⁴⁹²³

Wednesday, 15 May 2002

[Open session]

[The witness entered court]

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: I've temporarily forgotten and failed to mark which paragraph I was at. My mistake. If I can find it.

JUDGE MAY: While counsel is looking for the paragraph, Mr. Tanic, could you try and keep your answers as narrowly focused as possible. You've got a lot of evidence to give and it's important that we hear it, but our time is limited, and we'll get through it more quickly and you can get away more quickly if you would just focus on the questions and answer them. If counsel wants more information, he can always ask for it. If you'd keep that in mind.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll do my best to respect those guidelines.

MR. NICE: I think it was paragraph 53, was it? I may be wrong about that.

JUDGE MAY: Judge Kwon reminds me the private chain of command was the last topic.

MR. NICE: I'm grateful. It was paragraph 54 and indeed I now have found the mark I've left myself. Thank you very much.

WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] ⁴⁹²⁴ Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

Q. Mr. Tanic, you were telling us yesterday of the fact-finding mission and of the recommendations that it was able to make. Were those recommendations - yes or no - acted on by the accused?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever pronounce the KLA to be a terrorist organisation?

A. Not in the legal framework, but just as a political accusation. But not within the law as provided for by the constitution.

Q. Yes/no will do to this answer: Did he ever proclaim a state of emergency in Kosovo which would have allowed for official action against terrorists?

A. Not in keeping with the law.

Q. Just yes or no to this, and I mean just yes or no: Following the recommendations of the fact-finding group, were you aware of the accused laying blame for what was happening in Kosovo elsewhere? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. From whom did you hear this account of blame, if not from the accused himself? From whom did you hear it?

A. From the leadership of the State Security Service and from political structures with whom we had a regular exchange of information, both in parliament and in the government of Serbia.

Q. And in a sentence, what was now being said by the leadership as to who bore responsibility for the problems in Kosovo?

A. Well, it turned out at the end that the responsibility for the problems in Kosovo was to be borne by a group of unresponsible -- ⁴⁹²⁵ irresponsible policemen, and the Security Service and the army that were covering up the facts and did not wish to act against the terrorists. Those were the rumours and story bandied about within the circle, inner circles of Yugoslav and Serbian parent authority.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE KWON: Excuse me a minute. Mr. Tanic, you just mentioned that the action against the KLA was not done in legal framework. Is it right?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE KWON: Could you clarify more about the legal framework? Does it mean that the actions taken in the Kosovo area was kind of unofficial one?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't say they were unofficial. All I can say is that they were illegal with respect to our constitution and legal frameworks, at least as far as I am aware of them, and as I was able to check up in consultations. So an extraordinary state of affairs or an emergency situation is proclaimed by the Assembly of Yugoslavia. That is provided for by the constitution. It is the Assembly that decides on war and peace. And to proclaim a group terrorist, you have to follow a procedure that is much stricter than a political qualification by saying that somebody is a terrorist or is not. So the actions were official, but they weren't in conformity and dovetailed to the constitution and the legal provisions of the country.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE: ⁴⁹²⁶

Q. There's one event that occurred rather later, on which you draw a particular inference. It's paragraph 55. And I want you to deal with this very shortly. Was there, on the 23rd of March of 1999, a session of the Republic of the Serbian Assembly which was televised, in the course of which Mr. Milutinovic made an observation? If yes, just tell us about the observation and, in one sentence, its significance.

A. Yes. At the Serbian Assembly meeting held on the 23rd of March, 1999, first of all there was a completely illegal discussion as to whether Yugoslavia would enter into a war with the NATO pact or not, and that does not come under the competencies of the Assembly of Serbia but the Assembly of Yugoslavia.

Q. Mr. Tanic, we're going to get on better if you remember what His Honour Judge May said to you this morning and if you listen carefully to my questions. We'll do this as an experiment to make sure that we get it right.

What I asked you is this: On that 23rd of March, did Mr. Milutinovic make an observation? And, if yes, tell us about the observation and, in one sentence, its significance. So all I want from you is two things: what he said and what was important about it.

A. Mr. Milutinovic said that the political problem with the Kosovar Albanians did not exist at all, neither did it exist in Rambouillet, the problem of a political agreement, and that the Western powers and the Contact Group was -- offered the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet a political agreement of whatever kind it liked, as it saw fit and as it understood the interests of Serbia and Belgrade and Yugoslavia, but that ⁴⁹²⁷ the only problem in that was that the Contact Group and the international community wished to ensure the implementation of that political agreement with the ground troops who would be present in Kosovo.

Q. Thank you. And so the significance of that observation, in your understanding, is what?

A. The significance of that observation, in my opinion, is that that talk about the fact that the Western forces and the Contact Group wanted to impose a bad political agreement for Serbia and Yugoslavia at the detriment of Serbia was completely incorrect, not to say untruthful, because Mr. Milutinovic did acknowledge that we could have had a favourable agreement, favourable to Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 57. In the course of that Serbian Assembly session, did other SBS representatives make statements contrary to or in support of war?

A. Well, they spoke in favour of a war conflict, but in complete contrast to what Milutinovic had said. He said that we were being offered a bad political agreement and that that is why we had to accept war, to go to war with NATO.

Q. And finally, paragraph 58. Did Mr. Vuk Draskovic provide an alternative?

A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, he did, on behalf of a group of people who compiled an alternative solution to the Serbian Assembly which should have been sufficient to avoid this conflict with the NATO pact, which would have been suicidal.

MR. NICE: Can we now, then, please, look at a document which ⁴⁹²⁸ comes in three parts. It needs a little explanation. And can we have TX 8, please.

The original, Your Honours, is an old-style fax paper. The significance will become obvious, but includes that, of course, old-style fax paper used to degrade over time, so it was recopied when it came into the possession of the OTP. But I think we can probably survive on this version. Now, if we'd like to lay the original on the overhead projector so that we can see it.

Q. Mr. Tanic, is this a document that you've seen before and indeed that you received?

A. Yes.

Q. What's on the overhead projector on the moment is, I think, an original fax document. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Dated March 24th, 1999. How did you receive it, please?

A. The document is draft conclusions, as you can see, and it was sent to the deputy group --

Q. Now let's put the -- we'll move --

A. -- for a meeting of the Assembly that we mentioned a moment ago.

Q. Can we now please lay the English translation on the overhead projector. Then we'll come back to the original in a minute. And if we look at the draft conclusions, running through them: 1. At its session on the 23rd of March, the National Assembly accepted positions and work of the Republic of Serbia state delegation at Rambouillet and Paris. ⁴⁹²⁹ 2. The National Assembly affirms that the state delegation made every effort and did everything it could, in direct dialogue with the delegation from the separatist movement of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija, both in Rambouillet and Paris, et cetera. 3. It is with regret that the National Assembly notes that the international goodwill mediators and co-chairs of the talks in Rambouillet and Paris did not find a way to persuade the delegation of the separatist movement to sit at the same table.

4. And there's an illegible line ... be ascribed to the state delegation of Serbia, which insisted the whole time on direct discussion. Instead the blame lies exclusively with the delegation of the separatist and terrorist movement.

5. And I'm summarising it to save time: The National Assembly appeals to eminent representatives of the Contact Group to find a way to get the delegation of the Albanian separatist movement to sit at the same negotiating table.

6. If the delegation of the Albanian separatist movement does not want to talk and reach such an agreement, then the state delegation is prepared, at any time, and so on.

7. As soon as any political agreement is reached, the state delegation of Serbia and the Federal Republic is prepared to conclude an agreement.

8. The National Assembly demands an end to all threats of aggression by the NATO pact.

9. Expresses the determination of Serbia to reach a quick, ⁴⁹³⁰ peaceful, and just agreement.

Now, if we go back to the -- well, let's just read 7 in detail. Again, 7: "As soon as any political agreement is reached, the state delegation of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is prepared to conclude an agreement with the international community on the application of the said political agreement, with a clearly specified and strictly limited mandate from the UN Security Council." Now, let's go to the original, please, the fax copy, on the second sheet, where we can see that there is a handwritten addition there. Just yes or no: Did somebody tell you whose hand that was in?

A. Yes.

Q. Who told you whose hand it was in?

A. I got that information from Vuk Draskovic and Dusan Mihajlovic.

Q. And whose handwriting did they say that was?

A. According to that information, it is the handwriting of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.

Q. Had you seen his handwriting yourself before? Yes or no.

A. Yes, on two or three occasions.

Q. Right. Let's now go back to the English version to see what the amendment reads. And so at the end of paragraph 7, the amendment in hand reads: "Respecting the sovereignty of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

MR. NICE: Very well. May that be given an exhibit number, then, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked Prosecution's ⁴⁹³¹ Exhibit 149.

JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, did the witness answer to your question how he got this document? He said it was sent to the deputies. Was it the answer?

MR. NICE: That's the only answer he gave, and it wasn't sufficient. I'll get a little bit more -- I'm sorry not to have dealt with that properly earlier.

Q. You heard His Honour Judge Kwon's question. It was sent to the deputies. How did you receive it yourself? How come you were talking to Vuk Draskovic about it?

A. I got the document from my own personal archive and from my own knowledge, from the president of our deputy group, and I noticed differences between what had been agreed and what was actually discussed at the meeting. So I wanted to have the paper, to have the document, to see whether it had been circulated, and that's how had I came by that paper, or rather, the draft conclusions.

Q. And how did you come to be talking to Mr. Draskovic about it?

A. Not only with him, but with a series of other individuals. Well, for the simple reason that I was included in the group of people who prepared a document which would have been sufficient to avoid this unnecessary and suicidal war with the NATO pact, and I received information that Mr. Milosevic, in principle, was in agreement but that all that had to be done was to find a solution which would not be to the detriment of the sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia. And at the Assembly meeting of Serbia, I saw a completely different discussion taking ⁴⁹³² place which was directly leading into an unnecessary war with NATO. And this enormous difference cropped up over two days, and I think that that caused --

JUDGE MAY: That again is the point that I had in mind. Just stick, if you would, to the question.

MR. NICE:

Q. Just so that we understand the position, Mr. Tanic: The draft conclusions, apart from the handwritten addition, are they conclusions that you accept had been reached and were a plan that had been made?

A. According to my information, yes, between Mr. Draskovic and Mr. Milosevic.

Q. And what you're saying, but correct me if I've got it wrong, but what you're saying is that this plan, even with its handwritten amendment, was inconsistent with the debate you heard in the Assembly where Milutinovic and others were speaking; is that correct?

A. Yes, because capital differences rose to the surface.

Q. And I think there was -- I needn't trouble with that. We'll move on to the next page, paragraph 65.

From your knowledge, Mr. Tanic, going back a couple of years, 1996, 1997, how large or small was the KLA?

A. According to professional intelligence on the security assessment, about 2.000 people who were poorly armed and distributed in small groups, generally young villagers, young male villagers.

Q. The KLA leadership was where, and how numerous was it?

A. Well, the true leadership was, for the most part, abroad, perhaps ⁴⁹³³ not more than five or ten people: Switzerland, Germany, Croatia, from time to time Albania.

Q. Now, you told us yesterday there were already indications from other countries that they would give assistance to Serbia if it was determined to control the KLA; is that correct?

A. The conditions for the political -- based on the conditions of the political solution for Kosovo, yes.

Q. And what, if anything, had President Rugova said was his intention so far as KLA or other radicals were concerned? What was he prepared to do for them?

A. Generally speaking, they waged a policy of non-violent resistance and they were ready to politically marginalise the KLA if a political solution to Kosovo were to be found.

Q. Paragraph 67 to 72 I can deal with in, I think, one sentence. As to the possibility of foreign troops functioning on the soil of Serbia, was there any, to your knowledge, constitutional objection to that happening?

A. No.

Q. Paragraph 74. In the late 1990s, but maybe earlier, but certainly in the late 1990s, were there occasions of Kosovar Albanians being killed in the course of this developing conflict?

A. Yes, already at the beginning of 1998.

Q. Were these deaths discussed in the political circles in which you moved? Yes or no.

A. Yes. ⁴⁹³⁴

Q. Was this topic brought to the attention of the accused? Yes or no.

A. I'm sorry, but I'm getting the English interpretation on my headsets -- the French, sorry. I'm getting the French.

Q. Was this topic brought to the attention of the accused? Yes or no, please.

A. Yes.

Q. And again, do you know - yes or no - what his reaction was from time to time to the problem of Kosovar Albanians being killed? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you learn of that from direct contact with the accused or from other sources, or perhaps from both?

A. From both. First of all, from other sources.

Q. Then also from the accused himself?

A. Yes, on the occasion that I mentioned yesterday.

Q. When he said what about the deaths of Kosovar Albanians?

A. Well, that there was collective support of the Albanian people to the Albanian terrorists, and so if there was collective support, then the death of civilians is something that will come about in a war conflict as an unfortunate consequence.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I appreciate your attempt to be concise, but it's not clear to me how it is being alleged that these Kosovar Albanians met their death.

MR. NICE: ⁴⁹³⁵

Q. Can you please tell us, Mr. Tanic: The deaths of which we're speaking, how did they come about, typically?

A. Well, they came about -- and I have to explain this at length. I find it difficult to strike a balance between being precise and being allowed to explain, so may I get instructions as to that?

JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... the reason why I'm asking is that this is in the early stages of the conflict, the developing conflict, and I consider it useful, in fact necessary, to find out exactly how it is alleged that these Kosovar Albanians met their death. And you can give the answer as concisely as possible.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those deaths came about through the regular activities of our police force against the Albanian terrorists. However, bearing in mind the fact that this activity was conducted in the manner that I described previously, according to the chain of semi-personal command, without constitutional and legal frameworks, without police logistics and security logistics, what happened was that, together with the terrorists, civilians would be killed too, and a large number of civilians at that, sometimes larger, sometimes smaller. The classical example took place in the Donje Prekaze village in March 1998. If you want me to, I can explain that case to you.

JUDGE ROBINSON: This would be in 1997, or what year was this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1998, the beginning of 1998.

