FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE U.S. ROLE IN IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA ("THE IRANIAN GREEN LIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE")
House International Relations Committee - October 10, 1996 - 104th Congress; 2nd Session


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 8, 1996, the United States House of Representatives voted to establish and fund the Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (the "Select Subcommittee"). The Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate and report on all aspects of United States government policy regarding shipments of arms and other assistance from Iran to the countries of the former Yugoslavia from September 21, 1991 until June 1996, the period in which an international arms embargo was in effect for the region. The scope of the investigation included the impact, if any, of such policy upon the safety and presence of United States troops stationed in and around Bosnia, the relations between the United States and its allies, and upon United States efforts to isolate Iran.


In addition, the Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate and report on communications and representations to the people and the Congress of the United States regarding such policy, the international arms embargo and United States participation in the international arms embargo. Finally, the Select Subcommittee was authorized to determine what actions were taken to review any of these matters or, conversely, to cover up such matters. In order to report its findings, the Select Subcommittee was empowered to review all relevant deliberations, discussions, and/or communications within the United States Government as well as all communications between the United States Government and other governments, organizations, or individuals.


The following Minority Views to the report of the Select Subcommittee are based upon a thorough review of thousands of pages of classified and unclassified materials made available by the Departments of State and Defense (including the National Security Agency), the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council as well as press reports, materials prepared by Congressional Research Service, and other material in the public domain. In addition, the staff of the Select Subcommittee interviewed and deposed approximately seventy current or former employees of these agencies as well as two foreign nationals. The Minority wishes to thank the individuals who were deposed and interviewed as well as the many employees of the United States Government agencies who spent countless hours identifying and making available relevant documents. In addition, the Minority wishes to thank the investigators detailed to the Select Subcommittee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their invaluable assistance.

Select Subcommittee Organization and Structure.


Legislative History.



On May 2, 1996, the Committee on International Relations (the "Committee") reported House Resolution 416 creating the Select Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia. The Committee also reported House Resolution 416 which, as amended, established a budget of $995,000 to be used either until the Select Subcommittee ceased to exist or immediately before noon on January 3, 1997, whichever first occurs. (564)

Legislative Mandate.



House Resolution 416 charged the Select Subcommittee with investigating the following:


(1) The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of arms and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "FRY") during any period that an international arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect.


(2) The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the FRY during the period that an international arms embargo was in effect.


(3) Any actions taken by the United States Government to facilitate or impede transfers described in the preceding paragraphs.


(4) Any communications or representations made to the Congress of the United States or the American people with respect to the matters described in the preceding paragraphs with respect to the international arms embargo of the FRY, or with respect to efforts to modify or terminate United States participation in that embargo.


(5) Any implication of the matters described in the first three paragraphs for the safety of United States Armed Forces deployed in and around Bosnia, for the prompt withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Bosnia, for relations between the United States and its allies, and for United States efforts to isolate Iran.


(6) Any actions taken to review, analyze, or investigate any of the matters described in the preceding paragraphs, or to keep such matters from being revealed.


(7) All deliberations, discussions, or communications within the United States Government relating to matters described in the preceding paragraphs, and all communications between the United States Government (or any of its officers or employees) and other governments, organizations, or individuals relating to such matters. (565)


House Resolution 416 contains a sunset provision providing for the conclusion of the Select Subcommittee investigation and submission of its final report within six months of the passage of the resolution, or November 8, 1996.

Treatment of Confidential and Classified Information.



The Select Subcommittee investigation of United States policy and actions in the FRY includes fact-finding with respect to policy deliberations, intelligence gathering (including sources and methods), highly sensitive confidential communications between the United States Government and the governments of other nations, and equally privileged communications among United States Government officials. The Minority believes the utmost care must be taken to avoid disclosure of confidential communications between United States and foreign government officials, policy deliberations within the United States government involving senior officials in communication with the President, and the sources and methods of intelligence gathering. For this reason, the Minority has prepared this Executive Summary in a non-classified format which will be supplemented by extended Minority Views in a classified format. The Minority also has rejected the view, espoused by some, that disclosure of highly confidential or classified information in the media and/or in Congressional hearings places such information in the public domain. Advancing such a view provides leakers of sensitive and classified information with the key to unlock such information at their own discretion, and robs the United States Government of its legitimate interest in protecting such information. Notwithstanding the need to protect material which is deserving of protection, the Minority expects the United States Government to exercise the classified application only in cases where the laws and executive orders clearly apply and to refrain from keeping material classified which is merely embarrassing.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS



The central issues of the Select Subcommittee investigation include whether the United States Government ordered, organized or otherwise encouraged Iran or any other country to ship arms to Bosnia; whether the United States Government

TEXT:


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


December 20, 1996



Dear Mr. Murray:


(U) This letter responds to the Select Subcommittee's request, contained in letters from Chairman Hyde of October 11, 1996, and Mr. Hamilton of October 15, 1996, that the executive branch review for classification the Subcommittee's majority and minority reports. The final version of the majority report was provided on October 23. The final version of the minority report is dated October 25. Supplemental information to these reports was provided subsequent to both final reports being received. On November 6, the executive branch also received from Chairman Hyde a request to review for classification a 26-page letter to the Department of Justice signed by the Republican members of the Select Subcommittee. As these letters correctly note the reports are lengthy (approximately 600 pages) and contain a great deal of classified information.


(U) In response to these requests NSC staff distributed these materials to designated representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, including component elements, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to maximize knowledge, save time, and in the interest of the addressing the majority and minority reports at the same time, the executive branch treated these requests as a single request. Classification/Declassification experts from each of these entities have now completed their review by portion marking each paragraph and footnote. Additionally, we have bracketed the specific portions of the text that are classified within each marked paragraph or footnote.


(U) The executive branch reviewed the document for classified information only. The executive branch review did not address the substantive content of these documents. Neither does this letter. Further, this declassification review does not constitute concurrence in the public release of any declassified information enclosed.


(classified data deleted) Due to the length of these reports, and the voluminous nature of the classified material contained in them, including sources and methods of intelligence that directly inform and provide for the safety of U.S. forces in Bosnia, the executive branch is not in a position to offer substitute language. This would require rewriting the majority of both reports. (classified data deleted)


(U) Executive branch review of the letter to the Department of Justice referenced above, indicated that one sentence on page 18 could reveal an intelligence source or method. With the inclusion of this sentence, the letter would be classified TOP SECRET/GAMMA. With the deletion of this sentence, the letter would be unclassified. The "classified attachment" to the letter should be marked TOP SECRET/GAMMA.


(U) The text of this letter is also being sent to Mr. Van Dusen.


Sincerely,


William Danvers


Special Assistant to the President


and Senior Director for


Legislative Affairs


Mr. Patrick Murray


Professional Staff Member


Committee on International Relations


Room 2170 RHOB


Washington, D.C. 29515-6128


Enclosure: a/s

One Hundred Fourth Congress


CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in


Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515


November 7, 1996



The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman


Chairman


Committee on International Relations


2170 Rayburn House Office Building


Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Mr. Chairman:


In accordance with H.Res 416 (f), directing the Select Subcommittee to transmit a report to the Committee on International Relations not later than six months after the date of the Resolution, please find enclosed a copy of the Select Subcommittee's Report, together with Minority Views. The Report was approved by the Select Subcommittee during an executive session on October 10, 1996.


I urge the Committee to review the Report carefully for matters that the Committee may wish to pursue further in the next Congress. I also believe the Committee should continue the Subcommittee's efforts to get the Executive Branch to declassify as much as much of the Report as possible without endangering legitimately classified information. Assuming the Administration is reasonable in its approach to declassification, it would be of particular value to the American people if the Committee were able to work from the redacted classified version to prepare a revised, unclassified version for public release.


Sincerely,


Henry J. Hyde


Chairman

(Unclassified when detached from Classified Report)


SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND


CHAPTER 1


ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE



On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times ran a front-page article by James Risen and Doyle McManus that led with the sentence:


President Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that the United States was pledged to uphold and the Administration's own policy of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of terrorism, according to senior Administration officials and other sources. (1)


This article was the first of several extraordinary articles that spelled out in detail, and with what turned out to be excellent sourcing, a policy decision that the Clinton Administration had carefully guarded for two years - forbidding reference to it in writing, denying it to the press, deflecting Congress, hoodwinking allies, and even trying to keep it secret from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secretary of Defense. The decision came to be referred to by higher ranking Administration officials as the "wink and nod," "the blind eye," and other terms, but the one that seemed to have stuck was given near the time of the decision's inception by one of its intellectual authors: the "green light." (2)


The articles authoritatively spelled out the advantages Iran had reaped from the green light policy, the confusion it had caused within the Executive Branch, and the other policy options that had been overlooked or rejected by the Administration as being too difficult.


The congressional response was one of incredulity. Members were shocked to learn that the Administration had chosen to give Iran an unprecedented foothold in an extremely unstable and vulnerable part of Europe. It was equally disturbing that for two years the Administration had purposely hidden from Congress, US allies, and the American people its highly questionable, major US policy shift.


There had been occasional press reports before that might have exposed the policy earlier; however, Congress continued to believe the Administration's denials of the Iranian green light policy. Congress found it unlikely that the Administration would adopt such a policy that was inconsistent and incompatible with the Administration's well-known and vigorously championed policies regarding the former Yugoslavia and Iran. Also, given the long-settled US policy of isolating Iran both economically and politically, Congress refused to believe that the Administration could have such bad judgment as to invite Iran, the world's largest exporter of terrorism, into Europe, much less into an area so ripe for fundamentalist exploitation as the Balkans.


The thought was that the Administration would surely inform Congress if it intended a major policy shift towards Iran and Bosnia. In retrospect, Congress cannot be blamed for presuming to trust the Administration's truthfulness, consistency, and strategic acumen.


In any case, when the story of the green light policy broke in April 1996, there were calls from both houses of Congress for an investigation; since then, several committees have looked into the issue, emphasizing aspects relevant to their specific areas of oversight. For example, both intelligence oversight committees -- the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -- have examined the green light policy with an emphasis on its intelligence-related issues. Also, on May 8, 1996, the House approved Resolution 416, establishing a select subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee and gave it a broad charter to investigate all aspects of the policy and implementation. This subcommittee, the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (also known as the "Iranian Green Light" Subcommittee) conducted an extensive investigation of the green light policy over the ensuing months and presents its findings and recommendations in this report.

