?

A. Of course I'm aware of that, and it may well have continued, indeed, in more modern times. That all goes to show that my suggested ²⁴⁴¹ model for KLA structure - although what that has to do with the events that I saw is a matter which is perplexing me at the moment - the suggested KLA structure was as I've described it.

Q. And at that time, or perhaps later on, did you learn anything about the links between Al Qaeda and the KLA?

JUDGE MAY: We're going well outside what's relevant to this case in terms of what evidence this witness can give. We're dealing with his evidence, not about his opinions or anything like that. Now, you haven't yet mentioned the meeting, Mr. Milosevic, which you had with Lord Ashdown. If you want to ask him some questions about that, if you dispute anything that he said that happened at that meeting, you should do so, because, as you know, your time will not be unlimited. The witness is only here today. It may be that the amicus has some questions.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes, we can end there. There's no problem, Mr. May, on that score. But this is an essential point. It is important to define who it was that was the protagonist of all those terrorist attacks in Kosovo and who was involved in them. That's why I asked him whether he knew anything about that, because Mr. Ashdown was involved with all those matters. Does he know about Al Qae