JUDGE KWON: And if you could give us some concrete conversation between you and Milosevic at that time, in concrete terms, your comment and Mr. Milosevic's answers. ⁴⁹³⁶

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said yesterday that it wasn't a conversation in the classical sense, but a sort of short verbal communication. When it was said by Mr. Milosevic that the Albanians had the massive support of the people and that it was a case of mass terrorism in fact. So this wasn't, in fact, a conversation, and I was quite specific when I described it yesterday. Because you couldn't discuss those matters with Mr. Milosevic, at least I couldn't, because I didn't have that rank.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE:

Q. So far as you were aware, were other senior -- were senior officials at that time, including Perisic, Stanisic, Mihajlovic and others, were they taking any line on the death of Kosovar Albanians, either a line that was consistent with the attitude of the accused, as you've described it, or different? What was the position?

A. Yes. I am aware of that much better, because I could discuss these matters with these persons at much greater length at meetings. Their positions were mostly to the contrary to the position held by the accused. They were opposed to the unselective use of force.

Q. More recently, and I think probably in the course of the preparation of the book you've told us about, you've had conversations with various people, including with Perisic; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In the course of those conversations, were you shown a letter, which we'll have a look at, dated the 23rd of July of 1998, from Perisic ⁴⁹³⁷ to the accused? Is this the letter that you were shown by Mr. Perisic?

A. Yes.

MR. NICE: If the original can just be -- or not the original. If the B/C/S version could be laid on the overhead projector, first of all as to the first page, so the accused can see what it is. The next sheet, please. The date, the 23rd of July of 1998, and we can see the address to the president. And then if we just look on to the last page, we can see the signature of Momcilo Perisic. So if we can now put the English version on the overhead projector, please, starting at the first substantive page.

JUDGE MAY: Before we do, we need to know where this comes from.

MR. NICE: Yes.

Q. Is this -- first of all, do you recognise this as the letter that you were shown?

A. Yes. That is the letter of the Chief of General Staff, addressed to Mr. Milosevic, as President of Yugoslavia.

Q. In fact, this version comes, I think, from a book, is that correct, the letter having been published?

A. Yes. Yes. That's quite clear to me. But it is quite identical to the original of the letter that I saw, read, studied, and discussed with several people.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. It comes from a book, the witness's book, is that?

MR. NICE: No. It's another book, and I think it's -- the front cover of it, I think, gives you -- in the original. And it's got the ⁴⁹³⁸ authors at the top and the date of publication at the bottom.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: I'm not sure that I have the whole book here. If the Court wants it --

JUDGE MAY: No. I just want to know how it comes to be in evidence.

MR. NICE: Yes. I hope the method of summarising these texts for people who can probably read faster than I can read out loud is satisfactory, to save time. The English translation, by the way, of the book title is "Fire and Flood." I'm grateful to Ms. Graham. She had already told me that, and I should have told you that.

Q. "Dear Mr. President: Having analysed your attitude towards the Yugoslav army, I need to urgently convey to you certain facts ..." Paragraph 2: "I hope you've had an opportunity to assure yourself of the high military patriotic consciousness..." and et cetera. Paragraph 3: "We would not be correct and sincere under these fateful circumstances if, as professionals who safeguarded the VJ and the SRJ in conditions known to you, we did not point out the following negative facts:

The constant tendency to use the VJ outside the system's institutions; the separation of VJ units from the Yugoslav army; the attempt by unauthorised persons to command VJ units, passing over command levels in official conversations with VJ members; conducting personnel policy on an unlawful basis and without criteria; financial expenditures outside the law" and so on. ⁴⁹³⁹ Then it gives some typical examples: "The tendency to use the army outside the system's institutions." It says that the state -- The situation in Kosovo and Metohija could have been overcome if a state of emergency had been declared when written proposals had been sent, which had not been accepted.

And over the page to B, setting out a request to the government to ensure legal definitions, the proclamation of one of the following: A state of emergency and material and financial conditions. Then it goes on to say: Using the VJ in this manner is untenable for three reasons: The army is not being used adequately and the effects are minor; true goals not being achieved; and we are being accused of behaving as traitors. The use of the army in this manner has been noticed by observers which may provoke reprisals from the international community and NATO.

The proposed solution was to use the VJ lawfully and, "The position is clear to us," this part concludes, "but we must have a legal political decision."

And 2: "Separation of units from the VJ. You have decided to separate the Guards Brigade from the VJ," and the suggestion in the letter is that that's not lawful and that the decision should be annulled. Attempts by -- 3, attempts by unauthorised persons to command VJ units. Then this: "Constant aspirations by members of the MUP to have some VJ units subordinated to them leads to misunderstandings if the units are not given, and if they are given, this represents unauthorised and unprofessional use which has counter-effects, the best examples being ^{4940 BLANK PAGE 4941} Decani and Orahovac."

"B, attempt by civilian members of the staff to command the corps. The responsibility of the Corps Commander is to evaluate the situation, plan operations for the VJ and the MUP in cooperation with civilian members of the staff and the MUP, and report to Sainovic and Minic." And then it goes on to say: "In practice, the commander of the Pristina Corps plans what he is ordered to do, which is at the request of Sainovic, Minic and the MUP, and is then turned in to their service for planning and realisation. Since it is his wish, like the wish of us all, to realise the plan if others cannot or will not do it, he does it with the Pristina Corps units, which leads to illegal, unsystematic and inadequate use of VJ units, thus violating the system..." and so on. And the proposal for this part of the letter is to disallow command of the VJ outside the system of military subordination and unity of command and that the third army should set up a forward command post in Pristina.

4: Passing over command levels and official conversations with VJ members, the letter says: "According to VJ service regulations, you have the right to conduct official conversations with all members of the VJ, however you sometimes do this without the knowledge of the Chief of the General Staff, contrary to military subordination and unity of command. Violation of these principles leads to the break-up of the unity of the VJ. Proposal: Respect the principles of military subordination." 5: Conducting personnel policy on an unlawful basis and without criteria. Sets out: "Generals and colonels are often promoted at the VSO ⁴⁹⁴² and outside VSO on an unlawful basis, without decrees or criteria, which has far-reaching negative effects in the VJ."

VSO, please, Mr. Tanic? What does VSO stand for?

A. The Supreme Defence Council.

Q. Thank you. It's not on our list of acronyms, I don't think. It goes on to say: "Necessary to respect the laws, decrees, and criteria for promotion." Over the page in the English: "Each institution depends on the main elements of the system," and sets out what a general should be and proposes refraining promotion of colonels and generals to higher ranks if this is not in agreement with the law.

And 6, financial expenditure outside the law. "You often order me to give up movable and immovable property for the needs of the MUP on the basis of the SRJ law on property. Neither do you have the right to order me nor do I have the right to carry out orders regarding material payments." The solution proposed: "Direct such requests to the legal owner of the property, namely, the government."

Then various concluding paragraphs which we can read rapidly to ourselves, with the concern that if the proposals made aren't met, second to the last paragraph on the English version of that page,: "Otherwise, this sole highly functional Yugoslav institution will turn into a non-functional and disunited amorphous mass."

The rest of it we can read. Just a couple of comments from you on what we've been looking at. Can you help us? We saw reference to the Guards Brigade. Can you help us with the significance of that, please, if any? ⁴⁹⁴³

A. The Guards Brigade was singled out to be under Mr. Slobodan Milosevic's personal command in order for them to carry out orders that the army would not have carried out because it would have implied illegal use of force.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please speak slower.

MR. NICE:

Q. If you could speak a little more slowly, Mr. Tanic. I know you're getting a bombardment of instructions as to how you should give your evidence. A little more slowly, please. Bombardment from me. I'm not describing anybody else's addresses in those terms. Similarly, any significance in the reference to civilians giving instructions? Can you deal with that, the civilian staff?

A. Well, that pertains to this private chain of command that went through the personal representatives and envoys of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic. These were civilians who were engaged in the staff for Kosovo, or rather, in the commission for Kosovo. The army cannot receive orders from civilian persons.

JUDGE KWON: The exhibit in Serb, you said it's the original one. So is this the copy -- photocopy of the original letter or is it printed again?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is a photocopy of the original letter, but probably adjusted for printing purposes, because it was written on A4 because that is the official format for official communications, A4. ⁴⁹⁴⁴

JUDGE KWON: So is it that Mr. Perisic kept this letter after he had sent this letter to Milosevic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course he kept a copy. That is official documentation. It can be seen from the letterhead and the number and also it says "confidential," and also the official channels through which it was sent. The Chief of General Staff has the right to retain a copy of such official documents.

JUDGE KWON: Did he serve as chief of the staff of the army later on, after he sent this letter to the accused?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, for another three and a half to four months, I think.

JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

MR. NICE: We'll be coming to the end of Perisic's engagement in due course. But I think it may be that what His Honour would like to know just a little more in detail is this:

Q. When Perisic showed you a document, did he show you his own copy that he had retained or did he show you a copy that had already been published in somebody else's book?

A. No, not then. This copy was not printed in any book. He showed me his very own copy, two or three years before it had been published in any book.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just to go back to the first typical example given, the chief of staff says that the situation in Kosovo and Metohija could have been overcome if a state of emergency had been declared, as indeed he had recommended. The witness is not a lawyer, but ⁴⁹⁴⁵ would he be able to say, briefly, how the declaration of a state of emergency would have made the difference? Does he have any knowledge of the powers that would be available to Mr. Milosevic in a state of emergency that would have been critical in that situation?

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Tanic, you've heard --

JUDGE ROBINSON: If he doesn't have that knowledge, then he need not answer.

MR. NICE:

Q. You've heard the question and its limitations. Can you help His Honour? You've touched on it to some degree, but can you help a little further?

A. I assume that I can be of assistance, but it is up to the Trial Chamber to decide whether I'm capable of doing it or not. According to our constitution, Mr. Milosevic would not have any greater or lesser powers if a state of emergency had been declared in a regular way through the Assembly of Yugoslavia. The problem lies elsewhere. If a state of emergency had been declared by the Assembly of Yugoslavia, it would have had to be preceded by a serious national debate as to whether there was really terrorism in a part of the country to such an extent that it did necessitate the use of the army and the police, or was this not the case. So then we would have had an in-depth discussion as to whether the problem of terrorism in Kosovo was really so great or whether it was just blown out of all proportion, fabricated, whatever.

On the other hand, the declaration of a state of emergency also ⁴⁹⁴⁶ makes it incumbent upon the president of the republic, in this case Mr. Milosevic, to take other political action, and this would have prevented the voluntaristic and non-selective use of force. This is the way I see it and this is the best I can do in terms of assistance.

Q. Just a couple more questions arising from the document we've been looking at. VJ equipment going to the MUP - just, again, yes or no to this question - do you know the involvement, if any, of the accused in the decision that VJ equipment should go to the MUP? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you learn that from the accused himself, from documents, or from being told about it by an individual?

A. Not from the accused personally. I didn't find out from him directly. I found out from talking to the leaders of the SDB, politicians, and through my insight into certain documents.

Q. Well, then, in those circumstances, can you tell us, please, what from those sources you understood to be the involvement, if any, of the accused in the movement of VJ equipment to the MUP.

A. To the best of my understanding, the participation of the accused, Mr. Milosevic, was crucial.

Q. All right. Let's move on, but we may return to some of those topics when they become relevant in later passages.

JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.

MR. NICE: I'm so sorry, yes.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit 150.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this this book? ⁴⁹⁴⁷

JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this book becoming an exhibit?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

JUDGE MAY: The letter, for the moment, is an exhibit. If you want the book -- just a moment. Let the accused see the book if he wants to see it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am asking whether the book is an exhibit, because I see that this is a book that is called "Fire and Flood," published in Belgrade.

JUDGE MAY: I'm going to have the book passed over to you. You can have a look at it and you can address us on it in due course if you want.

MR. NICE: I'm checking whether I have it available in the building. If I do, I'll make it available, I hope, by the break. If not, we'll try and get the book -- we'll find a source for the book and try and get a copy as soon as we can.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well. Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Paragraph 77, and it's just the middle -- sorry, 78, and let's take the Court to the source of the evidence that is to be given. Just yes or no to this: Did you have a conversation with somebody which touched on the business of orders being given in 1998 to local commanders in Kosovo? Did you have a conversation with somebody about that topic? Just yes or no.

A. Yes. ⁴⁹⁴⁸

Q. With whom did you have that conversation, and when?

A. The leadership of the state security and my political colleagues, the president of my party. This was an entire series of talks with regard to that.

Q. And were these conversations you had contemporaneous with events or were they after the event, when you were preparing your book?

A. At the same time, contemporaneous. And later on I could only compare certain things.

Q. What was said to you about the giving of orders to local commanders?

A. I received information from several sources, completely identical, that practically the so-called State Commission for Kosovo, consisting of seven or eight persons, commands over the situation in Kosovo. This is a parapolitical body which practically goes beyond the legal authorities of Yugoslavia and this meant carrying out Mr. Milosevic's personal will regarding the non-selective use of force, for unpurposeful means in terms of using force.

Q. We'll come, then, directly, I think, to the body you've described as the State Commission, paragraph 83, over the page in the summary. When was this body formed; who, in your understanding, were its members?

A. In my opinion, it was formed at a very early stage, during the first third of 1998. And the members of this commission, that has nothing to do with my opinion really, it's a question of knowledge.

Q. I was going to interrupt you to invite you not to give us your opinion, which is exclusively the province of the Judges; just to tell us ⁴⁹⁴⁹ what you learnt at the time, as a matter of fact. But I interrupted you. The commission was formed early, and it comprised whom?

A. Sainovic, Minic, Andjelkovic, Matkovic, the civilian part. And then the military part, Generals Pavkovic and Velickovic. Probably there were some other members, but these are the members that I know for sure, persons who I know for sure were members of the commission for Kosovo.

Q. When you speak of Markovic, which Markovic are you speaking of? What's his first name?

A. Matkovic. Matkovic.

Q. And his first name?

A. Dusan, I think.

Q. Very well, I misheard. Can you tell us now a little bit about something that's been referred to but occasional, something called Horseshoe. Again, not opinion; just facts, please. Was there a plan that went by the name of Horseshoe?

A. Not in that sense. This was a colloquial nickname for a completely different plan.

Q. Just so that we can understand the colloquial nickname, can you help us at all with when the name was first used and applied -- when it was first used?

A. I know what the plan meant. Now, when the term was used first, I really can't say, especially as it was the colloquial term applied and not an official one.