The Uncovering of the Iranian Green Light Policy by the Press



As early as May 1994, allegations began to surface that Iran, with some sort of US complicity, was covertly transferring weapons to Bosnia, despite a United Nations (UN) arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. Each time the Administration issued denials of US complicity and managed to keep the story in the bottle. (3)


Unfortunately for those seeking to maintain the cover-up, James Risen and Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times became aware of these hidden policy missteps. From April through July 1996, they wrote a series of thirteen investigative articles exposing the missteps with incredible detail to large numbers of well-placed Administration officials who were willing to speak to them on a "not for attribution" basis. (4)


Because the Risen/McManus articles played such an important role in uncovering the green light policy and its consequences, their findings are summarized below.

Background



The Clinton White House was not the first Administration to face the question of Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia through Croatia, but its response was the opposite of the prior administration's. In September 1992, the Bush Administration discovered that Iran was attempting to smuggle arms on board a 747 airplane to Bosnia through Croatia in violation of the arms embargo and, according to former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, "raised hell." The Administration acted decisively and had the 747 and the weapons seized. According to Secretary Eagleburger, "We made it very clear that we were adamantly opposed to this going on. There was no question in the Bush Administration of where we were on this subject." (5)


Throughout the presidential campaign of 1992, Governor Clinton forcefully and repeatedly criticized President Bush for his consistent enforcement of the arms embargo and called for the United States to arm the Bosnians. The new Administration, upon taking office in 1993, found itself hamstrung. Unfortunately for President Clinton, the same policy constraints that faced President Bush -- Unwillingness on the part of the American public to commit troops and allied opposition to lifting the embargo -- equally applied to him. By the spring of 1994, Clinton's frustrations were at a peak. (6)


While Clinton felt compelled by circumstances to follow President Bush's much-criticized path, Iran was also chafing under the policies of containment consistently followed by the Bush Administration and, until the green light policy, under President Clinton. Iran's radical Islamic government was eager to increase its influence in the Balkans and saw the West's refusal to provide weapons to the Bosnian government as an opportunity. Though Iran had smuggled a small, insignificant amount of weapons to the Bosnian government prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, it was their subsequent truce and creation of the Bosnian Federation that set the stage for Clinton's green light policy decisions.

The Proposal



On April 27, 1994, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic entered the US embassy in Zagreb with a potentially explosive request: Would Washington accede to Croatia's plans to accept Iran's offer to open up a weapons pipeline from Iran into Bosnia? The Croatians were split over the question, having yielded to the Bush Administration's demands in 1992 that weapons shipments be stopped, and were seeking instructions. Granic was giving the US advance notice that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman planned formally to ask US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith how the United States would respond to new arms shipments from Iran. Granic himself was against the idea, a minority view in the Croatian government, but was following his orders to seek Washington's reaction.


Ambassador Galbraith had been impatient with the Clinton Administration for not doing more to aid the Bosnian cause, and was strongly in favor of the US allowing the new arms shipments. Risen noted that Galbraith had earned his reputation as an activist as a staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had sometimes rankled the career officials within the US government in his efforts to expand his role as the first US Ambassador to Croatia. It is clear that Galbraith supported the pro-weapons pipeline faction within the Croatian government, the most prominent member being Gojko Susak, Croatia's Defense Minister and Tudjman's right-hand man. (7)


Though the Administration thought the green light decision "obvious" and insignificant at the time, a senior US diplomat would later acknowledge that the pipeline probably would not have been established if the United States had opposed it forcefully. (8) Peter Galbraith would later testify," I can say that had we in a very, very forceful way made it clear that we would not tolerate the flow of arms to the Bosnians, they probably would not have done it . . . . When we did not object, they proceeded to go ahead and do it." (9)

The Decision



While most diplomatic exchanges require days, if not weeks or months, to coordinate and yet, this request for instructions reached President Clinton in a matter of hours. The first recipient of the cable was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander Vershbow, who referred the question to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who were travelling with Clinton to Nixon's funeral in Yorba Linda, California.


Talbott and Lake agreed on the solution: Do nothing. Galbraith was to give the coded response of "no instructions," which would tell the Croatians that the US would not act to stop the shipments. Lake asked for 20 minutes of President Clinton's time and was ushered into Clinton's office aboard Air Force One. James Risen described the meeting as follows: "Lake ran the President through the pros and cons and said, 'This is our recommendation . . . .' And he said 'yes' a senior official recounted. There was little discussion and no serious debate. It seemed like 'an obvious choice,' the official said." (10)


No other officials even at the highest levels of the US government were consulted before the green light was given to the Iranian arms transfers. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to protect national security by evaluating information on political and military developments abroad, was never officially notified of the policy. (11)


As a result of this closed and truncated decision-making process, US officials would later admit they gave little thought back in 1994 to the chance that Iran's political and military presence would grow in Bosnia as it did. A senior Administration official would concede they did not focus on the problem until the prospect of US troops going in was raised in 1995. (12)

The Alternatives



For the first two weeks following the breaking of the story, the Administration spin was that "there were no alternatives" to allowing the Iranian arms transfers, and that the decision was "obvious." Further research showed, however, that far from being "forced" into approving the arms transfers, the White House had actively rejected multiple calls for having nations friendly to the United States supply weapons to the Bosnians. The Administration rejected these equally effective alternative means of arming the Bosnians even though they would have negated the chance of increasing Iranian influence in Bosnia. (13)


The first such suggestion was made by Richard Holbrooke several months after the green light decision. In the fall of 1994, Holbrooke sought a legal opinion from State Department attorneys asking what diplomatic approaches to friendly nations could be made without triggering US covert action laws requiring Congress to be notified. Holbrooke thought that the unequal battlefield conditions faced by the Muslims in Bosnia could be eased if friendly nations would covertly supply the weapons with American encouragement.


When news of this proposal reached the upper levels of government, Holbrooke was rebuffed. According to Risen, Anthony Lake thought the idea was "too risky," and Secretary of State Warren Christopher was also opposed. (14) Indeed, Risen would write that, "senior administration officials opposed Holbrooke's plan because they feared that covert smuggling by friendly nations would make it too obvious the United States was encouraging the violation of a UN arms embargo against Bosnia." (15)


In a July 1996 article, Risen and McManus would document other alternatives to the failed green light policy that were rejected by the Clinton Administration. They would note that at least three times between 1993 and 1995, discussions were held about asking friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to move weapons and support to the Bosnians. The model for such aid existed before in the 1980s when Saudi Arabia served as the conduit between the US and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency.


Galbraith himself had suggested using friendly intermediaries in late 1993. He reportedly asked the (classified data deleted) in his embassy how much it would cost to begin a covert operation to aid the Bosnians, wondering if $250 million would be enough. (16) The (classified data deleted) was surprised by the request, advised Galbraith that such an action would be illegal without formal authorization, and warned (classified data deleted) in Washington that Galbraith was thinking along these lines.

The Consequences



Among the negative consequences of the green light policy and how it was implemented, as identified by Risen and McManus, are the confusion it caused within the US government, the resultant increase in Iranian influence in the former Yugoslavia, and concerns that, beneath the Administration's obfuscation of the policy, there may have been an illegal covert action.

A. Policy Confusion



There was considerable confusion among Administration officials throughout the whole process. Very little time elapsed and even less thought took place from the time the original query was made to Galbraith until Lake met with the President on Air Force One. Even after receiving the "no instructions" instruction, Galbraith himself was still unclear what action to take. According to Risen, Galbraith called Jenonne Walker, the National Security Council's chief European expert, who told him Lake had indicated he was to stick to "no instructions," but she added, "Tony was smiling when he said it." (17)


Not only were other appropriate agencies of the US government not consulted, they were not advised of the decision once it was made. Neither the CIA nor the Pentagon were informed of the policy change. Accordingly, the (classified data deleted) in Zagreb continued to be under the impression that the official policy of the United States was to support the arms embargo, the same position which Assistant Secretary of State Talbott would also lead CIA Director James Woolsey to believe was still valid. The CIA continued to collect information on embargo busting and became increasingly mystified at the US government's unwillingness to act on that intelligence. The CIA would never be informed, and, as the evidence grew that Director Woolsey had been deliberately kept in the dark, he resigned in December 1994.

B. Increased Iranian Influence



The most troubling consequence of the green light policy was the resultant exponential expansion of Iranian influence in Bosnia. Risen's sources helped him paint the following assessment of Iranian influence before and after the green light:


Western intelligence agencies detected several hundred militant Muslim guerillas from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in Bosnia as early as 1992, officials said, including several "Afghanis," veterans of the CIA-funded war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But these were largely ragtag volunteers, with no readily apparent command and control from Iran or anyone else. (18)


In 1994, however, a different kind of Iranian was showing up in Bosnia, officials said:


. . . military and civilian advisors who appeared to have been sent by the Tehran government on well-defined missions. Some were military trainers who taught the Bosnians how to use the wire-guided antitank missiles Iran was shipping, one source said. Others helped with logistics and with weapons factories, according to the Bosnian government. (19)


Ambassador Galbraith himself noted that the difference was like night and day. "Certainly what was being talked about in April 1994 was something very substantially greater" (20) than what had been shipped by Iran previously. Risen would elaborate:


From May 1994 to January 1996, the Iranians shipped more than 5,000 tons of arms to Bosnia through the Croatian pipeline. They provided the largest portion by far of Bosnia's military hardware -- two thirds by official US estimates. The Iranians delivered mostly small arms and equipment, including rifles, ammunition, and uniforms but also antitank weapons and shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles -- weapons that could threaten aircraft, including US aircraft.


Other countries did supply weapons to Bosnia without US encouragement . . . . But Iran was the largest supplier by far. By early 1995 the Iranian flights were landing as often as three times a week. The arms pipeline was managed largely by the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's militant Islamic shock corps, operating out of the Iranian embassy in Zagreb. Other Revolutionary Guard officers moved to Bosnia to serve as military advisors and trainers. The Bosnian Government's intelligence service and internal security forces soon had Iranian advisors too. To both secular Bosnians and US intelligence analysts, this was a worrisome trend: creeping Iranian influence in what once had been a multiethnic, secular state. (21)


The former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had himself worked in the Balkans for several years as a US diplomat, declared the increase in radical Islamic support in Bosnia as a major blow to the national security of the United States. He referred to it as "the height of insanity. We are inviting Bosnian-Islamic connections with a terrorist state that wishes us as much damage as they sic can possibly inflict upon us." (22)


Of even more concern to the United States and the families of American servicemen deployed in Bosnia is the terrorist threat that materialized in Bosnia under the green light policy. Risen gave two examples in his articles of the increase in the terrorist threat, but alluded to having more information than he reported.