Q. What did it mean?

A. It was an exercise plan of the Yugoslav army while it was the JNA, ⁴⁹⁵⁰ the Yugoslav People's Army, and the plan provided for training and exercise in case of an aggression on Yugoslavia from south-east Europe, and if the Albanian population should take the side of the foreign aggressor, then it would come into force. The army of Yugoslavia would come into force if these two conditions were met. They would take seven defensive positions and they would be geared towards neutralising the Albanian strongholds, and this exercise -- this plan was actually stored in an archive and then it was reactivated and would be reactivated with all the rest for taking action in Kosovo.

Q. The seven defensive positions, can you -- are you in a position to list them, and if so, would you rather have a map to point them out for us?

A. When we discussed this, I had this jotted down in writing, but as I haven't got the right to have my notes with me, I'm afraid that if I speak off the bat, I might make some mistakes. But they were seven directions making this semi-circle, and I think that those exact directions, the seven of them, are contained in my statement.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, we can see the ones that have been set out in paragraph 85, at the top of page 15. I don't know if the Chamber would want to see those places, if I'm allowed to refer to them, on a map. We can either use the map that's at the front of the atlas --

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I find it useful.

MR. NICE: If I can just make mine, I think, available. This may do. It may be too big for the overhead. But if you can just look at this. I'm just going to read you some -- ⁴⁹⁵¹

Q. Would you point them out with the pointer, please, Mr. Tanic. First of all, there's the -- something called -- well, that's Mount Deravica. Can you just point that out for us?

A. I do apologise, but if the Court agrees, I'm not a military expert and I'd prefer not to indicate something on the map that I haven't already practiced.

Q. Very well. I'll abandon that exercise.

MR. NICE: We can see how he lists it and we can get somebody else to do it maybe later. Thank you very much, I'll take the map back.

Q. Now, do you know, one way or another, whether there was any intention or expression of intention at the time, the time of this conflict, to have anything to do with the Horseshoe plan?

A. Well, quite simply, the basic purpose and intention of that plan was altered. There was no foreign aggression, and the Albanian population did not take the side of a foreign aggressor.

Q. Mr. Tanic, back to where we were. Just yes or no: Was there any intention or expression at the time to have anything to do with this plan? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Was there general acceptance of its appropriate -- of its being an appropriate plan or not? Did anybody resist its use? Paragraph 87.

A. As far as I know, the peaks of power in the army and the security structures.

Q. Did they accept it or did they reject it?

A. No. They didn't want to use the plan at all, because there was no ⁴⁹⁵² external aggression or Albanian rebellion, or rather, that they should take the part and go to the side of the foreign aggressor, because it didn't exist.

Q. And from where did you learn that they were rejecting the use of such a plan, or from whom did you learn that they were rejecting the use of such a plan?

A. From the army leadership. I would prefer not to mention any names. I don't want to harm those people, because many of them are under pressure anyway. So could we deal with it in a different way?

Q. Very well. Let's move to paragraph 88.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. What's the objection?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My objection is that the witness must answer the questions asked. What does it mean if he can say some nonsense like this and then he says that he can't tell you who he heard it from?

JUDGE MAY: That's a point you can make in due course. You can ask him again in cross-examination and we'll decide what to do about it. Meanwhile, the witness can go on in the same way.

MR. NICE:

Q. Paragraph 88, and this turns to the topic His Honour Judge Kwon was asking you about a little earlier. Were there some personnel changes at a very high level in the autumn of 1998? And just list them, please, for us.

A. Yes, there was. After the signing of the agreement between Mr. ⁴⁹⁵³ Milosevic and Mr. Holbrooke on a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Kosovo, the military-political agreement, and the chiefs of the Security Services of Serbia and the Chief of the General Staff were replaced later on, Mr. Stanisic and the whole group of the leadership cadre. And Mr. Perisic as the head of the General Staff.

Q. They were replaced by, and just give us the names of those who replaced them. Perisic was replaced by --? Paragraph 90.

A. General Ojdanic.

Q. And before we move from him, how had he ranked before this appointment? What were his political associations, if any?

A. I apologise. As to rank, I don't answer the question -- I don't understand the question. And as to his political connections, as far as I know, he was strongly connected to the JUL party. I can't tell you about rank.

Q. Very well. Stanisic's replacement was whom?

A. Mr. Radomir Markovic. We referred to him as Rade Markovic but his full name is Radomir Markovic.

Q. What had been Radomir Markovic's previous political associations, if any?

A. Very close personal ties with Mr. Milosevic and his family. Otherwise, before that, he didn't deal in any intelligence work but in the classical police force, or rather, the public Security Service, the public police force.

Q. Thank you very much.

A. SJB, as we call it. ⁴⁹⁵⁴

Q. Yes. And then Dimitrijevic's replacement, can you help us with that?

A. I'm not quite sure.

Q. Very well.

A. And I don't want to give you an incorrect answer.

Q. Paragraph 91. In 1998, did something happen in relation to what I think you described as economic materials in Kosovo? Just tell us about that.

A. Well, economic materials was the term I used, and it relates to movable and immovable property, if I understood you correctly. Is that what you were referring to?

Q. Yes.

A. If they were material -- economic materials, yes, then that did take place.

Q. And what sort of materials are you talking of and what time are you talking of, so that we can see how far it was before NATO's intervention.

A. Well, there might be a misunderstanding, but we'll be able to ascertain. If we're talking about allocations for Kosovo, then immovables are combat vehicles belonging to the artillery, light artillery, tanks, and that is the materiel, in fact, of the army that must not be used against civilians because in this case the Albanians were citizens of Yugoslavia. If that's what you mean, combat resources. Now, if you're referring to economic material of a different nature, we could perhaps clarify that too. ⁴⁹⁵⁵

Q. Gasoline reserves?

A. Yes. I assumed that there was a misunderstanding. That's right. For several months before the conflict with the NATO pact, fuel, strategic fuel reserves, they were transported to lesser reservoirs all over Serbia, both belonging to military and economic organisations. So the strategic fuel reserves were transferred to other places several months before, between the conference in Rambouillet, or rather, the Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement and the conference in Rambouillet.

Q. Thank you. Yes. Paragraph 94, conversations you've had, but I want you to move carefully and listen to the questions carefully, please. Vladimir Stambuk, remind us of his position at the time.

A. Vice-president of the government of Serbia, one of the vice-presidents, actually.

Q. Now, did you - just yes or no - did you have a conversation with him in I think 1998 about the problems with Kosovar Albanians? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Where and, so far as you can be precise, when?

A. The conversation was between the British ambassador, Mr. Donnelly, the German ambassador, Mr. Gruber, Mr. Stambuk and myself, and this took place on the premises of the German embassy, and I think that that was two weeks before the Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement, perhaps ten days prior to that, a brief time before the Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement.

Q. Very well. The topic of the conversation, in the most general terms first? ⁴⁹⁵⁶

A. The topic of conversation was how to avoid NATO intervention against Yugoslavia, because at that time the danger already loomed over the country that the intervention might take place, and could Holbrooke prevent this intervention? Those were the general lines discussed. Or rather, whether a Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement would come into being at all to prevent the intervention, to be more precise.

Q. In other words, I think a particular observation made by Stambuk that you can tell us about in the course of that conversation?

A. Yes. Mr. Stambuk did make an observation which I heard from others as well. I quoted Mr. Stambuk by way of one example. He made the observation to the two foreign ambassadors, ambassadors of NATO-pact countries, that official Belgrade had nothing against a small-scale bombing operation by NATO, and of course I reacted to that.

Q. Did he go on to qualify and explain what would happen at all, if there was a small bombing operation?

A. Well, he didn't carry on his explanations in the face of these two ambassadors, the ambassadors of Great Britain and Germany, because I asked him to go to one side and to stop that kind of conversation, and then he explained it to me. The explanation he gave was -- actually, I asked him how was it possible for any official - and as we knew each other, I was free to ask him that - any official to say that official Belgrade had nothing against a limited bombing? That kind of observation was completely taboo because that means an invitation to them to bomb.

Q. I'm going to expand on the answers, because we just want an account of what was said. So you made those observations to him, and ⁴⁹⁵⁷ what, if any, further explanation did he give to you?

A. Well, he answered me by saying that I didn't understand certain things, but the president of my party, Mr. Mihajlovic -- that is, he said that a small-scale bombing would be a great pretext and alibi for us to continue with the persecution of Albanians and the Serb opposition as well, because in times of war, nobody can ask anything. So he advised me to convey to the president of my party that we go back to the ruling coalition and to stop resisting attempts of this artificial construction of a war conflict.

Q. You've used in your evidence the phrase "continue with the persecution of Albanians." Obviously it's a long time ago, and don't guess if you can't, but can you help at all with exactly what he said about the Albanians and/or persecution of them?

A. Well, he said to finish ethnic cleansing, to have a pretext for completing the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians or to throw them out of the territory of Yugoslavia, and I heard words to that effect from others as well, mentioned in other documents, irrespective of my views and opinions.

Q. You say in relation to that last topic but also the earlier topic about the acceptability of --

A. To that effect about other nations as well.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter corrects herself in the previous sentence.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. I'll repeat my question, then. You say in relation to the last ^{4958 BLANK PAGE 4959} topic but also in relation to the earlier topic of the acceptability of small-scale bombing, that others said similar things to what Mr. Stambuk had said. Can you give us the names of any of the others who said such things, either at this meeting in the embassy or elsewhere?

A. Well, this is a very large group of people, from Mr. Milovan Bojic to Mr. -- that is to say, various people from the SPS, leaders, Mr. Milutinovic himself. I just can't enumerate all these people, there were a lot of them. And they were all closed talks. They all spoke about this little bit of bombing as if this wouldn't make a problem. Of course, not in their public statements, but in their private conversations. Not only then but on many other occasions as well.

Q. Paragraph 96. There's a man called Bogdan Tomas. Who was he in 1998? What was his job?

A. Could I ask us to leave this question for a private session, to protect these people? Not because I don't wish to answer, but I don't wish to place anybody in a precarious position. These people are in a sufficiently precarious position already when they want to say what happened.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I put that on one side, then, and come back at the end to a collective, if there is to be any private session, a collective private session? And that, I think, will take care of 97 as well.

Q. You may have touched on this yesterday, but just tidy it up, if you wouldn't mind, today: Did you get to learn of the accused's attitude towards information gathering on the KLA generally and about his attitude ⁴⁹⁶⁰ towards the surrender to this institution of any who had committed crimes against the Serbs? Just yes or no to that. Did you get to learn of his attitude?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. From where did you learn of his attitude? From him himself or from others?

A. From others.

Q. Give us the range of people and their jobs, if you can, from whom you learned of his attitude.

A. The leadership of the security structures, the military leadership, the socio-political structures, and I can name them at a private session. That will be no problem.

Q. What was the accused's attitude towards learning about the KLA and handing them over to this institution?

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, this is important evidence. I think better that you come back to it.

MR. NICE: Certainly.

JUDGE MAY: We'll consider the whole question of a closed session in due course.

MR. NICE: In that case, I think, although part of 1998 may be separable, if I just come back to that generally. We can then go over to page 18, and I think probably it will be better if I deal with this major element on page 18 later. I'll come back to that, but not in closed ⁴⁹⁶¹ session, Your Honour, but I think in open session, but I'll come back to it.

Paragraph 101.

Q. Now, did you learn of the conduct of certain operations against the KLA in 1998, and in particular, of one involving the Jashari family? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any pattern -- according to your information, was there any pattern in the way some of these operations were mounted, in particular, in terms of the size of the initial action taken against the KLA?

A. Yes. There was a terrible pattern in opposition to everybody -- anything that could be read in the leadership of the army, et cetera.

Q. The pattern that you identified or that's been identified was what?

A. This pattern consisted of the fact that they should allow a smaller number of Serb victims first in order to raise tensions, and then to launch a massive non-selective use of force against the Albanian population much greater than would be necessary for eliminating the rebels and to destroy civilian lives and civilian buildings. This pattern, not only with the Jashari family was used, but in Decani as well, with certain variations. But usually it was the overly great use of force and unselective use of force, which was contrary to the rules and regulations of the police force as well, the rules of service of the police force and the laws generally. ⁴⁹⁶²

Q. Now, you've given the pattern. We'll come back to the two particular locations you've identified briefly in a few minutes. But as against this, and from your understanding of the Security Service with which you had contact, what was the appropriate way to deal with terrorists who would be in a civilian community? Paragraph 105.

A. Well, it's not my understanding. There is procedure that is prescribed, and that procedure, combat procedure, that's what I'm talking about, not legal procedure. Combat procedure was dovetailed with the law and ascribed in the rules of services with respect to the deployment of the services, at all attempts to divide civilians from terrorists, particularly under circumstances where we know that many terrorists do have, as a rule, resort to using civilians as a human shield or things of that kind. There are technical means and logistics to combat that and the equipment of our units. After that, what is done is to arrest them at all costs rather than killing them, and you can carry out arrests in various ways. You have combat means for effecting an arrest and taking people into custody, but at any right, the mass use of force against civilians would be --

Q. I think that's enough. And just this last question from paragraph 106. Were units at that time available equipped with the necessary materials and equipment to deal with terrorists in this proper and formal way?

A. Nor were they equipped with the materiel, nor did they have the necessary cadres, and so those were one of the criticisms that Stanisic and Perisic made. ⁴⁹⁶³

Q. It may be my misunderstanding.

A. They were criticised for.

Q. Did the units at that time have, for example, tear gas or material like that that might have been usable against terrorists in a controlled way, of the way you've explained a few paragraphs before?

A. Yes, they did, in their warehouses, but they didn't use them, and that's why the misunderstanding came about. They didn't use them on the terrain, in the field. They did have all the equipment necessary and logistics, theoretically speaking.

Q. Thank you. Now, you've given two examples, Jashari family and Decani. As to any detail of what happened at either of those events or incidents, what was your source of information, in general?

A. Well, once again, the leadership of the State Security Service and the army, and this can be brought up at a private session. And some people who were there on the spot as well.

Q. But passing beyond your sources, then, to what they told you, who did you understand to be in charge of these missions at those times?

A. Well, we first discussed the problems at length. They didn't tell me that once, we had an ongoing discussion about that kind of problem.

Q. You're not listening -- you are listening. It's my mistake for not getting the question properly. Who in the leadership was in charge of these missions that bore this characteristic you've described? Paragraph 102.