In February 1995, NATO troops raided a "terrorist training school" at which they arrested eight Bosnian and three Iranian "diplomats," who quickly invoked diplomatic immunity and flew back to Iran. Items seized in the raid included bomb devices within shampoo bottles and children's toys and a training video showing how to ambush a car on an open highway and to kill its occupants. (23)


In an even more ominous sign, American embassy officials in Zagreb and Croatia became aware in 1995 of suspected Hizballah (Party of God) members stalking embassy personnel and their families. Suspected Iranian terrorists were seen with video cameras recording Americans as they came and went. Officials feared that an attack was imminent and one official confirmed "the terrorist threat went right up the scale to levels you would see in preparation for an attack." (24)

C. Possible Illegal Covert Action



The final consequence of the Administration's giving the green light to the Iranian arms pipeline was the chance that actions taken by US government officials crossed the legal line from what the Administration terms as passive, i.e., "no instructions," to a concrete act which might reasonably be construed by foreign officials as an invitation to conduct covert action. Under US law, covert action is illegal unless it has been authorized by the President and reported to Congress.


According to Risen's sources, there were two instances when Administration officials came objectively close to the legal line. The first case occurred in May 1994 when Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia Charles Redman intervened with senior Croatian government officials to expedite the movement into Bosnia of a blocked convoy that is believed to have carried arms to the Muslim government troops. Redman claims to have never asked whether arms were being carried, but US officials now acknowledge that questions could be raised whether the Administration had gone beyond passive support for the Bosnian cause and taken on a more active role. (25)


The second case occurred in September of 1995 when a shipment of Iranian (classified data deleted) missiles bound for Bosnia was detained in Croatia because the Croatian government was nervous that the missiles were tipped with chemical warheads. (26) Experts from (classified data deleted) and the US Army rapidly moved to inspect the missiles, determined that they were not carrying chemical or biological warheads, and then permitted them to be delivered into Bosnia. (27) Some US officials were concerned that in this action the US had directly violated the UN arms embargo. (28)


The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) was secretly commissioned on November 29, 1994 to investigate the green light policy and to determine if any covert action laws were violated. The IOB's classified report sharply criticized the Administration for excessive secrecy but determined that notification of Congress was not necessary. The Administration's actions, according to the IOB, fell within the category of "traditional diplomatic activity," exempt from US covert action laws. (29)


The IOB investigation had the potential to put the matter to rest, but raised questions of its own. Moreover, the White House, even after receiving the report, failed to advise Congress of the green light policy. What made the situation worse in the minds of many in Congress was the decision by the Administration in April 1996, after the story was out, to bar IOB Chairman Anthony Harrington from sharing the report with Congress or testifying about it under oath. (30) Suspicions were heightened.

The Congressional Response



The congressional response to the revelations about the green light affair was strong. Senior Democrats joined Republicans in denouncing the Clinton Administration's failure to consult with or notify Congress of the important change in policy towards Iran and the arms embargo. It was only this wellspring of bipartisan condemnation that prompted the Administration to admit that it should have consulted Congress. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff acknowledged that he was unaware of any congressional notification, and an Administration official admitted that "there is a growing understanding in the Administration that in terms of Congress, this could have been handled better. " (31)


In the two years between when the green light policy went into effect and when it was uncovered, there had been innumerable meetings between Members of Congress and senior Administration officials discussing policy options on lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. The failure of the Administration to mention the green light policy in any of these discussions can only be intentional.


A week after the green light decision was made, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott responded to a lengthy list of specific questions on Bosnia that had been submitted by Republican Senator John Warner. In his letter to Senator Warner, Talbott warned that lifting the embargo, as many favored in Congress, could lead to an increased Iranian presence in Bosnia. Talbott did not mention that he had just taken part in a policy decision that would bring Iranians streaming into the region. (32)


In midsummer 1994, Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn met with Charles Redman, then chief US negotiator in the Balkans, to discuss ways of aiding the Bosnian cause. Redman failed to mention the fact that the Administration had already made the green light decision. "I don't ever recall anybody in the Administration telling me anything about that," noted Nunn after the cover-up came to light in 1996. (33) Senator Nunn later reflected on the Administration's keeping Congress in the dark, "It seems to me the question is whether Congress should have been informed, not so much as a matter of law but as a matter of comity." (34) In response, Ambassador Redman could only say, "It never came up." (35)


Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, speaking on the floor of the Senate, observed:


While we read and heard reports that Iran was smuggling arms to the Bosnians, we did not know the President and his advisers made a conscious decision to give a green light for Iran to provide arms. Indeed, those of us who advocated lifting the arms embargo -- Republicans and Democrats -- argued that if America did not provide Bosnia with assistance, Iran would be Bosnia's only option. (36)


Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott offered another response in defense of the Administration: Since the press was reporting on Iranian arms shipments, Congress was properly informed. Democratic Senator Robert Kerrey sharply rebutted the argument, "Do you think, Mr. Secretary . . . that Congress getting its information through what really was half a dozen newspaper accounts in 1994 constitutes knowing more or less what you knew?" (37) Senator Kerrey also observed that for Congress to do its job properly, it must be kept informed by the Executive Branch, particularly in the area of foreign policy. "Certainly, you don't want us reaching a conclusion every time we pick up the newspaper or hear a news account of something terrible going on and knee jerk, particularly when its a foreign policy question." (38)


House Speaker Newt Gingrich described the chilling effect the cover-up of the green light has had on trust between the executive and legislative branches of government:


Never did Clinton indicate the Administration had given a green light to Iranian arms smuggling . . . . If you have been told face to face by the President of the United States for three years that you can't help the Bosnians and now you learn after all these face-to-face meetings that they were encouraging the Iranians, giving the Iranian arms shipments a wink and a nod, then how do you walk into the next meeting and believe what you are being told? (39)


Throughout, the congressional reactions to the uncovering of the green light policy was outrage that the Administration had given Iran, the rogue state most actively hostile to US interests around the world, a sanctioned foothold in Europe from which it could launch terrorist campaigns against US personnel across Europe. Congressman Henry Hyde, for example, warned that the policy had to be examined and could not remain "buried behind classified documents." He was of the view that "the introduction of the most radical nation in the world . . . into the Balkans in force with weapons to give them a foothold in that most volatile part of the world is incredible folly." He wondered, as many have since, why the Administration had not chosen readily available and far more palatable means of assisting the Bosnians, means that would not endanger the safety of the American people. "There were some dozen countries," Hyde explained, "that could reasonably be asked to provide weapons for the Bosnians -- not Iran." (40)


A strong majority in Congress was also incredulous that the Administration would violate its own declared policy of containing Iran in favor of inviting the radical terrorist regime into the Balkans. Congressman Christopher Cox would speak for many when he denounced the Administration's decision to give the green light. "This policy was absolutely insane," he noted. "Giving Iran a foothold into Europe . . . . That's what this policy is about." (41) In particular, a great many Members of Congress would express their concern over the increased terrorist threat to US and NATO troops resulting from the expanded Iranian influence in Bosnia, a threat the Administration chose to overlook.


Yet, not all Members of Congress, particularly in the House, were upset by the revelation of the green light policy. Congressman Alcee Hastings spoke for many of them when he publicly thanked Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman for their efforts in putting together the green light policy:


A central criticism of the "no instructions" policy that you two gentlemen have testified here about allows that, according to some, it permitted the dangerous military and intelligence penetration of Bosnia by Iran.


Yet we know just from using open, public sources, the United States decisions in April of 1994 did not give Iran a beachhead in Bosnia; Iran and other Muslim countries were already there. And I might add for historians and the buffs of history, Islam has been involved in the Balkans since fights with the Ottoman empire, if we just want to go back into it . . . . And any Congressperson that did not know all of that, that serves on the Committee on International Relations, was not doing his or her job." (42)

The Genesis and Charter of the Select Subcommittee



The controversy over the secret green light policy culminated in calls for legislative investigations. The House of Representatives' Committees on International Relations, National Security, Intelligence, and Judiciary began investigations probing the Administration's green light policy in April and May of 1996. At the urging of his Senate colleagues, Senate Majority Leader Dole called upon the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Judiciary Committees for parallel investigations.


During initial hearings held by the House Intemational Relations Committee, many questions were raised that demanded further examination:


Was the US government directly or indirectly involved in the execution of the transfer of Iranian arms, and did any of the Administration's actions violate US law?


Where did the idea of an Iranian pipeline originate and with whom?


Why were Congress, the CIA and other government agencies, US allies, and the American public not notified of this decision when it was made or in the nearly two years until the policy was exposed by the press?


And, why did the President allow the world's most dangerous terrorist state, Iran, to provide arms and establish a foothold in Europe when other friendly nations were willing to help?


In an effort to consolidate the investigations of the four House committees and to further examine these questions, the House leadership and the International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman announced a proposal to establish a Select Subcommittee to investigate the United States' role in the transfer of arms from Iran to Bosnia and Croatia during the period when the international arms embargo was in effect. On May 8, 1996, the House approved Resolution 416 which created the Select Subcommittee within the International Relations Committee. The Subcommittee is composed of five Republican Members and three Democrat Members, and is chaired by Henry J. Hyde of Illinois, with Lee H. Hamilton as the Ranking Minority Member.


The Select Subcommittee was given the authority to investigate the following areas:


The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of arms and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during any period that an international arms embargo was in effect;


The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period that an international arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect;


Any actions taken by the United States Government to facilitate or to impede such transfers;


Any communication or representations made to the Congress of the United States or the American people with respect to the international arms embargo or with efforts to modify or terminate United States participation in that embargo;


Any implications from the Iranian arms transfers for the safety of United States armed forces deployed in or around Bosnia, for relations between the US and its allies and for United States efforts to isolate Iran;


And all deliberations and communications between the United States Government and other governments, organizations or individuals relating to such matters.


The Subcommittee's charter ends on November 8, 1996, by which time it is to have transmitted its report to the House International Relations Committee. Given its short lifespan and limited resources, the Subcommittee has attempted to address as many of the key questions as possible. What follows are the results of the Subcommittee's investigations.

CHAPTER 2


THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA


AND THE EARLY YEARS OF THE BALKANS WAR



The events discussed in this report mainly occurred during and after April 1994. To understand these events, however, it is necessary to have a basic familiarity with the political developments in the former Yugoslavia prior to that date.


The autocratic rule of Yugoslav dictator Tito after World War II suppressed but did not eliminate the strongly divergent and divisive ethnic and religious tensions that have existed for hundreds of years between the various peoples living within the borders of what was Yugoslavia. These rivalries reemerged after Tito's death in 1980, and the centrifugal pull of ethnic identities led to increasingly bitter arguments over the scope and powers of the central government. Unable to convince Serbia and Montenegro that a loose confederation was a viable alternative to the existing Serb-dominated government, Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on June 25, 1991. Further complicating the situation, several Serb-dominated regions of Croatia declared independence from the new republic.


The central Yugoslavian government based in Belgrade, Serbia promptly declared the Slovenia and Croatia secessions "illegal and illegitimate" and sent the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (YPA) to restore control over the breakaway regions. Hostilities broke out when the Croatian and Slovenian forces refused to lay down their arms. The fighting continued until the Brioni agreement was finalized in early July 1991.


The Brioni agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in exchange for a three-month suspension of the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. The YPA soldiers began immediately to withdraw from Slovenia, where the Slovenian irregulars had been able to hold their own. Despite the agreement, however, the fighting continued within Croatia between the newly independent republic and the Krajina Serbs backed by the YPA forces.


In September 1991, the UN Security Council, through Resolution 713, enacted a general and complete arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia to try to temper the conflict. In October 1991, the three-month moratorium on secession elapsed, and the governments of Slovenia and Croatia formally separated from the former Yugoslavia. Germany recognized both countries as sovereign nations in December 1991. The European Community (EC) followed suit in January 1992.


As Slovenia and Croatia were leaving the former Yugoslavia, a more bitter and protracted conflict was developing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On October 14, 1991, the National Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina passed, by majority vote, a memorandum on sovereignty and independence which stopped just short of declaring outright independence. The following December 21st, the Bosnian Serbs held an unofficial referendum declaring their opposition to withdrawing from the withering Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and local Serbian leaders proclaimed their independence from Bosnia.


Following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia's Muslim and Croat citizens voted for independence in a March 1992 referendum. The Serbs boycotted. On April 6, the EC recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following day, the US recognized the nations of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lifted the economic sanctions against the three republics.


The Bosnian Serb minority vigorously opposed the withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the rump SFRY that was rapidly becoming a de facto Serbian state. The Bosnian Serbs withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina into their self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."


Fighting between the Serbs and the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government ensued. The Bosnian Serbs soon seized more than two-thirds of the Bosnian republic's territory and began the siege of Sarajevo. The Serbs managed their successes despite the fact that, according to a 1991 census, they comprised only 31 percent of the population, with the Muslims and Croatians having 44 and 17 percent, respectively. (43) Two key reasons the Bosnian Serbs gained such an advantage over the Bosnian Muslims so quickly were that the withdrawing YPA relinquished its large arsenal of weapons to the Bosnian Serb forces as it withdrew and that the YPA soldiers with a Bosnian Serb background stayed behind to become a formidable part of the new Bosnian Serb officer corps.


While the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims were fighting, the Bosnian Croatians were working to consolidate their positions in western Bosnia in their desired mini-state, Herceg-Bosnia, which they would proclaim in July 1992. The Bosnian Croatians, much like Croatia, would change sides in the Bosnian conflict as the circumstances affected their interests, supporting the Muslim government at this time, then later moving towards the Bosnian Serbs, until shifting again towards the Muslim government when the 1994 Washington Accords established the Bosnian Federation.


On May 30, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 757. The resolution condemned the SFRY's defiance of UN demands that it cease its interference in the affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and placed an economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until it fulfilled its obligations under Resolution 752. Resolution 752, which was passed two weeks earlier on May 15, called for an end to the fighting in Bosnia, elimination of influence and forces from both the YPA and Croatia, and respect for the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.


Notwithstanding the UN's efforts, the war continued into the summer. In August 1992, representatives from over 30 countries and nongovernmental organizations met in London at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to bring about a negotiated end to the fighting. The London Conference, co-sponsored by the EC and the UN, named Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance co-chairmen of the EC-UN steering committee. The Conference affirmed the principle that international boarders should be changed only by mutual consent, and called for a cease fire, access to detention camps (by international organizations such as UN High Commission on Refugees or the Red Cross), and the protection of human and minority rights. Unfortunately, the London Conference, like the resolution before it, had little effect on the violence on the ground. Finally, on August 31, Cyrus Vance announced that all parties had already violated the terms of the Conference, including the cease-fire, which they had approved just days earlier.


The Geneva Peace Conference was held the following month, for the purpose of developing means of implementing the lofty principles declared by the London Conference. The Geneva Conference, under the co-chairmanship of Vance and Owen, established six working groups focusing on the most pressing issues confronting the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina, confidence-building measures, humanitarian issues, economic problems, minority rights and various other legal issues.


(classified data deleted) The US became aware of the program and demarche the Croats, who shut it down. The Iranians were forced to return to their small-scale arms smuggling and training efforts.


In October 1992, negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen advanced their plan (the "Vance-Owen" plan) to settle the conflict. Their plan was to establish a decentralized state with seven to ten autonomous provinces defined by economic and geographic, rather than ethnic, criteria. The Bosnian Serb leadership promptly rejected the plan the following day.


In response to the Bosnian Serbs, Vance and Owen reworked their plan several times, and in January 1993 the Bosnian Croats approved the measure. The Bosnian Muslims followed suit in March. On May 2, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic signed the plan under intense pressure by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Two days later, the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected the plan, and the Vance-Owen process was finished.


There was no hiding the viciousness of the fighting. Genocide was frequently alleged by the combatants and, as the world discovered more and more about the atrocities being inflicted by all sides, the Security Council passed Resolution 808 in February 1993, establishing the War Crimes Tribunal. In support of the Resolution, the EC, the UN staff and the US State Department submitted reports documenting the crimes of systematic rape, murder, mutilation, deportation, illegal imprisonment, and "ethnic cleansing" by all parties.


All three sides committed a great many atrocities during this conflict upon innocents, but it appears the Bosnian Serbs were the most egregious in their violations of human rights. It was the Bosnian Serb leadership that set the war aim of creating an ethnically "pure" and geographically contiguous greater Serbia by (seemingly) any means necessary. Unfortunately, it will be future historians who will have to render a more complete accounting of the genocide which occurred.


In May 1993, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned of a "new aggression" by Bosnian Croatians, and relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians steadily worsened. As the fighting intensified around the city of Mostar and throughout central Bosnia, both sides engaged in atrocities and "ethnic cleansing" to solidify gains made on the battlefield.


Also that May, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 824, which declared that Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Zepa should be treated as "safe areas" and that all Bosnian Serb military units should withdraw from those areas at once. The Security Council followed up this declaration on June 4, 1993 with Resolution 836 extending the mandate of UN Protection Forces and authorized measures, including use of force, to protect these "safe areas." By February of 1994, the situation on the ground had become intolerable for the NATO leadership as the Bosnian Serbs overran Srebrenica and Zepa and besieged and shelled the others, creating appalling humanitarian conditions. Serbian actions had made a mockery of the term "safe area."


The catalyst for increased international action came when a mortar shell landed in a crowded Sarajevo market on February 5, 1994, killing 68 and wounding over 200 civilians. The following day, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lifted his opposition to air strikes and asked NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to seek permission from the North Atlantic Council to secure a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. President Clinton supported the Secretary General's call for air strikes should more violence against civilians occur. On April 10, the NATO Alliance, in its first offensive action since its founding, launched air strikes against Serb positions which had been shelling Gorazde relentlessly. A second strike the following day helped bring the Bosnian Serb advance to a halt, although the Serbs maintained control over a large percentage of the territory acquired in their advance.


The Serbs had also been put on less advantageous terms by the Washington Accords reached the month before, in March, between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats. The Accords set up a Federation which, in addition to relieving military pressure on the hard-pressed Muslims, put the Serbs in a difficult strategic situation. The Croats were now freed up to begin preparations for a major offensive to retake the Krajina, and the Muslims were able to shore up their defenses and keep other Bosnian Serb units engaged elsewhere in Bosnia.


This was, in brief, the situation in the region in April 1994, when Iran again sought to interject itself into the war on a large scale.

CHAPTER 3


THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION


ON THE BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO -- DENIAL AND DECEPTION



This chapter will examine the Clinton Administration's public policy on the UN arms embargo on Bosnia. Starting with the formulation of the Iranian green light policy in April 1994, the actual policy became very different from what the Administration represented it to be in its statements to Congress, the press, and the American people. As is discussed in Section II of this report, where the development and implementation of the Iranian green light policy are discussed at length, the Administration went to extraordinary lengths to keep its diplomatic duplicity under wraps. Senior Administration officials were intent that there should be no US "fingerprints." In the public realm, this went beyond the usual practice of offering "no comment" on allegations of US covert activity; instead, Administration officials from the President on down lied.


Some have criticized the Clinton Administration for a lack of consistency in foreign policy. While this charge could be leveled at several aspects of its Balkans policy, it would largely be unfair in describing the Administration's public record on the Bosnian arms embargo.


Regarding the embargo, the Administration consistently expressed its opposition to the embargo while also consistently stating its unwillingness to take unilateral action to lift it. The concept of unilateral action by the US was fundamentally inconsistent with the "assertive multilateralism" that became the centerpiece of the Administration's foreign policy. Assertive multilateralism rests on a high regard for the UN as an instrument of foreign policy, a profession of the moral obligation to follow the spirit and letter of international law, and the imperative of multilateral cooperation. In its public statements about the arms embargo, the Administration never deviated from the positions necessitated by these principles, despite the fact that the Administration learned within days of taking office that assertive multilateralism effectively tied its hands in working to lift the embargo it believed to be against US interests. It was this quandary that would, in April 1994, lead the Administration to subvert the embargo clandestinely through third parties, specifically Iran and Croatia.

The Administration's Sea Legs: The Idealism of "Assertive Multilateralism"



Although foreign policy was not a centerpiece of Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, Bosnia was an exception. Candidate Clinton condemned the Bush Administration's policy of nonintervention, "The continuing bloodshed in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia demands urgent international action . . . . It is time for real leadership to stop the continuing tragedy in the former Yugoslav republics." (44) He expressed confidence that, as president, he could define a policy, working jointly with other countries and the UN, that would stop the fighting and lead to a peace settlement. "We will make the United States the catalyst for a collective stand against aggression, the action I have urged in response to Serbian aggression in Bosnia." (45) He provided some specificity in the first presidential debate in October 1992:


I agree that we cannot commit ground forces to become involved in the quagmire of Bosnia or in the tribal wars of Somalia. But I think that it's important to recognize that there are things that can be done short of that, and that we do have an interest there . . . . I think we should stiffen the embargo on the Belgrade government, and I think we have to consider whether or not we should lift the arms embargo now on the Bosnians, since they are in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on "ethnic cleansing." We can't get involved in the quagmire, but we must do what we can. (46)


And, as Governor Clinton would repeatedly stress, "what we can do" meant what we can do in tandem with others, that is to say, within the framework of assertive multilateralism.