A. Well, to all practical terms, it was the civilian part of the staff, and this is mentioned in General Perisic's letter as well. To all ⁴⁹⁶⁴ practical purposes, it was that part that conveyed orders from Mr. Milosevic and his closest associates, not from institutions, but from them as local commanders, according to my information.

Q. And can you give us the names of the civilian individuals who were responsible for these particular missions?

A. Well, mostly it was Mr. Nikola Sainovic's name that was mentioned.

Q. Anybody else?

A. And Mr. Vlajko Stojilkovic as well, but the gentleman has died since, so I don't like to ...

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't know if that would prove to be a convenient moment.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. I'd be grateful for your assistance. Perhaps you can reflect on it during the adjournment, and also the amicus, is the course which we should follow with this evidence. Some of it's important but based on sources which either are not given or are said to be given in private session. The question is the value of that evidence and whether it should be admitted at all. But perhaps you would reflect on it. We'll adjourn now. We're going to adjourn, Mr. Milosevic. We'll hear you afterwards.

We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.

--- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, I should have explained this to you, since you may not have followed the procedural argument, that the question of naming any names is a matter on which you will be guided by counsel, and ⁴⁹⁶⁵ in due course it may be the Trial Chamber will have to make a ruling on the subject, but you'll be told what to do and what your position is.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply did not understand that, and that is why I asked for instructions.

MR. NICE: I don't know if the Court wants to discuss the utility of a private session now or whether we should get through the rest of the evidence and deal with it all at the end.

JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with the evidence.

MR. NICE: I have a copy of the book. It's actually a private copy of Mr. Shin, but he's prepared to make it available if not to donate it to the greater good. It's the only copy we have got at the moment, so can I make it available so the accused can look at it?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: I've flagged it, or rather, Ms. Graham has flagged it at the two letters that are going to be produced. We can consider its status as an exhibit or whatever later.

Q. Paragraph 107. No. That falls for the same consideration later, I'm afraid.

Let's move on to paragraph 108, to events during the NATO bombing. Did you, in the course of the NATO bombing, have any face-to-face meetings with the accused?

A. There was communication with the accused, through official channels.

Q. But did you have any face-to-face meeting with him, at receptions and things of that sort, in April of 1999? ⁴⁹⁶⁶

A. Not a meeting that could prove anything. The accused is denying everything. I cannot prove this. I can prove all the rest. So let that be my answer to this question. Indirect communication through official channels, communications between the governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia respectively.

Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm just going to press you. The question of how things are proved is a matter for the Court really. Just yes or no: Did you have conversations with the accused in April 1999?

A. During the spring of 1999, yes, on a very brief occasion.

Q. Whereabouts?

A. I repeat: It is quite hard to prove that now, and I would kindly ask that, if possible, this also remains for this other part, when these specific matters will be dealt with, names and things like that.

Q. Very well. Paragraph 110. In the course of the NATO bombing, the -- did you learn - just yes or no - about some of the things that were happening in the course of the bombing; for example, deployments of the armed forces, aircraft -- anti-aircraft positions, that sort of thing? Did you learn about any of those sorts of things?

A. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Personal insight.

Q. What appeared to be the main strategy about, so far as an approach to NATO was concerned, from what you understood?

A. On the basis of what I understood and found out, the main strategy was to procrastinate as much as possible and to extend the war with NATO for as long as possible, to the detriment of own country, and then the civilian loss of lives and the civilian destruction would constitute a ⁴⁹⁶⁷ kind of moral victory over NATO, and that strategy was clearly enunciated. That can be proven as well.

Q. Very well. I think 113 will fall in the same category probably as some of the earlier passages. But over the page: Did you have contact with the Russian foreign minister at the time?

A. No. I beg your pardon. This must be a mistake. In everything I said, there was not a single indication that I could have had that kind of contact.

Q. Very well. My mistake. Yes. We'll have to move on from that, I think.

As to civilian buildings, what happened to civilian buildings - paragraph 115 - in the course of the conflict?

A. Well, they were used for military purposes, and this was unauthorised. I'll give an example. I'm talking about the command of the town of Belgrade, the city of Belgrade, which was at two different locations. I personally saw this. I can mention both locations. There is no problem with that. The elementary school of Sveti Sava in the street of Marsala Tulbuhina and also the department store company in Marsala Tulbuhina Street as well. They are very close to one another. The one is a civilian company, the other an elementary school. And the command of the city of Belgrade was relocated to these locations and the officers who were in command of the city of Belgrade for long periods, during the day wore civilian clothes. And then tanks for a while, they were deployment around the church of Sveti Sava, Saint Sava, and then when people started complaining about this, then they were moved from there. ⁴⁹⁶⁸ But as for the command, the headquarters of the defence of the city of Belgrade, I personally saw where they were relocated.

Q. Paragraph 117. RTS, Radio Television Serbia, did you get some information about that?

A. Yes, I did have information about the bombing of the RTS building with two days before and two days later, and I communicated this through official channels to the command or defence, or rather, to Mr. Milosevic, who at that time was the supreme commander of the defence, so he had to be informed, and I have doubt that he must have been informed. The building was not evacuated and civilians were left there on purpose so that they would lose their lives, and I know that there were several sources of information with regard to this RTS building bombing.

Q. The SDB, did it have information about future targets other than whatever you may have acquired from somewhere else? Did it have other sources of information?

A. Yes, there were other sources of information, two or three different types of sources of information, quite valid, without any kind of espionage involved. I'm not referring to that.

Q. And was this continuously provided to the accused or was there any change in the pattern of provision to him, as you understood it?

A. He absolutely had to obtain this information, and his behaviour showed that he did have this information and that sometimes he would evacuate the population and sometimes he would not. It depended on what was useful for him. Also this refers to goods, property, not only the population. ⁴⁹⁶⁹

Q. Did the SDB continue to provide him information throughout the war or not?

A. Yes, yes, absolutely.

Q. Your role at this time was to do what, and on whose authority?

A. According to the decision or opinion. Please take into account one of these two wordings. The opinion or the decision of the united defence of the town of Belgrade and the SDB. I went abroad twice during the war. I cannot call this being sent out on official business, but the explanation was that I should do my best, depending on the people I know, to investigate, to investigate - I emphasise that word - the possibility of bringing the conflict with NATO to an end as soon as possible.

JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... to an end. Mr. Nice, I'm concerned about this evidence, based on what are described as sources. And the question really is: Of what value is it to the Trial Chamber to have evidence of that sort?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. That, of course, falls for determination when we -- in part when we look at the next thing. As to this particular passage of evidence, he's told us what he was doing. I now need to know on what authority he was doing it and then we come to another concrete piece of evidence.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: At this stage, I think we're in a slightly different territory.

JUDGE MAY: Very well, but if you would stick to the concrete for the moment and in due course we can consider the rest of it. ⁴⁹⁷⁰

MR. NICE:

Q. Mr. Tanic, you've told us what you were doing. You were abroad on official business, investigating the possibility of bringing the conflict to an end. Whose authority was it that you should do that?

A. The united staff of the defence of the town of Belgrade and the State Security Service. There was no way of leaving Belgrade during the war for private purposes only.

Q. And you were able to leave Belgrade to do the functions that you've described; yes?

A. Yes. Yes. But being officially seen off and met by the Security Service at the border with Hungary, and that is where I left the country, and there are official records of that. So this was an official procedure.

Q. Very well. As a result of those missions, or that mission, did you have any proposals that you were able to advance?

A. Yes.

Q. One or more than one?

A. One. One. It was one proposal that was figuring prominently throughout this time. Various variations of it, but basically one proposal.

Q. And when did that proposal come about, first?

A. As far as I know, mid-April 1999, at the latest, to the best of my knowledge.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, there's a letter that we may be able to produce from Mr. Lilic to the accused. ⁴⁹⁷¹

Q. Does that letter have a bearing on this potential agreement, or is it a reflection of it?

A. I did not understand this question as being addressed to me.

Q. Yes, it is addressed to you. There's a letter --

A. I'm sorry.

Q. There's a letter from Mr. Lilic in May of 1999, and does that bear out what you're saying about the offer of an agreement that you came back with?

A. Yes. Yes, it does bear it out. The spirit and many concrete provisions of that proposal as well.

Q. Now, that letter is in the annex or the appendices to the book that we've just provided to the accused. Had you ever seen the letter before seeing it in that book?

A. No, and I did not see the letter in the book either. I found out about it from an interview that Mr. Lilic gave to the weekly called Vrema, about three months ago, and I saw that it coincided to a great degree.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm proposing to deal with that letter at a later stage in the evidence, by another witness.

Q. But can you tell us, just in the shortest possible form, please: What was the agreement that you -- what were the elements of the agreement that you were party to proposing?

A. No. No. I was not putting it together. I did not have the mandate to put anything together. The elements of this agreement were the following: The unilateral ceasefire of all combat activities of the army of Yugoslavia and the special units of the MUP for a 24-hour period, ⁴⁹⁷² except for cases of self-defence. After that, the suspension of combat activities of NATO for a period of 24 hours. And then a longer unilateral ceasefire by the army of Yugoslavia and the combat units of MUP, except for cases of self-defence. And a longer suspension of bombing by NATO. In the meantime, the urgent initiation of political dialogue with Kosovar Albanians, specifically with Mr. Rugova, about resolving political problems related to Kosovo. The Pristina Corps remains in Kosovo, and peace troops enter Kosovo and they possibly -- no, not possibly. They do cooperate with the Pristina Corps. And then after a lasting ceasefire and after a peace agreement is reached, then the economic community would help the reconstruction of Kosovo and then peace troops would enter under the UN flag, and official Belgrade would be free to influence the composition of the peace troops of the UN in the following sense: That there would not be too many people from NATO countries there, so that this would be a bit of a face-saving formula for Yugoslavia.

That is, in rough terms, the content of the peace proposal, and there was not only one of them, and they were shown to President Milosevic.

Q. Thank you. Was there a proposal for a ceasefire on Catholic Easter, and was there a linkage of that, or temporal linkage of that, with the release of some American soldiers?

A. Yes. Yes, there was. That was also one of the variants of this plan.

Q. Was that discussed by you and your party leader Mihajlovic, and did that lead you to making a telephone call? Yes or no. ⁴⁹⁷³

A. Yes.

Q. To whom was the telephone call made?

A. First we addressed a proposal in writing to Mr. Milutinovic, and then, after that, the president of my party spoke on the telephone to Mr. Milutinovic in connection with a reply to that letter.

Q. Were you in a position to hear one side or both sides of that telephone conversation?

A. Both. Both. It's no secret; the speakerphone was on.

Q. What was said by Mihajlovic to Milutinovic and what was said by Milutinovic in reply?

A. Well, first of all, Mr. Milosevic clearly made it known that he would accept a ceasefire for Catholic Easter, and it is not only that we knew about it, but also Mr. Sedano [phoen], the Secretary of State of the Vatican.

Q. [Previous translation continues]... background. You really must focus on the questions. Thank you.

A. That's right.

Q. The phone call now, please: What was said?

A. Well, quite simply, our question was: Why was there no ceasefire for Catholic Easter when it was promised? Because Catholic Easter was already in the past. And also, the freeing of the three American soldiers.

Q. The reply?

A. Well, the answer that Mr. Milutinovic gave was that he said there would be a ceasefire but a little later on, because he said we - and he ⁴⁹⁷⁴ meant Belgrade - we have not finished the job done there yet, meaning Kosovo, and that it would take place for the Orthodox Easter.

Q. This is how much later?

A. He wasn't specific, Mr. Milutinovic. He said, "We haven't finished the job down there in Kosovo yet, and once we do finish it, then we'll see to it."

Q. Thank you. I think at one stage you had a conversation with the president of the Assembly, Tomic, about the peace negotiations of which you were aware. Just yes or no: Did Mr. Tomic seem aware of those negotiations at all? Had they been communicated to him?

A. Yes, but with others too; Vuk Draskovic, in the first place, who was the vice-premier. Perhaps there was a mistake in my basic -- that is to say, technical mistake, because there was far more communication with Mr. Draskovic as the vice-premier of the Yugoslav government at the time, but also with Tomic, yes.

Q. Paragraph 131. No. Paragraph 131 will have to come later, if at all.

Paragraph 137, just a few odd details now, please, Mr. Tanic. The Republic of Serbian police, did they have any particular characteristics? Did they have any particular source from which they were drawn which would identify them in a particular way?

A. Could you repeat that question and be more specific? I'm not quite sure I understood it.

Q. Yes. The Republic of Serbian police, how integrated were they with the other agencies of law enforcement? How separate were they? ⁴⁹⁷⁵

A. The composition of the public Security Service was integrated. However, the composition of the specialised units were not integrated into those basic forms. But I still don't think I've understood your question fully, at least not precisely enough to give you a full answer.

Q. I'm not going to pursue the matter. I'll move on to something else.

The control of the MUP -- no, I think you've actually dealt with that already. That's paragraph 138.

Paragraph 148. Special units, again, then, picking up on that. Did you see anything of those special units yourself at the time with which we're concerned?

A. Well, yes. The special units and the police, they were referred to as the JSO.

Q. Did you learn - just yes or no - by whom they were controlled?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. In particular, by whom they were controlled when they were operating in Kosovo?

A. Mr. Milosevic, using his private chain of command through Sainovic and Rade Markovic and Vlajko Stojilkovic.

Q. Paragraph 149. Did you have any conversation, I think, with Perisic about these units? Yes or no.

A. Could you be more specific once again when you say "special units," because there are special units both in the army and the police force.

Q. Very well. ^{4976 BLANK PAGE 4977}

A. It would be difficult for me to discuss special police units with Perisic, for example.

Q. That is my error, I think. Can I come back to it? Did you have a conversation - yes or no - with Perisic about military equipment going to the police? Just yes or no.

A. Yes. Yes. Yes, absolutely so.

Q. When did you have that? Was that contemporaneously or was that more recently, when you were sourcing material for your book?

A. It was at the time when I was preparing the material for my book and comparing my knowledge from the previous times with that of Mr. Perisic.

Q. Just yes or no to this: Did Perisic tell you something of Milosevic's attitude towards this topic? Just yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Last line of paragraph 149: What did he tell you of Milosevic's attitude?