As might be expected, considering her key role in implementing multilateral foreign policy, US Ambassador to the UN and cabinet member Madeleine Albright became one of the preeminent public advocates of assertive multilateralism. As she has explained it, the US has three roles it can play internationally: " world cop," "ostrich," or "partner," and the Clinton Administration prefers the role of partner. As Ambassador Albright explained:


The fancy word is 'multilateral,' but the ordinary word is 'partner.' I fully believe it is my job at the U.N. and the job of all of us within the foreign policy structure to put an adjective with the partner -- senior, managing, leading, whatever way you want to phrase it. So the term assertive multilateralism comes from having a leadership role within a multilateral setting to deal with the problems that we have to deal with. (47)


Bosnia, for the Clinton Administration, is exactly such a problem; one of those many occasions when, in the words of George Stephanopoulos, "we need to bring pressure to bear on the belligerents of the post-Cold War period and use our influence to prevent ethnic and other regional conflicts from erupting. But usually we will not want to act alone -- our stake will be limited and direct U.S. intervention unwise." (48)


The weeks leading up to the inauguration in January 1993 saw the start of new UN-sponsored diplomatic talks on Bosnia in New York. These talks fed the hopes of the new Clinton foreign policy team, anxious to exercise its policy of multilateralism, as well as the hope of an American populace sickened by the viciousness of the fighting.


The heady days of transition brought forth within the new Administration declarations of major reviews of Bosnian policy alternatives and the strong desire for "improved" options. (49) Nonetheless, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, these deliberations inevitably led back to Clinton's policy as declared in the election campaign. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking in January 1993 said, "I would stress, as President Clinton has, starting last August, that it Bosnia does seem to be a place where the United States needs to be activist and internationalist in our outlook." (50)

International Political Reality: The Europeans Say "No"



Yet, once in office, President Clinton found the Bosnian problem much more complex and intractable than he anticipated as a candidate. Despite the rhetorical flourishes and talk of change, practical changes in the policy from that of the Bush Administration were difficult to discern. Leaving the new Administration's first Bosnia policy review, Secretary Christopher counseled the press to "lower expectations," particularly "in terms of timing." (51) Where candidate Clinton had been calling for "urgent" international action, President Clinton was now urging caution:


The thing I have not been willing to do is to immediately take action, the end of which I could not see. I want to do -- whatever I want to do, I want to do it with vigor and wholeheartedly, I want it to have a reasonable prospect of success, and I have done the best I could with the cards that I found on the table when I became President. (52)


Given the President's desire to act "with vigor and wholeheartedly," it was still not clear what he wanted to do. Yet, it was also clear that he did not know what it was he wanted to do. Some criticized the Clinton Administration for lacking the political will to enact a policy change. Democratic Congressman Frank McCloskey accused the Administration of being an accomplice in genocide in Bosnia, stating that "when it comes to real action to get the arms embargo lifted from the Bosnian Government, the administration opts out." (53) It is probably more accurate to say, however, that the lowering of Presidential sights came about as the Administration realized that it had painted itself into a corner by advocating an end to the arms embargo but surrendering the only vehicle by which the embargo could be lifted -- namely, unilateral action by the US. Simply put, neither the UN (the Clinton Administration's preferred multilateral mechanism) nor other international bodies were willing to go along with lifting the embargo. That left the Administration without a vehicle it thought acceptable to implement the changes in Bosnian foreign policy it believed to be in the national interest.


In the first few months of the Administration, the UN, in particular, turned out to be an unlikely forum for a fresh approach. In addition to the UN Security Council being the body that put the embargo in place, the new Clinton Administration found itself in the uncomfortable position of being unwilling to subscribe fully to the ongoing UN-sponsored Vance-Owen plan it felt would have effectively partitioned Bosnia. For an administration that placed heavy emphasis on the UN and multilateralism in foreign policy, this was not a comfortable situation. Secretary Christopher tried to step around the problem during a trip to the UN in February 1993, saying that the US supported the "process" without necessarily supporting the results. (54) Two days later, using locution that would later become the hallmark of the Iran green light policy, White House spokesman George Stephanopoulos said President Clinton "does not have any specific support or rejection" of the UN plan. (55)


Some commentators have strongly attacked the tenets of the Clinton Administration's policy of assertive multilateralism. Steven Erlanger, in the New York Times, called it "a formula for action that seemed to make the UN the only source of legitimacy for the use of force to keep the world secure," and Peter W. Rodman of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, declared that for multilateralists "American unilateralism was the principal sin to be avoided, as if to atone for a shameful past." (56) It was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, however, who most astutely identified the inherent weakness of assertive multilateralism. The policy, he said, resigns the US to a belief that "the national interest is on the whole defined by the attainable global consensus." (57) This turned out to be the reef on which the Bosnia policy foundered. Although the Administration wanted to lift the arms embargo as it applied to the Bosnian Muslims, it was unable to lead its global "partners" into a consensus to do so -- and to act unilaterally would require the Administration to violate the philosophical cornerstone of its foreign policy.


The Administration quickly learned that the Europeans, in particular, were unwilling to yield on the fundamental question of lifting the arms embargo. Fighting in eastern Bosnia intensified, and in April 1993, the Serbs, in a much-reported offensive, moved to capture the town of Srebrenica. President Clinton spoke of his outrage at the fighting, "I condemn it and I have condemned it repeatedly and thoroughly. And I have done everything I could to increase the pressure of the international community on the outrages perpetuated in Bosnia by the aggressors and to get people to stand up against ethnic cleansing." (58) The Europeans, however, had refused to go along, and, without their support, the US simply did not have the votes in the Security Council to overturn the embargo. More importantly, though, as President Clinton would repeatedly point out in the years to come, even "if we did, it would endanger the humanitarian mission there carried on by the French and British who oppose lifting the embargo." (59) Despite the President's outrage, he steadfastly refused to permit unilateral US actions. Behind this all there continued the drum-beat of keeping US policy within the boundaries acceptable to the UN. As Secretary Christopher declared, "whatever we would do, we would do multilaterally and we would want to do it with the full concurrence of the UN. We would not try to take any shortcuts in the matter." (60)


President Clinton's press conference on April 23, 1993, illustrated the irreconcilable tension between US national interests and the Administration's allegiance to assertive multilateralism. On the one hand, the President stated vigorously about Bosnia, "I think we should act. We should lead -- the United States should lead." Yet, a few minutes later, in response to a pointed question about multilateralism "hamstringing" US foreign policy, he conceded his Administration's abdication of policy-making to the UN, "The United States, even as the last remaining superpower, has to act consistent with international law and under some mandate of the United Nations." (61)


On May 6, 1993, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan, which the Administration had finally come to support. The Administration renewed its call for multilateral lifting of the embargo against Bosnia. Then Secretary Christopher traveled to Europe on an ill-fated mission to win the support of Britain and France. His charter, evidently, was not broad enough to allow him to negotiate the issue forcefuily. Later, Secretary Chrisopher would admit that the effort had been a mistake. "The way that I made the trip to Europe in May 1993 was not consistent with global leadership." (62) After that, the Administration more openly acknowledged its political impotence. President Clinton explained:


Let me tell you something about Bosnia. On Bosnia, I made a decision. The United Nations controls what happens in Bosnia. I cannot unilaterally lift the arms embargo. I didn't change my mind. Our allies decided that they weren't prepared to go that far at this time. They asked me to wait, and they said they would not support it. I didn't change my mind. (63)


It was also at about this time that Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff indicated the US had to rethink its international role and realistically reappraise the degree to which it could hope to act and infiuence international events unilaterally. This doctrine, the socalled "Tarnoff Doctrine," was eventually disavowed by President Clinton. A Congressional Research Service report noted, however, "US policy on Bosnia appeared to confirm Mr. Tarnoff's views rather than contradict them. Lifting the arms embargo, while in principle favored by the Administration, was not viewed as a viable option without the participation of other allies." (64)


On June 30, the Administration suffered yet another defeat in changing US policy. It was the only other Security Council member to back a resolution put forth by five nonaligned member countries to lift the embargo. Even though President Clinton had previously asserted that the US should take the lead in formulating international policy towards Bosnia, the US "did not push strongly for its adoption," (65) and Russia, France, and Britain joined other Council members in handily defeating the measure. The result was that a policy change the Administration deemed to be in the national interest was squelched yet again by the UN.


In July, the President was again put on the defensive in a press conference when a questioner referred to the Administration as being "indecisive" in formulating a Bosnia policy. He replied,


Let me, first of all, point out what the United States has done just since I've been President. We spent a great deal of money on humanitarian aid; we have pushed hard for strengthening the embargo against Serbia; we have pushed for a number of other things to try to help resolve the situation that we have all agreed on.


I did not back away from my position, sir. Britain and France and Russia said they would not support that position within the United Nations. The United States cannot act alone under international law in this instance. (66)


In July, as Serb forces stepped up their assault on Sarajevo and threatened to overrun the Bosnian capital, the Administration finally was moved to act. It announced that, while it hoped to work with the allied states, it was prepared to act unilaterally with air strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo. It is hard to know how serious the Administration was in making this statement. No military action was ever taken, although the threat did motivate NATO to meet in August to consider joint action. Even then, NATO ceded its authority to the UN Secretary-General to determine if military action was warranted and to call for air strikes.