A. Well, similarly to what he had written in his letter. Let me be precise: That Mr. Milosevic kept asking him that the military equipment be issued to MUP units and that that military equipment would be used in combat operations, and Mr. Perisic, for many reasons, which he set out in the letter and one which he explained to me, was the deployment of this against the civilian population. There is no rule and regulation for this to be deployed and used against the inhabitants. And I'm referring here to heavy military materiel, equipment.

Q. Any reference or consideration given to how the personnel would be ⁴⁹⁷⁸ dressed?

A. Well, there was mention of tanks, combat vehicles, infantry ones, and grenade launchers, 120 millimetres and over. And as I was told, Mr. Perisic said that that was absolutely impossible, and Mr. Milosevic responded to that and said that this would not be used by the army but by the police, so there was no danger of having the army blamed for it.

Q. Were local commanders, in your experience and understanding, able to arrest special unit members for wrongful acts?

A. Of course. Members of the reserve force as well. They also did that.

Q. In the course of the war, in general, what did you observe about the output of the local media, newspapers and so on?

A. Well, I noticed a whole series of incorrect information put out, information which fanned the flames of war and masked the true results of the combat operations of the war; and this was true throughout 1998 and 1999. I'm talking about the official media.

Q. What sort of distortions were there?

A. As to the number of terrorists, for example, they were exaggerated, and the peaceful solutions were diminished. Our own victims were made less of, and generally, the whole operation was masked. So that kind of distortion, more or less, a distortion of the actual situation, in fact.

Q. Last paragraph. Some graves, mass graves, were found in Serbia. Did you have a conversation with someone about them?

A. Yes. ⁴⁹⁷⁹

Q. Who was that?

A. Well, first, in the summer of 1999, when I was preparing my book and when we researched into the Serb and Albanian victims - where they were, where they could be found - and the second time was --

Q. I asked you who it was.

A. I do apologise, but I'm a little confused now. Do you want me to answer now or can I ask to answer this in a private session, if we're going to have one? If not, then I can give an answer. There's no problem there. I don't wish to refrain from answering, I just want to see whether we're going to have this in open session or in closed session.

Q. Obviously, I would prefer, if this is a name you can give publicly, that you give it publicly. Is there any reason not to give this name publicly?

A. Well, all right. Very well. I won't be jeopardising these people, because there was an official investigation. Zoran Mijatovic, deputy head of the Security Services of Serbia, Dusan Mihajlovic, the Interior Minister of Serbia.

Q. What did Mijatovic say about these mass graves that were found?

A. That there was an official investigation conducted by the MUP which indicates exactly the perpetrators, the locations, the sites themselves, but that for some reason that investigation was stopped. Otherwise I myself, when I was kidnapped, was exposed to torture --

Q. I'm coming to that in a minute.

A. -- linked to the mass graves.

Q. Yes. I want to know a little bit more about what you learnt about ⁴⁹⁸⁰ the mass graves. There were mass graves. Mijatovic told you about it. Was there any connection made between those graves and any other finding or occurrence at that time?

A. Not only Mr. Mijatovic, but Mr. Mihajlovic as well, the Internal Affairs Minister. They merely told me the results of the investigation, as far as it had got. Now, could you clarify what you mean by the connection?

Q. Had a vehicle been found in the Danube River? Is there a connection between one and the other?

A. Yes, a vehicle had been found in the Danube, at a place called Vitusi Puteljak, near Tekija, and it was a vehicle which Mr. Keta took from the customs department and gave to the units of public security to transport the bodies, just prior to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

Q. What did Mijatovic tell you about all this? And then we'll turn on to the circumstances of your leaving Yugoslavia. What did Mijatovic tell you about all this?

A. Well, quite simply, that -- actually, he didn't tell me his opinion, but the results of the investigation, that there was a clear connection between Mr. Milosevic and the order to mask -- cover up the graves, and that these bodies had been brought in before the NATO intervention and that the origin of those bodies, unfortunately, was that in the units of Sreten Lukic and not the state security of Serbia, and that that is why a cover-up was under force, a cover-up for the truth and the mass graves, although our official organs were well aware of it. ⁴⁹⁸¹

Q. Were these the only mass graves of which you learned or were there others?

A. No. I just discussed one. I didn't have the psychological strength to go into the others.

Q. Sreten Lukic at the time the head of the MUP in Kosovo; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. We'll come back now, then, to deal with the circumstances in which you came to leave Yugoslavia. What happened to you?

A. Well, after I had started preparing my book and sourcing the material for the book linked to Kosovo and the crimes connected with Kosovo, a short time after that, and after my telephone conversations had been intercepted and that they came to learn that I was preparing a book which would be expounding the kind of things I am saying here today, I was quite simply kidnapped in the street, and two hours later so was my wife, at the beginning of October 1999.

Q. How long were you held for, altogether?

A. We were both kidnapped, drugged, and taken to two different private prisons, where we spent two days each, my wife and myself, that is.

Q. What happened to you in prison? I don't want to distress you and we don't need to go into it in great detail, not because it may not have been --

A. No, and to save time too. But it was torture of the Latin American variety, from administering injections to being beaten up, to be suffocated, and I'm building up this source and these materials for my ⁴⁹⁸² book, but I don't want to present them all. But there was an attempt to show a sort of non-existent international plot and conspiracy against Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.

Q. And the -- were you questioned?

A. If you can call it questioning, if beating with a sack over your head and being drugged can be called questioned, then I was questioned. That's how I was questioned.

Q. And what was the topic of the questioning? What was its apparent direction?

MR. NICE: Your Honour, this is page 18 of the summary. I'm sorry not to have directed you to it earlier.

A. Well, it was geared towards knowing why I was investigating this, the Serb graves and the mass graves, why I was in contact with the SDB, do I really want to write this book, and so on and so forth. And around public -- private matters of that kind.

Secondly, we discussed the investigations. That was the reason for my being tortured, because they wanted me to acknowledge the so-called conspiracy against Mr. Milosevic, his private security, and so on, British conspiracy, and that I had contacts with intelligence services. And then they tortured me and my wife and wanted us to say that it was -- we were engaged in espionage. Now, we managed to survive this torture. I was drugged, my wife was not drugged. She was only beaten. And then the next stage of the investigation took a somewhat different turn. In that next stage, these individuals said that they were the people who wanted to overthrow Milosevic, in fact, and that everything ⁴⁹⁸³ I went through was in fact a test on their part to see how fit I was to survive and that they wanted me to link them up to the people from the British intelligence service so that we could cooperate to toppling Mr. Milosevic.

Q. You were released. How much longer after your release did you stay in Serbia at that time?

A. Well, I was released two hours prior to the abortive attempt to assassinate Vuk Draskovic, and I stayed on for another month.

Q. And then eventually you were able to leave the country?

A. Yes, legally, because I saw that a killing was being prepared this time.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think I'm going to pause there, and perhaps we can deal with the other topic in general. Might it be convenient to deal with that itself in private session? Because names may get mentioned. The argument about the admissibility.

JUDGE MAY: I think the matter should be dealt with, if possible, in public, because it's a matter of principle, without mentioning any names. If you want to refer to the statement, perhaps that would be a convenient way to deal with it.

MR. NICE: My notes would suggest that this issue relates or would become relevant to page 2, paragraph 3. Now, I'm not sure about that one. That's the one I'm not sure about. I've got an annotation at the foot of paragraph 3 which may relate to this sort of material. And then the rest of the material turned up today, and I have annotations starting at page 17, paragraph 96. 97, 98. Then at page 20, paragraph 108. ⁴⁹⁸⁴

JUDGE KWON: How about paragraph 87, page 15?

MR. NICE: I didn't note that one at the time, Your Honour.

JUDGE KWON: If you could check it out later.

MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. Now, it seems to me that when we come to page 17 -- I've dealt with 17. When we come to page 20, the issue arises in a similar way in respect to paragraph 113, but rather differently in relation to paragraph 108.

I'm passed a note that Your Honour is quite right about the earlier page, paragraph 87.

Paragraph 113 is the usual problem. Paragraph 108 I think is a different problem, because paragraph 108 is not dependent upon anxiety about the well-being of others, and it's a matter perhaps for the witness to give further explanation of his reasons for not wishing to give this evidence publicly. It may be convenient if I asked him about that once more, so that we can understand the difference.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE: So that he can understand the difference as well.

Q. Mr. Tanic, as you realise, the Chamber is about to consider evidence that turns on what you were told by other people, you being concerned to protect their names in order to protect them from risk. Now, before we come to deliberate -- or before the Chamber comes to deliberate on that and to hear argument about it, there's another passage of evidence which related to the conversation or encounter certainly you had with the accused in April 1999.

What's your reason, so that we can have it, for preferring to give ⁴⁹⁸⁵ that evidence in private session, given that you've said everything else you've had to say about the accused publicly and given also that, as we know, you're protected in these proceedings by facial distortion in order that your future security may be properly preserved? So what's your concern about the evidence in April 1999?

A. It is my overall relationship to the Tribunal. I wish to show maximum respect. Mr. Milosevic rejects everything I say, beginning with my very existence in these affairs onwards. So I'm ready to give the Tribunal just those statements which I can confirm by at least two or three independent sources, so that it becomes quite clear that --

Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm going to stop you there. It's the Tribunal and the lawyers who address it who decide issues of law, sufficiency of evidence, and matters of that sort, not for you. So the question is quite simple. There's no reason not to give that evidence; if you don't wish to give it, just say you don't wish to give it, and then we'll move on, but there's no reason in what you've advanced for not giving the evidence. Are you prepared to give that evidence?

A. Well, not because there is official communication with Milosevic at that time. That is sufficient for public -- for a public statement, public testimony. Nothing changes in this communication. He did the same thing he did in the private communication, which I can't prove. So it's the same thing. I have not cut short this information to the Tribunal.

Q. Very well. Are you prepared, then - it's for the Tribunal to weigh - are you prepared to tell us what was said at that meeting in April 1999, please? ⁴⁹⁸⁶

A. I am prepared to state what was said in official communication with Mr. Milosevic, and that is the same substance as the other kind.

JUDGE MAY: It is pointless going on fencing like this. Let us move on.

MR. NICE: Yes, certainly. Well, I think that comes to an end of that paragraph.

Paragraph 113 falls into the same category, the general category, and page 131 [sic] certainly, and I think that's all I have. The Tribunal is in a position to provide closed session under -- or in camera proceedings under Rule 75, subject also to Rule 79, and Rule 79 is fairly narrow. It deals with closed session for public order or morality. Safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness is provided in Rule 75, or the protection of the interests of justice, which is rather more broad. It may be that it's the protection of the interests of justice that is one thing that the Chamber should have in mind in considering the present position.

When we come back to 75, making sure it hasn't been amended, because I still haven't got an up-to-date version with me. I'll read from the amended version:

"A Chamber may hold an in camera proceeding to determine whether to order..." and then "(i) measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or the whereabouts of a victim or witness or of persons related to or associated with a victim or witness by means such as..." and then it runs through protective measures not including closed session. ⁴⁹⁸⁷ And then without listing a series of criteria, identifies (ii), "closed session in accordance with Rule 79." And then (iii), "appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses, such as one-way closed-circuit television." So that looked at in the most technical sense, simply because Rule 79 is not given further criteria in Rule 75, the category of persons identified in 75(B)(i), which is inclusive of persons related to or associated with a victim or witness might not, prima facie, cover this particular circumstance, although if it would be appropriate, and we would invite you to say it really must be, to incorporate that wider reasoning for closed sessions, then it could be. And in any event, the interests of justice -- it's not described as the interests of justice, it's described as the protection

of the interests of justice -- would allow what this witness seeks. He seeks to be able to give his evidence in certain particulars, withholding from the full public scrutiny the names of people from whom he derived information. The names will, of course, be known to the accused and may be provided by the accused to those assisting him in the preparation of his defence as to the amici, and in those circumstances, there is no unfairness on the accused. His rights are fully preserved. He's able to cross-examine. It might be necessary to have discrete areas of closed session or private session testimony for the cross-examination, but he's quite able to deal with the case, and there is no loss to him. The witness's concerns, of course, reflect that there are others who may hold views contrary to his, who may be concerned by illegal means ⁴⁹⁸⁸ to thwart these proceedings, and who would thus pose a very real threat to sources of information upon which he acted. The Court knows of the concerns we've had about the dissemination of information, but so far, apart from the matters I've drawn to your attention in the past, nothing further has come to light. And now, of course, the accused's assistants are committed to the Rules of the Tribunal. So there's a realistic prospect of material heard in private session not leaking out, and the accused has told you himself on an earlier occasion that his word is enough for these things and he doesn't have to be bound by your Rules. So that the witness identifies a real distinction between what is provided here in -- or could be provided here in private session, to make the trial fair, and what could only be provided, in his judgement, publicly, at risk to those individuals. My understanding is that there have been earlier occasions of selective private-session evidence being held, I think once in the Tadic case.

JUDGE MAY: That's not a difficulty. We can order part of the evidence to be given in private session.

MR. NICE: I was saying also for the protection of people other than witnesses, although I think in the Tadic case it was probably for a relation. And with this sort of case and with these sorts of issues, although we are doing everything we can to ensure that everything is given in public in this case, this sort of evidence, which is potentially valuable or very valuable to the Tribunal, does expose certain individuals to risk.

Now, there's, of course, a difference between -- and it's a ⁴⁹⁸⁹ difference that the accused has himself really articulated - between naming the people, whether they are named as co-perpetrators or whether they are simply people closely associated with government at the time, and he's named those entirely straightforwardly. There's a difference between those people and the functionaries who don't fall within those categories, who may not themselves be associated with any wrongdoings of the kind charged here but whose provision of information to this witness, in the public good, could be deeply damaging to them. And so we would invite you to say that it's entirely proper, for these comparatively limited number of instances, to allow private-session testimony, in both direct and cross-examination, for the Chamber in due course to decide what weight to place on that evidence if it decides that there is any diminution in its value by reason of its being in private session.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, wouldn't you say that the Rules are primarily designed for the protection of victims and witnesses and that insofar as the protection of other persons is concerned, there would be a higher threshold to be met to gain that protection?