The President's subsequent statements squarely contradicted his professed willingness to take unilateral action and reaffirmed his commitment to multilateralism, no matter what the consequences for US national interests. Seven months later, on February 6, 1994, the day after a rocket attack on a crowded market in Sarajevo killed 68 people, President Clinton made his most categorical statement yet on his interpretation of the limits on US sovereignty in using its military, "The United States, I will say again, under international law, in the absence of an attack on our people, does not have the authority to unilaterally undertake air strikes." (67)


In the same month, February 1994, arguing against Senator Dole's legislative proposal to lift the embargo, Madeleine Albright advanced another argument that the Administration would frequently use -- lifting the embargo would set a precedent allowing states to pick and choose which of the internationally sanctioned embargoes and sanctions they will enforce:


Frankly, what will happen is, if we decide to lift the embargo unilaterally against -- on this particular issue, then there will be those who will decide that we can just not abide by the international embargo against Iraq or against Libya. This is an international system, whereby we deal with rogue states, Iraq and Libya, through an international embargo. We depend on the international community to abide by it. And, even though we do not think it is appropriate for the Bosnian Muslims to be embargoed at the moment, it is an international decision that we cannot change unilaterally. (68)


A few months later, in April, with renewed and increasingly bipartisan criticism of the Administration's refusal to lift the embargo, President Clinton made a similar argument, "If we ignore a United Nations embargo because we think it has no moral basis or even any legal validity, but everyone else feels contrary, then what is to stop our United Nations allies from ignoring the embargoes that we like, such as the embargo against Saddam Hussein? How can we ever say again to all of the other people in the United Nations, you must follow other embargoes?" (69)


By mid-1994 there was bipartisan consensus in Congress that the US should lift the Bosnian arms embargo unilaterally. This opinion was shared by many of those who supported a more active US role in stopping the fighting, as well as by many who still believed the US should be cautious in any action that could commit it to a role on the ground in the region. On May 25, Representatives Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, and Henry Hyde urged the President to "act in our national interest and not rely on the UN to determine our policy." (70)


In late summer, with peace talks stalled, Congress began working on several options to remove the embargo. This eventually led to Section 1404 of the fiscal year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. (71) According to that legislation, if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Contact Group peace plan by October 15, the President was to introduce a resolution at the Security Council to lift the arms embargo multilaterally no later than December 1. Moreover, should such a resolution fail to pass, no US funds were to be expended after November 15 to enforce the continued embargo. This provision is commonly referred to as "Nunn-Mitchell," after its Senate sponsors. Since it was clear the Security Council would defeat a resolution to lift the embargo, the Administration halted the use of US funds effective November 12, 1994. It also ended the deployment of American ships in the Adriatic Sea for embargo enforcement and ended the sharing of intelligence on embargo violations with other countries.


In all other respects, the Administration's policy remained unchanged, particularly its opposition to unilaterally lifting the embargo. Although the Administration consulted with Congress on possible plans to aid the Bosnians unilaterally (as was also required in the legislation), the Administration made it clear it would not accept any form of unilateral action by the US. Indeed, on January 8, 1995, Vice President Al Gore warned that the President would veto any bill requiring a unilateral lifting. (72) This actually came to pass on August 11, 1995, when the President vetoed S.21, a bill calling for the unilateral lifting of the embargo after the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia or 12 weeks after the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina requested that UN peacekeepers leave, whichever came first.


Another concern expressed repeatedly by the Administration during its debates with Congress in 1995 about the unilateral lifting of the embargo was that it could lead to one of two possible situations, both of which were worse than the status quo. The first was the "Americanization" of the war. The second (and this is brazen in light of the Administration's ongoing secret Iranian green light policy) was the introduction of Iranians into the war.


The logic behind the fear of "Americanization" was that the nation that lifts the embargo unilaterally will be held responsible for what follows. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry explained that the Administration "strenuously" opposed a unilateral lifting of the embargo because it would " give the US unilateral responsibility for the devastating consequences." (73) Consequently, if the Bosnian military were to begin to falter after the lift, the US would have to step in to train, arm, and possibly defend its new dependents. American intervention, the argument went, became all the more likely because a unilateral lifting by the US would likely have led UN peacekeepers to withdraw from the region. Thus, not only would US intervention be required to prop up Bosnian forces, it would also be required to aid the withdrawal of UN forces. (74)


The most disingenuous of the Administration's arguments was that lifting the arms embargo could allow the Iranians a foothold in Europe. The argument was that if the US were to lift the embargo, without itself arming the Muslims, Iran would fill the vacuum and thereby "establish a presence" in Bosnia and the Balkans. (75) (As shown in Section III of this report, the Administration had already secretly acquiesced in Iran's filling the existing vacuum.) It was against such an argument that Senator Dole spoke on June 5, 1995,


W hen those of us who advocate lifting the arms embargo . . . point out that other countries would also participate in arming the Bosnians, we are told that this would allow Iran to arm the Bosnians. The fact is the arms embargo has guaranteed that Iran is a key supplier of arms to Bosnia and administration officials have actually used that fact to argue that there is no need to lift the arms embargo . . . . From statements made by State Department officials to the press, one gets the impression that Iran is the Clinton Administration's preferred provider of weapons to the Bosnians. If the Administration has a problem with Iran arming Bosnia, it should be prepared to do something about it. (76)


Senator Dole had no idea at the time how true his words were about Iran being the Administration's "preferred provider" of weapons. His mistake, like that of his colleagues in Congress, was in believing the Administration's denials of complicity and thinking no administration would be so foolish as to permit Iran -- the world's leading sponsor of statesanctioned terrorism -- to establish a foothold in Europe.


It would seem that the Administration would not want to revisit this particular argument, knowing how it would look when the truth finally emerged. Yet a month later, in July 1995, White House spokesman McCurry could not resist speculating sarcastically that Senator Dole, in his calls for lifting the embargo, was presumably ready to surrender Bosnia to Iran. (77) It would not be until spring 1996 that Congress and the American people would learn the truth and appreciate the irony behind McCurry's statement: A year before he accused Senator Dole of being willing to give the Iranians a free ride into Bosnia, the Clinton Administration had already laid out the welcome mat for Iran.

Denial of the Iranian Green Light Policy



As is discussed elsewhere in this report, the Administration's public pronouncements about its policy on the embargo significantly diverged from actual practice starting in April 1994. It was then that President Clinton authorized the giving of a secret "wink and a nod" or "green light" for the covert transshipment of Iranian arms to the Balkans. The development of that covert policy is treated at length in Section II of this report. In this chapter, treating the publicly acknowledged policy, we will only discuss the official denials that were made as elements of the policy began to leak to the press.


The flow of Iranian arms through Croatia was difficult to disguise, and the opening of the so-called arms pipeline to Bosnia was reported in the US and European press within weeks. (78) An obvious question for the press and our allies with troops on the ground in the region concerned whether the US was involved in either setting up or sanctioning the operation.


On May 13, 1994, two weeks after the Administration gave the green light, State Department spokesman David Johnson commented on reports of Iranian shipments through Zagreb, "It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia." He quickly added that the US believes "It's important that UN Security Council resolutions be fully observed," a broader statement that suggested that the US expected other nations to respect the embargo as well. (79)


On June 3, the British newspaper, The Independent, reported that Iranian sources "close to the government and opposition in Tehran, claim that elements in President Bill Clinton's administration have made it clear that America would not interfere with Iran's attempts to circumvent the international arms embargo on Bosnia." (80) The same article contained official US denials. Nonetheless, the issue would not die, and the press continued to pursue the story.


Later in June, the Administration once again was faced with a press story that threatened to uncover the green light policy. An article by Bill Gertz of the Washington Times led with the sentence, "Croatia has become a major transit point for covert Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia with the tacit approval of the Clinton administration, which publicly remains opposed to a unilateral lifting of the international arms embargo against the fractured Balkan states." But in the same article a "senior U.S. official" said that the US government opposed the Iranian arms shipments because they undercut UN sanctions. " 'There is no U.S. support for what Iran is doing,' the official said." (81) That same day press guidance issued by the State Department explicitly denied active complicity and any sort of acquiescence, "It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia. We strongly believe that UN Security Council resolutions must be fully respected." (82) This guidance would be sent out repeatedly in the following months. (83)


Subsequent press guidances and public statements from the State Department, National Security Council and the White House consistently denied any US role in the Iranian arms pipeline. At the State Department's daily press briefing on November 7, for example, spokesman Christine Shelley was asked directly if the US was contributing to, or turning a blind eye to, the violations of the arms embargo. The response was clear and categorical, "We're certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly are not turning a blind eye. We have been a major participant, as you know, in the enforcement of all the different UN Security Council resolutions which have been passed in the past." (84)


Congress took the Administration at its word, yet the press and intelligence reporting indicated the Iranian arms kept flowing and, in the wake of such reports, the growth of Iranian influence in the region became increasingly a matter of concern. While the Administration still denies the linkage, at least for Congress it was obvious from the beginning that there was a direct connection between the provision of Iranian weapons and assistance and the growth of Iranian influence. Senator Dole in January 1995 argued that S. 21, his legislation lifting the embargo, "would reduce the potential influence and role of radical extremist states like Iran" in the Balkans. (85) The Administration nevertheless vetoed the legislation. As on many other occasions, it chose not to advise Congress that the actual Administration policy was that "at the highest level we do not wish to interpose ourselves" between the Iranians and the Balkans -- that is, to permit Iran to use arms transfers to solidify its influence in the region. (86)


In April 1995, a year after the green light policy went into effect, a Washington Post story reopened the question of the US's tacit approval of Iranian arms transfers. Department of State press guidance on April 14 posed the following hypothetical question and guidance on its answer:


Q: Is Iran delivering arms to the Bosnians? Does the US tacitly approve of this activity? What are we doing about it? How do we reconcile this policy with our more general concern about Iranian arms sales?


A: Contrary to the impression left by this morning's Washington Post story,


- T he US neither "allows" nor "tacitly accepts" the provision of Iranian arms to Bosnia or to any other country.


- It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia ...


- The United States has on many occasions made known its strong objection to the behavior of the Government of Iran. We are actively involved in international efforts to isolate Iran and prevent it from engaging in illegal and dangerous weapons transfers. (87)


In July of 1995, the President and Secretary of State confirmed the press guidance set forth above as the Administration's "declared" policy. In a CNN interview on July 28, 1995, President Clinton was asked if the US was "orchestrating the transfer of arms to the Bosnian Muslims through Arab or Middle-Eastern countries or anywhere else." The answer was a curt "no." On the same program, Secretary Christopher stated, "We are not, as I repeat myself, covertly supplying arms to Bosnia or taking steps to support arms." (88) The next day, Secretary Christopher was quoted in the press as saying, "The United States is not, underline not, covertly supplying arms or supporting the supply of arms to the Bosnian government." (89)


Perhaps the most categorical false denial of the green light came in the National Security Council's press guidance of February 2, 1996, only two months before the Administration finally admitted its true policy towards Iranian arms transfers. This time, the Administration was concerned with allaying suspicions raised by another Washington Post story, this one alleging US involvement with a Saudi program to arm the Bosnians. Again, the guidance is given in hypothetical questions and answers. They are quoted at length below. This is necessary to document the degree to which the Clinton Administration was willing to misrepresent the truth in order to cover up their policy to allow Iran to develop a foothold in Europe through Bosnia.


Q: Response to allegations in the Washington Post that the United States cooperated with Saudi Arabia in a program to arm the Bosnians over the past three years.


A: We categorically deny the allegations in the Post story that the US was in any way involved with the purported Saudi program to arm the Bosnian Government, in violation of the UN arms embargo. While this Administration consistently argued that the arms embargo unfairly punished the victim of aggression during the Bosnian conflict, it was always our policy to abide by the terms of the arms embargo. We opposed a unilateral lifting of the embargo because it would undermine respect for other binding UNSC resolutions, including economic sanctions against Serbia, Iraq and Libya. The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other government regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians.


Q: But weren't you aware of covert arms assistance to the Bosnians by the Saudis and other countries, such as Iran?


A: No such shipments were taken in consultation or coordination with the US government.


Q: If you were aware of these shipments, why didn't you stop them?


A: We have always made clear that we were abiding by the arms embargo and that we expected other countries to do so as well. (90)


The Clinton Administration's consistent assertion of the need for assertive multilateralism was matched in effort and practice only by its consistence in falsely denying its "Iranian green light" policy. The truth finally came to light with the publication of the series of highly detailed and well-informed Los Angeles Times articles starting on April 6, 1996. (91) It was only then that the Administration ceased its denials and deceptions and admitted what its true policy was - to allow Iran to purchase influence in the Balkans by supplying arms.

CHAPTER 4


THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN



In the preceding chapter, we have discussed at length the Clinton Administration's public policy of duplicity and denial regarding its green light to the Iranians' breaking the UN arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia. What makes the green light policy scandalous is that the Administration chose to use Iran, of all countries, to carry out a policy that the Administration was legally able, but unwilling to carry out itself. The green light decision allowed Iran to expand economic and diplomatic relations in a volatile and unstable part of the world and, worse, to establish programs of military, security, and intelligence assistance and cooperation of unprecedented scope in Europe. This decision was made despite the US's firmly entrenched policy of isolating and containing Iran. The threat from Iran has been as clear as has been the US policy response to the threat, at least prior to the Administration's green light policy. For this reason the green light is not only an inexplicable reversal of long-standing US policy, it is a case of appallingly bad judgment in which US national interests were sacrificed out of the Administration's policy-based objections to unilateral actions by the US to protect American interests.


In later chapters, we will demonstrate how such an indefensible decision was made and the effect it has had in radicalizing certain elements in Bosnia, as well as buying Iran influence in the region. In this chapter, we will simply establish the fact that, in its public pronouncements, the Administration has advocated an Iranian policy that is totally incompatible with its actions in Croatia and Bosnia.

Recognizing the Problem: Iran



The Clinton Administration deserves credit for its public statements recognizing Iran's preeminent role as a state sponsor of terrorism. According to the annual State Department report on international terrorism issued on April 1996, (92) Iran is "the premier state sponsor of international terrorism and is deeply involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts both by its own agents and by surrogate groups." The report goes on to note that Iran continues "to view the United States as its principal foreign adversary, supporting groups such as Hizballah that pose a threat to US citizens. Because of Tehran's and Hizballah's deep antipathy towards the United States, US missions and personnel abroad continue to be at risk." (93) Two years earlier, the annual report reached much the same conclusion:


- Iran again was the most active state sponsor of terrorism and was implicated in terrorist attacks in Italy, Turkey and Pakistan. Its intelligence services support terrorist acts -- either directly or through extremists groups ... Iran still surveys US missions and personnel. Tehran's policymakers view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish their political objectives, and acts of terrorism are approved at the highest levels of the Iranian government. (94)


In this document, which, ironically, was published the very month of the Administration's green light decision, the Administration provided information that would lead one to believe the Administration would be making efforts to crack down on Iran's involvement in Bosnia and Croatia rather than "wink and nod" at it:


Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic warned in June 1993 that Bosnians living in Europe were likely to resort to terrorism if the West did not come to Bosnia's aid, and outside terrorist groups are reported providing support to the Bosnian Muslims. In August, Croatian authorities confiscated weapons, explosives and false documents from a "terrorist" network that had been aiding Bosnia. Hizballah and Iran have provided training to the Bosnian Muslim army. (95)


Section III of this report further documents the extensive information available to the Administration on Iran and its surrogates' activities in the former Yugoslavia prior to the green light as well as after.

The Policy Response to the Iranian Threat



Not only has the Clinton Administration been clear in acknowledging Iran's threat to US national interests and world stability, the Administration has also been consistent (other than in the former Yugoslavia) in articulating and adhering to a policy that was meant to isolate Iran politically, economically, and militarily. Such isolation, it was hoped, would lead to the regime's moderation. (96)


Secretary Christopher encapsulated the Iran policy and its rationale in May 1994 in a speech before the American Jewish Committee Conference:


Well, Iran is an outlaw country in my judgment and deserves to be treated with containment and isolation. It is not only their weapons of mass destruction program that concerns us, but their resort to terrorism around the world. Their ugly hand can be seen not only in the Middle East but in Africa and some places in Europe. Their determined opposition to the peace process in the Middle East is only one of the reasons why I think that they do not deserve the approbation of the international community.


We cannot expect to end all trade with them, but I think what we can urge our allies is to not give them concessions and not welcome them into the family of nations and accord the advantages of that kind of status. The United States will be working hard in this vein, feeling it's necessary to try to isolate them, to try to contain them until there is a change in their attitudes toward their neighbors and towards the rest of the world.


... Iran is a country that I think deserves our very close watching, and until they make a major change in their policy, I think the United States' present policy of isolation and containment is the correct one. (97)


More than just keeping up the rhetorical drum-beat of calls to isolate Iran, the President has also taken action to further that objective and increase the pressure on its leadership to moderate its many objectionable policies. In May 1995 the President signed an executive order banning, in effect, all US trade and investment in Iran. (98) In August 1996, the President signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, (99) a bill that had passed the House without a single dissenting vote, imposing sanctions on foreign companies exporting petroleum-related technology to Iran. In regard to this bill, the President said, "You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night. That is wrong. I hope and expect that before long, our allies will come around to accepting this fundamental truth." (100) As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has noted, those countries that believe positive inducements will work with Iran are wrong and improvement in relations must come about only as a reward for Iran's moderating its objectionable behavior. "The most effective message is a consistent one: no normal relations until these objectionable actions end." (101)


The Administration turned its back on this established principle of American foreign policy in making the green light decision. Instead of "isolating" and "containing" Iran, as Secretary Christopher had promised, the Administration's policy in the Balkans was "at the highest level we do not wish to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and the Croatians." (102) In allowing Iranian arms transfers to Bosnia, the Administration essentially forced the Bosnians into a position of dependence on, and subservience to, Iran. This would soon come back to hurt the Administration.

SECTION TWO:


THE INVESTIGATION AND ITS FINDINGS


CHAPTER 5


CONDUCT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION


Testimony



The Select Subcommittee sought to take depositions from all significant participants in the events under investigation. In some instances, interviews, rather than depositions, were conducted by special investigators, who were detailed as a joint resource to the Subcommittee staff. (103) Both the majority and minority staff were represented at every deposition and interview. The deposition testimony was transcribed by a certified court reporter who is provided by the Office of Official Reporters to Committees of the House of Representatives. Depositions were conducted under oath in a question and answer format. Interviews were conducted by the Select Subcommittee staff and by the special investigators. Interview witnesses were not put under oath.


The Select Subcommittee took the depositions of 27 witnesses and interviewed approximately 55 others.


The following individuals (listed in alphabetical order) appeared for depositions: Janet S. Andres - former Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence; Reginald Bartholomew - former Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia; General Wesley Clark - former Director of Strategic Plans & Policy (J-5) on the Joint Staff; Thomas Donilon - Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State; Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith - Ambassador to Croatia; Colonel Richard C. Herrick - Defense & Army Attache, Embassy Zagreb; Ambassador Richard Holbrooke - former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; Richard A. Holtzapple - former Political Officer/Second Secretary, Embassy Zagreb; Susan C. Hovanec - former Public Affairs Officer, Embassy Zagreb; Ambassador Robert Hunter - Permanent US Representative to the North Atlantic Council; Ambassador Victor L. Jackovich - former Ambassador to Bosnia; (classified data deleted) Douglas MacEachin - former Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Thomas D. Mittnacht - former Economic/Commercial Officer, Embassy Zagreb; Ronald J. Neitzke - former Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy Zagreb; Rudolf V. Perina - Chief of Mission, Embassy Belgrade; Charles E. Redman - former Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia; Lt. Colonel Robert J. Sadler - Defense Attache, Embassy Zagreb; (classified data deleted) Lt. Colonel John E. Sray - former G- 2 Intelligence Chief for Bosnia/Herzegovina Command, UNPROFOR; Charlotte Stottman - former secretary to Ambassador Galbraith; Strobe Talbott - Deputy Secretary of State; Peter Tarnoff - Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; (classified data deleted) Alexander R. Vershbow - former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; James Woolsey - former Director of the CIA; Kathryn Zabetakis - former Secretary to Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke.


The Select Subcommitte staff, including staff investigators, also conducted interviews, not taken under oath, of the following individuals: Mark E. Anderson; Terri Lee Baker; Richard C. Barkley; Frederick Baron; Maria Barton; Samuel "Sandy" Berger; Robert L. Burkhart; Ambassador Lawrence Butler (telephonically); Robert Caudle; Peter Comfort; Robert Davis; former Senator Dennis DeConcini; Dushka Djuric; Robert P. Finn; former Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley; Philip S. Goldberg; Jane Green; Anthony G. Harrington; Christopher R. Hill; Christopher J. Hoh; Swanee Hunt; Stephen H. Klemp; National Security Advisor Anthony Lake; former Republican Leader of the House of Representatives Robert Michel; John Monjo; Imam Sevko Omerbasic; Ronna Pazdral; Shane Pitzer; Susan Ray; John Rizzo; William G. Root; James W. Swigert; Mildred Tangney; Alexander "Sandy" Vershbow; Paul Vogel; Ambassador Jenonne Walker; Thomas G. Weston; Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.; and John S. Wolf.


Briefings of Subcommittee staff and special investigators at CIA Headquarters were given by the following CIA analysts of the Directorate of Intelligence. (classified data deleted)


Under advisement of their agency of for other reasons, several of the above individuals declined to testify under oath. The National Security Council (NSC) declined to have its employees testify under oath, including. National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake and his deputy Samuel "Sandy" Berger. Chairman of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, Anthony Harrington, at the instruction of the White House Counsel, also declined to testify under oath. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Leon Feurth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, all declined to sit for a staff deposition.


In addition, the Select Subcommittee acquired copies of relevant testimony given by several individuals in closed hearings conducted by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). HPSCI was most generous in sharing these and other resources for review by the Select Subcommittee. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) also provided the Select Subcommittee access to transcripts of its relevant closed hearings. In addition, SSCI offered the services of their special investigators who shared their research and information they obtained during their investigation of this issue.

Acquisition of Classified and Non-Classified Federal Government Documents



Throughout the Subcommittee's investigation, documents were obtained from several Federal agencies. Documents were processed, each identified with a bate stamp number and stored in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).