MR. NICE: I'm not sure that I'd agree with the second proposition, although I think the first proposition is clearly right, because the Rules, when they were being drafted, probably had victims and witnesses more specifically in focus. But I would respectfully doubt whether a court would operate on a higher threshold of safety or danger -- a higher threshold of danger or lower threshold of safety, if it was aware that testimony was about to be given which would expose someone to real risk. ⁴⁹⁹⁰

JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you know, one reason for the higher threshold might be the availability of reliable evidence to the Chamber. That evidence would certainly be easier to get in relation to a victim and witness than in relation to other persons. So it's a question of how will the Chamber be satisfied as to the need for protection of a person who is neither a victim nor witness? So it's a question of evidence to satisfy the Chamber, and it seems to me that it would be much easier to get that evidence in relation to victims and witnesses.

MR. NICE: Well, that's a different proposition, and I think the threshold of evidential material may typically be different. Yes. I don't necessarily disagree with that. But it's the very nature of the material that the witness is providing here that would - and we can see it from the summary - which would point to the obvious danger that providers of that material might be in, given the nature of people who still hold very strong views in a country that has, as we know, quite a high level of crimes recently associated -- killings, indeed, recently associated, or comparatively recently, associated with these events. People have disappeared, and, as we know, people have been shot, and so on, for one reason or another, but it's of that sort of country. So if we look at just one or two of the particular passages, and I think probably page 17 is as good as any, without going into the detail of either the sources or the topics upon which they were providing information to this witness. Paragraph 96, but perhaps more particularly, 97, one can see particular places referred to. And then I think also if you go over to page 107. ⁴⁹⁹¹

JUDGE MAY: The paragraph?

MR. NICE: I'm sorry. Paragraph 107, page 19. And then finally, page 22, paragraph 131. One can readily imagine how people providing information on those topics might very well be at considerable risk from the intervention of others but how their provision in private session will mean that the accused is well able to conduct and have a fair trial. I think that's all I can say on it.

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.

MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honour. This is an issue where we should look at the Rules first of all. I note His Honour Judge Robinson's observations about Rule 75, which does seem, on our reading, to be a provision more directly connected with protection of victims and witnesses. When one looks at 75(B)(i), again victim or witness or of persons related to or associated with a victim or witness, looks rather to deal with more of a witness's personal situation as he finds himself in a courtroom at that time, the protection of others who are close to him. And we would say that this provision is more specifically designed for the witness who comes from a place where his family is, his associates, people related to him, could in some way be affected by his giving particular evidence. That isn't the case here with this particular witness and his circumstances. It is not the normal one and would fall outside Rule 75 in its general application. We say it's more Rule 79 issue that the Prosecution are bringing here, relying more upon the protection of the interests of justice.

This is an issue where an accused is entitled to have evidence ⁴⁹⁹² which a witness gives in public and to be accountable for that which he says. Reliance upon sources which are not identified publicly does put him at a disadvantage, although the names may be given in closed session and identities able to be investigated by his associates in preparation of his defence. This kind of material can also help an accused if it is made public, because others associated with these events and information at the time are able to scrutinise what is said and able to offer themselves to a defendant as witnesses on his behalf if they disagree with what is said. The equality of arms principle does, to a great extent, require, as much as possible, for a Defence to be in public so it is capable of being analysed by external sources, scrutinised, and witnesses to be held accountable for what they have said publicly. The difficulty is, with a closed session, that that becomes less likely and it can affect the equality of arms which the Court must seek to achieve in providing a fair trial.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

[Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, Mr. Tanic. You want to say something. This is really a legal argument, as you must understand, but if there's something you want to say about your evidence, you can.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I'm not going to interfere in the legal argument. This has to do with my evidence. I believe that this question is unduly hampering my testimony, and therefore I am prepared to state in public what I said I would like to say in public [sic] session. I don't want to make the work of the Trial Chamber, of the ⁴⁹⁹³ Office of the Prosecutor, more difficult, so I'm prepared to do that.

JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

MR. NICE: That's very helpful. I'll go back over those paragraphs. I do, for my own reasons, and in order to communicate something to the accused, need about 30 seconds in private session. It's got nothing to do with the current testimony, it has something to do with the witness. May I do that literally now, while we've broken the testimony?

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

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[Open session]

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.

MR. NICE: Right. Well, I think I'm going to go as swiftly as I can. We're going to revisit certain topics that you've given us some answers on earlier. Again, briefly, please, if you can.

Q. Paragraph 87, page 15. You spoke of the Horseshoe plan, and indeed you spoke of the peaks of power - those were your terms - who opposed it. Who were the peaks of power who opposed and refused to implement this plan?

A. The army -- the use of the army and police for these purposes were opposed by Jovica Stanisic, head of state security of Serbia, Zoran Mijatovic in the capacity of his deputy, that is to say, head of the centre of the services of state security of Belgrade. That is practically 80 per cent of the SDB. General Momcilo Perisic, in his capacity as chief ⁴⁹⁹⁶ of general staff. General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, in his capacity as head of the intelligence service of the army. It is known as the KOS.

Q. Thank you.

A. Then there are other persons as well. I'm sorry, there are other persons who also opposed this.

Q. Very well. Go on.

A. Then the leading persons in the operations of the SDB and the military security. Then -- I have to pull myself together in order to recollect all of this. Then politicians from the so-called Reformist Group within the government of Serbia, or rather, within the Serbian and Yugoslavia political scene. Mr. Zoran Lilic, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, Mr. Nebojsa Covic, people who were popularly known as the Reformists. That would be a group of people. Perhaps I've forgotten someone. It's a broader group but I really don't want to burden you with more of this. They always opposed this in a substantiated manner.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'd like to find out, if the witness is able to tell us, what was the basis for their opposition to the Horseshoe Plan, very briefly.

And just let me tell you: My recollection is that your evidence is that the essence of the plan was that if an aggressor attacked from a particular point, and if the Kosovar Albanian population supported the aggressor, then particular action would be taken. So the plan was really based on a hypothesis. So in the context of that hypothesis, can you help me as to what was the basis for the opposition to the plan?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I shall gladly answer, but I have to ⁴⁹⁹⁷ make a point. Horseshoe plan did not exist as an official name. I said that quite precisely. So there was an abuse of this old military plan for exercises and training. It was not a new Horseshoe plan. This was just a colloquial nickname, as I had put it.

And now I'm going to answer your question. The point of their opposition was that, first and foremost, there was no external aggression and therefore there was no Albanian population that sided with the foreign aggressor. Therefore, there was less need to use the army in such a large scale and all these special units.

Additional reason for their opposition was that the problem of Kosovo could have had been resolved through political means and through selective force, and that was something that was known two or three years prior to that, including me. I knew that. And this entire group, and I had opposed this, of course, at a lower level than the group of people I just referred to.

JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Nice.

MR. NICE: Thank you.

Q. Page 17, paragraph 96. You had started to tell us about knowledge of the detail of the KLA forces. How well was their strength known, and who talked to you about this in Belgrade in 1998?

A. Most of what I know, when speaking about the top echelons of the State Security Service, is based on working conversations. These are not private conversations or dinner-table conversation. This is with -- these are conversations with Mr. Zoran Mijatovic, the deputy of Mr. Jovica Stanisic, and also head of the State Security Services for Belgrade, and ⁴⁹⁹⁸ also with his other associates. I think that identifying this one name is sufficient. And this name became known to the general public later. It was mentioned that, according to the assessments of the MUP and the SDB, there were 2.000 terrorists at that time. Excuse me, Mr. Nice; which period are we actually discussing? 1998 or before that?

Q. When you went to Belgrade on leave in 1998, did you have conversations with someone about the strength of the KLA, particularly in Djakovica?

A. I'm sorry. 1998. I have to correct myself. The KLA was more than 2.000-strong. I was referring to the period 1997, 1996. I'm sorry. This was inadvertent. So as for 1998, I discussed that with the officers, or rather, the officials of the SDB. I mentioned one name. And also a man who was in charge of SDB operations down there in the region of Djakovica. His name is Bogdan Tomas.

Q. And what was he able to tell you about the strength of the KLA and about the Security Services' level of knowledge of where they lived and so on?

A. I have to insist upon the following: The question has to be a bit more precise. There is a great difference between the KLA in 1997 and 1998, and these mentioned persons held these particular offices in both years. Please make the question as precise as possible so that the accused, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, would not later abuse an omission made on my part. As I already said, in 1998, the KLA became stronger, but by then --

Q. We want to know what Mr. Tomas told you about his level of ⁴⁹⁹⁹ knowledge in relation to Djakovica.

A. First of all, we talked about the example of Decani. The centre of Decani was razed to the ground by a tank unit of the Army of Yugoslavia, around Easter 1998, under the pretext that they wish to do away with terrorist sniper nests. The special units of the SDB of Serbia knew about these sniper nests. The police could have done away with them without any army participation. Instead of that, the army came in and unselectively destroyed part of Decani, the old part, where Albanians lived, Kosovar Albanians, and this gave rise to ethnic tensions, and the terrorist nests were -- and the sniper nests were not demolished. And the State Security complained that this action was ineffective, and in response it was said that this was ordered from the top, and the shelling of Decani went on for days. I do not know who the military officer in charge of this particular operation was. And as for the -- all right.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, it's past the time usually for an adjournment. Are you going to be many minutes more, do you think?

MR. NICE: I think probably about five or ten, but no more than that.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on, then.

MR. NICE:

Q. So no sniper was killed. But generally, what did Mr. Tomas tell you, if anything, about his level of knowledge in Djakovica?

A. Perhaps some sniper was killed, but first and foremost, Mr. Zoran Mijatovic, who was the person in charge, told me that Mr. Milosevic would not allow the State Security Service to operate against the KLA leaders ⁵⁰⁰⁰ who were abroad, that they do not allow the electronic surveillance of the border, that also he was impeding active measures, as they were called, in terms of Albanian terrorism, also drug trafficking, and also that he refused equipment that was practically offered with a credit, that was entailed for border surveillance. So that he was talking against, but in practice that he was impeding actions aimed against terrorism. Because terrorists were not peasants; it was their leaders.

Q. We'll come back to this page, but paragraph 107 fits together with this. Did you learn anything about what had happened in Likosane and Prekaz? If so, from whom?

A. Yes, I did. In the village of Likosane, a patrol was killed, a police patrol, which was --

Q. You did learn about it. From whom?

A. Tomas Bogdan, Mijatovic. And when I use the term "the service," that's who I have in mind.

Q. And what were you told by them about what had happened in Likosane and Prekaz?

A. The results of the internal investigation conducted by MUP show that the situation was highly suspect, that the police units, our Serb police units in the village of Likosane -- that is to say, they were sent to Likosane, to the terrorist stronghold, which we knew existed, without the necessary equipment, vehicles, logistics, intelligence, and so on and so forth, and it was just as if you had thrown them to their death. After that, our police force, in their quest for the perpetrators, the killers, the Kosovar Albanian terrorists, killed a certain number of ⁵⁰⁰¹ people. The Jashari brothers set up barricades in their own house in Donje Prekaz. There were there with their families. And our police force was well aware of the age-old tactics of the Albanian terrorists and Muslims, that in any terrorist [as interpreted], they take a sort of human shield to protect them, both amongst their family members, their friends, and so on. So that is a very ugly thing, but it doesn't mean to say that you can kill them.

Now, our police intervened en masse, using force en masse, and along with the Jashari's who were killed, a large number of women, children, and civilians were killed, without any need at all. This gave rise to great concern in professional circles: the police, the army, and the Security Services, because we knew that this would give rise to the Albanians' wish to take their own back and to retaliate.

Q. Thank you. Let's just come back to paragraph 98.

JUDGE MAY: When you finish that, we'll adjourn.

MR. NICE:

Q. Was there an identified Albanian called Agim Ceku?

A. Yes. The Albanians were identified, several of them. Even when I wanted to learn information about them, I was prevented by people who were loyal to Milosevic in doing so. I mean Agim Ceku, Ramush Haradinaj, Hashim Thaci.

Q. Did you discover - just yes or no - the accused's attitude towards pursuing these people in order to hand them over to this institution, the ICTY? Did you learn about his attitude to those things? Yes or no.

A. Yes, I did learn about that, in a very drastic way. ⁵⁰⁰²

Q. From whom?

A. Well, first of all, from the leaders of the State Security Service, and then my example, through torture. Because one of the accusations against me and why I was tortured was what did I have to do to meddle into the investigations against the Albanian terrorists together with The Hague Tribunal? So I was beaten for two hours on that particular topic alone.

MR. NICE: I may have a few more questions, but it will only be a few.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

--- Recess taken at 12.24 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

JUDGE MAY: Yes.

MR. NICE:

Q. Paragraph 113, page 20. Now, just yes or no to these questions, please. Did you learn anything about the ordering of troops into the Djakovica region in June 1999 or thereabouts? Just yes or no.

A. Yes, but before June 1999.

Q. From whom did you learn what you did learn?

A. We're talking about the Easter of 1998, and it was Bogdan Tomas. Perhaps there was a mistake in the typing.

Q. No. It's because we're jumping around to tidy up matters that were left incomplete.

I'm now moving on to June 1999. During the NATO bombing. There may be some confusion in the typing, you're quite right. But did you at ⁵⁰⁰³ that time, June 1999, learn something about an occasion of ordering troops into the Djakovica area? Just yes or no.

A. Yes, but before June. That's the mistake. In June it was almost all over. I do apologise.

Q. From whom did you learn that?

A. An officer of the State Security Service, Tomas Bogdan, was down there under direct bombing and was able to see what was going on and what was happening to the troops and how they were being sent off to die under the bombs.

Q. What was it that he was able to tell you about that?

A. Well, quite simply, he said that when they were bombing, it was as if the earth was boiling. That's how strong it was. That it was burning. And that without any need, after the bombing was over, the soldiers had been sent to take control of the fields where the bombing had taken place, and then NATO planes would turn up again and the army would lose their lives again. And the Chernomyrdin agreement was already known, Chernomyrdin-Atisari.

Q. Just yes or no to this: Did you learn what the troops were supposed to be doing in Djakovica? What was their purpose there? Just yes or no to that.

A. Yes.

Q. Was it from the same Mr. Tomas or from someone else?

A. Yes, plus subsequent sources afterwards.

Q. What was the purpose of the troops being there, as related to you by these people? ⁵⁰⁰⁴

A. To expel the Albanian terrorists from the areas in which they could return after the NATO bombing. Then a fresh bombing, fresh Serb victims, fresh expulsions.

Q. Next question: Yes or no, was Mr. Tomas able to tell you - just yes or no - who had instructed the troops to go there and do that? Just yes or no.

A. No, he couldn't tell me that. I learnt that in a different way.

Q. Without telling us the conclusion, how did you learn it? What was this different way in which you learned it?

A. In discussions with General Perisic later on, preparing the book on the sense of using an army under such circumstances, deploying the army under such circumstances.

Q. And from that source, as you understood it, who had instructed the troops or ordered the troops to go to Djakovica for those purposes?

A. Once again, the private chain of command, as far as I was informed. I can't confirm this directly, but it was the private chain of command, going down from Milosevic, via Sainovic, and Pavkovic, without any institutionalisation and conduct in times of war, or even as it was a war.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 131, page 22. Did you learn from any source about - just yes or no to this - who was instrumental in ordering or who ordered the operation in Racak? Just yes or no. Did you learn who ordered that?

A. Yes. Yes. Yes.

Q. Who informed you? ⁵⁰⁰⁵

A. Foreign source.

Q. Can you name the source?

A. I can't. I can name the public source.

Q. You say the public source. Who was the public source?

A. The writings of the press, just one paper, actually.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, those are not admissible.

MR. NICE: I'm not going to take that further in those circumstances. All right. That tidies up, I think, the paragraphs that we passed over. I have a couple of concluding question and one other exhibit that we must sort out from yesterday. Let's just deal with a couple of questions.

Q. As a matter of detail, when looking at the possible agreement that you've spoken of, had Yugoslavia itself participated in United Nations peacekeeping forces on any other earlier occasions, to your knowledge?

A. Yes, in the peacekeeping forces, for keeping the peace.

Q. As a matter of fact, do you hold any views about Kosovar Albanians or about Albanians or about their culture? Are you particularly fond of it? What's the position?

A. My personal one or the political one?

Q. No. Your personal one.

A. Very negative.

Q. Because, as a matter of fact, why?

A. Well, because they do represent a problem for the state and national interests of Serbia, not in the extent to which it is being viewed, but they do nonetheless, especially now. ⁵⁰⁰⁶

Q. Thank you very much.

MR. NICE: Thank you, Your Honour. That's all I want. Can I tidy up the newspaper exhibits that we produced or started to produce yesterday? I needn't go through them. The Chamber will remember that --

JUDGE MAY: Is this from the last witness?

MR. NICE: Yes. You'll remember the problem was that the original newspaper reports had been redacted, and it looked as though they had been redacted to excise the witness's name. And so we had unhelpfully redacted originals with redacted copies. I'm very loath to burden the CLSS with the retranslation of newspaper articles, so what I'm going to propose. If this is acceptable to the Chamber, that we hand in first for yesterday's exhibit the original, which has been underlined with wherever there's a redaction, and -- this is Exhibit 147. And even for those unfamiliar with the Cyrillic script, I think the name of the witness is clearly that which has been redacted. And so that will make sense, if it's necessary to make sense of the English translation. But underlined is "Ratomir Tanic" on several occasions. I think on one occasion his title may have been redacted as well. That's about it.

Then there are two other similar newspaper articles, and in this case I've presented them I think as - I hope I have - presented them as a clip of materials where there's the English translation followed by the original newspaper article with underlinings of the redacted passages, and the same for the other. I wonder if they could all become 147. There's no need for them to have a separate number. If that would be acceptable. There are therefore two more parts to 147. And with the leave of the ⁵⁰⁰⁷ Chamber, if we can save the further translation of the articles that have simply had the names redacted, I think that will save time and money.

JUDGE MAY: It may be helpful to have 147, 1, 2, and 3, so there's no confusion.

JUDGE KWON: And Mr. Nice, if you could tell us whether Mr. Tanic dealt with paragraph 108 in page 20 in full after he decided to give evidence publicly.

MR. NICE: I'll ask him once again.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we'll have the article dated 18 September 1996 as 147.2, and then the article dated 31 July 1997 as 147.3.

MR. NICE:

Q. My last question to you, Mr. Tanic, is this, following on from His Honour Judge Kwon's inquiry: In light of your willingness to give evidence publicly, are you willing now to tell us what happened at the meeting in April 1999 with the accused? Just yes or no. No explanation is required.

A. Yes, but with a correction as to the description. The description does not correspond entirely. That's probably my fault in describing this.

Q. Tell us when it was and what happened.

A. During April and May, four or five meetings were held. I'll have to take up a little more time, but I will try and be as concise as possible. So during April and May, there were five or six meetings held in Belgrade on the premises of the business club of the Novo Demokracija - the street is Majke Jevrosime Street - between the Italian ambassador, ⁵⁰⁰⁸ Amerigo Sessov [phoen], and Vuk Draskovic, the vice-president, the vice-premier of the Yugoslav government, the president of my own party, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, and myself. The purpose --

Q. Mr. Tanic, it may be that this background is going to be helpful. Our immediate interest is in what the accused said to you at a face-to-face meeting or a face-to-face encounter, however you describe it. If you can move there very swiftly and then answer His Honour Judge Kwon's or my inquiry with your evidence, please.

A. Well, that's what it's about. As we did not have a face-to-face meeting, there was a telephone conference, actually, and I'll take upon myself the responsibility. But I wasn't thinking of going into that, but into some other matters, and perhaps I did not devote attention to that. There was a personal telephone conversation, but not face-to-face, not a face-to-face encounter.

Q. What was said?

A. What was said was that, quite simply, there would be no ceasefire in the conflict for some time to come, that Serbia and Yugoslavia needed some more civilian victims. This was said upon insistence to bring the war conflict to an end as soon as possible. But nothing -- I don't wish to say anything else about that because there are other traces of that accusation against Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Who said that, and who was at the other end of the telephone?

A. In order to prove that NATO was a criminal organisation, at the end of the previous paragraph.

Communication between Mr. Milosevic and Draskovic; I heard that on ⁵⁰⁰⁹ the speakerphone. It was a reception, but it was our own reception. Now, may I explain the context of that, if the Tribunal wishes to hear it? Because the context is highly significant.

JUDGE MAY: No. But, Mr. Tanic, we do need to understand precisely what was said. The important part of your -- of this is the conversation. Now, do I understand this all right: There was a telephone conversation between Mr. Draskovic and Mr. Milosevic; is that right?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, on the open speakerphone.

JUDGE MAY: And you were listening in on the speakerphone and heard what you've described?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because it was held in the offices of our own party.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. You mentioned a reception. It might have been a mistranslation. Has that got any relevance?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a small reception that we held with the presence of the Italian ambassador, and we used that occasion to -- it was a small reception. I spoke of this superficially earlier on. And the mistake is mine. I wasn't going to talk about it in this way but in a different way. Now we've cleared that up. But the substance of it all is the same.

JUDGE MAY: Very well.

MR. NICE: Your Honour, that concludes all that I need ask this witness at this stage. I will be very grateful if before the close of today's hearing we can have an idea of how long the accused is going to want with this witness. The bulge or whatever it is of witnesses for next ⁵⁰¹⁰ week is very difficult to manage and it may be a certain amount of reordering, which I'll be able to give notice properly today or tomorrow.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, how long do you anticipate being with this witness?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, at any rate, quite a long time, more than Mr. Nice needed in view of the fact that the witness has provided a large bundle of papers.

JUDGE MAY: Yes. There's no need to go -- no need to go into the detail for the moment, we're just considering the timing.

MR. NICE: That's very helpful. It's probably sufficient for my purposes.

JUDGE MAY: Certainly tomorrow, I would think.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all day tomorrow would be less than Mr. Nice had.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you're going to begin your cross-examination of this witness. He has given a lot of evidence, evidence relating to you and evidence that will generally be considered of importance to the Chamber. In order to make the best use of your opportunity to cross-examine, I encourage you to keep your cross-examination as focused as possible, confining it to relevant issues, and resisting the temptation to indulge in bickering and perhaps even quarrelling with the witness, and certainly cross-examination should not be used to score points. I thought I should say that at the beginning of your cross-examination of this witness, whose evidence is of importance to ⁵⁰¹¹ you and to the Chamber.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as time goes, I'm going to bear in mind that I have less than 40 minutes left to me today, which means that tomorrow I would spend the whole day and on Monday. I would need tomorrow and the whole day Monday to cross-examine this witness.

JUDGE MAY: That is by no means certain. You will certainly have tomorrow. I have just noted that the Prosecution had four and a half hours. If you have the whole of tomorrow, you will have much the same. We will consider what progress is being made and we'll consider the nature of the examination to decide whether the examination will go on beyond tomorrow.

On one matter, Mr. Nice, a technicality: Can the witness be here next week?

MR. NICE: No difficulties of any kind. It happens I won't be here, I think, on Tuesday but I can be substituted.

JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll bear that in mind. Yes.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. That means that I have at my disposal the first day of the following week. Have we understood each other?

JUDGE MAY: No. That's precisely not what I said. I said you can have tomorrow, and we would then consider whether you can have any time next Tuesday, depending on how you get on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And are you bearing in mind the fact that Mr. Nice started yesterday, started his examination-in-chief ^{5012 BLANK PAGE 5013} yesterday at 20 minutes to 12.00, and that he had a full two hours yesterday?

JUDGE MAY: Yes, I've considered that. He didn't. He had an hour and a half. But let's go on rather than arguing about the time.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's move on to the cross-examination, then. But I would like to say that the very fact that the first Serb who is testifying here is a false witness, confirms my assertions --

JUDGE MAY: That is a comment. Now, if you have questions, ask them. That will simply lose you time.

Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

Q. [Interpretation] You claim that you were an associate of mine.

A. I apologise. I've never claimed that I was a friend and associate of yours. But due to force and circumstance -- that would be false testimony, if I were to say that I were your friend or associate. But the fact that I was an advisor to the president of one of the three coalition parties over a period of three or four years did bring me into a constant working contact with your policy, and from time to time with you yourself, because you saw that I made a list of very limited circumstances under which we met.

Q. All right. All right. We'll come to that, we'll clear that up.

A. So I was very modest in representing all this.

Q. Very well. Associate in the sense that you said that you got from me some guidelines for work, or that I followed or attended some work of yours. That's what you claimed; isn't that right? ⁵⁰¹⁴

A. I've been asked to wait for the interpretation. I said that on several occasions, as far as the work that I did, first of all on behalf of my party, as a member of the ruling coalition, on several occasions this was confirmed on your part, either directly, but much more frequently indirectly. So I never claim that I was your constant associate or friend, and I depicted this in a very modest manner, my working contacts with you in a very modest way. But the fact remains that we were in the ruling coalition of our three parties.

Q. I don't want to go into this coalition. You claim that you had direct contacts with me.

A. Yes. I'm waiting for the interpretation.

Q. Well, you understand Serbian, I assume.

A. Yes, I do understand, but for the purposes of the Trial Chamber and --

JUDGE MAY: You've got to remember that this has got to be translated, so leave a gap.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I have a question. I don't hear the interpretation, so I don't know when I can go ahead and speak or how long I should wait. That is a problem. It's presenting a problem.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. You claim that you were a member of the Novo Demokracija or New Democracy. Just yes or no.

A. Yes. ⁵⁰¹⁵

Q. Did you have a post in that party, a function of any kind? Yes or no.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me, but very briefly, why you think that I, in addition to 700.000 members of my own party, the socialist party, and 150.000 members of the left and other distinguished people in Serbia, why would I need to select you, to issue any tasks to you?

A. I didn't claim that you gave me any tasks. What I said was that you authorised tasks which I was entrusted with and which I performed in keeping with the ones that I was given by the president of my party.

Q. I see. So your president, your party president, gave you some tasks to fulfil. Now, did you ever have a meeting with me personally?

A. Yes.

Q. You said yesterday in response to a question from Mr. Nice that you had meetings with me frequently; is that right?

A. No, it is not right, because I enumerated the number of times I actually had meetings with you in response to Mr. Nice's question.

Q. All right. I made a note of that, and that's why I say that he asked you whether your meetings with me were frequent. You said yes. Then he asked you was it more than once, you said yes, and then he asked you how many times, and you said five to seven times. Isn't that right? Yes or no.

A. Yes, that is correct, and in my opinion, that wasn't frequent. Now, if Mr. Nice thinks it's frequent, well ...

Q. All right. You said five to seven times? ⁵⁰¹⁶

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. He asked you where. You said two or three times at a reception of the delegation of the Novo Demokracija, New Democracy, and two or three times at other receptions, receptions in the JUL party; is that right?

A. No. I was far more specific than that.

Q. All right. You can be provided with the transcript of what you said. That is what I jotted down and that's what it says.

A. Then you didn't make a note of it correctly, because I know what I said.

JUDGE MAY: The note which I have was: "Five to seven times, always in a working environment or at receptions. At two to three -- for instance, at two to three annual meetings between the parties, JUL receptions, or state holiday receptions."

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Very well. So those were those five to seven times; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right, just like the distinguished judge, Judge May, said.

Q. As far as I'm able to interpret this, you never had a personal meeting with me, did you?

A. You mean eye-to-eye, a tete-a-tete, just you and me?

Q. Any meeting.

A. I'm waiting for the interpretation. Each of these times there was a meeting between you and me, but never a tete-a-tete. There were always other people present. It was always a group of some kind. ⁵⁰¹⁷

Q. All right. Now, as you're talking about receptions in the New Democracy party, that these receptions were always attended by the media; the press, journalists, TV cameramen and so on. They were always recorded by the media?

A. Mr. Milosevic, I didn't mention a single reception of the New Democracy.

Q. You said meetings and receptions that the Novo Demokracija had on an annual basis with me.

A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, but they weren't receptions by the Novo Demokracija, they were meetings between the Novo Demokracija delegation and you in the building of the presidency of Serbia. There are photographs. This was photographed. I can bring you the photographs tomorrow.

Q. Yes, that's what I'm saying. How shall I put this? When the Novo Demokracija turned up, this was a numerous delegation; isn't that right? Yes or no.

A. I'm waiting for the interpretation.

Q. Oh, come on.

A. Sometimes yes, sometimes no.

Q. Very well.

A. At all events, it was always within a delegation. There was always a delegation, and a delegation implies many people.