The Select Subcommittee sought relevant documents from numerous federal agencies. These agencies included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), the US Information Agency (USIA), and the Department of State (DOS). The Select Subcommittee initially submitted written requests to Federal agencies based on information available in the public record. The agencies identified responsive documents and, with some exceptions, made them available for review. Security arrangements were made for the review of classified documents, in accordance with proper security procedures. The Conference Room, within the Select Subcommittee offices, was examined for surveillance devices whenever deposition testimony was given or classified documents reviewed.


Some agencies permitted the Select Subcommittee to retain copies of pertinent documents, and others provided documents which were to be returned following this investigation. Review of highly classified documents was conducted in a secure facility at the various agencies, and only notes were permitted to be removed by the staff.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)



Two staff members from both the Majority and Minority staff were given unrestricted access at CIA headquarters, to a wide variety of requested materials, including over a 1,000 documents and cables related to our inquiry. The Select Subcommittee, also received over 1,000 pages of CIA finished intelligence products for review at the Subcommittee.

Department of Defense (DOD)



Both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) offered their cooperation in providing the Select Subcommittee with documents relating to the Balkans crisis. Several hundred NSA documents were reviewed by staff at NSA headquarters, and approximately 150 pages of materials were made available for review at the Select Subcommittee offices. DIA also compiled several hundred documents for review at DIA headquarters and provided approximately 250 for use at the Select Subcommittee.

National Security Council (NSC)



The National Security Council (NSC) provided fewer than 30 documents for use at the Select Subcommittee. The staff was briefed on an additional 52 documents at the NSC. In addition, the Subcommittee was provided with a Bosnian Document List, however, no actual documents were attached.

White House - Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)



The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) provided the Select Subcommittee with a list of individuals it reviewed in the course of its own investigation. (104)

United States Information Agency (USIA)



The United States Information Agency (USIA) provided the Select Subcommittee with copies of official calendars kept by Susan Hovanec, the Public Affairs Officer at the US Embassy in Zagreb, for 1994 and 1995. These calendars documented dates of important meetings between Hovanec and officials in the region, relevant to our investigation.

CHAPTER 6


ADMINISTRATION RECORD OF COOPERATION


WITH THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE



During the first days of it's existence and throughout the investigation, the Select Subcommittee continuously sought the cooperation of various federal government agencies. In an effort to obtain all classified and unclassified information related to the United States role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, the Subcommittee requested the assistance of the White House, National Security Council, Intelligence Oversight Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The rate and scope of administration cooperation, however, varied from full compliance from some agencies to almost complete non-compliance from others.


In April 1996, before the establishment of the Select Subcommittee, document requests relating to the Iranian "green light" policy had already been submitted to the Administration. Chairman Arlen Specter and Vice Chairman Robert Kerrey of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence contacted the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, the National Security Council, and the Department of State requesting "any unpublished material bearing on this subject, such as cables, electronic correspondence, internal memoranda, minutes of meetings, letters, and memoranda to other agencies or talking points for briefings." (105) Additionally, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested the President turn over "... all documents related to the role that your Administration may have played in proposing, organizing, assisting, consulting, arranging, or agreeing to the transfer of arms by any government or private organization into the former Yugoslavia during the period in which the United Nations arms embargo was in effect." (106) Chairman Benjamin Gilman of the House International Relations


Committee, and Chairman Floyd Spence of the House Committee on National Security also submitted requests at this time, for similar information. (107)


President Clinton on May 15, 1996, insisted that the Administration would cooperate with Congress:


I have asked the relevant agencies . . . to work with you to ensure that the Committee obtains the information it needs on this matter.


I welcome this opportunity to present the policy my Administration has pursued to help bring peace to Bosnia. Let me assure you that my Administration will cooperate fully with the Committee and with other Congressional bodies in their examination of this matter. (108)


Because Congressional requests were made, and because the President directed his agencies to meet these requests, it is presumed that the Administration would have compiled all information relevant to the Iranian arms issue. When the Select Subcommittee later requested this information, however, the Administration needed until the end of September, five months after the original Congressional request, to gather all related materials. The Subcommittee notes, in particular, that the materials made available on September 27 by the Department of State were important documents, critical to the investigation of the US role in Iranian arms transfers. The Department was aware that it was providing access to documents only a week before the Subcommittee planned to finalize its report.

Agency Compliance


Central Intelligence Agency



The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the most cooperative and willing of the Administration agencies in their efforts to provide the Select Subcommittee with requested documents and other related material. Within days of the Subcommittee's inception, thousands of pages of cable traffic were made available at the CIA headquarters for review by a limited number of Select Subcommittee staff. The CIA also accommodated the Subcommittee in making their staff, including former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey, available for depositions and interviews, as requested.


In addition, the Agency also played a pivotal role in expediting the security clearance process for Select Subcommittee staff, which enabled the Subcommittee to complete its investigation during its six-month charter.

Department of Defense



The Department of Defense (DOD) was generally helpful in the production of requested documents. It was consistently effective in making Defense personnel available for depositions, as requested. The only exception to this remains an outstanding request for Secretary William Perry's appearance to provide information to the Select Subcommittee.


In addition, the Defense Department's Investigative Service and Security Directorate understood the Subcommittee's critical and immediate need to obtain security clearances, and were instrumental in expediting the processing of background investigations of the Subcommittee staff.

Federal Bureau of Investigation



On May 13, 1996, Chairman Hyde requested special agents be detailed from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the Select Subcommittee to assist with its investigation of the US role in Iranian arms transfers. (109) The "October Surprise Task Force", in 1992, employed the services of seven agents detailed from three federal government investigative agencies, while the Select Subcommittee requested only three agents from the FBI. Additionally, unlike "October Surprise", the Select Subcommittee paid the salary and benefits of these agents, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation.


The Subcommittee worked jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI to make the appropriate arrangements to secure their assistance. (110) Both agencies were reluctant at first to provide investigators to the Sub committee. Part of the FBI's hesitancy could rightfully be attributed to the political fervor, at the time of the Subcommittee's request, surrounding the White House/FBI "Filegate" affair. (111) Nonetheless, on July 23, 1996, the Deputy Attorney General, Jamie Gorelick, approved the detailing of three FBI agents to work as shared resources between the Majority and Minority staffs of the Select Subcommittee.


In an effort to ensure that the inquiry would be conducted in a bipartisan manner, Chief Counsel and Chief Minority Counsel agreed to a memorandum of understanding with respect to the utilization of the agents detailed to the Select Subcommittee. (112) The memorandum provided that the investigators assigned would be a joint resource between the Majority and the Minority staffs. It was also agreed that, upon conducting an interview, the investigators would provide an interview report to both the Majority and Minority staffs.

Department of Justice



In addition to the Department of Justice's assistance in obtaining FBI agents for the Select Subcommittee, DOJ personnel were also helpful in securing space for depositions. The Office of Legislative Affairs, in particular, Alan Hoffman, was able to arrange secured areas to conduct depositions of Ambassadors Charles Redman and Richard Holbrooke in Chicago and New York, respectively. Likewise, the US Attorney's office was most accommodating in these requests. (113)

Department of State



The Department of State (DOS) was generally slow to respond to the Select Subcommittee's document requests and reluctant to facilitate requested depositions and interviews. At the outset of the Subcommittee's investigation, the Department stated that it "remains committed to cooperating fully with the Select Subcommittee, with a view toward concluding this inquiry promptly." (114) The State Department's actual performance fell well short of its assurances. Only days prior to the Subcommittee's drafting deadline and after the Subcommittee had met with all witnesses, did the Department of State provide important documents which were requested within the first month of the Subcommittee's existence.


The Select Subcommittee, on July 26, 1996, made an initial request to the Department of State for Ambassador Galbraith's compilation of memos which he maintained in his office in Zagreb as his "record" of the issues and events that he encountered as US Ambassador to Croatia. Also requested were the Ambassador's calendars, phone records, and travel vouchers. The Department at first characterized the record as being Ambassador Galbraith's personal document despite it having been typed by a government secretary, on a government computer, on government time. (115)


On August 22, 1996, the State Department made available only selected (by State Department officials) portions of the record. Even then, the Subcommittee was not given copies of these materials, as requested, but rather was only allowed to review selected portions at the State Department, where no photocopying or verbatim note taking was permitted. (116) Not until September 18, 1996, were Chairman Hyde and Mr. Hamilton advised that Ambassador Galbraith's "record" would be made available, in its entirety, at the State Department. It was made available for review, however, solely to the chief counsels who could not remove any notes from the Department, nor discuss the contents of the over 150 page document with anyone other than Chairman Hyde and Mr. Hamilton. (117)


Based on testimony received by various witnesses, the Select Subcommittee, on August 14, 1996, requested access to additional documents during staff travel to Embassy Zagreb. The requested documents included the chronological cable file of all cables sent to the State Department by Embassy Zagreb, as well as notes taken by Political Officer Richard Holtzapple during Galbraith's meetings. To alleviate costs and the burdens of production upon the State Department, Select Subcommittee staff offered to review the previously requested phone records and travel voucher information while at Embassy Zagreb, and to simply make copies of only those portions the Subcommittee staff determined to be relevant to their inquiry. This offer would have saved the Department from making photocopies of the entire set of documents, and shipping those same items to the Select Subcommittee offices. (118) Upon arrival in Zagreb, however, the Subcommittee staff was not permitted to view any documents and were told that it would be provided access to them only in Washington. Some of the documents were finally provided on September 18, 1996. (119)


As part of the staff delegation's inquiries, the Select Subcommittee asked the State Department to request, on its behalf, meetings with specified Croatian and Bosnian government officials and community leaders to discuss their knowledge of the United States' role in Iranian arms transfers. (120) Due to the late notice from the State Department, Embassy Zagreb was only able to arrange one meeting. One hour prior to the staff's departure, the Subcommittee staff met with Croatian Muslim cleric Imam Sevko Omerbasic. Despite a renewed request, (121) the State Department has never shared a copy of a diplomatic note or other Departmental correspondence showing Department efforts to arrange the requested meetings with foreign officials.


Subsequent document requests, made in early and mid-August, were also not responded to until September, including requests to turn over the approximately 30 spiral notebooks that former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Alexander Vershbow kept during his tenure with the State Department. The morning of Vershbow's deposition, the Select Subcommittee staff was informed that Vershbow made available some of his handwritten notes, which were taken contemporaneously with events being investigated by the Subcommittee. That same day, Chairman Hyde submitted a document request to the State Department requesting production of all of Vershbow's notes, not just those the State Department decided the Subcommittee should review. (122) More than one month later, the State Department provided only portions of the materials to Hyde and Hamilton, and even fewer sections for review by