Q. All right. Let's not waste time.

A. Well, we've already wasted time, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Do you know that at the receptions in JUL, the Yugoslavia United ⁵⁰¹⁸ Left, or state receptions, there were always over a thousand people; the diplomatic corps, representatives of the religious communities, prominent public figures and so on and so forth? Are you aware of that?

A. Of course. Of course.

Q. Now, receptions of this nature, the receptions at which over a thousand people take part, can they be considered to be meetings with me?

A. I described the circumstances very precisely, where there were short brief working meetings with you, Mr. Milosevic, at those receptions, because it was at those receptions, like any other head of state, that you used them to do some business, to hold working talks with some individuals. These were brief encounters, and I mentioned these encounters. I didn't speak of meetings. I was very precise. And when I mentioned your words, I never said that this was a meeting. I just said an encounter in which there was a relevant exchange of opinions. So could you consult the record for that. I don't want it to appear that I was saying something I wasn't.

Q. Well, you're representing everything that wasn't correct, because I didn't have working contacts at those meetings and receptions, and you said that the receptions were fairly rare anyway. So I never engaged in working meetings at receptions of this kind and therefore I could not engage in them with you. Now, did you, or how did you receive invitations to attend those receptions within the Novo Demokracija party's quota? You say you weren't a member of the leadership. You say you were an advisor to the president. So how were you invited to those receptions?

A. I beg your pardon, but these are three questions at once, if I ⁵⁰¹⁹ understand this correctly.

JUDGE MAY: Just answer the last one: How were you invited to the receptions?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was invited in writing within the quota of Novo Demokracija, and I never said that I was never an official of Novo Demokracija. I was first and foremost an advisor there, but I also carried out other duties, and I got invitations regularly and they do exist in the register.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. In the quota of Novo Demokracija.

A. Mr. Milosevic, I really am not involved in quotas here. I'm not dealing in quotas.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, there may be a temptation to argue with the accused. Would you resist it. Just remember, you're in a court, answering questions, and don't personalise it.

Mr. Milosevic, on your side, would you slow down when you're asking questions.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. My next question is quite brief. Did you represent yourself falsely here? I mean your capacity, not your name and surname, the capacity that you had. Yes or no.

A. No.

Q. Allow me to read something to you, and then I'm going to ask you for an answer to this question. This is what Novo Demokracija, that is to say, your party, stated yesterday, after your statement here: ⁵⁰²⁰ Novo Demokracija stated the following, your party. As you mentioned, its president is the current Minister of the Interior, that is to say, my political opponent, at any rate. So this is what it says: "The content of the testimony of Ratomir Tanic testifies to his attempt to construct a story in which Novo Demokracija did not take part in the way in which he has presented this, nor did he have the importance that he wishes to attach to himself. According to our knowledge, Tanic least of all could have been a partner to Milosevic in carrying out some kind of plan in order to restore to Kosovo its autonomy."

JUDGE MAY: We'll pause there.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Did you get interpretation of this?

JUDGE MAY: No, but we're going to stop anyway. Mr. Milosevic, what are you reading from?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This morning's paper. I'll give it to you.

JUDGE MAY: Which one?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just finish. Belgrade morning newspapers that I got.

JUDGE MAY: No. No. Unless there's a specific question, this is all comment by somebody else.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a specific question. Please. This is not a comment. This is an official statement of his party, and in relation to this official statement, I wish to put a question to him, and I'm trying to read it. It's very short. ⁵⁰²¹ "'Imagination does all sorts of things, and necessity even more, and we have understanding for the Tanic case,' was stated yesterday by Novo Demokracija."

JUDGE MAY: I'm not going to permit this. This is pure comment by a journalist or somebody putting out a statement. Now, if you've got a question, you can ask the witness a question rather than reading out this kind of thing from newspapers.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to read this to you. This is a statement of his party, a press release. It is not interpretation by journalists

JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. I'll consult.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, who wrote this article?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not an article. I told you: This is a press release issued by his party. This was issued by his own party. That's why I'm asking him about it.

JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter for a moment. Which journalist reported it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On this photocopy that I got by fax, there is no signature of any journalist. This is a daily newspaper called Blic, today's newspaper. A journal of this nature --

JUDGE MAY: Very well. It doesn't matter. I just wanted to understand the position. Now, what we're not going to permit is a lot of abuse, if that is coming. What you can ask the witness about is questions which go to his credibility. Comments like "imagination" and the rest of ^{5022 BLANK PAGE 5023} it are of no assistance to us at all and we're not going to allow questions about that. Now, is there something concrete in that that you want to put to the witness? For instance, that his representation of his position is incorrect. Now, if that appears, then you can ask it. But merely to read out a lot of comment about his evidence from whoever is not going to assist. Now, can you find a concrete question to arise from it?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am putting the question on the basis of a very brief sentence that is part of the press release issued by his party and which reads as follows:

"Therefore, we are unaware of his decision to testify about something that we do not know that he took part in." That's it. Could it be more specific than that? His party does not know about his participation in that.

JUDGE MAY: Well, that is the question. Now, Mr. Tanic, what he's put to you is that your party do not know about your decision to testify, and it's --

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no.

JUDGE MAY: And it's something that we do not know that he took part in. It's not at all clear what that means, but we'll allow you to reply.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I shall give a very simple answer. A party with a membership of 35.000 or 40.000 members cannot know everything that its top leadership does. That is one point. The second point is that many things that I presented here today are things that were unknown to the public of Serbia. Until now these ⁵⁰²⁴ were secret matters, as far as many politicians were concerned, as far as, unfortunately, many members of my party were concerned as well, because Mr. Milosevic concealed these facts so they really do not know about everything that I took part in. That is true. As a party, they do not know about everything that I took part in but therefore, the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, knows that full well and he knows that for two and a half years I have not been in the country and I never said that in this courtroom I represent Novo Demokracija. I said that I am a private person here, that after torture and after kidnapping, I have been an exiled person, so for two and a half years they haven't known whether I've been dead or alive.

Q. The question did not relate to your current status, that I also have my doubts, but their claim - and this is not a membership of 30.000, this is your party - that you are talking about something that they are not aware of your participation in, and you claim that you did participate in this. Is that right or is that not right?

A. Could you please tell me who signed this press release? I never said that I participated in this through them. This was in the president's office, Mr. Mihajlovic's office.

Q. And who was the president of the party?

JUDGE MAY: Both slow down for the record. Now, the witness, I think, has dealt with the question of whether the party knew or not. Have you got another question?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just ask him one more thing. How does he react to the fact that some persons that he mentioned ⁵⁰²⁵ yesterday in relation to the talks that he allegedly had with them sent letters this morning that they are challenging everything he said in its entirety? I have a letter of Ratko Markovic stating that he had no talks with him before going to Rambouillet, and --

JUDGE MAY: You can call Mr. Markovic. You can call him to give evidence and deny it.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I answer this?

JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, you can answer about Mr. Markovic, but shortly.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I didn't put a question.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My talks, my work, can be shown and proven through independent statements from at least three sides. Mr. Milosevic can seek these statements, and of course people now are going to deny, after this was said, that they had ever met me, because they will be afraid to go through the same things that I went through, an attempt of assassination, et cetera. I can always prove all my contacts from at least two or three independent sources.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you accusing me of some kind of an assassination attempt?

JUDGE MAY: Don't reply to that.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. All right. Since you won't let me show these other letters, I will go on, but please save my time and do not interject. What are you by profession? ⁵⁰²⁶

A. I'm a political emigre now, but before that, I was a businessman.

Q. And what kind of an education do you have? What did you train for?

A. I graduated from elementary school and I am literate.

Q. What was that?

A. I don't want to answer questions of this nature, because I already had them put to me in a basement while I was tortured by your men.

Q. I don't know who tortured you because you say yourself that these were people who were against me. I'm not going to go into all of that now. Now I'm putting a very legitimate question to you, because I'm trying to establish your credibility. What kind of education do you have? That is no secret.

A. I studied economics and philosophy, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Did you graduate?

A. That really is not for this Court to deal with, or is it for me to deal with. I don't really think I have to answer this kind of question.

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, is there any reason why you can't tell us that?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because I do not wish to do that, because I was not an expert witness here in order to have my education established. I said very precisely --

JUDGE MAY: These are some very basic questions. It seems to me there's no prejudice to you in answering them. Now, is there any reason at all why you can't tell us if you graduated or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course there is a reason, ⁵⁰²⁷ because why would I answer personal questions? The next question, then, is going to be my sock size. I didn't ask Mr. Milosevic what kind of school he graduated from, so --

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, you will answer proper questions and you will answer properly. That was a perfectly proper question. There's no reason the Court can see why you shouldn't answer. If you choose not to, the fact that you don't will be noted.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. I studied economics and philosophy, and as for the question where I graduated from and what kind of a degree I have, that is a question that I am unwilling to answer, and I hope I have the right to say that.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Therefore, are you an ungraduated student of philosophy and economics; one who has not graduated?

A. Well, that can be -- from my previous question, I said that I did not want to answer that question, and I don't want to answer it in any other way. I said nothing here to do with a diploma linked to the faculty of philosophy or economics.

Q. Right, so what you're saying is your education level is a secondary education level; is that it? A gymnasium.

A. No, I did not complete a gymnasium, a secondary school.

Q. What school do you have, then?

A. Secondary economics school. ⁵⁰²⁸

Q. All right, so secondary economics, school of economics; is that it?

A. No, that's not what I said. We would have to call in experts here to ascertain the level of education, and I don't wish to answer questions that have nothing to do with this trial.

Q. But they do have to do with this trial, because I'm trying to establish your credibility, and of course your answers here do that for me. Now, where were you employed and where did you receive a salary during the time you say you were performing all these tasks, doing all this work that you claim you were doing? During that time, where were you employed?

A. I received a salary and therefore was employed in my own enterprise, my own company.

Q. Where did you say? Where were you employed?

A. In my own company.

Q. Oh, your own company.

A. Yes. I had three companies.

Q. Your present job, does it entail the duty to give out insider explanations to this false accusation that has been raised here, false indictment?

A. No. I am not duty-bound with respect to this trial at all or with respect to any insider explanations or any other political obligations with anything that is false or true, nor do I know that this is a false indictment, as you have termed it.

Q. And do you understand that it is very easy to see how parts of the ⁵⁰²⁹ indictment coincide with the pamphlet you wrote on 30 pages, that you wrote in the form of your statement? Do you realise that?

A. If there is a coincidence, then probably coincidence of fact. I did not write the indictment, and I doubt that I am qualified to write it. We talked about that a moment ago. So quite certainly I did not study law.

Q. And do you know it is a generally known fact that the indictment was compiled in cooperation with the British service which you worked for?

JUDGE MAY: Totally irrelevant. Not for the witness to deal with. Next question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And is this fact relevant: The fact that Mr. Nice presented, which was that when the statements of this witness were made, that there were two members of the British intelligence service present. Is that a relevant fact?

A. Are you asking me or are you asking the Tribunal?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm asking the Tribunal.

JUDGE MAY: That is a matter you can ask about, yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, if you did not take part and cooperate in writing the indictment, why, then, would they change your identity and ensure a new country for you to reside in and spend enormous money on your protection programme, when you are allegedly testifying here to some generally known political matters?

A. I'm not testifying here on general political matters but very ⁵⁰³⁰ specific secrets which your regime tried to hush up, and they are providing protection for me, I assume, because with all their check-outs that they have done, they have established that I was at least the victim of torture, perhaps even an attempted murder, together with my wife, and people from the British intelligence service was there as security and not to tell me what to do or what to write. Because they did not know about many of the things that you did, so how could they tell me what to do?

Q. And how many people from the British intelligence service were present while you were making your statement?

A. First of all, I don't know whether they were people from the British service or from the British Security Service. There's a vast difference between the two. For brief periods of time, one person would be present for physical protection, and he was never present throughout nor did he influence the proceedings and statement in any way.

Q. I would like to ask you to answer my questions. Your opinions and your explanations are something else.

A. No, those are facts.

Q. Well, I'm not interested in them. Now, are you clear on the following: Do you know at least that in writing the indictment, the same individuals participated from Serbia who throughout all these years were the internal fulcrum for the media war against Serbia?

JUDGE MAY: The writing of the indictment is nothing to do with this witness. It's a matter for the Prosecution. So there's no point asking him questions about it. Now, have you got another question for him? ⁵⁰³¹

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Well, don't you think that, in fact, it is precisely by what you have written in your statement and through your oral testimony that in a way you have in fact confirmed that you are -- were one of the associates, in a way, in the writing of the indictment? Just yes or no.

JUDGE MAY: No. Not for him.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. And is it clear to you that you are appearing here in that so-called role of an insider, the role of an insider which you in fact did not have?

JUDGE MAY: That's a matter of comment too.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you understand that every literate citizen of Serbia can compare that, what you're saying here and what it says in the indictment?

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you are wasting your time and the time of the Court with these comments. Now, there are two minutes left. You can ask another question.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd like to move on to the point that was made about ethnic cleansing, but as you tell me that I have only two minutes left, then it would be senseless to go into that now, to move on to that area now. So let me ask one interim question, if I can put it that way, a brief one.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Why did you seek the status of a secret witness?

A. No, I did not seek for that, nor was it the status of a secret ⁵⁰³² witness. I'm here with my name and surname, Mr. Milosevic.

Q. Oh, come on.

A. How can I be a secret witness if I have a name and a surname?

JUDGE MAY: No. Just a moment. Just a moment. There's too much interruption going on.

Right. You've got one more question.

MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Q. Are you aware of the fact - let me rephrase my question - that until the day before yesterday, until the end of business the day before yesterday, you were before this illegal institution as a secret witness under the term K3, the code term K3?

A. That, Mr. Milosevic, is something I neither knew nor sought to know. And as I am testifying here under my own name and surname, I don't know that, and I'm here under my own name and not under some secret name. And you can sully the name as much as you like.

JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you want us to have the witness statement at any time, the statement of this witness, perhaps you could let the Court know and we'll have copies of them so we can read it over the adjournment, if there's some point you want to make on the statement. You can think about that.

We'll adjourn now. 9.00 tomorrow morning.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 16th day of May, ⁵⁰³³ 2002, at 9.00 a.m.